The Earliest “Great Wall”? The Long Wall of Qi Revisited

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This article explores textual, paleographic, and archeological evidence for the “Long Wall” of Qi, arguably one of the earliest long walls erected on Chinese soil. It analyzes the possible dates of the Wall’s constructions, its route, its defensive role, and its relation to military, political, economic, and administrative developments of the Warring States period (453–221 BCE). I argue that the Long Wall played a significant role in Qi’s military strategy in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, bolstering its defensive capabilities. In the long term, however, the Wall might have inadvertently hindered Qi’s southward expansion, placing it in a disadvantageous position versus its rivals.

The Great Wall is arguably the most famous human building worldwide, and is also the most famous symbol of China. Erection of long walls was not exceptional to China, of course: Hadrian’s Wall in Britain or the less famous Sasanian Great Wall of Gorgan immediately come to mind. Yet nowhere can long walls be compared to those in China in terms either of their combined length, or of investment of human and material resources, or of their symbolic value, or of their historical persistence. Recall that in China long walls were constructed for more than twenty centuries, counting from the Warring States period (Zhanguo 战国, 453–221 BCE) to the last decades of the Ming 明 dynasty (1368–1644), that their combined length well exceeds twenty thousand kilometers, and that they cross no less than fifteen provincial-level units of the People’s Republic of China. Add to this the much-debated symbolic value of the Great Wall: all this explains why China’s “Great Wall” (or, more accurately “long walls”) continue to fascinate scholars and laypersons alike. Yet

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2. The recently published archeological survey of the remnants of long walls from different periods includes all the provincial units of northern and central China, from Xinjiang to Shandong and from Heilongjiang to Henan (notably, Ming-period walls against the Miao tribesmen in Hunan and Guizhou were not included in the survey). See Guojia wenwuju 國家文物局, ed., Changcheng ziyuan diaocha gongzuo wenji 長城資源調查工作文集 (Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 2013). For an estimate of the combined length of the walls as being 21,196 km, see the announcement by China’s State Administration of Cultural Heritage from June 5, 2012, “Changcheng rending gongzuo wancheng” 長城認定工作完成, Zhongguo wenwu bao 中國文物報 2012.6.

3. I prefer to use “Great Wall” for the famous northern defensive line, especially when referring to its symbolic position; for other walls I use a more accurate translation of Chinese changcheng 長城, i.e., “long wall(s).”


despite the remarkable advancement of historical and archeological research, many questions remain unanswered. Among these, the issues related to the origins of the long wall tradition figure prominently. When and how did the idea of lengthy walls running for hundreds of kilometers come into existence? What prompted their erection? And what was their military and non-military impact?

In what follows I want to tackle some of these questions by focusing on a single case of an early long wall: that of the state of Qi 齊. My selection of Qi as the major case study is not fortuitous. Newly unearthed paleographic materials provide precious evidence about the origins of the Qi Long Wall, and this wall is also among the best studied archeologically. These new data can be synthesized with the scattered—and often confusing—evidence in the received texts to provide new crucial clues as to the origins and functions of early long walls. Even though some of the new data add to confusion rather than provide neat solutions to every question, the cumulative information attained from textual, paleographic, and material sources advances our knowledge considerably.

I shall start my discussion with a brief survey of textual information about the erection of the Long Wall of Qi, then introduce the new paleographic evidence and utilize it and the archeological data to clarify issues of the Wall’s origins and of its route. From there I shall proceed to a broader analysis of the Long Wall of Qi in the context of the military, economic, and administrative history of the state of Qi and, more generally, of the Warring States-period Chinese world. Finally, in the epilogue I shall briefly compare the Long Wall of Qi and that of Chu 楚, which rivals the Qi Wall as a candidate to be the earliest long wall on Chinese soil.

THE LONG WALL OF QI: TEXTUAL SOURCES

The Warring States-period texts contain several references to the Long Wall of Qi. The *Stratagems of the Warring States* (Zhanguo ce 戰國策) twice cite an almost identical depiction of Qi’s advantageous topography: “the clean Ji and muddy [Yellow] River suffice to serve as an impediment; the great barrier of the Long Wall suffices to serve as a fortification” 齊之清濟濁河，足以為限；長城巨防，足以為塞.5 Putting aside the thorny question of these speeches’ historical reliability, we may observe that their geographical data should reflect the situation of Qi as viewed by late Warring States-period observers. Both speeches pair the major rivers that protected Qi from the west and northwest (the Yellow and the Ji 濟 River), with the “great barrier of the Long Wall,” presumably the southern boundary of Qi. Evidently, the Long Wall was considered as potent a hurdle against potential invaders as the two major water arteries.

We shall return later to the issue of the Long Wall’s military value; but first, let us ask: when was it first erected? Here the received texts produce a confusing picture. The earliest

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5. See *Zhanguo ce zhushi戰國策注釋*, annot. He Jianzhang 何建章 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1991, hereafter *Zhanguo ce*), 3.5.89 ("Qin ce" 秦策 1) (restoring the sentence on the basis of He’s glosses); ibid., 29.8.1099 ("Yan ce" 燕策 1); the first of the cited speeches is recorded also in the *Han Feizi*, where it is attributed to Han Fei 韓非 (d. 233 BCE); see *Han Feizi jijie韓非子集解*, comp. Wang Xianshen 王先慎 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1998), I.1.4 ("Chu xian Qin" 初見秦). Judging from the historical information contained in that speech, its attribution to Han Fei is more plausible than the *Stratagems’* attribution to Zhang Yi 張儀 (d. 309 BCE).
possible date of the Qi Wall construction is presumed to be during the reign of Lord Huan of Qi (齊桓公, r. 685–643 BCE), since the existence of the Wall between Qi and Lu is mentioned in the “Qing zhong D” 輕重丁 chapter of the Guanzi, a text attributed to Lord Huan’s advisor, Guan Zhong 管仲 (d. 645 BCE). Yet a few Shandong-based scholars, who want to ensure Qi’s priority as the first builder of a Long Wall in Chinese (or global) history, accept this as a proof of the wall’s precedence. However, as many critical scholars have noticed, there is a broad agreement that Guanzi in general, and its “Qing zhong” chapters in particular, could not have been composed before the Warring States period (if not later). Like many other chapters of Guanzi, these chapters reflect a Warring States-period situation imposed backwards on Lord Huan and Guan Zhong’s times without much consideration of historical veracity. Consequently, the Guanzi evidence can be dismissed.

Another contested piece of evidence is the Zuo zhuan 左傳 record of the Jin 晉 invasion of Qi in 555 BCE. The relevant passage is translated and analyzed below; here suffice it to say that it mentions a battle at a Qi fortification which was stormed by Jin and its allies. This fortification is identified in the Annotated Canon of Waterways (Shuijing zhu 水經注) as referring to the Qi Long Wall. For not a few scholars this appears to be the earliest firm evidence for the existence of Qi’s Long Wall. The proponents of this view do not explain, however, why the term “long wall” never appears in Zuo zhuan, which actually never refers to other fortifications along the Qi-Lu border.

Two other pieces of evidence place the construction of the Qi Wall in a decidedly later period. The Annotated Canon of Waterways cites an entry from the Wei 魏 chronicle, the Bamboo Annals (Zhushu jinian 竹書紀年), according to which the Long Wall of Qi was erected in the twentieth year of King Hui of Wei (魏惠王, r. 369–319 BCE), i.e., in 350 BCE. Confusingly, however, the next phrase in the Annotated Canon of Waterways refers to another entry from the Bamboo Annals, which mentions the penetration of the Long Wall of Qi by the invading Jin armies in the twelfth year of Lord Lie of Jin 晉烈公 (r. ca. 416–389), i.e., in 404 BCE. To aggravate the confusion, a seventh-century CE gloss to the Records of the Historian (Shiji 史記) quotes a lost text, Qi Records (Qi ji 齊記), which attributes the construction of the Long

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7. See, e.g., Guo Guanghong 國光紅, “Qi changcheng zhaojian yu jianzhi niandai” 齊長城肇建原因及建置年代 稱光紅 (Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe, 1999), 8.735.

8. For a sound refutation, see, e.g., Zhang Weihua 張維華, Zhongguo changcheng jianzhi kao (shang pian) 中國長城建置考 (上編) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1979), 15–16.


10. For a representative view (which hints also at the possibility that a Guanzi entry may be correct), see Wang Yongbo 王永波 and Wang Yunpeng 王雲鵬, “Qi changcheng de renzi xing buju yu jianzhi niandai” 齊長城的建置原因及建置年代, Guanzi xuekan 管子學刊 2013.2: 33–39, 64; see also He Deliang 何德亮, “Zhongguo lishi zhi gong changcheng Qiqi changcheng” 中國歷史上的古城長城：齊長城, Zhongyuan wenwu 中原文物 2009.2: 64–70.

11. See Shuijing zhu 26.2258. The Bamboo Annals entry concerning the construction of the Long Wall of Qi in 350 BCE is repeated in a note to the Records of the Historian (Shiji [Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1997], 69.2268n6). Adding to the confusion, this latter citation attributes the construction of the Long Wall to King Min of Qi (齊閔王, r. 300–284 BCE), certainly a mistake by the later editors or transmitters of the Bamboo Annals (for the complex history of which, see Edward L. Shaughnessy, Rewriting Early Chinese Texts [Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 2006], 131–256).
Wall to King Xuan of Qi 齊宣王 (r. 319–300 BCE). Thus we have two pieces of evidence that date the Wall to post-350 BCE, which are contradicted by several other references, including one in the Bamboo Annals entry cited above, another in the Records of the Historian, and yet another in Lüshi chunqiu 呂氏春秋, which mention penetrations of the Long Wall of Qi by its enemies in the late fifth century BCE and again in 368 BCE.12

How to reconcile these confusing references? An elegant solution was proposed by Zhang Weihua 張維華, who prepared the most systematic survey of textual references to the Qi Wall. Zhang averred that different sections of the Long Wall were constructed in different periods: first came the western section near Mt. Tai (Taishan 泰山) and the Ji River, where fortifications were erected already in the sixth century BCE, then the eastern section near the sea, and finally the central section after the conclusion of which the single Long Wall stretching from the Ji River to the Eastern Sea was finalized (see Map 1).13 As we shall see below, this suggestion is not entirely accurate: new paleographic evidence, unknown to Zhang Weihua, suggests that the Wall was constructed in its entirety as a single project. Yet Zhang’s views surely have their strong points: it is quite possible that various entries in the Bamboo Annals refer to repeated reconstructions, renovations, or alterations of the Long Wall’s course, even if not necessarily to its piecemeal construction. I shall revisit some of Zhang’s suggestions later, but first let us turn to the new evidence.

### PALEOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE: XINIAN AND THE PIAOQIANG BELLS

In 2008, Qinghua (Tsinghua) University announced the acquisition of a large number of bamboo slips allegedly looted from a Chu tomb in Hubei or Hunan, then smuggled to Hong Kong and acquired there.14 The publication of these slips is still ongoing (as of 2018). For the purpose of the current discussion, the most significant part of the collection is a historical text named by the editors Xinian 繫年. This is by far the largest and best preserved historical text from among the so far discovered and published pre- and early imperial manuscripts.15 The text in twenty-three sections (zhang 章) covers the history of the Zhou 周 world from the founding of the Zhou dynasty in ca. 1046 BCE to the early years of the fourth century BCE. It focuses on fluctuations of inter-state relations during these centuries, specifically wars and alliances of the state of Chu and of its major rival, the state of Jin. Judging from its content, Xinian was in all likelihood produced in the state of Chu, ca. 380–370 BCE. Since I have discussed Xinian, its nature, dating, and authenticity elsewhere,16 I shall focus here only on the topics relevant to the Long Wall of Qi.

The four last sections of Xinian (#20–23) are highly precious for historians of pre-imperial China. These sections cover the period of ca. 450–395 BCE, which falls in between the

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12. See Lüshi chunqiu jiaoshi 呂氏春秋校釋, comp. and annot. Chen Qiyou 陳奇猷 (Shanghai: Xuelin, 1990), 15.3.880 (“Xia xian” 下賢); Shiji 43.1799.
15. The single comparable discovery of a previously unknown historical text is that of the Bamboo Annals, looted in 280 CE from the tomb of King Xiang of Wei 魏襄王 (r. 318–296 BCE). Most recently (2017), the Anhui University purchased another bundle of smuggled bamboo slips on the Hong Kong antiquity market. Among other manuscripts, these slips reportedly comprise a lengthy Chu historical text. For a preliminary announcement, see Huang Dekuan 黃德寬, “Anhui daxue cang Zhanguo zhujian gaishu” 安徽大學藏戰國竹簡概述, Wenwu 文物 2017.9: 54–59.
Zuo zhuan and Guoyu 國語 narrative on the one hand and the bulk of the Warring States-period sources on the other. The text narrates in relative detail the ongoing struggle between two competing coalitions: the Jin and its southeastern ally, Yue 越, fighting against the loose alliance between Chu and Qi. Initially Jin was allied with Yue’s predecessor as the major southeastern power, the state of Wu 吳; once Wu was destroyed by Yue in 473 BCE, Yue inherited Wu’s position as Jin’s major ally in struggles against Chu and Qi. I shall start the story with the formation of the Jin-Yue axis. The text tells:

晉敬公立十又一年,趙桓子會 [諸] 侯之大夫,以與越令尹宋盟于【 111 】龔, 18 遂以伐齊。齊人焉始為長城於濟, 自南山屬之北海。晉幽公立四年,趙狗率師與越【 112 】公朱句伐齊,晉師【 113 】長城句俞(瀆)=穀之門。越公、宋公敗齊師于襄平。

In the eleventh year of Lord Jing of Jin [r. 451–434, i.e., 441 BCE], Zhao Huanzi assembled the grandees of regional lords, making a covenant with lingyin Song of Yue at Gong; 19 thereupon

17. The character 諸 is missing.
20. Zhao Huanzi 趙桓子 is variously depicted as either brother or son of the de facto founder of the Zhao independent polity, Zhao Xiangzi 趙襄子. According to a convincing correction to the Shiji chronology proposed by Wang Zhengdong 王政冬, “You Qinghua jian Xiniian dingzheng Zhaoguo shixi” 由清華簡《繫年》訂正趙國世系 (2014) (http://www.gzw.fudan.edu.cn/Web/Show/2246, accessed Jan. 3, 2018), Zhao Huanzi headed the state
they invaded Qi. The people of Qi then for the first time erected the Long Wall at the Ji [River]; [the Wall] stretched from the Southern Mountain to the Northern Sea. In the fourth year of Lord You of Jin [r. 433–416, i.e., 430 BCE], Zhao Gou led the army, and, together with Lord Zhuju [r. ca. 447–411 BCE] of Yue, invaded Qi. The Jin army stormed the Long Wall at the Gu Gate. The lord of Yue and the lord of Song defeated the Qi army at Xiangping. Until now Jin and Yue maintain amicable relations.

This section offers several important points regarding the Long Wall of Qi. First, it was erected in 441 BCE following the combined assault by Jin and Yue, assisted by other allies, against Qi. Second, the Wall was evidently built in its entirety (from the Ji River to the sea) as a single project. Third, soon after its erection the Wall became an important barrier facing future invaders; hence during the 430 BCE assault on Qi the allies had already to storm the Long Wall at one of its gates. Fourth, the text does explain the route of the Wall as starting at the Southern Mountain, near the Ji River, and going all the way northward toward the “Northern Sea” (Bohai Gulf). In the next section I shall discuss this geographical information in greater detail; here suffice it to mention that this route of the Wall is at odds with the entirety of other references to its existence.

Xinian information appears to be more reliable by far than that found in other textual sources. First, because of its relative earliness. There is a broad scholarly agreement that Xinian was composed—judging from its content and, possibly, from its orthography as well—no later than ca. 370 BCE, i.e., relatively close to the time of the alleged Wall’s erection. Second, because of the nature of Xinian. As I have tried to demonstrate elsewhere, Xinian belongs to the so-called “informative history” genre, i.e., its goal is not to edify the reader but rather provide him with a working knowledge of major shifts in inter-state relations during the period under discussion. While the text does at time skew its accounts of Chu history, especially with regard to its domestic affairs, the information it provides about other states is generally accurate, and, judging from comparisons with Zuo zhuan and other sources, is overall reliable.

of Zhao in 442–424 BCE. Alternatively, Liu Guang 劉光 (“Qinghua jian Xinian di ershi zhang suo jian Jin Zhao jinian xin shi” 清華簡《繫年》第二十章所見晉、趙紀年新識, Chutu wenxian 出土文獻 2017.11: 177–83) suggests that Zhao Huanzi was an usurper who seized power from his nephew in 441 BCE but died a year later. Nothing is known of Yue’s prime minister (lingyin) Song, nor is the location of Gong identifiable.

21. Zhao Gou was a Jin military commander, mentioned under the posthumous name Muzi of Xinzhi 新稚穆子 in Guoyu (“Jin yu” 晉語); see Guoyu jijie, comp. Xu Yuangao 徐元誥 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2002), 15.18.453. Lord Zhuju of Yue is King Zhuju (r. 447–411 BCE); inexplicably, Yue rulers after King Goujian 越王句踐 (r. 496–464 BCE) are invariably referred to in Xinian as “lords” or “dukes” (gong 公) and not as “kings” (wang 王).

22. The text editors proposed reading 句俞 as 句瀆, which, following numerous parallels in Chunqiu and Zuo zhuang, can stand for a single character, Gu穀. See Qinghua 2, 188n6, and more detailed discussions in Xiaohu 小狐, “Du Xinian yizha” 读《繫年》臆札, (http://www.gwz.fudan.edu.cn/Web/Show/1766, accessed Jan. 3, 2018); Su Jianzhou, Qinghua er et, 784–85; Ma Nan 馬楠, Qinghua jian Xinian jizheng 清華簡《繫年》輯證 (Shanghai: Zhongxi shudian, 2015), 447–48. Gu was a major fortress, contested by Qi and Lu, near the Ji River and to the south of the westernmost point of the Long Wall (see Map 1); the Gu Gate should be located in the western section of the Wall.

23. Xiangping was tentatively identified by Chen Jie 陳絜 as another location in the Taishan mountain range, i.e., along the western route of the Long Wall of Qi. See Chen Jie, “Qinghua jian Xinian di ershi zhang diming buzheng” 清華簡《繫年》第二十章地名辨正, in Qinghua jian Xinian et gushi xintan 清華簡《繫年》與古史新探, ed. Li Shoukui 李守奎 (Shanghai: Zhongxi shuju, 2016), 112–14.

24. All these points are based on Pines, “Zhou History and Historiography.” For the study of the text’s orthography as possibly indicating its early fourth century BCE composition, see Guo Yongbing 郭永秉, “Qinghua jian Xinian chaoxie shidai zhi guce: Jian cong wenzi xingti jiaodu kan Zhanguo Chu wenzi quyuxing tezheng xingcheng 清華簡《繫年》朝代之古性：從文字形態角度觀察戰國楚文字形態特徵” (2015).
tion of the Xinian authors. Actually, another section of Xinian (#22) provides a clue to the importance of that Wall shortly after its erection:

楚聲桓王即位，元年，晉公止會諸侯於任，宋悼公將會晉公，卒于鼬。韓虔、趙籍、魏【119】擊率師與越公伐齊，齊與越成，以建陽、陵陵之田，且男女服。越公與齊侯【120】盟於魯稷門之外。越公入饗於魯，魯侯御，齊侯參乘以入。晉魏文侯斯從晉師，晉師大敗【121】齊師，齊師北，晉師逐之，入至汧（峴？）水，齊人且有陳子牛之禍，齊與晉成，齊侯【122】盟於晉軍。晉三子之大夫入齊，盟陳和與陳淏於溇（雍？）門之外，曰：“毋修長城，毋伐廩【123】丘。”晉公獻齊俘馘於周王，遂以齊侯貸、魯侯羴（顯）、宋公田、衛侯虔、鄭伯駘朝【124】周王于周。【125】

26. The reigning dates of King Sheng of Chu follow the amendment made by Su Jianzhou (*Qinghua er*, 833–38). Zhi is Lord Lie of Jin. Ren is identified by Xiaohu, “Du Xinian yizha,” as a location between Song and Lu.
27. Han Qian is Marquis Jing of Han 韓景侯 (r. 408–400 BCE); Zhao Ji is Marquis Lie of Zhao 趙烈侯 (r. 408–387 BCE); Wei Ji is Marquis Wu of Wei 魏武侯 (r. 395–370 BCE), who acted back then on behalf of his father, Marquis Wen of Wei 魏文侯 (r. 445–370 BCE). Lord Yi of Yue is King Yi of Yue (越王翳, r. ca. 410–375 BCE).
28. Marquis of Qi, Dai, is Lord Kang 齊康公 (r. 404–379 BCE), the last ruler of the Jiang 姜 clan in Qi. Marquis of Lu, Yan, is Lord Mu 魯穆公 (r. ca. 416–383 BCE). The Ji Gate was the southern gate of the Lu capital.
29. Note that an initial assault on Qi was led by Marquis Wen’s son, the future Marquis Wu of Wei; Marquis Wen joined the campaign only in its second stage.
30. Xiaohu (“Du Xinian yizha”) identifies Qian 章 as the Xian 峴 River, a location near the Muling Pass 穆陵關, the major southern gate into Qi, at the eastern section of Qi’s Long Wall (see Map 1).
31. The details of the “trouble” caused by Chen Jing (?) Ziniu are difficult to verify. They are probably connected to internal strife among the scions of the Chen (Tian) lineage, the de facto rulers of Qi. See more in Ma Weidong 馬衛東 and Wang Zhengdong 王政冬, “Qinghua jian Xinian San Jin fa Qi kao” 清華簡《繫年》三晉伐齊, http://www.gwz.fudan.edu.cn/Web/Show/1943 (accessed Jan. 3, 2018).
32. The Three Masters of Jin are the heads of the Wei, Han, and Zhao lineages. The covenant was made between their subordinates and the de facto (but still not de jure) leader of Qi, Chen He (Tian He 田和). This arrangement apparently reflected the fact that “the Three Masters” of Jin were already acting as heads of independent polities, whose ranks were superior to that of Chen He; by dispatching their subordinates they emphasized the lowly position of Chen He, who still acted on behalf of the puppet lord of Qi (*Qinghua 2*, 194n12).
33. Lingqi 廬丘 was a locus of contention between Qi and Jin; in 405 BCE (one year before the campaign depicted above) its governor, Gongsun Hui 公孫會, rebelled against the Chen/Tian lineage of Qi and surrendered his territory to the state of Zhao. See more details in Ma and Wang, “Qinghua jian Xinian.”
Marquis of Qi, Dai; the Marquis of Lu, Xian; the Duke of Song, Tian; the Marquis of Wei 衛, Qian; and the Earl of Zheng, Tai. 34

The first part of this narrative continues the story of section 20. In 404 BCE, the ongoing alliance between Jin (or, more accurately, the three ministerial polities of Jin—namely Wei 魏, Han 韓, and Zhao 趙—under the nominal aegis of Lord Lie of Jin) and Yue, augmented by Song 宋 and Lu 魯, inflicted a new defeat on the state of Qi. In the aftermath of this defeat, Qi made a separate peace with Yue and Lu, prompting a renewed Jin incursion led by the single most powerful leader of the Three Jin polities, Marquis Wen of Wei. This incursion, which—if the identification of the Xian River, i.e., the Muling Pass, is correct—included one more breach of the Long Wall far to the east from the regular routes of Jin invasions of Qi, resulted in another humiliating defeat of the Qi armies. The beleaguered Lord Kang of Qi 齊康公 (r. 404–379 BCE), the last ruler of the Jiang 姜 clan in Qi, made a covenant with the Jin invaders in their military camp. This was followed by a new covenant signed by the representatives of the Jin ministerial lineages and the de facto rulers of Qi from the Chen 陳 lineage. This new covenant signed at the gates of Qi’s capital contained a notable clause against repairing the Long Wall, which indicates the importance of the wall for Qi’s defenses. In the aftermath of Qi’s defeat, the victorious heads of Jin’s ministerial lineages (Wei, Han, and Zhao) presented the spoils of the victory to the Zhou Son of Heaven. In return, as we know from manifold other sources, King Weilie of Zhou 周威烈王 (r. 425–402 BCE) granted the Jin ministers the position of regional lords (諸侯), starting thereby the new era in Chinese history. 35

The publication of Xinian 聖簡 sheds new light on yet another piece of paleographic evidence related to the Long Wall of Qi, namely the account in the so-called Piaoqiang (or Biaoqiang) 簡姜 bells inscription. These bells were unearthed in 1928–1931 near Luoyang and dispersed among museums in Japan and Canada; their inscription aroused heated controversies with regard to both its content and its relation to the events depicted in transmitted textual sources. With the publication of Xinian, most of these controversies can be settled, as has been demonstrated in several studies. In what follows I adopt the reading of disputed characters and the interpretation of debatable place names in the study by Chen Minzhen 陳民鎮, who synthesized much of the previous research, augmenting it when needed with other publications. 36

34. These leaders are Lord Kang of Qi; Lord Mu of Lu (whose name was transcribed as Yan 衛 on slip 120); Lord Xiu of Song 宋休公 (r. ca. 403–385 BCE); the lord of Wei whose rule is not recorded in Records of the Historian (he was supposedly the father of Lord Shen of Wei 旆慎公; see details in Su Jianzhou et al., Qinghua er, 868–69); and Lord Xiu of Zheng 鄭繻公 (r. ca. 422–396 BCE). Referring to the rulers of non-Chu polities by their official rank in the Zhou ranking system (roughly equivalent to European Duke, Marquis, etc.) and their private name (rather than a usual posthumous name + Lord [gong 公]) is characteristic of several entries in the last two sections of Xinian, which may indicate a direct or indirect incorporation of Chu court chronicles. See more in You Rui 尤銳 (Yuri Pines), “Cong Xinian xuci de yongfa chongshen qi wenben kekaoxing: Jian chutan Xinian yu gushi xintan,” Xinian yu gushi xintan (2016), 226–28.

35. For the importance of this event in the history of the Warring States period, see Yang Kuan 楊寬, Zhanguo shi 戰國史 (rev. ed.) (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1998), 292–94. The enfeoffment of the Jin nobles by the Zhou king was interpreted by Sima Guang 司馬光 (1019–1086) as the end of the ritually mandated order of the Zhou era (see Zizhi tongjian 資治通鑑 [Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1992], 1.1–6).

PINES: The Earliest “Great Wall”? The Long Wall of Qi Revisited

In the twenty-second year, Piaoqiang became a deputy.\(^{37}\) His leader, the head of the Han lineage, Qian, led [an army]: we invaded Qin\(^{38}\) and pressed Qi. We penetrated the Long Wall, assembling first near Pingyin, militarily reaching Shi, and forcefully assaulting and seizing Chujing. [I] was rewarded by the head of the Han lineage, received the command of the lord of Jin, and was illuminated by the Son of Heaven. I have inscribed this to make this pattern illustrious. Let my blazing martiality and refinement not be forgotten forever.

The twenty-second year in the inscription refers to the reigning year of the Zhou King Weilie, which is 404 BCE, i.e., exactly the date of the Jin-Qi war narrated in Xinian 22. Piaoqiang acted as an assistant commander of Han Qian, the future Marquis Jing of Han, and judging from the place names mentioned on the bell he took part in the first assault on Qi, i.e., prior to the Qi-Yue truce. The penetration of the Long Wall occurred near Pingyin, the major stronghold of Qi between the Ji River and the Tai-Yi Mountain Range (see below); it was followed by assault on nearby locations of Shi and Chujing, which is identified by Chen Minzhen as related to Jingzi, another location in the vicinity of Pingyin (Map 1).\(^{39}\) If these locations are identified correctly, we may conclude that successful penetration of the Jin armies behind the Long Wall fortifications was sufficiently threatening to the state of Qi to incur its submission first to Yue and then to Jin.

The cumulative impact of the above evidence on our understanding of the history of Qi’s Long Wall is enormous. Not only does it show unequivocally that the Wall existed in the fifth century BCE, but it also provides the date of its initial construction (441 BCE) and furthermore suggests that from its inception the Wall became an important barrier facing invaders of Qi; hence each of the three texts surveyed in this section refers to the penetration of the Wall as the hallmark of the campaign’s success. Yet going back to Xinian 20, we should notice that it not only answers previous questions but also poses new ones, most specifically about the route of the Qi Wall. It is to this question I want to turn now.

THE ROUTE OF THE QI WALL

In distinction from heated debates about the dating of Qi’s Long Wall, its route until recently was entirely uncontroversial. The remnants of the Long Wall of Qi remained visible throughout history, as is reflected in numerous geographic accounts of Shandong,\(^{40}\) and

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\(^{37}\) Zhang Shuguo (“Piaoqiang”: 194–95) prefers to read the character 戰 as 戰 戰, implying that Piaoqiang became a military commander. Behr (A Source Book, 288) parses the sentences differently, reading: “Piao Qiang supported his lord, the lineage head of the Han, and stood by him in warfare.”

\(^{38}\) The background for this record is not clear. Xinian 23 does mention a war between Jin and Qin, but this war occurred in the fourth year of King Sheng of Chu, i.e., in 401 BCE, later than the events depicted in the Piaoqiang bells inscription. Some scholars identify Qin as a place name on the western side of the Ji River, but as Chen Minzhen correctly notices, the verb 征 normally refers to an invasion of a polity and not of a town.

\(^{39}\) It was common to consider both locations as situated to the south of Pingyin, i.e., to the south of the Long Wall. However, following the discovery of the Shi cemetery in the 1990s, it can be confirmed that the statelet of Shi was located to the north of the Long Wall, which was also the case for the (currently unidentifiable) Jingzi. See Ren Xianghong 任相宏, “Qi changcheng yuantou jianzhi kao” 齊長城源頭建置考, in Dongfang kaogu 東方考古, ed. Luan Fengshi 樂豐實 (Beijing: Kexue chubanshe, 2005), 1.270.

\(^{40}\) These accounts are conveniently summarized by Zhang Weihua, Zhongguo changcheng, 1–29.
some sections are still visible today. In 1996–1997 a group of five elderly Shandong scholars undertook a remarkable survey of the entire length of the wall, passing its route from the westernmost section near the ancient Ji River valley to the easternmost section, where the Wall enters the sea in Jiaozhou Bay, near modern Qingdao. Given the Wall’s cumulative length of over 600 km, a detailed archeological survey of its entire stretch is unfeasible; but many focused studies of its segments have been conducted by several archeological teams. Until very recently both textual and archeological materials unanimously pointed at the route of the Wall as outlined in Map 1. That is, the Wall started at the narrow pass between the Ji River and the Taishan Mountain massif, then ran along the Tai-Yi Mountain Range, and entered the sea in the Jiaozhou Bay.

The scholarly consensus was shattered by the publication of Xinian. The text in section 20 discussed above is unequivocal: “the people of Qi for the first time erected the Long Wall at the Ji [River]; [the Wall] stretched from the Southern Mountain to the Northern Sea.” The starting point, the Southern Mountain near the Ji River may well refer to the commonly identified location near Guangli village, Xiaoli township of Changqing District, Ji’nan Municipality. Yet the ending point near the Northern Sea is puzzling. Textual and archeological evidence clearly shows that the Long Wall of Qi moved eastward toward the Yellow Sea (“Eastern Sea” 東海). The Xinian, in contrast, says that it moved northward into the “Northern Sea” (i.e., Bohai Gulf). How to reconcile this conflicting evidence?

One attempt to resolve the puzzle is that by Wang Yongbo and Wang Yunpeng who suggested that the Great Wall of Qi had an L-shaped structure. According to their interpretation, the west-east wall, the remnants of which are archeologically confirmable, was constructed before 555 bce, while in 441 bce it was supplemented by the second section, running along the embankment of the Ji River to the north. Ostensibly, this appears to be a neat solution, but a careful examination calls it into question. Not only is Wang and Wang’s evidence for the early construction of the west-east Long Wall very weak (as outlined above), but also the very idea that the Wall was built along Qi’s western boundary seems to ignore military realities of the fifth century bce, as I shall explain below. For these reasons, Chen Minzhen opted for a radically different approach, dismissing the Xinian reference to the “Northern Sea” as scribal carelessness: could a Chu scribe in charge of composing Xinian simply mix “Eastern” and “Northern” Sea? This supposition, however, is too speculative to be followed: although Xinian is not devoid of scribal errors and other inaccuracies, it is unlikely that a scribe was so careless as to mix North and East. In a later study, Chen Minzhen corrected his earlier approach and admitted the possibility that Xinian does indeed imply a northern route of the Wall; yet he put forward a series of arguments that make a construction of the Wall along this route highly implausible. I concur with Chen’s latter approach and want to add more evidence to strengthen it.


42. This is the conclusion of the text’s editors (Qinghua 2, 188n13).
43. Wang Yongbo and Wang Yunpeng, “Qi changcheng”; see also their map on p. 34.
44. This said, there is another occurrence of a similar scribal error in Xinian 17 (slip 92), where “Eastern Sea” is written at a place which clearly requires “Northern Sea.”
45. For Chen Minzhen’s early study of the Qi Long Wall, see Chen Minzhen 陳民鎮, “Qi changcheng xinyan: Cong Qinghua jian Xinian kan Qi changcheng de ruogan wenti” 齊長城新研：從清華簡《繫年》看齊長城的若
First, let us consider the military logic in creating a wall along the Ji River. The need for such an expensive fortification is not clear at all. The two riverbeds of the Yellow River in addition to the Ji River itself were sufficient to thwart large scale attacks from the west. Recall that Warring States-period sources considered “the clean Ji and muddy [Yellow] River” as a major western impediment facing Qi’s potential foes. Building a wall along the river would add little to the river’s defensive potential and would furthermore complicate access of the people of Qi to the river’s water.\textsuperscript{46} It would further weaken Qi’s grasp of the territories between the courses of the Yellow and the Ji Rivers, where some Qi strongholds, such as Gaotang 高唐, were located. Judging from this, turning the river’s embankment into a wall sounds odd.

Second, let us consider Qi’s strategic vulnerabilities. Chunqiu and Zuo zhuan record over twenty incursions of Qi by its enemies. In many cases no details are provided and the route of the incursions is difficult to estimate: for instance, the attacks by Rong 戎 and Di 狄 tribes could have come either from the southwest or from the northwest.\textsuperscript{47} Yet most of the major campaigns whose routes are traceable followed the eastern shore of the Ji River, attacking Qi from the southwest or, rarely, from the south.\textsuperscript{48} Jin clearly preferred this route as well (see below for the detailed account of the 555 BCE invasion). Crossing the Ji River from the northwest was a challenging task: in 549 BCE when Jin planned such a crossing “it was impossible because of floods” 水，不可.\textsuperscript{49} Only once can we confirm the success of Jin’s northwestern incursion into Qi: it was conducted in 485 BCE under the Jin commander Zhao Jianzi 趙簡子 (d. 475 BCE). Yet this latter assault was evidently of limited scope and it probably benefitted from Qi’s army being distracted by a Wu and Lu invasion from the south earlier the same year.\textsuperscript{50} Another important battle was fought between Jin and Qi in 472 BCE around Liqiu 犁丘 between the Yellow and the Ji Rivers; but even though Qi was badly defeated, the Jin armies did not cross the Ji River.\textsuperscript{51} Altogether, Zuo zhuan leaves no doubt that Qi’s major vulnerability was from southern, not from northwestern invasions.

Third, when we consider records related to the Qi Wall in the immediate aftermath of its construction in 441 BCE, it is clear that the Wall was assaulted and breached from the south rather than from the northwest. Recall that Qi was targeted by the Jin-Yue alliance, which was cemented in the southern parts of the current Shandong Province. Through most of the second half of the fifth century BCE, Yue expanded steadily into southern Shandong: it transferred its capital to Langye 郯邪, on Shandong’s southern coast, and started annexing local
polities. Not surprisingly, all the assaults on Qi recorded in Xinian and in the Piaoqiang-bells inscription seem to have followed the southern route. The Gu Gate, stormed by Jin troops in 430 BCE, the Pingyin-Shi-Jingzi area, attacked by Piaoqiang’s troops in 404 BCE, and the Xian River (near the Muling Pass), invaded by the major Jin army later that same year, all are located along the southern perimeter of Chu defenses (see Map 1). Even if the exact identification of each of these place names remains disputed, it is highly likely that the joint Jin-Yue attacks on Qi came from the south, and it is there that the Wall was breached.

Finally, should we accept the northern route of the Qi Wall as suggested in Xinian 20, one should explain why this wall is never mentioned either in historical records or in geographical accounts from Shandong province that invariably refer to the Long Wall running from the Pingyin County eastward. There is only one potential hint of the existence of the northern Wall, namely the brief record in the Records of the Historian that in 368 BCE Zhao invaded Qi, “reaching the Long Wall.” It is not clear, though, what the direction of Zhao’s assault was: it could well have followed a southwestern route along the Ji River and not the northwestern one used by Zhao Jianzi a century earlier. Overall, in light of manifold references to the archeologically verifiable line of the southern Long Wall, the silence about the northwestern route and the lack of supporting archeological evidence appear too meaningful to be ignored.

Currently, I cannot find a convincing way to reconcile the Xinian 20 statement with regard to the Wall’s northwestern route and the combined archeological and textual evidence (including that of Xinian itself) according to which the Wall protected Qi from the south. Tentatively, I dismiss the possibility of an embankment wall along the Ji River and treat the wall erected in 441 as the southern wall. It should be noticed however, that even if Wang and Wang are correct in their reconstruction of the L-shaped system of two walls of Qi, this will not weaken my discussion in what follows about the Wall’s military and political significance. However, to avoid needless speculations, I prefer to concentrate on the archeologically verifiable southern route only, admitting my inability to resolve the controversy about the possibility of a second, northwestern line of the Long Wall of Qi.

**THE LONG WALL: MILITARY AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE**

Let us summarize our findings up to this point. First, we may be confident that in 441 BCE Qi constructed a Long Wall. Second, this was in all likelihood the first construction of this

52. The precise history of Yue is not clear due to major deficiencies in the “Hereditary House of Goujian of Yue” chapter of Records of the Historian, but the scattered information in later sources (and in the Bamboo Annals, cited in the glosses to the Records of the Historian [Shiji 41.1747]) clarifies that Yue’s operational center shifted northward toward southern Shandong. See Yang Kuan, Zhanguo shi, 170. See more in Chen Minzhen 陳民鎮, “Qinghua jian Xinian suo jian ‘Shandong shiqi’ Yue guo de junshi yu waijiao” 清華簡《繫年》所見“山東時期”越國的軍事與外交, in Qinghua jian yu Rujia jingdian: Guoji xueshu yantaohui lunwenji 清華簡與儒家經典國際學術研討會論文集, ed. Jiang Linchang 江林昌 and Sun Jin 孫進 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2017), 20–13.

53. Shiji 43.1799.

54. I am not aware of any attempt by archeologists to trace the remnants of the Qi Wall along the Ji River embankment. Nonetheless, it is difficult to assume that the remnants—should they exist—would entirely have escaped the attention of archeologists, such as those engaged in the survey of the westernmost point of the Wall near Guangli village (Ren Xianghong, “Qi changcheng yuantou”). Recently (July 10, 2017), Hebei archeologists announced the discovery of remnants of a Qi dam along the old course of the Yellow River in Nanpi 南皮 County. The report suggested that the dam is related to the “Long Wall” allegedly built there as early as by the times of Lord Huan of Qi (http://kaogu.cn/cn/xccz/20170710/58831.html, accessed Jan. 3, 2018). I am not in a position to evaluate the reliability of this identification, based as it is on a preliminary report only.
kind in Qi history (hence the account of the Wall construction in Xinian 20 is preceded by the word shì 始, which in historical records is associated with novel developments). Third, whereas the line of Qi’s 441 BCE wall is debatable, the extant evidence, primarily archeological surveys, strongly suggests that the Wall protected Qi from the south, as outlined in Map 1. Fourth, ever since its inception, the Wall was a formidable obstacle facing Jin and Yue aggressors; so formidable indeed as to require a specific clause in the 404 BCE covenant to the effect that it should not be repaired. Fifth, during the Warring States period, the Long Wall was associated with Qi’s perceived impregnability (see the citations at the beginning of this essay). With these understandings in mind we may proceed toward analyzing the military and political significance of Qi’s Long Wall.

The erection of the Long Wall may be indicative of new departures in the warfare of the early Warring States period. During the aristocratic Springs-and-Autumns period (Chunqiu 春秋, 770–453 BCE), insofar as chariots constituted the crux of a country’s military forces and the campaigns were decided by chariot battles in the open field, the importance of protective lines remained limited. As Gu Donggao 顧棟高 (1679–1759) noticed, the states of that period did not maintain permanent garrisons even at strategic mountain passes. Only occasionally could these passes be utilized to hinder an enemy’s assault. The Zuo zhuan 地圖 depiction of Jin and its allies’ incursion into Qi in 555 BCE is the primary evidence to this effect and it deserves detailed discussion:

冬，十月，會于魯濟，尋溴梁之言，同伐齊。齊侯禦諸平陰，塹防門而守之廣里。夙沙衛曰：「不能戰，莫如守險。」弗聽。諸侯之士門焉，齊人多死。

In winter, in the tenth month, [the lords] met at River Ji in Lu to renew the words of the Covenant of the Ju Dam. Together they attacked Qi. The Marquis of Qi resisted the incursion at Pingyin, where he dug a moat outside the Gate of Defense and guarded it at Guang Hamlet. Susha Wei said, “If we cannot fight, it would be better to guard our strategic advantage.” [Lord Ling of Qi] did not heed him. The officers of the regional lords stormed the gate. Many died among the men of Qi.

Facing a massive assault from its enemies, Lord Ling of Qi 齊靈公 (r. 581–554 BCE) was terrified and attempted to prevent the enemy’s advancement and avoid the battle by guarding the narrow pass near Guang Hamlet (Guangli) in the vicinity of Pingyin. Eventually, however, he was scared by Jin’s ploys aimed at projecting a much larger size of an invading army than was really the case. As the main Qi army retreated, its rearguard commander, Susha Wei, maintained a valiant stand against the invaders:

十一月丁卯朔，入平陰，遂從齊師。夙沙衛速大車以塞隧而殿。植綽、郭最曰：「子殿國師，齊之辱也。子姑先乎！」乃代之殿。衛殺馬於隘以塞道。

In the eleventh month, on the dingmao day, the first day of the month, [the Jin army] entered Pingyin and thereupon pursued the Qi army. Susha Wei pulled up a great chariot to block the mountain paths as he was to bring up the rear. Zhi Chuo and Guo Zui said, “For you to stay at the rear of the state’s army would be a disgrace to Qi. You should just move ahead!” They thus took his place in the rear. [Susha] Wei killed some horses at a narrow pass to block passage.
This narration allows us to understand the relative ease with which the chariot army could be blocked. The location of this event—the vicinity of Guang Hamlet—is precisely the location where the starting point of the Qi Long Wall was erected a century later. A narrow pass between the large pond adjacent to the ancient flow of the Ji River to the west and the Tai-shan Mountain massif to the east is an ideal topographic location to control the movement northward along the Ji River; even now it is still used as a checkpoint by the Public Security Bureau on the National Highway 220. Cumbersome chariots could be blocked in this pass and adjacent paths just by a single large chariot or by piling up horses’ carcasses. Back then, there was no need to build a major wall: a small strategically located fortification (the “Gate of Defense”) was enough to slow down the invaders.

Gu Yanwu 顧炎武 (1613–1682), who, like other astute observers, noticed the absence of protective walls during the heyday of chariot-based armies, opined that the erection of walls started only with the proliferation of cavalry in the Warring States period. Actually, what changed the rules of the game was in all likelihood not cavalrymen but infantrymen. Infantry armies existed, of course, throughout the aristocratic age, but then they played primarily an auxiliary role, aside from special circumstances, such as sieges or wars against non-Sinitic entities. The proliferation of infantry was a lengthy process that spanned well over a century; actually even in ca. 396 BCE an army’s power was measured by its chariots. However, it seems that at a certain point in the fifth century BCE infantry became sufficiently important to merit re-organization of defensive strategies. Infantrymen were able to bypass the passes that were essential for chariots’ advancement, and this meant that more formidable obstructions had to be formed. In due time, the “Gate of Defense” mentioned in Zuo zhuan was replaced with a larger fortification that eventually became the starting point of the Long Wall. Archeological survey of this fortification shows that it was in all likelihood erected in the fifth century (“the very end of the Springs-and-Autumns period”), i.e., more or less the time mentioned in Xinian. This and other fortifications (at least seven major forts were identified in the western section of the Wall alone) were permanently garrisoned, creating new realities of standing units along the country’s defense perimeter.

The defensive importance of long walls is undeniable, but one should consider their other functions, such as their impact on inter-state commerce. Guo Guanghong proposed back in 2000 that the very construction of the Qi Wall (which he erroneously dated to 685 BCE) was prompted by the need to monitor the trade in salt across the Tai-Yi Mountain Range. Not all of Guo’s conclusions are convincing, but his observation that the Wall allowed much better control of commercial interactions between Qi and its neighbors is undoubtedly valid. The very possibility to channel the commercial exchange to selected gates in the wall facili-

62. Xinian #23 refers to the size of the Qi army sent to assist Chu in 396 BCE as “1,000 chariots” (Qinghua 2, 197). Chariots remained important thereafter as well, but by the second half of the Warring States period their role declined, as is evident from their relatively small numbers in the armies of major states. These numbers are scattered throughout several speeches in the Stratagems of the Warring States (Zhuangguo ce 戰國策), and are conveniently summarized in Yang Kuan, Zhanguo shi, 310.
63. Ren Xianghong, “Qi changcheng yuantou.”
65. Guo Guanghong, “Qi changcheng.” Note that Qi was much richer in salt deposits than its southern neighbors.
tated collection of custom fees and other levies, allowing Qi rulers to maximize the advantages of their abundant natural resources, especially salt. It may not be a coincidence that the most sophisticated ideas of manipulation of inter-state commerce, which are now collected in Guanzì (e.g., chapter “Qingzhong 5” 輕重戊), originated in all likelihood in the state of Qi.

Let us turn now to the Wall’s symbolic value. Its erection demarcated Qi’s boundary, turning it into the first clearly defined territorial state on Chinese soil. Defended by the sea from the north and east, and by the Ji River and Yellow River from its west, the state of Qi had now clearly delineated itself from its southern neighbors as well. Although Qi continued to possess territories outside the wall and outside its immediate defense perimeter, the core of the state was henceforth clearly separated from neighboring polities. The erection of the Great Wall of Qi may then be considered as the symbolic birth of a territorial state. In Qi (as elsewhere in the Warring States world), this external delineation from neighbors was accompanied by the process of accelerating domestic integration, as many (albeit not all) autonomous fiefs ruled by aristocratic lineages were eliminated in the wake of internal wars of the sixth and fifth centuries BCE, allowing nascent centralization under the dominant Tian lineage. This centralization is duly observable in the improved bureaucratic capabilities of the Qi rulers, which allowed mobilization of the population to large projects, among which the construction of the Long Wall figures prominently.

Let us consider for a moment Qi’s investment in the construction of the Long Wall. Although detailed studies of this topic have, to my knowledge, not yet been undertaken, some preliminary observations can be offered. According to He Deliang’s estimate, the construction of the Wall required approximately 29,700,000 cubic meters of soil and stones (different sections of the wall were built either of stones or of stamped earth). Using the methods developed by Gideon Shelach and Kate Rafael, the combined workload invested in acquisition, transportation, and preparation of wall-construction materials, in addition to constructing the wall itself, would require between 55 and 69 million work-days (the smaller number presumes transportation of working materials for 500 meters, the largest for 1,000 meters). If these estimates are correct, it would require almost four years for a workforce of ca. 50,000 laborers to complete the wall. The ability of Qi rulers to mobilize such a huge workforce and maintain it for a considerable period of time is indicative of the new era of the Warring States, when rulers were incomparably more capable of fully utilizing the material and human resources of their states than their aristocratic predecessors of the Springs-and-Autumns period.

Finally we should consider the strategic implications of the Wall construction on the state of Qi. An immediate impact of the Long Wall was surely positive: it strengthened Qi’s...
defense capabilities at the moment when this state faced strong pressure from the Jin-Yue alliance. The Wall may not just have impeded the aggressors but also overawed them by displaying Qi’s organizational cum military capabilities. It may furthermore be speculated that the Wall could soothe some of the fears among Qi’s weaker southern neighbors, indicating that Qi was not planning southward expansion. As we have seen, these goals were not immediately met: through the second half of the fifth century Qi suffered at least three incursions that resulted in the breach of the Long Wall. Yet in the long term the Wall proved to be a valuable asset: post-404 BCE records mention that it was once “reached” (in 368 BCE) but never again penetrated. So should the Wall construction be considered a story of success?

Without denying the Qi Wall’s advantages, I want to point at its potentially negative impact on Qi’s strategy. In the early fourth century BCE pressure on Qi receded, as Yue entered a lengthy period of decline (eventually relocating its capital from Langye back to the south in ca. 376 BCE). Later, Qi enjoyed a prolonged period of military superiority over its neighbors: this age lasted through most of the reign periods of Kings Wei, Xuan, and Min (356–284 BCE). Yet, even when at the apex of its power, Qi generally refrained from annexing minor polities in southern Shandong and did not utilize the power vacuum there in the aftermath of Yue’s retreat and prior to the region’s occupation by Chu. When Qi did expand its territory to the south of the Wall, this expansion remained limited. Qi rulers apparently remained satisfied with the nominal superiority over the so-called “twelve regional lords of the Si River” 泗水十二諸侯—such as Lu, Teng 鄉, Zou 鄒, Xue 薛, and so forth—without incorporating their territories directly. A possible exception was the state of Ju 莊 near the eastern section of the Wall, which in due time became a Qi stronghold, although how and when that happened is not clear. 71 It is difficult to assess the geopolitical considerations which brought about Qi’s relative passivity, but it is plausible to assume that one of the reasons was its leaders’ unwillingness to depart too far from the convenient protection of the Long Wall. The fact that Qi was more eagerly expanding northward along the Bohai Bay coast than southward strengthens this point. 72

In the long term this passivity backfired, preventing Qi from expanding its territories and augmenting its material and human resources on a par with other rival “hero-states” of the Warring States era. When Qi did adopt the policy of expansion, annexing the state of Song in 286 BCE, it was too late: the backlash from the outraged major powers brought about Qi’s most humiliating defeat. Notably, this defeat was prompted by the surprise attack of the state of Yan 燕 from the west, across the Yellow and then the Ji Rivers. The Ji River boundary was not adequately protected, and Qi collapsed, driven to the refuge in Ju and Jimo 即墨 districts. Eventually the state of Qi was rescued only due to the inadequacy of its Yan occupiers. 73 If the Long Wall indeed hindered Qi’s southward expansion for more than a century, we

71. For a brief survey of Shandong tiny polities, see Yang Kuan, *Zhanguo shi*, 280–83. See also articles in Liu Dunyuan 劉敦願 and Feng Zhengao 汪振鎬, eds., *Dongyi guguo shi yanjiu* 東夷古國史研究, 2 vols. (Xi’an: San Qin chubanshe, 1988 and 1990). For Qi’s willingness to maintain symbolic superiority over the Si River polities rather than pursuing annexation, see a statement attributed to King Wei of Qi in *Shiji* 46.1891. Ju was initially divided between Qi and Yue (see *Mozi jiaozhu* 墨子校注, comp. and annot. Wu Yujiang 吳毓江 [Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1994], V.18.203 [“Fei gong zhong” 非攻中]); later, as Yue left its Shandong possessions, Ju may have been fully incorporated into Qi. For a brief survey of Qi’s territorial expansion and its limitations, see Zhou Changfu 周昌富, “Qigu jianguyaoqie” 齊國疆域考略, in *Dongyi guguo shi yanjiu* 2, 202–15.

72. For Qi’s northward expansion (as indicated by the presence of Qi burials in the modern Tianjin area), see Sun Jingming, “Qi changcheng,” 22–23. Note that economically speaking, northward areas could be more attractive because of abundant deposits of salt in comparison to southern Shandong.

may estimate that the long-term negative consequences of wall construction could outweigh short-term gains.

**AFTERWORD: THE EARLIEST LONG WALL? QI-CHU COMPETITION**

At the beginning of this essay I mentioned the readiness of some Shandong scholars to accept the earliest possible date for the Qi Wall’s construction, which allows them to hail it as “the earliest Long Wall” in China’s or even in human history.74 While the above discussion did refute the possibility that the Wall existed prior to the fifth century BCE, it still remains the primary candidate to the title of the “earliest long wall” in China. Do we have evidence for earlier constructions of long walls elsewhere? Putting aside local pride, the answer to this question may promote our understanding of the role of long walls in China’s military and political history.

The immediate competitor of the Qi Wall would be the Fangcheng 方城 Long Wall of Chu. Zuo zhuan records a warning of a Chu commander, Qu Wan 屈完, to the invading Lord Huan of Qi in 656 BCE: “If you resort to force, then the state of Chu will turn Fangcheng into its wall and the Han River into its moat: although you have multitudes of troops, these will be of no use” 君若以力, 楚國方城以為城, 漢水以為池, 雖眾, 無所用之.75 Some scholars take Qu Wan’s words at their face value as referring to an already existing Long Wall.76 Actually, this should not be the case; Qu Wan clearly uses metaphors rather than referring to real fortifications.

The precise identification of Fangcheng is disputed because the term can in different contexts refer to either mountain ranges, a single fortification, a town, or a man-made wall.77 Yet in most cases, and probably in Qu Wan’s above statement, it referred to mountain ranges stretching from the Funiu Mountains 伏牛山 eastward and then southward toward the Tongbai Mountains 桐柏山. These crescent-like ranges and hills served as a natural boundary of the Nanyang 南陽 Basin, which was the major gate to Chu’s heartland to the east of the Han River. That in the Warring States period a Long Wall was built along parts of this 300 km long defensive perimeter is undeniable. The Wall’s remnants were recently (2009–2011) explored by Henan archeologists, who pointed out at the complexity of local protective constructions consisting of walls, military camps, beacon towers, and smaller fortifications in mountain passes.78 But when did the construction of the wall begin? With regard to this question Xinian can provide an important clue. The text contains not a few references to Fangcheng as a defensive line of Chu; yet much as in Zuo zhuan there is no hint of a man-made wall. This changes when we enter into the early Warring States period. Let us look at section 21, which deals with the late fifth-century BCE struggle between Jin and Chu:

楚簡大王立七年，宋悼公朝于楚，告以宋司城氏之約（弱？）公室。王命莫敖陽為率

【114】師以定公室，城黃池，城雍丘。晉魏斯、趙浣、韓啓章率師圍黃池，遂退而歸之

74. See, e.g., He Deliang, “Zhongguo lishi shang zui gulao de changcheng,” 68 and more examples in n. 7.
75. Zuo, Xi 4.1.292.
76. See, e.g., Waldron, The Great Wall, 13.
77. Li Yipi 李一丕, “Henan Chu changcheng fenbu ji fangyu tixi yanjiu” 河南楚長城分佈及防禦體系研究, Zhongyuan wenwu 中原文物 2014.5: 44–50, 74, on p. 44.
The events narrated in this section took place ca. 425–423 BCE. They are referred to in Chu divination slips from Tomb 1 at Geling, Xincai 新蔡 (Henan), which mention “the year when the Grand moao Yang Wei fought the Jin army at the Long Wall” 大莫敖陽為 具師於長城之嵗. Undoubtedly, by ca. 423 BCE the Long Wall of Chu existed already. When and how was it founded?  

79. There is much confusion about the dates mentioned here. Tentatively, I accept the reconstruction proposed by Li Rui 李錦 in “You Qinghua jian Xinian tan Zhanqiu chu Chu shi nianlai de wenti” 由清華簡《繫年》談戰國初楚史年代的問題, Shixueshi yanjiu 史學史研究 2013.2: 100–104 and followed in Qinghua er, 831–38. According to this tentative reconstruction, King Jian of Chu 楚簡王 reigned from 431 to 405 BCE. The reign years of Lord Dao of Song should be 421–404 BCE. The seventh year of King Jian should be emended to “tenth” (a scribal confusion between 七 and 十). This puts us in 422 BCE, when Lord Dao of Song had just ascended the throne (his official reign will start only in the first month of the next lunar year, 421 BCE), and sought Chu’s assistance against domestic rivals.

80. Huangchi and Yongqiu were both contested by Zheng and Song, with the former being also an objective of Jin’s expansion. According to Ma Nan’s analysis (Qinghua jian ‘Xinian’ jizheng, 449n2), Chu was using the assistance to Song as a pretext to establish a military presence in the area that was a focus of potential military expansion by its Jin rivals. Therefore walling both cities caused Jin’s reiteration. Moao was a high military rank in the state of Chu; for debates about the identity of Jin’s army, see Li Shoukui 李守奎, “Qinghua jian Xinian ‘moao Yiwei’ kaolun” 清華簡《繫年》“莫敖易為”考論 Zhonghua wenhua yanjiu 中華文化研究 2014.2: 50–54 vs. Su Jianzou 苏建洲, “Ye lun Qinghua jian Xinian ‘moao Yiwei’” 也論清華簡《繫年》“莫敖易為”, Zhonghua wenhua yanjiu 中華文化研究 2014.5: 115–21.

81. Wei Si, Zhao Hu, and Han Qizhang were Jin political and military commanders, who were in the process of establishing their independent political power at the expense of Jin. Wei Si is the future Lord Wen of Wei; Zhao Hu is Lord Xian of Zhao 趙獻侯 (r. 423–409 BCE); Han Qizhang is Han Wuzi 韓武子 (d. 409 BCE). The precise meaning of what the Jin armies attained is contested. The text’s editors read 述為 hengtong 衡通, referring to Jin’s assault on Huangchi; they also opine that gui zhi yu Chu 隨之於楚 means causing the Chu armies to return to their homeland. This latter reading is obviously wrong, as zhi 之 cannot refer to the Chu armies in this context. Du Xinyu 杜新宇 (“Qinghua jian Xinian ‘Hengtong er gui zhi yu Chu’ xiao yi” 清華簡《繫年》“衡通而歸之於楚”小議, http://www.gzw.fudan.edu.cn/Web/Show/2707, accessed November 30, 2018) proposed reading the two disputed characters as a verb and an object: chong tong 趓同, in which tong stands for military conscripts. The meaning according to him is that the Jin armies captured many Chu prisoners and then returned those to Chu. This explanation seems to me far-fetched and not fitting the text’s grammar. An easier solution would be that the Jin armies assaulted the city of Huangchi, but were unable to permanently occupy it and returned it to Chu. An alternative would be a scribal error: the city was returned to Zheng and not to Chu.

82. Yiyang was under Han control; it is located to the west of Luoyang. Chu wanted to shift the campaign westward, closer to its major power bases. The location of Chiyan is unknown.
Currently we do not have an answer to this question. But in light of the previous discussion I may make a guess. In all likelihood, the Fangcheng defense line served Chu defenses in the same way as the Tai-Yi Mountain Range served Qi. Namely, insofar as major assaults were conducted by chariot armies, small fortifications near narrow mountain passes sufficed to block the enemy’s advancement. There were some differences as well: since the plain land between the mountain ranges to the east of the Funiu Mountains is much broader than that between the Ji River and the Taishan massif, Chu had to protect itself through a series of walled settlements north of the Fangcheng line. With the proliferation of infantry warfare, the Chu leaders might then have come to the same conclusion as their Qi peers: that under the new circumstances it would be more appropriate to create a lengthy wall to protect their heartland from Jin attacks. From the archeological survey it seems that the Chu wall was much shorter than that of Qi: it was erected only on plain terrain, while in the mountains the defensive line relied primarily on a series of fortifications that blocked the passes. Overall however, both walls served a similar function. Whether Chu mimicked the Qi long wall strategy or vice versa, or both countries developed their walls independently, is currently unanswerable.

It may be noticed en passant that there was also a major difference between the Chu and the Qi walls: the former was much shorter and was never designed to protect the entire perimeter of Chu’s borders. Actually, since Chu acquired territories outside the Fangcheng line as early as the seventh century BCE, Fangcheng remained primarily an internal rather than external fortification. As such, this wall did not hinder Chu’s northward expansion, but nor did it provide sufficient protection against attacks that came from other directions than the Nanyang Basin.

This brief comparison between the Qi and Chu walls suggests that in analyzing early Chinese long walls, we should pay attention not only to their similarities but also to their important differences. To strengthen this point let us briefly consider the third, and much better studied, long wall, that of the Imperial Qin (221–207 BCE). This wall was built primarily against cavalry, not infantry; it was erected far away from the state’s heartland, and it served different strategic goals. As Nicola Di Cosmo’s study shows, the Long Wall of Qin was built in the immediate aftermath of Qin’s major expansion into Xiongnu territory to protect the empire’s recent conquests. As such it served offensive (or offensive cum defensive) goals, rather than being a purely defensive structure as were the Qi and Chu walls. Future research on early Chinese long walls should take into account the walls’ variability not only in terms of distinct construction techniques, but also in terms of military functions, economic costs and benefits, and strategic impact. The advances in archeological and textual research allow us to abandon once and for all the once popular “one size fits all” approach.

We cannot resolve many of the enigmas of China’s early long walls; but we can summarize the above discussion with a few observations. First, it seems that the construction of long walls paralleled the transformation of armies from those that primarily relied on chariots to those based on infantrymen: the walls had to limit the maneuverability of foot soldiers. Second, the emergence of long walls is related to the transformation of loose aristocratic polities

opined that the Geling strips refer to another battle of which we know nothing. See his “You Qinghua jian Xinian tan Zhanguo chu Chu shi niandai.”

84. For details about the interplay between lengthy walls and fortifications in mountain passes as the primary feature of Chu’s wall, see Li Yipi, “Henan Chu changcheng.”

85. Recall that Qin’s major blow to Chu in 278 BCE followed the Han River line, bypassing the Fangcheng fortifications. See details in Yang Kuan, ZhanGuo shi, 402–5.

of the Springs-and-Autumns era into centralized territorial bureaucratic states of the Warring States period: only the latter could command sufficient human and material resources to undertake these demanding construction projects. Third, the walls appear to be quite efficient in terms of their protective functions; yet their long-term impact on warfare remains disputable. At the very least in the case of Qi it seems that whereas the wall increased the country’s protective abilities, it also limited its willingness to permanently expand far beyond this fixed defensive line. In the Warring States-period world, in which “the flesh of the weak was the food of the strong” this self-imposed defensive strategy proved damaging in the long term. What are the lessons that this can teach us about other long walls in Chinese history and elsewhere should be a topic of a separate study.