


Foundations of Confucian Thought

Intellectual Life in the
Chunqiu Period,
722-453 B.C.E



YURI PINES

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Contents

<i>Acknowledgments</i>	<i>vii</i>
<i>Notes on Translation, Terms, and Quotations</i>	<i>ix</i>
Introduction	1
Chapter 1. Sources of Chunqiu Thought	13
Chapter 2. Heaven and Man Part Ways: Changing Attitudes Toward Divine Authority	55
Chapter 3. The Universal Panacea: Ritual and Preserving Hierarchical Order	89
Chapter 4. The World Falls Apart: A Futile Search for International Order	105
Chapter 5. When a Minister Mounts the Ruler: Chunqiu Views of Loyalty	136
Chapter 6. Nobility of Blood and Spirit: Chunqiu Ethical Thought	164
Chapter 7. The Chunqiu Legacy	205
Appendix 1: Grammatical Change in the <i>Zuo</i> : Case Studies of the “ <i>Yu</i> ” and “ <i>Qi</i> ” Particles	217
Appendix 2: Zhanguo Data in the <i>Zuo</i>	221
Appendix 3: Comparing Scribal Accounts in the <i>Zuo</i>	227
Appendix 4: Spurious Speeches and Interpolations in the <i>Zuo</i>	233

<i>Notes</i>	247
<i>List of Chunqiu Personalities</i>	309
<i>Glossary</i>	333
<i>Bibliography</i>	343
<i>Index</i>	373

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Notes on Translation, Terms, and Quotations

1. The precise translation of terms is one of the major problems of this kind of study. The protagonists of the *Zuo zhuan* and *Guoyu* were using a living language that allowed for overlapping and interchangeable usage of various terms. To avoid confusion, however, the translation has been unified whenever possible according to the following principles.

a. Kinship terms are translated as follows:

xing—clan or clan name

zong—high-ordered or “trunk lineage” (which consists of several independent lineages)

shi 氏—lineage or branch lineage (basic kinship unit in the Chunqiu period)

jia and *shi* 室—family / household or “house,” if it is the ruling house

Zhu Fenghan’s study indicates that in certain cases these terms were used interchangeably.¹ In choosing the English translation, the dominant meaning of each term will be used. In each case, an attempt will be made to discern the intention of the speaker. Thus, “Jisun *jia*,” referring to the Jisun *shi*, will be translated as “the Jisun lineage.”

b. Social status terms are translated as follows:

qing—[high] minister. The lineage whose head has the hereditary position of *qing* will be referred to as a “ministerial lineage” (following Hsu 1965).

dafu—noble; “noble lineage” in the case of a lineage headed by a petty official

qing dafu—aristocracy. This is a generic term for all those between the overlord and the *shi* stratum.

shi is simply transliterated. The terms “retainer,” “knight,” or “scholar” may be an appropriate translation in certain cases, but they cannot be a substitute for *shi* as a generic term of the lowest stratum of the ranked aristocracy.

min—people (includes aristocrats and commoners alike)

shumin—commoners

2. The proper names of Chunqiu personalities are most problematic. Aristocrats generally had at least two surnames: the clan name (*xing*), and the lineage name (*shi*). Unlike the clan name, a lineage name could change several times, even within the life of one generation. Moreover, each noble had a personal name (*ming*), a cognomen or “polite name” (*zi*), a seniority name (*bo* or *meng*—“the elder”; *zhong*—“second-born”; *shu*—“younger”; and *ji*—“the youngest”), and a posthumous name (*shi*). Throughout the narrative, each person may be referred to by any of these names or their combinations. For example, Fan Wuzi, Shi Ji, Sui Hui, and Mr. Ji are not four different persons, but four different names of a single Jin minister in the late seventh to early sixth century B.C.E. In the List of Chunqiu Personalities the names of persons mentioned throughout the present study will be unified.

3. *Hanyu pinyin* is used for all transliterations except personal names of those scholars who write in English and who use different transliterations (i.e., Hsu Choyun, not Xu Zhuoyun).

4. When pre-twentieth-century Chinese sources are cited in this study, numbers divided by a colon indicate the scroll (*juan*) or chapter (*pian*) and page for the particular edition of this work mentioned in the bibliography. In some cases, for the sake of convenience, I supply also the name of a chapter and / or the number of the paragraph (*zhang*), which then follows the *pian* number separated by a period. References to the *Shi jing* also include in parentheses the poem’s sequence number according to the standard Mao edition. In most cases I have used a short form of the title, with the full title in the bibliography.

5. Unless otherwise indicated all translations are my own.

Introduction

The three centuries following the time of Confucius (551–479 B.C.E.)¹ are commonly regarded as the most creative period in Chinese intellectual history, an age of an “intellectual breakthrough.”² What is unclear, however, is how this breakthrough occurred. What preceded it? Did Confucius and his followers spontaneously give rise to the flowering of Chinese thought, or rather did they inherit and improve upon the ideas, concepts, and views of their predecessors? And if the latter, how can we define the legacy of the preceding generations?

Confucius defined himself as a “transmitter,” not a creator, of the new thought.³ Was this only modesty on his part? If not, what did he transmit? Who influenced him? These questions have been raised by both traditional Chinese and modern scholars. Some regard Confucius as a demiurgic figure who created his thought *ex nihilo*. Others have argued that Confucius transmitted the wisdom of his sage predecessors (the founders of the Zhou dynasty), the roots of his thought being the classical books of the Western Zhou period (1046–771): the *Shi jing*, the *Shu jing*, and the *Zhouyi*. The intellectual life of the Chunqiu period (“Springs and Autumns,” 722–453), however, has so far received only fragmentary and unsystematic attention, even though it directly preceded and partially overlapped Confucius’ lifetime.

What was the role of the Chunqiu period in the genesis of Chinese thought? The answer lies somewhere in the obvious gap between the Western Zhou and the Zhanguo (“Warring States,” 453–221) worlds of thought. For example, most of the pivotal terms of Zhanguo discourse, such as *Dao*

(the Way), *ren* (benevolence), and *zhong* (loyalty), do not occur in Western Zhou texts; others, like *de* (charisma, virtue) and *li* (ritual), do occur but have different semantic meanings. These and other differences suggest that the two and a half centuries between the end of the Western Zhou period and Confucius' lifetime may be the missing link in the genesis of Chinese thought. What happened during this period? Which ideas evolved? How did they influence later thought? The present study will try to answer some of these questions by reconstructing aspects of the Chunqiu world of thought.

Intellectual life does not occur in a vacuum, and Chunqiu intellectual life is no exception. It evolved within a framework of contemporaneous political and social developments. Chunqiu thinkers, to paraphrase Angus C. Graham, were not seeking "the truth," but rather "the way" to restore political and social order;⁴ hence, their efforts cannot be adequately discussed without presenting the problems that these thinkers hoped to resolve. Understanding this background is crucial for understanding Chunqiu intellectual life. We shall begin, then, with a short historical outline of major political and social developments during the Chunqiu period.⁵

The political history of the Chunqiu period can be conveniently divided into three stages: early Chunqiu, from 722 to the death of Lord Huan of Qi (r. 680–643); mid-Chunqiu from 643 to the Song peace conference of 546; and late Chunqiu from 546 to the de facto dissolution of the state of Jin in 453.⁶ Each of these periods is characterized by sweeping changes both in the geopolitical situation in the Zhou realm and in the internal political and social conditions in each of the states.

The early Chunqiu period officially begins in 722—the first entry in the eponymous *Chun qiu* annals—but it starts more suitably with the end of the Western Zhou in 771. The Zhou world was comprised of hundreds of tiny states and polities ruled by overlords (*zhuhou*), most of whom were relatives of the royal house. The "state" was but a network of several walled cities and townships that were ruled from the capital. The highest dignitaries in these states were generally the closest relatives of the ruling overlord, usually his brothers or uncles. Descendants of former dignitaries were

organized in a patrilineal kinship structure—the lineage. The members of the lineage were united by common descent, worship of common ancestors, and, most importantly, common landed property—the primary condition for the existence of the lineage. The head of the lineage occupied an official position in the state hierarchy, thereby protecting his kinfolk.

After the establishment of the Zhou capital in the east in 771, the authority of the royal house steadily declined. Yet, in the early Chunqiu, the Western Zhou political system retained some of its vitality. The Zhou kings, Sons of Heaven (*tianzi*), continued to exercise their largely ceremonial authority over powerful overlords. Yearly court visits continued, royal envoys visited the courts of fraternal polities, and the kings initiated punitive expeditions against those overlords who dared to behave “irreverently” toward the Son of Heaven.

This order, however, bore the seeds of its own destruction. The Zhou kings lacked effective military power to bolster their leadership. In 707 the conflict between King Huan (r. 719–697) and Lord Zhuang of Zheng (r. 743–701) resulted in the military defeat of the royal forces; the king himself was wounded in battle. This obvious weakness of the Zhou house increasingly prevented the kings from imposing their will on the overlords. Powerful states like Qi in northern Shandong, Jin in southern Shanxi, Qin in Shaanxi, and Chu in Anhui, Hubei, and southern Henan began expanding their territory at the expense of weaker neighbors. In addition, the steady incursions of the northern and northwestern seminomadic peoples, the Rong and Di, which began early in the seventh century B.C.E., exacerbated the pressures at work in the Zhou system. An urgent response was needed to restore stability and prevent the decay of the Zhou world. This response came from the greatest Chunqiu overlord, Lord Huan of Qi, the first of the so-called hegemons (*ba*).

Hegemony is a unique Chunqiu institution. Theoretically, a hegemon acted as the surrogate of the Son of Heaven, on whose behalf he presided over the interstate meetings and conducted punitive expeditions against rebellious overlords and incursions of the tribesmen. In fact, the hegemon’s authority derived mostly from his military superiority rather than from royal support. Lord Huan utilized his military superiority to repulse the Rong

and Di invaders; he also stabilized the Zhou ruling house, and even nominally reimposed Zhou authority on some of the distant states, particularly Chu. For a short period of time Lord Huan created the illusion of the partial restoration of Zhou rule.

The mid-Chunqiu period was ushered in with the death of Lord Huan in 643, which sparked incessant struggles for hegemony. For almost a century the overlords sought to emulate Lord Huan's success. Most of the rivalry was between the northern alliance, headed by Jin, and the southern, headed by Chu. In the course of these struggles the Zhou kings, who sided with the northern alliance, lost much of their prestige, and for the most part ceased to preside over the alliance's meetings. The power vacuum, however, remained unfilled. Although Jin and Chu succeeded in imposing their will on their allies, they failed to subdue each other. The Jin-Chu struggle culminated in the great battles of Chengpu (632), Bi (597), and Yanling (575), but the stalemate was not broken. Finally, bowing to the strong pressure of small and medium war-torn states, the leaders of Jin and Chu agreed to a general cease-fire. This agreement resulted in the unique peace conferences in the state of Song in 546 and in the state of Zheng in 541. Thereafter the northern and southern alliances virtually ceased to exist.

While the statesmen's attention was diverted to international struggles, major changes occurred in the domestic lives of their states. Most Huaxia overlords began to lose authority and power to the newly emerging aristocratic lineages, descendants of former high ministers.⁷ These lineages successfully usurped most of the economic, military, and political power, and the heads of these lineages replaced the overlords' close relatives at the apex of government. Through a long process, both the chief ministerial positions and land allotments came to be hereditary possessions of the powerful lineages, and the overlords ceased to control the administration, as well as most of the territory of the state. The ruling houses became puppets of the powerful aristocratic lineages in the Central Plain states of Lu (from 601), Jin (from 573), Zheng (from 569), Wei 衛 (from 559), and Qi (from 546). Each state experienced internal chaos as the ministerial lineages sought to consolidate their power. The domestic turmoil

severely weakened the northern states, particularly the state of Jin. Torn apart by rival aristocratic factions, Jin ceded its quest for hegemony in 546, and unwillingly recognized the superiority of Chu at the Song (546) and Zheng (541) peace conferences.

During the late Chunqiu, the international arena was dominated by the subsequent hegemony of the southern and southeastern powers: Chu in 541–529, Wu in 506–478, and Yue from 475.⁸ Their leaders did not recognize the supremacy of Zhou kings and did not abide by Zhou norms of international conduct. Meanwhile, the northern part of the Central Plain remained without effective leadership, which resulted in increasing turmoil and pandemic war.

The decline of the ruling houses in the northern states culminated with the expulsion of Lord Zhao of Lu from his state in 517, the coup d'état by the Chen (Tian) lineage in Qi in 480, and the dissolution of Jin by the Zhao, Han, and Wei lineages in 453. Yet the aristocratic lineages, the major beneficiaries of these developments, failed to consolidate their achievements. Wearied and weakened by the incessant internal struggles that they themselves had set in motion, these lineages likewise began to lose power. Members of the *shi* stratum (former retainers of the aristocrats) began to replace their masters at the top of the government apparatus.

The disintegration of centralized rule and the ongoing anarchy encouraged statesmen throughout the Chinese world to seek solutions for restoring political and social stability. Administrative reforms had already begun in the mid-Chunqiu; by the late Chunqiu they quickened in pace. In several states, particularly Chu and Qin, hereditary allotments were gradually replaced by dependencies (*xian*) ruled by the center's nominees. Men of ability were increasingly welcomed into the administration at the expense of hereditary officeholders; and many rulers became aware of the urgent need to consolidate their power. Thus, social change was paralleled by far-reaching political and administrative transformations aimed at restoring centralized rule. The states that failed to implement reforms were doomed to decay. On the ruins of the former quasi-feudal order, new states emerged.⁹ The new order, that of the Zhanguo period, is beyond the scope of the present study.

Two observations should be made at this point of my brief exposition. First, the major malady of the Chunqiu age was the continuous disintegration of political power both on the international and the domestic level. Second, the major source of social tension throughout the Chunqiu period was the strife of the aristocratic lineages for power, first against the overlords, and then against the rising *shi*. These two characteristics of the Chunqiu period are crucial to understanding the thought of that period. Most efforts by Chunqiu thinkers were aimed at limiting the process of disintegration and restoring social stability for the upper echelons. At the same time, these thinkers (who belonged to the leading aristocratic lineages) wanted to secure the position of their stratum. They faced a difficult dilemma. Should they serve public interests or private ones? Should they be good ministers at the expense of their kin, or pursue advantages for the lineage in direct noncompliance with their obligations to the ruler? These perplexing ethical questions deeply influenced not only everyday policy making, but also the intellectual life of the Chunqiu age in general. When the overt aim of restoring stability and order coincided with the private needs of the aristocratic thinkers, they obtained impressive intellectual achievements, such as elaborating the concept of rule by ritual (*li zhi*). When, however, the interests of political stability were at odds with preserving the exalted position of the aristocracy, as in the case of administrative innovations, Chunqiu thinkers were indecisive, and their thought was ambivalent. The tension between the explicit and implicit aims of these thinkers may explain many of the unique characteristics of Chunqiu thought.

Chunqiu thought was decidedly aristocratic. This situation changed only with the ascent of Confucius and his disciples and followers, members of the *shi* stratum who broke down the aristocrats' ideological hegemony. Their thought, while originating in the late Chunqiu period, belongs to a distinct intellectual milieu and will be only cursorily discussed in my study. Thus, although historically the present research reaches the lifetime of Confucius, it focuses exclusively on the pre-Confucian world of thought, and presents the ideas that Confucius inherited and to which he and his followers reacted. The intellectual activities of the *shi* stratum be-

long to a distinct period of Chinese intellectual history and should be treated separately.

The major reason scholars have heretofore neglected Confucius' predecessors and contemporaries is that "we do not have [an] exposition of their ideas in early and unimpeachable works."¹⁰ Indeed, we have reason to believe that the philosophical treatise as such did not exist before the compilation of the *Lunyu* (fifth century B.C.E.).¹¹ There are, however, rich historical sources that deal with the Chunqiu period, among which the unique position of the *Zuo zhuan* (hereafter *Zuo*) is widely recognized. In addition to a thorough, year-by-year account of major events in the history of the Chunqiu states, the *Zuo* also contains hundreds of speeches attributed to various Chunqiu personalities. These speeches represent political, ethical, and religious views of the *Zuo* protagonists and may therefore serve as excellent sources for investigating the Chunqiu world of thought. Other historical and paleographical sources contain additional information on the intellectual life of the period.

A major question that is addressed at the beginning of this study is the reliability of the sources. Do the speeches quoted in the *Zuo* and in other texts reflect the authentic thought of Chunqiu personalities, or do they belong to the later intellectual milieu? This issue is discussed in Chapter 1. I shall try to show, first, that most of the *Zuo* speeches derive from written sources, namely short narrative histories prepared by Chunqiu scribes, and, second, that the unequivocal intellectual change throughout the *Zuo* narrative, as well as significant synchronic divergence among the *Zuo* protagonists, rules out the possibility that the speeches were invented or significantly polished by later editors or transmitters. Hence, I suggest that the *Zuo* speeches should be regarded as a genuine and reliable repository of Chunqiu thought. The *Zuo*, then, will be the major source for this study, although other textual and paleographical sources will also be used to corroborate and elucidate additional aspects of Chunqiu intellectual life.

An attempt to reconstruct intellectual life from a narrative history like the *Zuo* has certain disadvantages. Chunqiu scribes who recorded and reproduced (or produced) the statesmen's speeches prepared their records

for the sake of policy makers, and had little interest in broad ideological questions. Thus, the speeches cited in the *Zuo* are confined mostly to policy discussions, remonstrance, and diplomatic intercourse, resulting in an inevitable bias of our discussion toward political issues at the expense of other fields of thought. Besides, the speeches scattered throughout the *Zuo* narrative are usually brief, and the longest do not exceed five hundred characters. These speeches, therefore, are only fragments of Chunqiu thought.

The picture of Chunqiu intellectual life presented in the *Zuo* is not only fragmentary but also inevitably skewed. The speakers represent only a narrow segment of Chunqiu society; almost all of them belong to the hereditary aristocracy (*qing dafu*). Only rarely does the *Zuo* allow us to hear the voices of those who were not male members of aristocratic lineages; women and members of the *shi* stratum, not to mention commoners, remain woefully underrepresented. In addition, the *Zuo* speeches are limited geographically to the major states of the Central Plain and the state of Chu. Only occasionally may additional sources suggest a glimpse of the intellectual life of some important peripheral states such as Qin, Yan, Wu, and Yue, as well as that of small polities. Thus, the picture of Chunqiu thought presented in this study is by definition not complete. Furthermore, the reliance on a single treatise as the backbone of the study leaves us at the mercy of the author/compiler of the *Zuo*. It is impossible to know which sources were unavailable to the compiler, which ones were deliberately neglected, and which were edited out. The sample provided by the *Zuo* speeches, therefore, may not be representative of Chunqiu discourse, unless supplemented by other sources.

The disadvantages of reconstructing intellectual history from a historical narrative are compensated by several distinct merits. First, unlike in most Zhanguo philosophical writings, in the case of the *Zuo* we not only have the text but also the context. We usually know the identity of the speaker as well as that of his audience, the circumstances in which the speech was given, and its immediate purpose. Thus we can understand the speaker's motives as well as the background of his ideas. In addition, despite the geographical and social limitations discussed above, the *Zuo* presents a fairly broad sample of Chunqiu intellectual life, as its speeches

represent dozens of prominent statesmen from a number of major Chunqiu states, scattered over two and a half centuries of the *Zuo* narrative. A systematic exploration of the speeches, taking into consideration the specific circumstances in which each speech was delivered and its relationship to other speeches, allows us to trace changes in concepts, in approaches, and even of terms of political and ethical discourse throughout this period. All this turns the *Zuo* into an invaluable source for Chunqiu intellectual history.

As stated above, the intellectual life of the Chunqiu period generally has not been thoroughly examined. Traditional Chinese scholars have been disinclined to investigate Chunqiu thought. They considered the five centuries separating the Duke of Zhou (d.c. 1035 B.C.E.) from Confucius as an age of decline and turmoil, the legacy of which deserved little if any attention. It is only since the early-twentieth century that scholars like Liang Qichao (1911), and later Feng Youlan (1937) and Hou Wailu (1957), have attempted to define the role of the Chunqiu period in the genesis of Chinese thought. They pointed out that the decline of religious faith in the Chunqiu was a precondition for the lively subsequent intellectual activity; yet they paid little attention to other aspects of Chunqiu political and ethical thought.¹²

These pioneer efforts to reconstruct the Chunqiu legacy had little immediate consequence, particularly among Western scholars, whose doubts regarding the authenticity of the sources hindered a systematic investigation of Chunqiu thought. Even now, among English textbooks, surveys, and monographs on Chinese intellectual history, discussions of Chunqiu thought amount to less than half a dozen pages. Many studies skip from the Western Zhou classics directly to Confucius himself, mentioning only highly selective aspects of the Chunqiu intellectual heritage.¹³

Modern Chinese and Japanese scholars are more attentive to the Chunqiu legacy, although some continue the traditional neglect of the Chunqiu period, and confine their discussion of pre-Confucian intellectual life to the Western Zhou classics.¹⁴ Since the 1980s, renewed interest in ancient intellectual history has resulted in a few extensive discussions of the Chunqiu legacy by Feng Youlan (in his revised study), Liu

Zehua, and others.¹⁵ Many other Chinese and Japanese studies have discussed in greater detail specific aspects of the Chunqiu world of thought.¹⁶ The upsurge of scholarly interest in the Chunqiu legacy in recent years, reflected in these works, has contributed in no small measure to my research.

The above-mentioned works, despite their undeniable scholarly merits, share certain deficiencies. Most of the studies of Chunqiu thought confine their discussions to several eminent personalities like Guan Zhong, Zi Chan, or Yan Ying. By doing so, they transpose the Zhanguo notion of contending philosophical schools onto the preceding Chunqiu period. Numerous Chunqiu personalities who actively participated in the discourse are therefore neglected and the presentation of Chunqiu intellectual trends is severely distorted.¹⁷

Moreover, most studies pay little if any attention to intellectual changes throughout the Chunqiu period. This neglect misses the most important characteristics of Chunqiu intellectual life, namely the profound developments that occurred in many spheres of thought. The term “society in transition”¹⁸ pertains not only to political, social, and economic developments throughout the Chunqiu period, but to intellectual changes as well. Zhanguo thinkers did not inherit a fixed *Weltanschauung* from their predecessors, but rather, dynamic impulses that continued to influence later generations. Scholars who overlook the dynamic nature of these developments artificially ossify Chunqiu intellectual life.

Finally, the major problem of the current research into Chunqiu intellectual history is that most scholars have paid little if any attention to the reliability of their sources. The reader often has the impression that those scholars who deal with the history of Chinese thought are unaware of the important achievements of traditional and modern textual criticism in China and Japan. Many of the studies uncritically resort to questionable sources that attribute the views of their Zhanguo editors / compilers to Chunqiu personalities.¹⁹ Furthermore, few if any scholars have considered that some of the *Zuo* speeches were apparently interpolated by later transmitters and must subsequently be omitted from the discussion of Chunqiu thought. Others fail to distinguish between Chunqiu speeches of the

Zuo protagonists and the narrator's personal remarks.²⁰ As a result of this confusion the views of the *Zuo* author/narrator are attributed to a much earlier intellectual milieu. Conversely, many valuable sources of Chunqiu thought (particularly bronze inscriptions) have generally remained outside the interest of those who deal with Chunqiu intellectual history.²¹

In my study I shall try to avoid these pitfalls. My intent is to discuss major aspects of Chunqiu thought to the extent that the sources allow, while overcoming the methodological problems of the studies surveyed above. The present research is based on a systematic analysis of intellectual changes throughout the Chunqiu period as reflected in the *Zuo* speeches and other available sources. Special attention will be given to the question of the reliability of the sources. Furthermore, an attempt will be made to deal with intellectual history in the context of contemporaneous political and social developments.

This contextual approach is crucial for my study. Whether or not Marx's contention that "it is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness"²² is universally applicable is not a question to be addressed here. I do believe, however, that insofar as political thought is concerned, any discussion that omits general political background and the personal background of the thinkers becomes meaningless. We should not sink into a vulgar attempt, reminiscent of Mainland Chinese scholarship of the 1950s to the 1970s, to ascribe to each thinker a function as the representative of certain political and social forces. Nor should we go to the opposite extreme and concentrate on the extant texts as if they were a revelation of a mysterious and ever-present Idea. A thinker and a statesman (and in Chunqiu China these functions were inseparable) is a man who has personal needs and interests, colleagues and kin, opponents and supporters, superiors and underlings, all of which influence—directly or indirectly—his views and ideas. He lives under certain conditions that determine his intellectual agenda and divert his attention to specific issues. A Chunqiu aristocrat, living in an age of turmoil, could not possibly forget the interests of his state, his stratum, his lineage, or his person—least of all when discussing political and ethical issues. He reacted to current events, ar-

gued with proponents of alternative political courses, and was engaged in ongoing discourse with his contemporaries. Therefore, in what follows, due attention must be given to Chunqiu political and social life, which formed the ideas and concepts under discussion.

Furthermore, Chunqiu thinkers not only participated in the synchronic discourse but were also members of a long diachronic discourse throughout Chinese history. They inherited the concepts and views of their Western Zhou predecessors, and bequeathed their own ideas to Zhanguo thinkers. The present study, accordingly, will discuss Chunqiu thought in the light of preceding and subsequent intellectual developments. The result, I hope, will be the reconstruction of two and a half centuries of heretofore largely neglected Chinese intellectual history and an elucidation of this period's role in the formation of China's political culture and ethical life.

Chapter 1

Sources of Chunqiu Thought

Lord Huan was reading books at the top of the hall.
Wheelwright Pian was chipping a wheel at the bottom of the hall.
He put aside his mallet and chisel and went up to ask Lord Huan: "I dare to ask, what words is my lord reading?"
The lord answered: "Words of the sages."
[Pian] asked: "Are the sages alive?"
The lord answered: "They are already dead."
"So—" said [Pian]—"what my lord is reading is nothing but the dregs of the souls of the ancients!"

—Zhuangzi

Any discussion of Chunqiu thought is meaningless unless we can answer the crucial question, what are the sources of Chunqiu intellectual life? Or to formulate this more radically, are there any sources of Chunqiu thought? Many scholars have answered in the negative. The present chapter will suggest that such sources do in fact exist.

It may be assumed with a high degree of certainty that a philosophical treatise as such did not exist before Confucius' time. There are, however, rich historical sources that deal with the Chunqiu era, among which the unique position of the *Zuo zhuan* (hereafter *Zuo*) is widely recognized. Its detailed accounts of domestic and foreign affairs of major Chunqiu states contain hundreds of speeches attributed to rulers and courtiers of that age. The protagonists' discussions of various political, ethical, and religious matters provide us with a unique glimpse of their ideological premises. In addition, speeches by Chunqiu statesmen are recorded in several other historical and philosophical writings, particularly in the *Guoyu* (Speeches of the States).

To date, no systematic study has been solely devoted to dealing with the reliability of the *Zuo* as a source for intellectual history. Many scholars doubt the authenticity of the *Zuo* speeches; instead of reflecting Chunqiu thought, it is conjectured that they may have been invented or rewritten by the *Zuo* author to serve his ideological purposes. Others, in contrast, draw indiscriminately upon *Zuo* speeches while discussing various aspects of Chunqiu intellectual life. Pivotal to any investigation of Chunqiu thought, the reliability of the *Zuo* speeches remains controversial, and has not been subjected to thorough scrutiny. A similar, albeit less-pronounced controversy continues regarding the reliability of the speeches recorded in the *Guoyu*. These crucial issues will be addressed in the following pages.

The first two sections of this chapter deal with the *Zuo*. First, what were the original sources of the *Zuo*? If its author/compiler relied primarily on oral tradition, then the *Zuo*'s value as a source for Chunqiu intellectual history would be seriously impaired. I shall try to show, however, that the author/compiler had at his disposal abundant written sources from the Chunqiu states, namely the records produced by court scribes, and that these records contained inter alia speeches by major statesmen. Then I shall discuss the nature, dating, and reliability of the *Zuo*. When was the *Zuo* written, and by whom? Did the author/compiler preserve the content of his original sources undistorted, or did he edit them in accord with his ideological needs? How can we validate the reliability of the *Zuo*?

The third section will discuss the reliability of the *Guoyu*. What is the nature of this treatise? When was it compiled? And how did the compiler(s) treat the original sources? Similar questions will be asked with regard to the *Chunqiu shiyu*—a recently recovered silk manuscript that deals with Chunqiu affairs. The reliability of other paleographical and written sources will be discussed in the last sections.

“Scribal Records”: The Original Sources of the *Zuo zhuan*

The *Zuo zhuan* is a major historical treatise that contains detailed year-by-year accounts of the activities of major Chunqiu states, and spans the years from 722 to 468 B.C.E. In the Han dynasty, following a bitter controversy,

the *Zuo* was recognized as a commentary on the Lu *Chun qiu*, one of the so-called “five classics.” Since then the *Zuo* has enjoyed prestige unmatched by any other historical treatise; generations of Chinese scholars have left few if any of its 180,000 characters uncommented on. But the *Zuo* has not only benefited from thorough research, it was—and remains—the subject of a series of bitter scholarly controversies. Already two millennia ago scholars began to argue whether or not the *Zuo* deserved its position as a classical text or, more precisely, whether or not it comments on the *Chun qiu*. Later they began to question the *Zuo*’s dating and authorship. Twentieth-century scholars added a third dimension to the controversy over the *Zuo*: what is its reliability as a source for Chunqiu history? This third issue is of primary importance for the present study; hence, our discussion of the *Zuo* will concentrate on the question of its reliability, while other issues will be only briefly addressed.

Any meaningful discussion of the *Zuo* must begin with the question of the primary sources used by its author/compiler. Unfortunately, none of these sources has survived, which explains why their role in the composition of the *Zuo* is still largely neglected in current research. While few would argue that the *Zuo* author invented his narrative from beginning to end, many continue to treat the content and the structure of the *Zuo* as if they reflect nothing but the personal preferences and choices of the author. Few pay attention to the possibility that literary devices and interpretative techniques used in the *Zuo* may reflect primarily the nature of its sources, which mediate between actual events of Chunqiu history and the *Zuo* narrative. Understanding these sources will be our first step toward understanding the *Zuo*.¹

Despite a recent upsurge in historians’ interest in the *Zuo*’s primary sources, most Western-language studies deal with the origins and nature of the *Zuo* primarily in terms of literary criticism.² These discussions contribute significantly to better understanding the peculiarities of the *Zuo* narrative, but they deal insufficiently with the complexity of the *Zuo*. Literary analysis tends to break the narrative into scenes and to concentrate on the more picturesque ones, such as major battles, personal dramas, bloody coups, “heroic narratives,” “didactic anecdotes,” “moralizing speeches,” and

“court remonstrance.”³ Although the *Zuo* contains an abundance of dramatic events and moralizing speeches, these constitute only a portion of its entire narrative. Most of the dry accounts contained in the *Zuo*, such as administrative problems, inter- and intralineage struggles, everyday political consultations, and diplomatic contacts usually remain beyond the immediate interest of the scholars who analyze the composition of the *Zuo* from a literary point of view. Yet to adequately understand the nature of the *Zuo* sources we should deal systematically with the narrative in its entirety, including dry accounts as well as the more lively details. In the following pages I shall try to analyze the *Zuo*’s content in order to supply a working hypothesis about the original sources used by the *Zuo* author / compiler, and about their nature and reliability for reconstructing Chunqiu history, particularly intellectual history.

Few would doubt that the *Zuo* is a compilation of earlier sources. For instance, Ronald Egan and Wang He point to numerous short narratives scattered throughout the *Zuo*, which in all likelihood existed as independent units prior to the *Zuo* compilation.⁴ The *Zuo* also contains larger units of texts from different states, as indicated by the uneven coverage of various states throughout the narrative. Domestic and foreign affairs of certain states are presented in great detail for several years, while at other periods the same state almost disappears from the narrative. This disappearance cannot always be explained by changing political circumstances in the given state; in all likelihood it suggests that the *Zuo* compiler had no access to material from this state at the given period of time.⁵

These are only preliminary observations, but even they suffice to indicate that the *Zuo* author / compiler must have resorted to primary materials from different Chunqiu states. What was the nature of these materials? In the absence of hard evidence to the contrary, many scholars tend to reduce the primary sources of the *Zuo* to the official annals of the Chunqiu states, similar to the *Chun qiu* of the state of Lu, and to oral tradition.⁶ Despite my disagreement with this suggestion, I would like to make it a departure point for the discussion of the *Zuo* sources. In what follows I shall first analyze the official annals, to check the extent of their role in the *Zuo* compilation, and then provide evidence for the existence of addi-

tional sources—written not oral—which I designate “scribal records,” and which evidently played a pivotal role in the compilation of the *Zuo*.

First, let us briefly examine the official annals and their role in the compilation of the *Zuo*. These annals, of which the *Lu Chun qiu* is the best-known example, fall into a peculiar genre of historical writings.⁷ Elsewhere I discussed in greater detail my assertion that these annals belong to the cultic-ritual strand of ancient Chinese historiography, namely, that they were ritual messages directed primarily to the ancestral spirits rather than to living members of the educated elite.⁸ Here I shall briefly recapitulate my major arguments concerning the content of the annals. Scrutiny of the *Lu Chun qiu* suggests that the laconic messages were subjected to the strictly ritualized “rules of recording” (*shufa*), that its highly formulaic language often concealed actual historical events, and that in any case it was incomprehensible to persons lacking proper scribal education. In light of all this, the hypothesis that considers the official annals as primary sources of the *Zuo* loses much of its plausibility.

Ritual messages required neither a detailed account of the events, nor inclusion of all politically relevant information. Lothar von Falkenhausen’s description of bronze inscriptions applies equally well to the official annals: “These documents do not convey the full range of human experience; the spirits were not supposed to know everything—there were to be no surprises, no irregularities in ritual exchange.”⁹ Indeed, the *Chun qiu* mentioned otherwise insignificant occurrences from the life of the Lu ruler, but kept silent on such important events as military encounters between neighboring states, unless they had been properly reported to the Lu court.¹⁰ Besides, as spirits should not be irritated, the annals partly or completely concealed undesirable news. Such events as assassinations of the Lu rulers, domestic turmoil, military defeats, and so on, were generally considered taboo and were not supposed to be reported to the ancestors. Similarly, the *Chun qiu* either omitted or distorted reports on certain activities when the lord of Lu was not in attendance.¹¹

Since the annals were directed to the spirits, they acquired unusual weight as tools of praise or condemnation of political personalities; being condemned “on the bamboo tablets” (i.e., in the annals) was a grave pun-

ishment indeed.¹² Sacredness of the annals usually prevented willful intervention in their content by powerful politicians and ensured a relatively high degree of reliability.¹³ However, in certain cases the legal function of the annals outweighed the need for historical accuracy; reports of major crimes sometimes had to emphasize the legal responsibility of the high dignitaries rather than explain who really committed the crime.¹⁴

These omissions, concealment, or distortion of unpleasant events, lack of details, and highly formulaic language all indicate that the official annals were ritual rather than historical chronicles; their “audience” was primarily the ancestral spirits.¹⁵ It is worth noting that when manuscripts of the *Chun qiu* began circulating publicly (presumably in the fifth century), the text was already accompanied by the commentaries; the *Chun qiu* was seemingly unintelligible to persons lacking proper scribal education.¹⁶ This suggests that the official annals as such were obscure, even in the eyes of contemporaries, and that other less enigmatic sources were needed for those eager to learn from the events of the past. These documents had to inform the *Zuo* author/compiler that, pace the *Chun qiu*, the slain lords of Lu and their scions did not merely “pass away,” that Zhao Dun of Jin did not personally murder his ruler, and that King Xiang of Zhou was summarily summoned to the interstate meeting at Wen in 632 and did not merely “hunt at Heyang.”¹⁷ The author also had to gather information from some source about all those battles, meetings, and events that were omitted from the *Chun qiu* reports.

As mentioned above, many scholars have asserted that the non-*Chun qiu* information in the *Zuo* derives primarily from oral tradition. I believe that this is not the case. Although oral transmission of certain anecdotes definitely existed in Chunqiu China, it cannot sufficiently explain the enormous amount of precise and detailed information that appears in the *Zuo*.¹⁸ The *Zuo* abounds with dates, place- and personal names, and official titles, which cannot be plausibly attributed either to official annals or oral tradition. For instance, the *Zuo* often supplies precise dates of events, almost all of which are correct (i.e., the reported *ganzhi* date did occur in the month mentioned in the *Zuo*).¹⁹ Let us look at the first year of the *Zuo* narrative:

The eighth month. [The state of] Ji invaded Yi. Yi did not report; hence it was not recorded [in the *Chun qiu*] . . .

Winter, the tenth month, *gengshen*. [We] changed the mourning of Lord Hui. Lord [Yin] did not participate; hence, this was not recorded . . .

The lord of Wei came to participate in the mourning. He did not meet [our] lord; hence, it was likewise not recorded.²⁰

None of these events is mentioned in the *Chun qiu*; hence, the precise dating must have come from a different source. It may not be impossible for such precise information to be preserved orally for at least two and a half centuries, but it is highly improbable. This suggests reliance on written records. The accuracy of the *Zuo* account is not confined to the state of Lu; it includes almost every major Chunqiu state. Let us look at the account of 516 about the rebellion of Prince Chao in the royal domain of Zhou:

The fourth month. Shanzi arrived at Jin to report an urgency. The fifth month, on *wuwu*, the men of Liu defeated the army of Wangcheng in the [territory of the] Shi lineage. On *wuchen*, the men of Wangcheng encountered the men of Liu at Shigu, the men of Liu were utterly defeated . . . The seventh month, on *jisi*, Liu zi escaped together with the king. On *gengwu*, [they] camped at Qu. Men of Wangcheng burned down [the city of] Liu. On *bingzi*, the king stayed at the Chu lineage. On *dingchou*, the king camped at Wangu. On *gengchen*, the king entered [his territory] from Xuma. On *xinsi*, the king camped at Hua. Zhi Li and Zhao Yang of Jin led the army to reinstate the king. They ordered Nü Kuan to guard Quesai.²¹

This is neither a “didactic anecdote,” a “heroic narrative,” nor a “historical romance.”²² Rather, it is a bureaucratic account that was prepared simultaneously with or shortly after the events that occurred. This and similar accounts form the skeleton of the *Zuo* narrative. They suggest that the author of the *Zuo* had at his disposal a significant amount of detailed, written information concerning major events throughout the Chunqiu period.

Further scrutiny of the *Zuo* text supplies additional evidence for its reliance on written records. Not only does the *Zuo* abound in dates, but it employs simultaneously at least two calendrical systems. In the Chunqiu period three calendars coexisted in different states, the so-called Xia, Shang, and Zhou systems, each of which fixed the new year in a different month.²³ The state of Lu followed the Zhou calendar, while the state of

Jin adopted the Xia calendar, which lagged two months behind that of Lu. While the *Zuo*, like the *Chun qiu*, usually follows the Zhou calendar, the *Zuo* accounts about the state of Jin, as we shall see below, are often based on the Xia calendar. This further suggests reliance on written sources from Jin, which might have been incorporated in the *Zuo* narrative more or less verbatim, or at least without major editorial changes.²⁴

Grammatical analysis of the *Zuo* further confirms its reliance on written sources. Bernhard Karlgren's pioneer study argued that the compiler unified the language of his sources in accordance with current grammatical rules. While this observation is basically correct, and accords with what we know of the practice of later historians, it nonetheless requires certain modifications.²⁵ In some cases the compiler did not alter the language of his sources—presumably when two or more different usages were acceptable. Accordingly, we may discern slight but recognizable grammatical changes from the beginning to the end of the *Zuo* narrative. Two case studies of this change are discussed in Appendix 1; these are the changing frequency of the use of synonymous *yu* particles (于 and 於), and the substitution of *qi* (其) as a rhetorical question particle with *qi* (豈). In both cases a clear change occurs from the more archaic usage, characteristic of the Western Zhou texts, toward a modern one, which is akin to that of the early Zhanguo writings.²⁶ These changes indicate that the language of the *Zuo* follows, at least partly, the language of the primary sources and further supports our assumption that the *Zuo* author relied primarily on written sources while compiling his narrative.

Now, having ascertained the *Zuo*'s reliance on written sources, it is time to ask what these sources looked like. Earlier we mentioned the possibility that the *Zuo* comprises larger and smaller textual units. These units in all likelihood are short historical narratives, which I will call “scribal records” (*shiji*).²⁷ The discussion of the nature of these documents, most if not all of which were lost already by the Han dynasty (206 B.C.E.–220 C.E.), is inevitably conjectural, but the scribal records may be partly reconstructed from the *Zuo* narrative and from other sources. In the following pages I shall further develop my working hypothesis on the primary sources of the *Zuo*.

Earlier we mentioned the cultic origins of Chinese historiography. Communication with the ancestors was, however, only one of the stimuli for the development of historical writing. No less significant was the statesmen's desire to learn from the past in order to serve the present. Ever since the establishment of the Western Zhou dynasty, Chinese statesmen have been aware of the importance of historical lessons for policy considerations.²⁸ This awareness further increased in the Chunqiu period, when references to the past became one of the major tactics in political arguments. The political weight of learning from the past generated a demand for relevant historical literature, and the court scribes may have supplied this demand by creating short narrative histories—scribal records.²⁹

These scribal records might have originated as instructional materials for future scribes. Indeed, in order to master the sophisticated rules of recording the official annals, the aspiring scribe would have to learn the relationship between the laconic and enigmatic statements of the annals and actual events, so as to be able to make the appropriate record when similar circumstances occurred. It is plausible to assume that, in addition to official annals, scribes kept detailed and less-biased records of events, which were used (among other things) to instruct and train disciples.³⁰ These materials prepared for instructional needs might have foreshadowed the compilation of short narrative histories—scribal records—aimed at a broader segment of the educated elite.

While none of these narrative histories has survived, the existence of such documents is attested to in various Chunqiu and Zhanguo texts. They are designated by different names, the most common of which is *Chunqiu*—what may be considered a *terminus technicus* for historical texts in the pre-imperial period.³¹ While the detailed structure of these histories is far from clear, some of their basic features may be discerned from the *Zuo*. The most important observation in regard to these scribal records is that they were not purely literal accounts of Chunqiu events, but had political and ideological agendas according to which they interpreted the events they reported.

Scholars who have analyzed interpretative devices used in the *Zuo* have usually assumed that these devices were employed uniquely by the au-

thor/compiler of the *Zuo zhuan*.³² I shall try to use the analytical framework of these scholars in order to suggest that, on the contrary, many of these devices originated in the Chunqiu scribal records and were later copied into the *Zuo*. Let us take, for instance, the issue of predictions. The *Zuo* cites dozens of statesmen, scribes, and diviners who routinely predict the outcomes of battles, the destinies of states and individuals, and so on. Aside from several long-term predictions that refer to events of the Zhanguo age (for these, see Appendix 2), most *Zuo* speakers foretell events of the immediate future. The speakers' foreknowledge allows the reader to assess the future course of events and to learn which policy choices were acceptable. Predictions, along with the post-factum analyses of events scattered throughout the *Zuo*, are one of the major interpretative devices employed throughout the narrative.

Many scholars have discussed the role of predictions in the *Zuo*, and most of them have assumed that it was the *Zuo* author who put predictions in the mouths of his protagonists.³³ This assumption, however, may be questioned. Let us examine one case. In 655 Lord Xian of Jin (r. 676–651) planned to annex the states of Guo and Yu. The *Zuo* presents a detailed account of Lord Xian's moves and their outcomes. Among others, the narrative cites a prediction made by Bu Yan, a divination specialist at the court of Jin. In the eighth month Bu predicted that the state of Guo would be extinguished between the ninth and the tenth month of the year.³⁴ Immediately after Bu Yan's prediction the *Zuo* tells that the state of Guo was indeed annihilated, but this happened on the first day of the twelfth month.

Should we then consider Bu Yan's prediction to be incorrect? Not necessarily. Bu Yan used the Xia (Jin) calendar, according to which Guo was indeed conquered on the first day of the tenth month. The *Zuo* reported the day of the final annihilation of Guo according to the Zhou (Lu) calendar, the twelfth month of which was identical to the tenth month of the Xia calendar. The calendrical discrepancy suggests that Bu Yan's prediction appeared originally in Jin records, and was copied into the *Zuo* without significant modifications. Had the *Zuo* author invented Bu Yan's prediction, he would certainly have used the same calendar throughout the story; as this is not the case, we may plausibly assume that the prediction

was a contribution made by the Jin scribe. This is one of many examples of short-term predictions that the author transmitted more or less verbatim from his sources, but even this single example suffices to challenge the assertion that predictions should be invariably considered devices of the *Zuo* author.³⁵

Predictions are not the only instances in which we can demonstrate that interpretative devices commonly attributed to the *Zuo* author should instead be traced to his primary sources. Another device is the post-factum evaluation of certain events. These consist of, among other things, personal remarks by the narrator (the so-called “superior man”), remarks attributed to Confucius, and series of short statements that designate certain actions as either “ritual” (*li ye*) or “nonritual” (*fei li ye*). Recently, Mark Lewis has suggested that all three evaluations reflect personal judgments of the *Zuo* author.³⁶ Again, this assertion may be contested. We shall not discuss here the narrator’s and Confucius’ remarks,³⁷ but instead concentrate on the “ritual” evaluations. Carine Defoort noticed an interesting phenomenon; these evaluative remarks are scattered more or less evenly throughout the narrative, but then almost disappear from the last fifty years of the *Zuo*.³⁸ It is highly unlikely that their disappearance was caused by a sudden change in habits of the *Zuo* author. A much more plausible explanation is that the ritual/nonritual evaluative remarks appeared in the *Zuo* original sources, and were part of their interpretative strategy. Possibly, for the later part of the narrative, the *Zuo* compiler employed different sources, which did not contain references to ritual propriety of statesmen’s actions.³⁹

These few examples suffice to indicate that the original sources of the *Zuo* were not stenographic accounts of political events, but had their own agendas and interpretative strategies that found their way, at least in part, onto the *Zuo* pages. These sources were in all likelihood based on the original court records, but they definitely incorporated less reliable information, which might have derived either from oral anecdotes or scribes’ imaginations.⁴⁰ But now we may ask the question most important for our discussion: how does this understanding of the *Zuo* sources reflect on the reliability of the speeches it cites?

The tradition of recording speeches is probably as old as Chinese historiography itself. Short utterances by Shang kings, pronounced during the divination ceremony, appear on oracle bones. Many of the Western Zhou bronze inscriptions contain direct speeches pronounced during the investiture ceremony by the king or by the scribe who acted on his behalf; these speeches are marked by the phrases “the king said” or “the king said to the effect” (*wang yue* / *wang ruo yue*). Moreover, the inscriptions often mention the recorder (*zuo ce*) who was present at the investiture ceremony and apparently recorded the investiture speech and the recipient’s polite reply. A very similar pattern may be discerned in the Western Zhou documents of the *Shu jing*. For instance, according to the “Jin teng,” the Duke of Zhou’s spoken oath was recorded by the scribe; the record was preserved and later read by King Cheng (r. 1042–1021). A similar ceremony is mentioned in the “Luo gao” regarding the enfeoffment of the Duke of Zhou’s descendants.⁴¹

Quite probably, Western Zhou scribes recorded only the extraordinary speeches, such as oaths, declarations, and kings’ orders.⁴² By the time of the Eastern Zhou, however, this tradition encompassed broader activities; instances of recording statesmen’s speeches are mentioned several times in the *Zuo* and the *Guoyu*, and more examples appear in later Zhanguo writings.⁴³ It is impossible to validate all these cases, but they definitely indicate that the practice of recording speeches existed and might have been relatively widespread. A recently discovered *Yu shu* (Speech Document) from Shuihudi, Hubei, provides further evidence that recording speeches became common at least by the late Zhanguo period. The *Yu shu* begins: “In the twentieth year, the fourth month, which begins with the day *bingxu*, [on the second day] *dinghai*, Teng, the governor of Nanjun said to the local bailiffs from counties and border counties . . .”⁴⁴ After delivering a speech on the need to unify popular customs, Teng ordered copies to be distributed in the Jiangling area. It seems that the speech was originally delivered during a conference of local officials in the capital of Nanjun; it was simultaneously recorded and later distributed. This task was probably performed by Scribe Xi, who served in the Jiangling area and who is buried in the Shuihudi tomb. Thus, by the late Zhanguo period, even some speeches of local officials were immediately recorded.

In view of these examples, one can hardly doubt that at least some of the speeches by leading personalities, quoted in the historical sources, particularly in the *Zuo*, derive from written records.⁴⁵ It would be naïve, however, to assume that the *Zuo* speeches are verbatim transcriptions of the original pronouncements made by Chunqiu personalities. As we have seen from the discussion above, the speeches might have been embellished by the scribes, who for instance might have put correct predictions in the mouths of their protagonists. Should this discourage us from discussing the *Zuo* speeches as sources for history of Chunqiu thought? I do not think so. Even if some speeches were invented from beginning to end, and not merely embellished by the scribes, they still remain part of the Chunqiu intellectual milieu and deserve our interest, insofar as their content was not distorted by the *Zuo* author/compiler.

The *Zuo* may contain a certain amount of completely imaginary speeches, just as it contains several entirely reliable verbatim records of statesmen's sayings, but both are in a distinct minority.⁴⁶ Most of the speeches evidently underwent revision by the scribes in the process of preparing scribal records. As argued above, these revisions should not invalidate the *Zuo* speeches as sources for Chunqiu thought. But can we nevertheless ascertain to what extent scribal revisions distorted the original content of the speech?

Fortunately, we may investigate this question in greater detail. The *Zuo* contains two distinct accounts of the interstate meeting of late 510. One of the accounts was prepared by Jin scribes, and the second by their Lu colleagues; both contain the same speech of the Wei 衛 dignitary Biao Xi. In Appendix 3, by comparing the two accounts and the presentation of Biao Xi's speech in both, we learn much about scribal techniques of the Chunqiu period. We shall see that, although the versions are not identical, both preserved the basic content of Biao Xi's speech undistorted. This allows us to cautiously suggest that, despite certain embellishments, the speeches recorded in the *Zuo* may truthfully represent the basic vision of the Chunqiu statesmen, if not their original words.⁴⁷

The evidence presented above shows, first, that the author of the *Zuo* relied primarily on written sources for his work and, second, that these

sources contained, among other things, speeches by leading statesmen. These speeches, although embellished and edited by the scribes, apparently reproduce the views of Chunqiu personalities, or at least of Chunqiu scribes, and in any case they belong to the Chunqiu intellectual milieu. The question to be asked now is whether the author/compiler of the *Zuo* preserved the speeches without distortion, or if he reedited them to impose his own ideological perspective. Before answering this question we must first discuss the nature and the dating of the *Zuo*.

Authorship, Dating, and Reliability of the *Zuo*

Throughout two millennia the *Zuo* has been the subject of a bitter controversy regarding its relationship to the *Chun qiu* classic. In 6 B.C.E., the Han librarian Liu Xin (46 B.C.E.–23 C.E.) suggested establishing an office for the *Zuo* as an official commentary to the *Chun qiu*. Liu Xin met with fierce opposition from supporters of another commentary, the *Gongyang zhuan*, who claimed that “the *Zuo* does not comment on the *Chun qiu*.”⁴⁸ After almost a century of controversy, the *Zuo* was finally established in 83 C.E. as the officially recognized commentary to the classic, but thereafter scholars continued to criticize the *Zuo* for missing the “great meaning” of the *Chun qiu*.⁴⁹

Criticism of the *Zuo* as a pseudocommentary reached its apogee with the Qing scholar Liu Fenglu (1776–1829 C.E.). Liu pointed to numerous discrepancies between the texts of the *Zuo* and the *Chun qiu*, and claimed that they prove that the *Zuo* was originally merely a historical treatise, which had been manipulatively turned into a commentary by Liu Xin. Later, Kang Youwei (1858–1927), Cui Shi (1852–1924), and other scholars raised further accusations against Liu Xin. Though subsequent studies have refuted most of these claims and rehabilitated Liu Xin, contemporary scholars generally continue to deny the initial ties between the *Zuo* and the *Chun qiu*.⁵⁰

The question of the interrelationships between the *Zuo* and the *Chun qiu*, while crucial for Classical Studies, is of minor importance to the present research. Most of those who questioned the *Zuo*’s status as a commentary praised its historical value; some even regarded the historicity of

the *Zuo* as detrimental to the “great meaning” of the classic.⁵¹ The main issue for us, therefore, is not whether the *Zuo* is a commentary or not, but whether it is historically reliable. However, before we abandon this much-disputed issue, two observations are pertinent.

First, it is worth mentioning that the answer to the question of whether the *Zuo* comments on the *Chun qiu* or not depends on the definition of “commentary.” Most scholars implicitly assume that a commentary should be similar to the *Gongyang* or *Guliang zhuan*, namely it should explain “the great meaning” and “the subtle words” of the classic. The *Zuo* definitely follows a different pattern. It rarely focuses on the words of the *Chun qiu*, but provides a broad historical setting for the events mentioned therein. Therefore, although the *Zuo* may be regarded as an independent treatise, its ties with the *Chun qiu* cannot be easily dismissed.

Second, those scholars who deny initial ties of the *Zuo* and the *Chun qiu* fail to provide a convincing explanation for the reasons for the initial compilation of the *Zuo*. Why should anybody undertake such Herculean efforts, meticulously collecting scribal records of various Chunqiu states and composing a text that by far exceeds anything written in pre-imperial China? And is it a mere coincidence that this text covers the same period as the *Chun qiu*? In the absence of persuasive answers to these questions, I believe that the traditional explanation of the *Zuo* origins as a *Chun qiu* commentary sounds more plausible than the present alternatives.

When and by whom was the *Zuo* compiled? Sima Qian attributed its compilation to Confucius’ contemporary, “the Lu gentleman Zuo Qiuming.” This attribution to Zuo Qiuming was generally accepted throughout the Han period and thereafter.⁵² During the 6 B.C.E. controversy over the establishment of the academician’s office for experts on the *Zuo*, Liu Xin made clever use of Zuo Qiuming’s alleged authorship. He claimed that “[Zuo] Qiuming had the same likes and dislikes as the Sage [Confucius], he personally saw the Master, while the *Gongyang* and *Guliang* appeared [only] after the seventy disciples; hearsay transmission cannot be as detailed as that based on personal acquaintance.” None of Liu Xin’s opponents doubted this attribution.⁵³

The controversy over the dating of the *Zuo* began in the Tang dynasty,

when Dan Zhu (724–770 C.E.), Zhao Kuang (eighth century), and Lu Chun (d. 806) began to question Zuo Qiuming's authorship.⁵⁴ In the Song, Wang Anshi (1021–1086 C.E.), Ye Mengde (1077–1148), and Zheng Qiao (1104–1162) claimed that the *Zuo* contains several instances of Zhanguo data, and concluded that it must have been compiled in the Zhanguo or even as late as the Qin (221–207 B.C.E.) period.⁵⁵ Generations of later scholars continued to disagree; whereas some concurred with Zuo Qiuming's authorship, others repeatedly attributed the *Zuo* to a Zhanguo or, more rarely, Qin personality. While the controversy was partly motivated by purely scholarly reasons, many scholars rejected or approved Zuo Qiuming's authorship in order to bolster their claims regarding the *Zuo*'s value as a commentary.⁵⁶

The twentieth century witnessed an intensification of this discussion. Kang Youwei synthesized previous criticisms on the *Zuo* and claimed that the whole treatise is a forgery produced by Liu Xin, who rewrote the original text of the *Guoyu*. Despite his tendentious arguments, Kang's theory spurred controversy anew.⁵⁷ Although numerous linguistic, historiographic, and textual studies have since refuted the theory of Han authorship, the precise dating of the *Zuo* remains debatable, with a majority view assigning it to the mid-Zhanguo period, while a significant minority considers it a product of the late Chunqiu or early Zhanguo age.⁵⁸

Before discussing my own suggestions regarding the dating of the *Zuo*, two important observations are in order. First, there are strong indications that the bulk of the *Zuo* was compiled more or less single-handedly.⁵⁹ The *Zuo* is not a haphazard assemblage of earlier documents akin to the *Guoyu* or *Zhanguo ce*. Its compiler successfully integrated his primary sources, achieving a remarkable degree of stylistic and grammatical unity; and in all but a few cases he succeeded in eliminating whatever contradictions his sources might have contained. Furthermore, the *Zuo*'s literary composition is fairly sophisticated and bears all the signs of single authorship.⁶⁰ Besides, as Eric Henry has shown, the narrator's remarks scattered throughout the *Zuo* reflect a distinct outlook; it is unlikely that they are the product of different authors.⁶¹

This assertion does not presume of course that the *Zuo* we currently read was produced in its final form in the fifth or fourth century B.C.E.

Like most other pre-imperial texts, the final version of the *Zuo* was established in the long process of transmission, which included additions and probably also modifications and omissions from the earlier versions.⁶² When we talk of the date of the *Zuo* compilation we should discern between the earliest date at which the bulk of the text was put together from its primary sources, and the latest date after which no significant changes were made. Even after the text was firmly established, occasional interpolations occurred, but their relative weight is negligible, as they amount to no more than 3 percent of the *Zuo*.⁶³

Second, the *Zuo* was in all likelihood originally produced in the state of Lu. Over a period of more than two and a half centuries the *Zuo* refers to Lu as “us,” “our state” (*wo*), and visiting politicians are said to be “coming” to it (*lai*). Lu’s lord is merely called “the lord” (*gong*), while rulers of other states are referred to by name or at least by the name of their state. Moreover, unlike other states like Jin and Chu, which occasionally disappear from the *Zuo* narrative (see below), the state of Lu constantly remains the focus of the author’s attention, and its internal affairs are discussed in great detail. All this undermines the assertions of many traditional and modern scholars who attributed the *Zuo* to an author from Jin, Chu, or another Chunqiu state.⁶⁴ Lu provenance of the *Zuo* is significantly more plausible than other hypotheses.

After these preliminary observations, we may address the question of the dating of the *Zuo* composition. First, we should definitely refute the Han authorship conjecture. The *Zuo* is often quoted in late Zhanguo texts, so it must have been well known in the Zhanguo period.⁶⁵ As these quotations are too numerous to be mentioned here, I shall confine myself to a single example. Compare the account of Han Feizi (d. 233 B.C.E.) to the *Zuo* under the year 695:

The lord of Zheng intended to appoint Gao Qumi as a minister; [the future] Lord Zhao hated him,⁶⁶ and strongly remonstrated, without being heeded. When Lord Zhao ascended the throne, [Gao Qumi] feared that [the lord] would kill him. On [the day] *xinmao* he murdered Lord Zhao and enthroned Prince Dan. The superior man said: “Lord Zhao knew whom to hate.” Prince Yu said: “Gao the elder [i.e., Gao Qumi] must be executed. He went too far in avenging the hatred.”⁶⁷

Formerly, the lord of Zheng intended to appoint Gao Qumi as a minister; [the future] Lord Zhao hated him, and strongly remonstrated, without being heeded. [When] Lord Zhao ascended the throne, [Gao Qumi] feared that [the lord] would kill him. On [the day] *xinmao* he murdered Lord Zhao and enthroned Prince Wei. The superior man calls: "Lord Zhao knew whom to hate." Prince Da said: "Gao the elder [i.e., Gao Qumi] must be executed. He went too far in avenging the hatred."⁶⁸

The identity between the two passages is obvious. The difference amounts to only five characters, including a very common substitution of personal names by similar characters (*Dan* 亶 instead of *Wei* 韋 and *Yu* 圉 instead of *Da* 達). Han Feizi evidently cited the *Zuo*. The *Zuo* contains the date of the assassination of Lord Zhao, *xinmao*; from the previous passages we learn that the assassination occurred in the tenth month of the seventeenth year of Lord Huan of Lu (695). But Han Feizi mechanically copied the date (*xinmao*) without adding a year and a month, so the date in his context is meaningless. If Han Feizi had quoted a third common source with the *Zuo* he would have supplied a year and a month for the assassination. Moreover, he quotes the judgment of the *Zuo* author—"the superior man"—which further indicates that he copied the passage from the *Zuo*. Therefore, the *Zuo* was quite likely a well-known text as early as the late Zhanguo, and attempting to attribute it to a Han personality is pointless. But can the *Zuo* be more precisely dated?

Scholars usually date the *Zuo* according to some of its predictions that foretell events that occurred in the Zhanguo period. It is accepted that if the *Zuo* speaker correctly predicted a fourth-century B.C.E. event, then the *Zuo* must have been compiled after this event. The problem with this method, which may be traced back already to Ye Mengde, is twofold. First, many predictions are formulated in enigmatic language, which allows for several interpretations; hence, scholars disagree over which events were predicted and whether or not the prediction was correct. Second, most importantly, many predictions do not necessarily belong to the original text of the *Zuo*, and they might have been added by later transmitters. In Appendixes 2 and 4, I discuss the issue of predictions and interpolations in greater detail; suffice it to say here that I agree with the view of those schol-

ars who consider Zhangguo predictions to be insufficient indicators of the date of the *Zuo* compilation.⁶⁹

Zhangguo predictions, however, have one important advantage; namely they enable us to determine a *terminus ante quem* of the *Zuo* compilation. The *Zuo* contains several wrong predictions of fourth-century B.C.E. events; yet by far the greatest mistake is the author's statement that "Qin will never again invade the East." This statement could not have been made after Qin began its eastward expansion in the 360s B.C.E.⁷⁰ It strongly suggests not only that the *Zuo* was compiled before the second quarter of the fourth century B.C.E., but also that the *Zuo* text did not undergo substantial changes after this date; otherwise the editors would have deleted the unsuccessful prediction about Qin's future.

We may consider, then, 360 as the *terminus ante quem* of the *Zuo* compilation, but can we establish a more definite date for the beginning of the compilation of the *Zuo* as well? To do so we must analyze the structure of the text together with some of its linguistic characteristics. An interesting peculiarity of the *Zuo* narrative allows us to conjecture that its compilation took place earlier than the currently accepted view holds. Historical writings on the whole tend to be more detailed in regard to the years directly preceding the period of compilation. In the *Zuo* this tendency is only maintained until the late sixth century. The Qing scholar Cui Shu (1740–1816 C.E.) noticed that whereas the *Zuo* gives a very thorough and detailed account of the reign periods of the Lu lords Xiang (r. 572–542 B.C.E.) and Zhao (r. 541–510), its narrative is extremely sketchy on the reigns of the earlier lords, as well as the reigns of the late Chunqiu lords Ding (r. 509–495) and Ai (r. 494–468). Cui Shu asserted that at the time of the *Zuo* compilation the author had only meager access to the materials of the late Chunqiu period; hence he suggested that the *Zuo* must have been compiled in the mid-fifth century B.C.E.⁷¹

Cui Shu's assertion can be further substantiated. The narrative toward the end of the *Zuo* becomes not only brief, but also geographically limited. Table 1 compares the number of entries concerning each state in the last twenty-one years of the *Zuo* narrative with those of the mid-seventh and mid-sixth centuries B.C.E. Counting entries is not entirely

satisfactory: the distribution differs in various editions,⁷² and entries differ considerably in length; some states are only briefly mentioned, others are given a detailed account. Nevertheless, we can still rely to some extent on this method while comparing the different parts of the *Zuo*, since the distribution among entries follows a similar pattern throughout the narrative. Thus, it is possible to indicate the change in relative importance of each state for the author.⁷³

The results are revealing. Changes in the coverage of certain states can be explained historically, for example, the emergence of the Wu and Yue hegemony in the early fifth century B.C.E. But more significantly, the table clearly indicates that in the last years of the *Zuo* narrative its author focused almost completely on Lu and its close neighbors (Qi, Song, Wei), while powerful states that dominated the narrative in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C.E.—Jin, Chu, and Zheng, as well as Zhou and Qin—almost disappear from his account. The first group increases from 33.7 percent in the mid-seventh century and 39.6 percent in mid-sixth century to 56 percent in the later *Zuo*, while the second group shrinks correspondingly from 41.5 percent and 47.4 percent to only 14.7 percent. The picture is even clearer when we consider that over 90 percent of the entries that deal with internal matters, such as power struggles, rebellions, coups, are, in the last years, confined to Lu and its close neighbors. Other states are mentioned mostly in the context of international activities such as interstate meetings, visits to the state of Lu, or warfare. The results suggest that in the early fifth century the *Zuo* author already had access to his materials and had begun working on his treatise. As a resident of Lu, the author was confined in the last years of his work to materials of neighboring states and hence was forced to limit the geographical scope of his narrative. Thus he concentrated on depicting events in Lu and its Shandong neighbors, while events in the remote states of Shanxi, Shaanxi, Anhui, and Henan remained largely uncovered. This apparent change in the latter years of the *Zuo* narrative permits the assumption that its compilation began during late Chunqiu years.⁷⁴

A linguistic analysis of the *Zuo* further strengthens this assumption. The Yuan scholar Zhao Fang (1319–1369 C.E.) wrote:

TABLE 1: NUMBER OF ENTRIES PER STATE
IN THE *ZUO*

Years	660–640 B.C.E. (Min 2–Xi 20)		560–540 B.C.E. (Xiang 13–Zhao 1)		488–468 B.C.E. (Ai 7–Ai 27)	
State	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Lu	23	11.6	64	18.1	40	25.5
Qi	26	13.1	46	13	20	12.7
Song	10	5	13	3.7	11	7
Wei	8	4	17	4.8	17	10.8
Jin	25	12.6	72	20.3	8	5.1
Chu	14	7.1	39	11.4	7	4.5
Zheng	17	8.6	44	12.4	7	4.5
Zhou	15	7.6	8	2.3	1	0.6
Qin	11	5.6	4	1.1	—	—
Wu	—	—	10	2.8	23	14.6
Yue	—	—	2	0.6	11	7
Others	49	24.7	34	9.6	12	7.6
Total	198		354		157	

Note: The total number of states per entry is greater than the number of entries, since some of them deal with more than one state. States were not counted if they were occasionally mentioned without supplying any additional information.

The “History of the Later Han” (*Hou Han shu*) was compiled by Fan Yu (i.e., Fan Ye, 398–445 C.E.) and thus it became as terse as [writings] of the Jin (265–420 C.E.) and Song (420–479) times; the history of Yao, Shun, and the Three Dynasties was compiled by Sima Qian, and thus it became as coarse as [writings] of the Qin and Han times. Though Mr. Zuo is considered a Zhanguo personality, his style has absolutely no Zhanguo flavor. For instance, terms depicting warfare in Zhanguo books completely differ from the *Zuo zhuan*. The *Zuo* has no expressions like “storming a fortress” 拔其城, “seizing a city” 下其邑, “crushing [an enemy]” 大破之, “inflicting a sudden raid” 急擊. The term “general” 將軍 is seen only once in the later *Zuo*; perhaps it was the first time that this term was heard.⁷⁵

Zhao Fang correctly noticed that the *Zuo* vocabulary differs markedly from that of Zhanguo texts. Many common terms of Zhanguo discourse

are never seen in the *Zuo*, particularly such common compounds as “*renyi*” (benevolence and propriety), or “*wanwu*” (ten thousand things, all things), or the characters “*li*” (principle), “*cheng*” (sincerity, integrity), and “*zhi*” 智 (wisdom).⁷⁶ All these are very common terms and their absence from the lengthy *Zuo* narrative cannot be merely incidental. It indicates that the *Zuo* compilation took place before these terms began dominating intellectual discourse, that is, prior to the compilation of the texts of the Hundred Schools. Furthermore, the *Zuo* never mentions the crossbow (*nu*) or its parts, like the trigger (*ji* or *shu*), which again suggests that the compilation took place before the early to mid-fourth century B.C.E., when the Warring States’ armies began using the crossbow, and when the multifaceted term “*ji*” became particularly common.⁷⁷

Lexical peculiarities of the *Zuo* may give an important clue as to its pre-Zhanguo provenance. This hypothesis is further supported by He Leshi’s extensive study on *Zuo* grammar. He suggested that the grammatical uniqueness of the *Zuo* may reflect an earlier date of compilation than Zhanguo texts.⁷⁸ Although further philological studies are required to verify the date of the *Zuo* compilation, research to date lends plausibility to a pre-Zhanguo dating.⁷⁹ We may thus disagree with the mainstream view and cautiously suggest the fifth century B.C.E. as a possible date of the *Zuo* compilation, and the mid-fourth century B.C.E. as the latest date when a more-or-less fixed version could have appeared.

We can assume, then, that the *Zuo* was compiled relatively early, and that its author had at his disposal written materials from the Chunqiu states, which contained among other things statesmen’s speeches. These assumptions, however, are still insufficient to prove the reliability of the *Zuo*. The question remains whether the author of the *Zuo* preserved his information without distortion or whether he edited it to impose his ideology. Plainly speaking, did he put the speeches in the mouths of his protagonists?

Opinions differ on the question of the *Zuo*’s reliability. In the heyday of the controversy over its authenticity, in the late 1920s, Gu Jiegang (1893–1980) compared the reliability of the *Zuo* to that of the “Romance of the Three Kingdoms,” and Henry Maspero (1883–1945) claimed that the liter-

ary value of the *Zuo* outweighed its historical value.⁸⁰ Such views are heard less, lately. Most contemporary scholars rely on the *Zuo* as a historical source, but continue to doubt the authenticity of many of its speeches; others, in contrast, draw indiscriminately on *Zuo* speeches for discussing various aspects of Chunqiu thought. Although Chinese scholars have discussed the authenticity of selected speeches, a systematic study is still lacking.⁸¹

Scholarly skepticism toward the *Zuo* speeches is mostly based on two closely related arguments. First, many scholars argue that the speeches were employed by the author to serve his ideological agenda, which is usually defined as “Confucian,” or in David Schaberg’s definition, “Traditionalist.”⁸² It is assumed, accordingly, that the author subordinated the content of the speeches to his ideological needs. A second argument against the reliability of the speeches is that they are “ideologically unified,” which can only be a result of the author’s rewriting or inventing the content.⁸³

The argument of Confucian or Traditionalist imprint on the *Zuo* speeches has several weak points. “Who influenced whom” is a question of interpretation. A possible resemblance between the *Zuo* speeches and the so-called Confucian ideology may be interpreted as evidence of Chunqiu intellectual influence on Confucius and his followers. In fact, that is precisely the argument that I propose to pursue. Moreover, those who argue that the *Zuo* speeches serve a certain ideological agenda usually fail to explain the existence of the speeches that defy this putative agenda and represent values that cannot be plausibly attributed to the imprint of Confucius and his circle. Many of these will be discussed throughout this study; here I shall confine myself to a short example. For the year 688, the *Zuo* relates:

King Wen of Chu invaded [the state of] Shen, passing through Deng. Lord Qi of Deng said: “He is my nephew!”⁸⁴ He [urged King Wen to] stop and feasted him. [The lord’s] nephews Zhui, Dan and Yang begged permission to kill the king of Chu. The lord of Deng did not grant it. The three nephews said: “He is the man who will destroy the state of Deng. If we do not plot ahead, later you will bite your own navel!”⁸⁵ Let us plot now. This is the time.” The lord of Deng said: “People will be disgusted to eat the remnants of my food!” [The nephews] answered: “If you do not follow us, the three servants, then the altars of soil and grain will re-

main without blood offerings, where will you get remnants?" [The lord] did not follow them.

In the year when the King of Chu returned from Shen, he invaded Deng. On the sixteenth year [of Lord Zhuang of Lu, 679], Chu once more invaded Deng and destroyed it.⁸⁶

Lord Qi of Deng acted according to the moral norms that would later be described as Confucian: he "treated the relative as relative" and remained trustworthy to his guest. The results were disastrous. Others behaved differently. In 671 Lord Xian of Jin considered his position threatened by collateral branches of the ruling lineage. His advisor, Shi Wei, proposed to act against the lord's relatives, and within three years the latter were either expelled or executed.⁸⁷ But the *Zuo* is not critical of Shi Wei, who is depicted as a skillful politician, and founder of one of the most influential aristocratic lineages in the state of Jin. If the *Zuo* was nothing but a Confucian/Traditionalist polemical work disguised as a historical treatise, then we should expect it either to omit these stories or at least to add a moralizing appendix. Nothing like this was done. A person eager to learn from the historical experience presented in the *Zuo* might well place a higher value on the considerations of realpolitik than on family morality. Indeed, the *Zuo* frequently quotes some of the most respected Chun-qi statesmen, such as Zi Chan, Sima Hou, and Wu Zixu, who unequivocally advocated resolute action as superior to moral deliberations.⁸⁸ Their speeches, like the above stories, are hardly compatible with Schaberg's assessment that "willingness to put right before might . . . is . . . an engine of narrative in the *Zuo zhuan*."⁸⁹

I shall not trouble the reader with endless examples of *Zuo* speeches and narratives that defy the Procrustean bed of ideological purity imposed on the *Zuo* by modern scholars.⁹⁰ To be sure, the author of the *Zuo* definitely had his own outlook, which may well be defined as "Confucian" or "Traditionalist," but he generally remained faithful to his sources and preserved a significant number of speeches that "have no moral message" and "depict a world alien or hostile to Zhanguo Confucianism."⁹¹ It is precisely these features of the *Zuo* narrative that have been criticized most by rigorous Confucian scholars for the last two millennia.⁹² Thus, to re-

gard the *Zuo* as a Confucian/Traditionalist polemic and its speeches as ideological devices of the author is to miss the point.

The second argument of the *Zuo* skeptics, namely the alleged intellectual uniformity of its speeches, deserves more careful attention. If the speeches dispersed over 255 years represent identical views on political, social, and ethical issues, use similar terminology, and are “uniform in style and express the same philosophical outlook,”⁹³ then they must have been unified by the author/compiler of the *Zuo*. If, however, one can trace unequivocal chronological changes in the concepts and terms and in the political, social, and ethical views expressed in the *Zuo* speeches, then these speeches can be assumed to be reliable Chunqiu material. It would be incongruous to believe that the author of the *Zuo* deliberately invented intellectual developments spanning two and a half centuries. If ideological change in the *Zuo* can therefore be proven, it would significantly strengthen the assumption that the *Zuo* is a valid source for pre-Confucian thought.⁹⁴

I have noted above that the ideological variety of the *Zuo* speeches defies the attempt to ascribe a uniform outlook to their putative author. A careful reader may furthermore discern many instances of intellectual change from the beginning to the end of the narrative. Let us begin with the simplest example, namely the quantitative change in frequency of the use of four political and ethical terms: “*Dao*” (the Way), “*de*” (virtue), “*ren*” (benevolence), and “*xiao*” (filial piety). These terms played an important role in intellectual discourse beginning in the time of the *Lunyu* (fifth century B.C.E.). “*De*” and “*xiao*” were already widely used in the Western Zhou period, whereas “*Dao*” and “*ren*” were apparently introduced during the Chunqiu era. “*De*” and “*xiao*” will serve as a control group because they are supposed to be constant throughout the entire *Zuo*, while “*Dao*” and “*ren*” will be the variables we are comparing. Table 2 distributes the text of the *Zuo* into three equal, consecutive divisions, and compares the frequency of use of these four terms.

What can we learn from these results?⁹⁵ Although there is a change in the frequency of the terms “*xiao*” and “*de*” throughout the *Zuo* narrative, it is not as radical as that of “*Dao*” and “*ren*.” There is a steady increase in the use of the latter terms, both in the second and third divisions; in the late *Zuo* speeches, these terms appear almost three times as frequently as

TABLE 2: FREQUENCY OF
TERMS IN *ZUO* SPEECHES

	<i>xiao</i>	<i>de</i>	<i>ren</i>	<i>Dao</i>
722–613 B.C.E. (Yin 1–Wen 14)	7	88	5	12
612–542 B.C.E. (Wen 15–Xiang 31)	5	103	9	25
541–468 B.C.E. (Zhao 1–Ai 28)	4	82	14	34

Notes: I distributed the *Zuo* into equal consecutive blocks of the text to avoid a problem of unequal distribution of the narrative over the years. A division into equal periods of time brings similar results (Pines 1998b). The present table does not take into consideration those speeches, enumerated in Appendix 4, which I believe to be later interpolations. Including these speeches will not substantially skew the above results. *Dao* is not counted when used as a verb “to speak” or in its original meaning as “a road.”

in the early Chunqiu period. It is clear, therefore, that the *Zuo* speeches show a substantial increase in the use of the “new” terms “*Dao*” and “*ren*” over the Chunqiu period, whereas there is only a relatively slight variation in the use of the “old” terms “*de*” and “*xiao*.” This significant rise in the use of the new terms cannot be attributed to an increase in the number of speeches in the latter half of the *Zuo*, since this rise is unmatched by parallel changes in the use of the old terms. The quantitative change thus undermines the arguments of the intellectual uniformity of the *Zuo* speeches. Statistical analysis, however, is still insufficient. To further illustrate intellectual change in the *Zuo*, a more substantial analysis of the content of the speeches must be undertaken.

The present study on the whole endeavors to demonstrate intellectual change throughout the *Zuo* narrative, particularly the change in meanings and modes of use of certain key political and ethical terms. Such major concepts as “*li*” (禮; ritual, rites), “*de*,” “*li*” (利; benefit, profit), and others were profoundly reconceptualized throughout the Chunqiu period, and their meaning in the late *Zuo* unmistakably differs from that of the early part of the narrative. Chunqiu discourse, as we see it in the *Zuo*, was a dynamic response to contemporary political and social challenges. Throughout the Chunqiu period statesmen reevaluated many crucial questions, rejecting earlier beliefs in the process.

The *Zuo* presents a complicated pattern of intellectual change. In some cases, such as the reconceptualization of the term “*li*” (benefit, profit), discussed in Chapter 6, we may speak of sweeping developments, while in other cases, such as the ethical reinterpretation of the term “*junzi*” (superior man), discussed in the same chapter, or views of the transcendental, discussed in Chapter 2, changes were more gradual, and we can speak only of a shift of the center of gravity of statesmen’s views rather than a complete departure from earlier concepts. In yet other areas, such as views of ritual, discussed in Chapter 3, new ideas were endorsed by some statesmen but were bitterly opposed by others. Thus, aside from diachronic change, synchronic differences among the *Zuo* protagonists are similarly well pronounced, further defying the ascription of deliberate ideological uniformity to the *Zuo*.⁹⁶

Far from being monochromatic, the world of thought of Chunqiu China was full of ongoing controversies on internal and foreign problems, on attitudes towards the transcendental, on the relevance of the Western Zhou legacy, and on other related issues. These diachronic and synchronic divergences among the *Zuo* protagonists strongly support the reliability of the *Zuo* as a reflection of Chunqiu thought. Such differences, particularly the diachronic changes, cannot be assumed to have been forged or invented; rather they reflect real, vibrant intellectual life and the resultant changes in ideas throughout the Chunqiu period. They allow us to arrive at the conclusion that the author/compiler of the *Zuo* reproduced the statesmen’s speeches from his primary sources and did not invent them. Furthermore, changes in the speakers’ vocabulary, as indicated in Table 2 above, allow us to assume that the compiler reproduced the speeches without significantly distorting their original content. All this seems to confirm that the *Zuo* is a reliable—and invaluable—repository of Chunqiu thought.⁹⁷

The *Guoyu* and *Chunqiu shiyu*

The *Guoyu* consists of twenty-one books that record speeches from eight Chunqiu states, namely Jin (nine books), Zhou (three books), Lu, Chu,

and Yue (two books each), Qi, Zheng, and Wu (one book each). Almost all of these speeches are attributed to personalities from the Chunqiu period, the only exceptions being the book of Zheng and part of the first book of Zhou, which cite Western Zhou statesmen. Among the sources for Chunqiu history the *Guoyu* is second only to the *Zuo* in its length and abundance of details.

Tradition attributes the compilation of the *Guoyu* to the alleged author of the *Zuo*, Zuo Qiuming.⁹⁸ Fu Xuan (217–278 C.E.) was apparently the first to doubt this assertion; others followed him, and the discussion of the relationship between the *Zuo* and the *Guoyu* texts has continued well into the twentieth century.⁹⁹ Much less attention has been paid to the independent value of the *Guoyu*; even modern scholars have mostly refrained from comprehensively discussing its nature, dating, and reliability.

The similarity between the *Zuo* and the *Guoyu* is explicit. Both treatises deal with the same period. Almost two-thirds of the *Guoyu* narratives have parallels in the *Zuo*; in some instances the text is nearly identical.¹⁰⁰ However, Zhang Yiren's comprehensive comparative study pointed out numerous linguistic, lexical, and factual differences that virtually rule out the possibility that the texts were written by the same author.¹⁰¹ Thus, the striking similarity between both texts must be explained otherwise. Although several studies claim that either the *Zuo* quoted the *Guoyu* or vice versa, the mainstream view has been that the compilers apparently resorted to common primary sources.¹⁰² I cautiously concur with this assertion, though it needs further clarification.

The *Guoyu* definitely lacks the internal unity characteristic of the *Zuo*. Its books differ in style, in structure, and sometimes in their ideological commitment, as in the case of the book of Qi and the second book of Yue. Some books cover the entire Chunqiu period (of Zhou, Lu, Jin, and Chu), while others are confined to activities and speeches of a single personality over a comparatively short period of time (the books of Qi, Zheng, Wu, and Yue). Moreover, every single book usually consists of loosely connected anecdotes and may itself be a compilation by different personalities from different sources.¹⁰³ It may be plausibly assumed that parts of the *Guoyu* existed as independent units until the final compilation in the late Zhanguo

period.¹⁰⁴ This divergence within the *Guoyu* must be taken into consideration in discussing its dating and reliability.

When was the *Guoyu* compiled? The linguistic analysis by Yoshimoto Michimasa fixed the mid- to late Zhanguo period as the final date of compilation.¹⁰⁵ Although Yoshimoto's research is not comprehensive, it may serve as a guideline for further analysis.¹⁰⁶ In any case, it is clear that the *Guoyu* compiler(s) relied on much earlier documents. For instance, the *Guoyu* predicted the prosperity of the Mengsun lineage in the state of Lu. However, the Mengsun lineage perished in 408 B.C.E., after its stronghold in Cheng fell to the Qi invaders; hence, the prediction doubtless derives from an earlier source.¹⁰⁷ That the compilers preserved a wrong prediction may indicate the relatively low degree of their editorial interference. So, though the *Guoyu* was compiled later than the *Zuo*, it may still contain a certain amount of reliable data from the Chunqiu period. A more detailed exploration of its reliability is called for, however.

There is a significant difference in the nature of the *Guoyu* and the *Zuo*. The leading specialist on the *Guoyu*, Zhang Yiren, stated: "the *Zuo* . . . provides historical explanations to the [*Chun qiu*] classic . . . while the *Guoyu* is oriented towards 'clarifying virtue' (*ming de*)."¹⁰⁸ Indeed, unlike the *Zuo*, the *Guoyu* is not a narrative history. The factual setting of its discourses is of marginal importance for the compiler. The major aim of this book is to draw lessons from history for the purpose of upholding certain political norms; this aim is explicitly stated in the text through the speeches of several protagonists.¹⁰⁹ The *Guoyu* abounds in discussions on the importance of "historical lessons" (*xun*)—sometimes called "bright lessons" (*ming xun*)—and of "teaching [historical] lessons" (*jiao xun*).¹¹⁰ These discussions, which are scattered throughout the entire text, are absent in the *Zuo*; hence it is questionable whether they belong to the Chunqiu intellectual milieu. Perhaps the compiler(s) of the *Guoyu* voiced his (their) views on learning from history through the speeches of their protagonists. The book, therefore, belongs more to the category of a didactic device.

Unlike the *Zuo*, the *Guoyu* contains no visible intellectual change over the five centuries of its narrative.¹¹¹ With the exception of the book of Qi and the second book of Yue (which are discussed below), the entire nar-

rative promotes common political values. Certainly, claiming ideological unity for the *Guoyu* does not refute its reliability. After all, the compiler(s) could have selected authentic Chunqiu sources that corresponded to his (their) views.¹¹² There are, however, strong indications that these sources were too heavily “polished” by later editor(s), and hence are not as representative of Chunqiu thought as are those of the *Zuo*.

Before dealing with the bulk of the *Guoyu* narrative, I shall mention two chapters (“books”) that are widely considered to be of separate origin from the rest of the text. These are the book of Qi and the second book of Yue.¹¹³ Both are singularly well arranged, unlike other chapters, and their ideology differs greatly from the rest of the text. Several scholars have discussed their content, reaching the conclusion that these books were prepared by the Zhanguo “disputers of the *Dao*” who pursued purely ideological purposes; hence their presentation of the hegemony of Lord Huan of Qi (r. 685–643) and of King Goujian of Yue (r. 496–465) is significantly skewed due to the composers’ ideological commitment. Numerous factual mistakes, extensive usage of anachronistic (Zhanguo) terms, as well as the explicit ideological orientation of the “Qi yu” and “Yue yu 2” compromise the historical veracity of these books so that they are meaningless for the present study.¹¹⁴

The other nineteen books of the *Guoyu* are generally more reliable than the books of Qi and Yue, and most of their historical data is correct. Nevertheless, they cannot be regarded as a valid source for Chunqiu intellectual life, for several reasons. First, significant parts of the *Guoyu* narrative did not originate with written sources. The *Guoyu* speeches contain, for instance, midnight bedroom talks of Lord Xian of Jin with his cunning concubine Li Ji, secret negotiations between Qin envoys and the candidates for rulership of Jin, sayings of Lu official Gongfu Wenbo’s mother, and Ning Ying’s conversation with his wife.¹¹⁵ Almost half of the Jin books (“Jin yu” 1–4), which deal with Prince Shensheng and his half-brother Chonger, the future Lord Wen (r. 636–628), bear a strong imprint of oral history. Although oral tradition has its value, its reliability in regard to intellectual history has serious limitations. The *Zuo* also contains several narratives that definitely originated from the oral tradition, but in the *Guoyu* these occupy a much greater portion of the text.¹¹⁶

Second, the didactic nature of the *Guoyu*, along with its reliance on oral tradition, reduces its historical accuracy and results in numerous factual mistakes. For instance, the *Guoyu* quotes Prince Jin from the royal domain: "Though the Xia had declined, [its remnants, the states of] Qi 杞 and Zeng still exist."¹¹⁷ This statement was supposedly made in 550 B.C.E. However, eighteen years earlier the state of Ju had invaded Zeng and replaced the ruler of Zeng (the alleged descendant of the Xia dynasty) with his maternal relative, who was the Ju puppet. From that time the line of the Xia descendants in the state of Zeng ceased to exist.¹¹⁸ A Chunqiu personality could not possibly be ignorant of this fact. That the speech attributed to Prince Jin commits such an obvious mistake proves that it was either invented or heavily edited by the Zhanguo compiler(s), who paid little if any attention to its historical veracity. In another instance, the *Guoyu* quotes a speech by the Jin official Shu Xiang, in which he commemorated his late colleague Sima Hou.¹¹⁹ The speeches in the "Jin yu" are arranged in chronological sequence; accordingly, Shu Xiang's speech should have been made before 547 (the date of the next entry). The *Zuo*, however, mentions Sima Hou's activities as late as 537. Thus, either the speech was never made, or the compiler(s) were so ignorant of or indifferent to Chunqiu history that they misplaced Shu Xiang's speech by more than ten years!¹²⁰

Third, the *Guoyu* contains several examples of data that belong to the Zhanguo period. For instance, in 650 Prince Yiwu of Jin mentioned to the Qin envoys: "[Qin] is abundant in districts (*xian*) and commanderies (*jun*)."¹²¹ The administrative unit of *xian* might have existed in the state of Qin in the Chunqiu period, but commanderies (*jun*) certainly did not.¹²² The same speech mentions Yiwu's promise to grant his allies Li Ke and Pei Zheng one million and seven hundred thousand fields respectively in the areas of Fenyang and Fucui. Such huge allotments existed in the mid-Zhanguo period.¹²³ However, given the smaller territory, underdeveloped agricultural tools, and smaller population of the early Chunqiu state of Jin, it is clear that a promise of such a land allotment would have sounded absurd.

The *Guoyu* frequently refers to the state of Chu as "*manyi*" (barbarian).¹²³ This was a common definition of Chu in the Zhanguo period; in the Chunqiu, however, there are no traces of such a pejorative term

toward the southern superpower. Both the *Zuo* and archaeological discoveries indicate that the concept of distinct otherness regarding Chu did not exist in the Chunqiu period.¹²⁴ Thus, the term “*manyi*” in regard to Chu is apparently of Zhanguo origin.

Finally, the *Guoyu* vocabulary is undoubtedly of later origin than that of the *Zuo*. For instance, the *Guoyu* protagonists commonly use the term “*baixing*” (one hundred clans/surnames) as a definition for “the people.” This term had existed since the Western Zhou period, but then it referred only to ranked aristocracy. The term “*baixing*” became synonymous with “the people” (*min*) only in the late Chunqiu period, when increasing numbers of commoners acquired surnames (*xing*).¹²⁵ Thus its frequent use by the *Guoyu* protagonists is undoubtedly an anachronism. Other Zhanguo terms occur elsewhere in *Guoyu* speeches. “Trigger” (*ji* or *shuji*) is mentioned twice. As mentioned above, this term is related to the appearance of crossbows, and never occurs in either Chunqiu or early Zhanguo texts.¹²⁶ Other terms that are not current in the *Zuo* frequently occur in the *Guoyu*, such as “*zhi*” 智 (wisdom; thirty occurrences); “*cheng*” (sincerity/integrity; three occurrences); the compound “*baiwu*” (all things, equivalent to “*wanwu*”; eight occurrences).¹²⁷ Furthermore, the *Guoyu* contains a well-developed philosophy of nature and correlation between natural forces and political affairs, including elaborated concepts of *yin-yang* and *qi*. These are not seen in texts that originated before the mid-Zhanguo period.¹²⁸

We may summarize as follows. First, the *Guoyu* appears to be of much later origin than the *Zuo zhuan*. Second, its speeches underwent visible intervention by the editor/compiler(s); whatever the original text might have been like, it was significantly modified to suit the editors’ purposes. The *Guoyu* as a whole therefore cannot be regarded as a reliable source for Chunqiu thought. Nonetheless, parts of the *Guoyu*—particularly, most of the Lu speeches and part of the later Jin books—may contain significant amounts of authentic Chunqiu information. Moreover, the *Guoyu* grammar is akin to the *Zuo* and differs from that of any Zhanguo treatise.¹²⁹ This may indicate that the compilers’ intervention in the texts of their sources remained limited after all. Hence, it would be unwise to

neglect the *Guoyu* entirely: parts of it may be used with caution as an additional source of information for Chunqiu intellectual life.

Chunqiu shiyu is a silk manuscript, excavated in 1973 C.E. in tomb number three in Mawangdui, Hunan province.¹³⁰ The text consists of sixteen brief passages, all dealing with events of the Chunqiu period. Their structure is similar: a brief note on the factual setting is followed by a speech and the conclusion of the narrative. This structure is akin to that of the *Guoyu*; the *Chunqiu shiyu*, however, preserves a higher ratio of straight narration to quoted speech than the *Guoyu*. Although several passages were damaged, the events are identifiable—all but one (no. 2) appear in the *Zuo* or other sources.

The dating of the *Chunqiu shiyu* is less controversial than that of the *Zuo* and the *Guoyu*, the assertions ranging from the middle to the end of the third century B.C.E.¹³¹ This late dating presumes that the compiler(s) had limited access (if any) to the original materials of the Chunqiu period. Indeed, most passages follow the *Zuo*, although the compiler(s) may have had access to other sources, including probably the *Gongyang* and *Guliang zhuan*.¹³²

The didactic nature of the *Chunqiu shiyu* is even more explicit than that of the *Guoyu*; Zhang Zhenglang assumed that this is no more than a “school textbook” of Chunqiu history.¹³³ The structure of the *Chunqiu shiyu* is in fact extremely loose. Its anecdotes are not connected by either state or topic, nor are they arranged in any chronological or other meaningful sequence. It may be assumed that this text indeed served as a short textbook of Chunqiu political wisdom. Each of its anecdotes contains a short speech, either remonstrance or “planning” (*mou*), or a critical evaluation of an event by a contemporary or by a later personality.¹³⁴ The narrative usually continues to the point that proves the speaker’s arguments for the wisdom of a certain course of action. Thus, a short speech is the real heart of the anecdote, and the factual setting serves as mere background. Significantly, most of the cited speeches are absent from the *Zuo*.

That the compilers were more interested in the political wisdom of their protagonists than in historical accuracy is clear from the fifth anecdote.

dote. Its opening sentence says: “Lord Xian of Jin wanted to obtain Sui Hui; Wei Zhouyu requested to summon him [Sui Hui].”¹³⁵ The depicted event occurred in 614; however, Lord Xian of Jin died in 651. In 614 Jin was ruled by Lord Ling (r. 620–607), who was only seven or eight years old at that time. Consequently, neither Lord Xian nor Lord Ling could have played a role in summoning the fugitive official Sui Hui (Shi Hui) from Qin. Indeed, the *Zuo* explains in great detail that the plan to summon Sui Hui was adopted by the six high ministers of Jin, and the lord had no role in this decision.¹³⁶ More anachronisms appear elsewhere, and all of them significantly compromise the *Chunqiu shiyu*’s value for our research.¹³⁷

Paleographic Sources

Some additional sources for Chunqiu thought ought to be mentioned. The paleographical sources include numerous bronze inscriptions as well as remnants of the alliance/covenant texts from Houma and Wenxian. These sources have the advantage of undisputed reliability; they were obtained in the same shape in which they were written two and a half millennia ago, unrevised by later editors. Usually they can be dated with a high degree of accuracy, although in certain cases scholars strongly disagree on the dating, differences amounting to more than a century.¹³⁸ However, it must be remembered that, as these texts are neither histories nor philosophical writings, they must be dealt with differently.

The bronze inscriptions are texts inscribed on ritual vessels and placed in tombs and lineage temples.¹³⁹ The inscribed texts are addressed to the ancestral spirits, not to the living. Consequently, the language of the inscriptions is highly formulaic, as is their general structure. The only part of the inscription that is less circumscribed by rigid recording conventions is the so-called announcement of merit. In this announcement the donor of the vessel glorifies himself, mentioning his meritorious ancestors and his present achievements. These announcements provide an interesting glimpse of the aristocrats’ self-image. Unfortunately, by the Eastern Zhou, the inscriptions became markedly shorter than their Western Zhou pre-

decessors, and they contain far less information in this period about the lives and views of their authors.¹⁴⁰

Understanding the ritual nature of bronze inscriptions is particularly important for properly defining the role of these sources for Chunqiu intellectual history. Bronze inscriptions were not intended to serve as a means of political discourse, and we cannot expect to find inscriptions that discuss current issues or expound political and ethical theories. Furthermore, by the Chunqiu period, the language of the inscriptions (being primarily used for ritual messages) had become significantly removed from everyday speech.¹⁴¹ Thus, with a single exception, Chunqiu and Zhanguo inscriptions never mention basic political and ethical terms such as “*ren*” (benevolence), “*li*” (ritual), “*zhong*” (loyalty), and “*Dao*” (the Way).¹⁴² The inscriptions’ silence does not presume of course that these terms were marginal in contemporary political and ethical discourse, but merely indicates their insignificance in the ritualized language of communicating with the ancestors. Again, we should remember that bronze inscriptions are neither narrative histories nor philosophical treatises, so it is of little value to compare them directly to the textual sources of Chunqiu history discussed earlier.

Despite their relatively modest role in revealing Chunqiu intellectual life, the inscriptions have two distinct advantages for the present study. First, they occasionally allow us to learn about the self-image of rulers and nobles from the countries that remained beyond the scope of the *Zuo* and *Guoyu* narratives such as the state of Qin.¹⁴³ Second, when discussed as a distinct medium, the inscriptions allow for many interesting glimpses on the *Ichideal* of Chunqiu aristocrats. A particularly valuable approach is to trace diachronic changes in the inscriptions, their language, and mode of writing. Several recent studies have demonstrated that such an approach provides additional materials for Chunqiu thought not found in contemporaneous texts, and we shall employ these findings particularly in the discussions of the ethical views of the Chunqiu nobles.¹⁴⁴

Another interesting glimpse of Chunqiu history, and by extension of Chunqiu thought, is provided by the recently discovered “covenant texts” from Houma and Wenxian. These texts are dated to the first years of the

fifth century B.C.E and are related to the struggle between the coalition of the Zhao, Han, Wei 魏, and Zhi lineages against the Fan and Zhonghang lineages in the state of Jin.¹⁴⁵ The Houma texts record alliance oaths between the head of the Zhao lineage, Zhao Yang, and his followers and retainers; Wenxian texts, still unpublished, deal with the alliance headed by Han Buxin.

Alliance texts are not historical texts, and they contain only brief oaths and curses. Nevertheless, they provide an interesting additional source of information with regard to Chunqiu religious thought, as well as the role played by the aristocratic lineages in late Chunqiu politics. In addition, alliance texts from Houma contain useful information about the late Chunqiu aristocrats' relations with their personal retainers.¹⁴⁶

Other Sources

Speeches by Chunqiu statesmen and quotations from other Chunqiu documents are scattered throughout Zhanguo and Early Han philosophical and philosophical-historical writings. These documents (particularly the works of the contending Hundred Schools) contain an impressive amount of what is supposed to be authentic data on Chunqiu intellectual life. But what is the nature of these sources, and are they reliable?¹⁴⁷

I mentioned above that, beginning in the early Zhou, Chinese statesmen were aware of the importance of historical lessons for proper policy making. From the very beginning this awareness imbued historical writings with didactic and moralizing features. It is not surprising, therefore, that the intensification of political discussions in the late Chunqiu to the early Zhanguo period encouraged contending thinkers to increasingly invoke historical precedents for their controversial arguments. Mozi (c. 460–390), for instance, regarded history as one of the major tests for the validity of his proposed doctrines. To enhance the credibility of his interpretations of the remote past, Mozi claimed:

I am not a contemporary of [the ancient sage kings]. I have not heard their voices, nor seen their faces. [Yet] I know [their ideas] from what

they wrote on bamboo and silk, engraved on bronze and stones, carved on ritual vessels, and transmitted for descendants of future generations.¹⁴⁸

Other representatives of the Hundred Schools followed Mozi by increasingly resorting to historical arguments in ideological disputes. Sima Qian vividly depicted the enormous interest that the past held for Zhanguo statesmen and philosophers. Shortly after Confucius edited or published the *Chun qiu* (if indeed he did), a real explosion in historical writings began:

Duo Jiao was a tutor to King Wei of Chu (r. 339–329 B.C.E.), and since the king could not read the whole of the *Chun qiu*, he selected [stories on] success and failure, and created the *Duoshi wei* (“Subtleties of Mr. Duo”) in forty chapters. During the reign of King Xiaocheng of Zhao (r. 265–245 B.C.E.), his prime minister Yu Qing selected [extracts] from the *Chun qiu* on remote times, observed affairs of his time and likewise wrote *Yushi chunqiu* (Springs and Autumns of Mr. Yu) in eight chapters. Lü Buwei, the prime minister of King Zhuangxiang of Qin (r. 249–247 B.C.E.), also looked back to remote antiquity, selected [material from] the *Chun qiu*, collected the affairs of the six states,¹⁴⁹ and made eight surveys, six discussions, and twelve records, the *Lüshi chunqiu* (Springs and Autumns of Mr. Lü). Others, like the disciples of Xun Qing (Xunzi), Mengzi, Gongsun Gu, and Han Feizi frequently excerpted passages from the *Chun qiu* in writing their books; there are more [of these books] than can be mentioned.¹⁵⁰

The *Chun qiu* mentioned here probably refers either to the *Zuo* or to similar historical writings.¹⁵¹ This is, however, a minor point. Important for our discussion is that the historical writings discussed above were produced not for academic reasons of interest in the remote past, but to provide contemporary politicians with ready lessons on “success and failure.” The authors of the new *Chun qiu* were not scribes but prominent statesmen and disciples of the leading philosophers. Their intention “to use the past to serve the present” had important implications for the reliability of their writings.

It would be hopelessly naïve to mechanically distinguish between scribal writings of earlier periods and texts produced by adherents of the Hundred Schools. After all, it was precisely the didactic inclination of the

Chunqiu scribal records that facilitated their use by contending thinkers of the later period. Nevertheless, the similar origins should not obscure the differences in these two kinds of writings. Paraphrasing Ronald Egan, I find it useful to distinguish between “moralistic and rhetorical histories” and “philosophy and rhetoric in historical setting.”¹⁵² Certain biases notwithstanding, the scribal records emphasize accuracy and abound with minute details that enhance their reliability. Conversely, “disputers of the *Dao*” were less concerned with accuracy than with delivering the proper message to their audience. This led to distorting the content of their sources and adding numerous fictionalized details. To clarify this point, I shall analyze a famous passage from the *Mencius*:

Of the five hegemonies, Lord Huan [of Qi] was the most prominent. During the Kuiqiu assembly (in 651), the overlords only bound the sacrificial animals [but did not slay them], wrote down the alliance [oath] text, but did not smear blood [on their lips].¹⁵³ The first [oath] command said: “Punish the unfilial; do not replace the major scion;¹⁵⁴ do not turn the concubine into the wife.” The second command said: “Uphold the worthy, maintain the talented, distinguish those who possess virtue.” The third command said: “Respect the elderly, be kind to the young, be not forgetful of strangers and travelers.” The fourth command said: “There should be no hereditary offices for the *shi*, officials should not hold concurrently two [different] offices. In selecting *shi* you must get [the worthy]. No [overlord] should usurp the right to execute the nobles (*dafu*).” The fifth command said: “There should be no crooked embankments,¹⁵⁵ nor restrictions on the sale of grain, nor undeclared enfeoffments.” [Finally], it said: “Every participant in this alliance should henceforth reestablish friendly ties.”¹⁵⁶

Can the *Mencius* narrative be trusted? The first impression is that the text is completely reliable: it looks like a direct quotation from the alliance document. However, close scrutiny of the passage leads to serious doubts regarding its reliability. First, let us compare the *Mencius* account of the Kuiqiu assembly with that of the *Zuo* and the *Guliang zhuan*. The *Zuo* tells briefly:

Autumn; the lord of Qi concluded an alliance with the overlords at Kuiqiu. [It] said: “Every participant in this alliance should henceforth reestablish friendly ties.”¹⁵⁷

The *Guliang zhuan* says:

Kuiqiu assembly. The sacrificial animals were bound but not slain. [The alliance document] was read from above the sacrificial animals' heads, to clarify the uniqueness of the restrictions of the Son of Heaven.¹⁵⁸ [It said]: "Do not block the springs, nor restrict sale of grain. Do not replace the major scion. Do not turn a concubine into the wife. Do not let [the ruler's] wives interfere in the state affairs."¹⁵⁹

Obviously, Mencius made use of both the *Zuo* and the *Guliang zhuan* or their original source(s); hence, his depiction of the Kuiqiu alliance combines the narrative of both. But how reliable is the *Guliang zhuan*? Though the text of the alliance oath quoted in the *Guliang* does not seem implausible, it raises several questions. The procedure of concluding an alliance without smearing sacrificial blood was at odds with the established pattern of alliances, as expressed in the *Zuo* and in the Houma texts.¹⁶⁰ Furthermore, reference to domestic problems of the overlords is suspect. None of the alliance texts quoted in the *Zuo* contains any evidence of such interference in the domestic matters of the lords' families.¹⁶¹ Thus, although the *Guliang* story cannot be entirely dismissed, nor can it be completely trusted.

Now, what about Mencius? He quoted several additional items of the Kuiqiu alliance that seem not to belong to the original alliance text. First, he claimed that the Kuiqiu oath urged the overlords to punish unfilial sons, respect elders, and be kind to the young. All these are perfectly in accord with Mencius' view of filial piety and the upholding of family ties as pivotal ethical principles. However, Chunqiu politics lacked such notions. In Chapter 6 I shall discuss the attitude toward filial piety in the Chinqiu period, and show that it was of little significance in contemporary discourse; certainly it was never mentioned in international treaties. Second, Mencius' presentation of the administrative items in the Kuiqiu oath is anachronistic. *Shi* played no role in early Chunqiu administration, and certainly would not be mentioned in the overlords' alliance. Furthermore, Chunqiu rulers strictly adhered to hereditary offices, and no opposition to this principle was ever voiced until the end of the Chunqiu period. Besides, complicated administrative issues, such as the concurrent holding of two offices

by the same official, were of no concern to the early Chunqiu leaders, whose administration remained vague and unsophisticated. Finally, the opposition to the execution of nobles, cited by Mencius, may well be in accord with his idea of “benevolent rule,” but is incompatible with the established practices of the Chunqiu period. All this allows us to suggest that Mencius simply invented more than half of the items of the Kuiqu alliance!¹⁶²

This case study indicates the problems that we encounter in dealing with Zhanguo discussions on Chunqiu history and thought. Zhanguo thinkers were certainly less concerned with historical accuracy than Chunqiu scribes. Even when they relied (as in the above-mentioned case of Mencius) on extant sources, they did not refrain from adding desirable details to the narrative. It was a common practice in the Zhanguo period to attribute one’s ideas to the revered ancients. Therefore, the value of Zhanguo polemical writings for investigating Chunqiu history, particularly intellectual history, remains marginal. As sources for Chunqiu thought they must be used with caution.

Intensification of ideological discussions in the late Zhanguo period encouraged the disputants to adopt for their needs heroes of the past—and sometimes even to invent such heroes.¹⁶³ Real or imaginary deeds of these paragons appear in collections of historical anecdotes, which flourished in the Zhanguo and Early Han periods. Some of these collections, like the *Yanzi chunqiu* and parts of the *Guanzi*, claim to be accounts of activities of the eminent Chunqiu statesmen Yan Ying and Guan Zhong. Yet critical scholars unanimously agree that these represent the Zhanguo rather than the Chunqiu intellectual milieu.¹⁶⁴ Similarly unreliable are collections of anecdotes from the Han period, like the *Hanshi waizhuan*, Liu Xiang’s (77–6 B.C.E.) *Shuo yuan* and *Xin xu*, and others; these often display a cavalier attitude toward historical accuracy.¹⁶⁵

A similarly cautious attitude is required regarding the two commentaries of the *Chun qiu* classic, the *Gongyang* and *Guliang zhuan*. Both were compiled in the middle to late Zhanguo period. They are claimed to have been orally transmitted until early Han, when they were finally recorded. Both texts contain few historical narratives; they concentrate instead on

explaining the “hidden meaning” of the “subtle words” of the sage. Consequently, both commentaries lack historical accuracy, as many traditional scholars have pointed out.¹⁶⁶ The explicit ideological biases in both texts further undermine their credibility. Suffice it to mention the *Gongyang zhuan* presentation of the conflict between the northern states and the southern superpower of Chu as the struggle of the Huaxia against the *manyi* (barbarians). This presentation, as I argued above, represents Zhanguo bias and is incompatible with the Chunqiu view.¹⁶⁷ Therefore, neither commentary is of much value for the present study.

We must finally add two potentially interesting sources for Chunqiu thought, namely, the *Shi jing* and the *Shu jing*. Although most of the poems and the documents contained in these classics were produced in the Western Zhou period, they are of considerable importance for the present study. Chunqiu statesmen inherited and were directly influenced by the Western Zhou legacy. Therefore, understanding Western Zhou thought as reflected in the *Shi jing* and the *Shu jing* contributes to our understanding of Chunqiu intellectual life. In addition, an important, although rarely mentioned, source for Chunqiu thought are those parts of the classical texts that were written in the Chunqiu period.¹⁶⁸ The Chunqiu part of the *Shi jing* apparently comprises portions of the “Guo feng” (Airs of States) and “Lu song” (Lu Hymns) sections.¹⁶⁹ As for the *Shu jing*, the only document it contains that is commonly dated to the Chunqiu period is the “Qin shi,” attributed to Lord Mu of Qin (r. 659–621); opinions differ greatly on the precise dating of the other documents.¹⁷⁰

Summary

The widely held assumption that we lack sources to reconstruct certain aspects of the world of thought of the Chunqiu period can be contested. The foregoing discussion indicates that these sources do in fact exist. Our main sources for Chunqiu thought are speeches by major statesmen. These speeches were recorded and reproduced (or produced) by court scribes in their scribal records, and later incorporated into the *Zuo zhuan*—the major repository of Chunqiu history. A systematic analysis of these speeches,

particularly tracing the intellectual developments that occurred throughout two and a half centuries of the Chunqiu period, yield surprising results. Hundreds of speeches and utterances quoted in the *Zuo* allow us to reconstruct significant intellectual trends of that age. In addition, other historical and paleographical sources contribute to our knowledge of Chunqiu thought.

The *Zuo* will serve as the basic corpus for my discussion. The intellectual changes that are reflected in the *Zuo* narrative allow us to assume that it is not only the richest but also the most reliable source for Chunqiu intellectual history. It will be supplemented, when possible, by the *Guoyu*. Although the *Guoyu* was compiled much later and is significantly less reliable than the *Zuo*, it nonetheless contains portions of authentic Chunqiu materials. Further information on Chunqiu intellectual life may be provided by the relevant parts of the *Shi jing* and the *Shu jing*, and particularly by bronze inscriptions. Zhanguo texts will be consulted whenever they supply additional details on Chunqiu intellectual developments.

It is important to remember that the relative paucity of our sources results in an inevitable bias. Our discussion of Chunqiu thought is limited to the highest dignitaries from the Chunqiu states, while the intellectually active *shi* stratum remains woefully underrepresented. Similarly, female voices are only rarely heard in the pages of the *Zuo zhuan*, preventing us from gaining a meaningful reconstruction of gender aspects of Chunqiu intellectual life.¹⁷¹ Moreover, our knowledge is geographically limited. The *Zuo* relies primarily on sources from the states of Lu, Jin, Chu, Zheng, Qi, Wei, and Song. Important intellectual developments that quite likely occurred in other states, particularly Qin, as well as Wu, Yue, and other small or peripheral states, were beyond the scope of the *Zuo* narrative, and can be only partially verified by means of other sources.¹⁷² Thus, the world of thought that we reconstruct belongs mostly to the male aristocrats of the Central Plain. Yet these men contributed enormously to the intellectual flourishing of the subsequent Zhanguo age. A picture of their legacy will be drawn in the following pages.

Chapter 2

Heaven and Man Part Ways

Changing Attitudes Toward Divine Authority

Rescuing the sun or moon from eclipse, praying [for rain] in time of drought, deciding great affairs only after reading cracks and casting stalks are not because one expects to get what he asks, but to manifest refined culture (*wen*). Hence, superior men consider these as refined culture, while the people consider these as dealing with deities. To consider them refined culture is auspicious, to consider them as dealing with deities is baleful.

—Xunzi

Angus Graham opined that the Zhanguo intellectual upheaval was the thinkers' "response to the breakdown of moral and political order which had claimed the authority of Heaven."¹ Indeed, even a cursory look at Western Zhou versus Zhanguo writings reflects an enormous gap between their attitudes toward divine authority. Most of the Western Zhou documents of the *Shu jing* and odes of the *Shi jing* present Heaven as the foundation and the guardian of political order, whose will should be counseled prior to major undertakings. Most Zhanguo texts, in contrast, largely neglect Heaven's will, and no Zhanguo thinker, with the exception of Mozi, assigns divine forces any significant role in political and social life. Of course this schematic presentation does not do full justice to the complexity of early Zhou and Zhanguo thought, but it properly conveys the sense of profound change that occurred throughout the Zhou period in human relationships with the transcendental. This change was both the precondition for and reflection of the Zhanguo intellectual breakthrough.

Graham's statement cited above can serve as the departure point for

my discussion. I share Graham's (and other scholars') conviction that it was the thinkers' reconsideration of the role of Heaven and deities in everyday life that made new departures in political and ethical thought possible. Logically, therefore, the discussion of Chunqiu intellectual life must begin with this crucial process of reassessment of human relations with the divine. I shall furthermore try to answer the questions that Graham did not ask, namely, when did the authority of divine forces in mundane affairs decline, and why did this happen.

To avoid possible misunderstandings, I should clarify at the beginning that it is not my intention here to discuss either the actual beliefs of Chunqiu elite members and commoners or the religious practices of that age; these topics have been extensively covered elsewhere.² My discussion concentrates instead on the political aspects of Chunqiu religious thought, focusing on the impact of the transcendental on political undertakings and on political thought in general. Sure enough, throughout the Chunqiu period and beyond, vibrant religious life continued among all strata of society; sacrifices remained a major state activity, while divination and omens were routinely consulted prior to major undertakings.³ Yet I think it is useful to distinguish, as Xunzi did two millennia ago in a saying quoted in the epigraph, between the form and the content of these so-called religious activities. I hope to show that behind the largely unchanging ceremonial facade, a deep reappraisal of human relations with extrahuman powers took place.⁴ More and more Chunqiu statesmen gradually arrived at the conclusion that human affairs should be settled here and now, without resort to divine authority.

My discussion of Chunqiu attitudes toward the transcendental is divided into two parts. First, I shall trace the changing role of Heaven in human affairs. Heaven, the supreme deity and the ultimate guardian of social order in the early Zhou, remained highly revered throughout the Chunqiu period, but it lost much of its sentient characteristics. Once a purposeful deity with recognizable intent, Heaven gradually became equivalent to impersonalized objective law, with or without recognizable moral content. The less secure Chunqiu statesmen felt concerning the possibility of comprehending Heaven's intent, the more willing they became to

concentrate on the Way of Men instead of on the impenetrable Way of Heaven.

A somewhat different dynamic accompanied Chunqiu attitudes toward other extrahuman powers, namely deities and spirits. Chunqiu statesmen inherited the reciprocal “*do-ut-des*” (I give in order that thou shouldst give) mode of relations with the deities, but they increasingly questioned the relevance of this concept in the political sphere. As far as the destiny of the state or the personal fortunes of its leaders were concerned, many leading members of the educated elite came to the conclusion that the deities were responsive not to lavish offerings but to the proper political and moral conduct of the person who seeks their support, and it was more prudent, therefore, to improve one’s behavior and one’s rule rather than to seek good fortune from the deities. By the mid- to late Chunqiu period the increasing skepticism regarding the deities’ political potency, and even their very existence, further reduced the number of those eager to rely on divine support in political affairs.

The new understanding of the role of divine forces in human life crystallized only gradually, and it was never unanimously endorsed. The picture of Chunqiu religious thought as it appears in the *Zuo* suggests a gradual shift in statesmen’s views, rather than a sweeping breakthrough. Yet individual differences notwithstanding, the basic intellectual tendency of the Chunqiu period may be defined as the redirection of the statesmen’s interest from the divine to the mundane, from reliance on extrahuman support toward helping oneself. This emancipation of the human world from the dominance of transcendental forces laid the foundations for the continuing intellectual upheaval of the late Chunqiu–Zhanguo age.

“Heaven’s Way Is Distant, the Human Way Is Near”

It is natural that the examination of political aspects of Zhou religion should begin with Heaven (*tian*). The importance of Heaven for the discussion derives not only from its position as the supreme deity in Zhou religion, but also from its unique role as a primarily political deity. While it is not my intention to discuss the much-debated issue of the origins of the cult

of Heaven, it is evident that the paramount role of Heaven in the early Zhou was intrinsically connected to the concept of Heaven's decree or mandate (*tian ming*), the foundation of the legitimacy of Zhou rule.⁵ Political aspects of the cult of Heaven seem so pervasive to modern scholars that Poo Mu-chou, a leading specialist on Zhou religion, almost denied this cult the name of religion, claiming that it "was more akin to a type of political philosophy."⁶ Leaving definitions aside, we should notice that, indeed, from the early Zhou period human relationships with Heaven differed markedly from the familiar *do-ut-des* pattern, since Heaven was considered an impartial deity that "exercised arbitration over the fate of the people not whimsically, but according to a moral standard."⁷

The central role of Heaven in the political life of the early Zhou is evident from almost any text datable to that period, such as the earliest chapters of the *Shu jing*, many of the *Shi jing* odes and hymns, and many bronze inscriptions. These texts present a coherent view of the interaction between the mundane and the divine spheres, which we may briefly summarize as follows. Heaven is a sentient deity, which directs, scrutinizes, and responds to human actions. In the past, Zhou (and Shang) dynastic founders had possessed the charismatic power of "*de*" (*mana*, virtue), which enabled them to enlist divine support for their actions; conversely, the oppressive and licentious last rulers of the Shang (and Xia) lost their *de* and thereby deprived themselves of Heaven's blessing. Zhou thinkers believed that these changes of Heaven's decree were not the only manifestations of Heaven's intent (*tian zhi*); Heaven continues to scrutinize the deeds of current rulers, and if they deviate from the way of *de* and behave oppressively and licentiously, they will similarly lose Heaven's mandate and may be accordingly overthrown by the new contenders for power. Thus, while the responsibility to obtain divine support is within the realm of human action, the final authority to provide or deny this support remains the prerogative of the supreme deity, Heaven. Success and failure are the outcomes of a complicated balance between human action below and Heaven's approval or disapproval of that action above.⁸

Zhou founders and their immediate descendants did not question Heaven's power and willingness to intervene in political life. Under-

standably, compliance with Heaven's will was the only prudent political course. A Zhou hymn states:

Be reverent! Be reverent!
 Heaven is clear-sighted.
 The mandate is not easily [preserved].
 Do not say that [Heaven] is too high—
 it exalts and degrades [human] affairs
 it constantly watches us here.⁹

This hymn, probably performed at a sacrificial ceremony, demanded a pious attitude toward the supreme deity. Other texts, compiled for political use, emphasize the importance of proper action in the mundane realm, particularly the preserving of *de* as the precondition for obtaining divine support.¹⁰

The political crisis of the late Western Zhou may have been the first serious challenge to the belief in a heavenly approved political order. The dynastic collapse and subsequent turmoil encouraged contemporaries to question the role of Heaven in human affairs. Late Western Zhou odes of the *Shi jing* commonly express resentment and even direct criticism of Heaven's behavior. "Pitiless Heaven" that previously deprived Shang of its decree now turned its rage on the Zhou rulers. Bitter complaints about Heaven's cruelty, common in these odes, reflect a complicated process of reappraisal of Heaven's role in political life.¹¹ Those who criticized or even cursed Heaven presumably believed in its being a sentient, though probably malevolent deity. Yet this deity could no longer be trusted, and could no longer serve as a guarantor of the political order; solutions had to be sought elsewhere. The late Western Zhou understanding that "the disasters of the people below do not descend from Heaven but arise from men"¹² foreshadowed the Chunqiu search for political solutions in the human world.

For the Western Zhou statesmen the dynastic collapse was a shocking accident; for their Chunqiu descendants the disintegration of the Zhou world order became a *fait accompli*. The more the political and social system of the Western Zhou disintegrated, the less reasons there were to trust Heaven's ability to preserve the centuries-old order. And the crisis was

harsh indeed: while the Zhou Sons of Heaven lost all but the shadow of their former power and prestige, no alternative locus of power appeared, and the Zhou realm descended into a woeful war of all against all. Heaven's decree was not transferred to others; it simply disappeared.¹³ How could this be explained? Was this a manifestation of Heaven's intent? Or was there, perhaps, no intent of Heaven at all? In this bewildering new situation, Chunqiu statesmen began reassessing the role of Heaven in mundane life.

In the early Chunqiu period, Heaven was still a highly relevant political entity, as many statesmen continued to claim that their actions were directed by Heaven's intent. This view was most clearly expressed by Lord Zhuang of Zheng (r. 743–701), who conquered the state of Xu in 712, but instead of annihilating it decided to enthrone Xu Shu, the younger brother of the fugitive Xu ruler, as the new lord of Xu. He declared to the Xu noble Baili:

Heaven brought misfortune on Xu, the spirits and deities were truly dissatisfied with the Xu ruler and made use of me. Yet, I am unable to satisfy the needs of my own populace, so can I dare consider [obtaining] Xu as my personal achievement? I have a brother with whom I was unable to live in peace, and forced him to gain subsistence elsewhere,¹⁴ so how will I be able to gain Xu for long? You should assist Xu Shu in pacifying his people. I shall detach [Gongsun] You to help you. If, after I pass away, Heaven will act according to ritual (*li*) and repent of the misfortunes it sent to Xu, would it not be better for me to allow the lord of Xu to return and nourish his altars of soil and grain? Zheng's only request is to declare that we want to reestablish the old marriage ties [with Xu]; can [Xu] give up [its enmity] and follow us? I do not want to grant this place to another family that will struggle with Zheng for these lands. My descendants can spare no time to escape their own troubles—how will they be able to perform sacrifices for Xu? I send you [to restore Xu] not only for the sake of Xu, but also to have somebody on whom we can rely on our borders.¹⁵

For Lord Zhuang, Heaven's intent was both comprehensible and predictable. Although Heaven punished Xu, it might later repent; and this probability was the major factor to be considered. While Lord Zhuang's decision to restore Xu was motivated by political reasons as well, such as

the difficulty of preserving the conquered territory under Zheng's control, his speech is couched in transcendental terms showing that these considerations were of primary importance for him.

Lord Zhuang's somewhat optimistic belief that Heaven's intent is recognizable and predictable was echoed by other early Chunqiu statesmen. In 641, Ning Zhuangzi of Wei 衛 suggested invading the state of Xing, arguing that it would accord with Heaven's desire and would thereby convince Heaven to relieve the state of Wei from a prolonged drought. Conversely, Gongsun Gu of Song attempted in 638 to dissuade Lord Xiang (r. 650–637) from a military expedition against the Chu army by reminding him that this action would probably contradict Heaven's intent. In 645 Lord Mu of Qin (r. 659–621) justified his decision to release the captive Lord Hui of Jin (r. 650–637) by his fear of Heaven's probable retaliation for violating an earlier promise to do so.¹⁶ All three speakers claimed that they understood Heaven's intent. Even if these claims disguised mundane political motives, what is important for us is that the speakers believed that resorting to Heaven would significantly bolster their arguments. This implies that in the early Chunqiu a significant portion, probably a majority, of statesmen still regarded Heaven's support or lack thereof an important factor in policy making—perhaps the primary consideration.

By the mid-Chunqiu period, the above-mentioned attitude toward Heaven as an active and sentient force began to disappear from statesmen's discourse. Perhaps the major, albeit implicit, reason for this development was the increasing awareness of the difficulty of predicting or even comprehending Heaven's intent. By the Chunqiu period, whatever vestiges of earlier shamanistic cults still existed had lost all political relevance, while divination, though an important means "to resolve doubts," was not considered sufficiently compelling when major political undertakings were under consideration.¹⁷ No prophet spoke on behalf of Heaven, no priests explained its will, there was not even a sacred book to explicate Heaven's demands of the people. No Chunqiu leader, insofar as we can rely on our sources, ever matched the self-confidence of the Zhou founders who declared that they had received Heaven's decree to oust their enemies.¹⁸ Lacking adequate means to learn Heaven's intent, Chunqiu states-

men became increasingly reluctant to rely on Heaven in day-to-day political affairs.

Thus, as mid- to late Chunqiu statesmen no longer claimed that they knew how to obtain Heaven's support, they began to develop different approaches toward Heaven. Some of them reinterpreted Heaven's intent as a kind of objective law that influenced human affairs; according to this interpretation Heaven's intent remained recognizable and even predictable, but it was no longer subject to active manipulation by the policy makers. Others went one step further; they questioned the intelligibility of Heaven's intent and were increasingly reluctant to indulge in speculations on the Way of Heaven. Consequently, those statesmen who continued to invoke Heaven's will in political arguments met with increasing skepticism and distrust. Gradually, Heaven was transformed from a purposeful deity interacting with humans into impersonal law, which paved the way for the later rational reevaluation of Heaven that culminated in the thought of Xunzi.

The legacy of the Western Zhou belief in Heaven as an ultimate source of political and social order is mostly recognizable among those Chunqiu thinkers who referred to Heaven as a guardian of justice that should punish evildoers and save the oppressed. This idea was particularly popular among statesmen who were in dire straits; Heaven remained the last hope of the oppressed and humiliated.¹⁹ For instance, in 612 when the state of Lu, betrayed by its allies, fell victim to the continuous atrocities of its powerful neighbor Lord Yi of Qi (r. 612–608), the head of the Lu government, Ji Wenzhi, had nobody but Heaven to rely upon:

The lord of Qi, will he escape? He lacks ritual, and moreover punishes those who preserve ritual, saying: "Why perform ritual?" [To perform] ritual is to comply with Heaven; this is the Way of Heaven. He opposes Heaven, and moreover punishes others—acting so it is difficult to escape. The *Shi [jing]* says: "Why do they not fear each other? [Because] they do not fear Heaven." The superior man does not oppress the young and humble because he fears Heaven. The "Zhou Hymns" state: "Fear Heavenly wrath, and thus be shielded."²⁰ One who does not fear Heaven—how will he be shielded? [Lord Yi] seized the state by means of disorder. Even if he upholds ritual to protect his possession, I fear he

will not reach a good end, and since all his actions are devoid of ritual, he will be unable to ensure his existence.²¹

The first impression of Ji Wenzi's speech suggests a close resemblance to utterances cited above. Ji Wenzi depicted Heaven as a guardian of the political order based on ritual norms (*li*); the violator of these norms could not escape Heaven's wrath. Yet the political implications of Ji Wenzi's approach differ significantly from those of previous speakers. Ji did not propose any positive action to obtain Heaven's support and to hasten the punishment of Lord Yi; instead, he merely suggested to passively wait for Heaven's intervention against the enemy. Ji did not expect Heaven to respond to Lu's activities; laws of divine retribution were impartial and not subject to manipulation in the mundane realm.

It is impossible to know whether Ji Wenzi's arguments reflected a genuine belief in divine retribution or whether they were simply cries of despair. Other invocations of Heaven's justice occurred similarly when no positive course of action was possible. In 531, Jin statesmen observed with increasing dismay how their archenemy, King Ling of Chu (r. 540–529), overcame Jin's powerless ally, the state of Cai. An elder statesman, Shu Xiang, tried to calm his colleagues:

Heaven relied on Chu to exterminate Cai: is it possible that Chu will not succeed? Yet I, Xi, heard, It will not happen twice that the untrustworthy obtains good fortune . . . Heaven may rely on the assistance of the wicked, but it does not bestow good fortune on them; it [lets them] accumulate evil and wickedness and then punishes them. Besides, it is as if Heaven possesses five materials and makes use of them: when their force is exhausted, it casts them away. Thus nothing will help him [King Ling of Chu], and in the end he will not prosper.²²

Shu Xiang's resort to divine retribution is akin to that of Ji Wenzi: both invoked Heaven to justify passively waiting for a positive outcome. Like many of his contemporaries, Shu Xiang continued to trust Heaven's justice; yet this reliance was not wholehearted. True, Shu Xiang's and Ji Wenzi's Heaven was not entirely blind: it perceived the evildoers and punished them. Yet it was not an entirely responsive deity either; instead of granting its decree to the virtuous ruler, it simply played one wicked power

against another, and then cast away the useless tool of retribution. As statesmen no longer hoped for Heaven's approval of proper actions, Heaven's political importance diminished, and actively seeking Heaven's support was replaced by the implicit recommendation to avoid direct conflict with its laws. Thus, while many Chunqiu statesmen continuously declared their belief in Heaven's justice, these declarations remained of limited political weight, serving either to predict bad ends for vicious statesmen, or to offer post-factum explanations of past events. An appeal to Heaven's justice never served for proposing a new political course; late Chunqiu statesmen knew that such arguments would not be entirely compelling.²³

The belief in divine retribution remained therefore of limited importance in Chunqiu discourse; reliance on Heaven's justice was not a convincing way of dealing with acute political problems. Chunqiu historical experience supplied few credible examples for the triumph of right over might. Hence, most Chunqiu thinkers tried to understand Heaven's intent not by analyzing the moral content of Heaven's laws, but by investigating actual modes of Heaven's behavior. That certain events happened, or unusually favorable situations ensued, meant that Heaven approved of a certain course of action. Heaven's intent, therefore, could not be predicted, but it could be deduced from the circumstances, and acting according to Heaven's will meant merely seizing the proper opportunity, a concept akin to the Zhanguo idea of timely action (*shi*).

A good example of circumstantial deduction of Heaven's intent is supplied by the story of one of the most remarkable Chunqiu personalities, Lord Wen of Jin (r. 636–628). The *Zuo* presents a lengthy account of the wanderings of Lord Wen (then still the fugitive Prince Chonger) in exile. Several times the fugitive prince was maltreated in the courts of different states, and in each case Chonger's defendants reportedly claimed that it was unwise to insult him, since his ability to survive long years in exile and establish himself as a likely candidate for the throne of Jin proved beyond doubt that he was favored by Heaven, and opposing him would be self-defeating.²⁴

The story of Chonger's wanderings is in all likelihood based on a re-

construction of legendary materials by Jin scribes whose purpose was to extol Chonger.²⁵ Needless to say, the speeches cited in this story cannot be considered authentic, but they are nevertheless indicative of the mid-Chunqiu intellectual atmosphere. What is interesting to us is that, although the Jin scribes aimed to flatter Chonger, the arguments they presented in proof of Heaven's support of the fugitive prince neither accentuate Chonger's virtue (*de*) nor claim that Heaven's support of him was morally justified. Chonger's supporters did laud his moral qualities and his conduct, but in their eyes these were not the reasons why Heaven backed the prince. Rather, the mere fact of Chonger's extraordinary success was considered sufficient evidence of his being Heaven's favorite. In all likelihood the Jin scribes who authored these speeches believed that moral explanations of Heaven's intent were not sufficiently convincing for their audience.

This shift from moral to circumstantial arguments in deducing Heaven's intent had profound consequences. Let us briefly analyze one of the Chonger-related speeches. In 632 King Cheng of Chu (r. 671–626) tried to dissuade the *lingyin* (head of the government) Cheng Dechen from seeking military engagement with Chonger. The king said:

The ruler of Jin [i.e., Chonger] spent nineteen years in exile but finally seized Jin. He overcame numerous difficulties; he knows perfectly well the true feelings of the people. Heaven gave him longevity and removed obstacles from his way. How can one destroy somebody established by Heaven? The *Military Maxims* state: "When you face an equal, retreat." Also, "When you recognize trouble, withdraw." Also, "The virtuous is irresistible." All three maxims fit Jin.²⁶

This speech reflects a purely pragmatic attitude toward Heaven. Although implicitly mentioning Chonger's *de* (namely, his knowledge of the people), King Cheng did not bother with the question whether Heaven's support of Chonger was justified or not. What was important was that Chonger's past successes proved that Heaven favored him, and it was imprudent to contradict Heaven's apparent will. To avoid conflicts with Heaven one should, therefore, understand current circumstances, and act accordingly.

Such pragmatic invocations of Heaven were common in mid-Chunqiu discourse. In 627 Xian Zhen of Jin mentioned the unfavorable position of the Qin army as proof that Heaven assisted Jin in its conflict with Qin, and recommended inflicting a mortal blow on the enemy. Another Jin noble, Bo Zong, similarly claimed that the favorable or unfavorable balance of power with Jin adversaries reflected Heaven's approval or disapproval of military action; the enemy's weakness was a heavenly opportunity not to be missed, while its strength was Heaven's warning to avoid engagement. Bo Zong's invocations of Heaven notwithstanding, his decisions were based on entirely mundane considerations of the possible benefits from the proposed action.²⁷

This new approach reflects a further change in speakers' attitudes toward Heaven. Early Chunqiu statesmen conceived of Heaven as a purposeful deity that was responsive to human actions, and Heaven's desires had to be complied with. Later, adherents of the idea of Heaven's retribution viewed Heaven as an impersonal moral law that was only partly responsive to human deeds, but whose actions were nevertheless basically predictable. From the mid-Chunqiu, those who equated Heaven's intent with favorable opportunity further de-emphasized Heaven's purposefulness. If understanding Heaven's intent derived exclusively from analyzing objective circumstances, it meant that mundane considerations received priority over the transcendent. A further step in the same direction was made by the skeptical statesmen of the late Chunqiu period. Questioning their ability to comprehend the way of Heaven altogether, they preferred to concentrate entirely on human affairs.

A skeptical attitude toward human ability to comprehend Heaven's intent appeared already in the Western Zhou, but became especially pronounced by the mid-sixth century. Many late Chunqiu statesmen openly expressed their doubts. In 538 the Jin military commander Sima Hou discussed with Lord Ping (r. 557–532) the proper policy toward King Ling of Chu. He said:

The king of Chu is excessive. Perhaps Heaven intends to let him satisfy his desires in order to increase his malice and then punish him—it is yet impossible to know. Perhaps it will let him obtain a good end—

this too is impossible to know. Heaven supports Jin and Chu, and nobody can struggle with them. Better agree to [King Ling's] demands, improve your virtue and wait whither he goes. Should he return to virtue, even we shall serve him, not only other overlords. If he turns to excesses and cruelty, Chu will abandon him—so with whom shall we contend?²⁸

In a similar policy discussion cited above, Sima Hou's colleague, Shu Xiang, had argued that Heaven would inevitably punish the ruthless king of Chu. Sima Hou was, however, much more cautious. He categorically refused to indulge in pointless discussions about Heaven's intent; instead, he suggested that the ruler "improve his virtue," which, in the context of Sima Hou's speech, meant adopting a nonaggressive foreign policy and strengthening the lord's domestic power. In other words, Jin should not wait for Heaven's help but, rather, help itself.

Sima Hou's skeptical mood is representative of late Chunqiu attitudes toward Heaven. Many other late Chunqiu thinkers admitted that they could not estimate Heaven's intent, and suggested instead to concentrate on practical considerations in order to determine the desirable course of action.²⁹ As the skeptical voices became more pronounced, those who continued to invoke Heaven in political debates lost much of the persuasive power of their arguments. In the late Chunqiu period, many leaders simply dismissed warnings concerning Heaven's potential wrath. Although scribal accounts usually express reservations about such open defiance of Heaven, and emphasize the dire results of such arrogance, the increasing frequency of such cases in the later *Zuo* indicates a diminishing trust in Heaven's will.³⁰

It is worth noting that the scribes themselves might have shared the statesmen's skepticism toward the comprehensibility of Heaven's intent. In many cases when the late Chunqiu statesmen invoked Heaven to justify a certain political course, the scribes do not fail to remind us that these arguments were based on sheer manipulation and not on genuine belief. The manipulative attitude toward Heaven is evident from the stories that deal with the expulsion of Lord Zhao of Lu (r. 541–510). After a coalition of powerful lineages, led by Ji Pingzi, ousted the lord in 517, many Lu neighbors began planning an armed intervention to restore Lord

Zhao. To prevent this, Ji Pingzi sent his envoys to bribe foreign dignitaries, who then dissuaded their rulers or allies from assisting the ousted lord of Lu. What is most remarkable in these stories is that the corrupt statesmen routinely invoked Heaven to justify their unwillingness to act. Thus, in 516 Liangqiu Ju, the aide of Lord Jing of Qi (r. 547–490), accepted Ji Pingzi's bribes and dissuaded Lord Jing from intervening on behalf of Lord Zhao, saying:

That all [Lu] ministers do not do their best for the Lu ruler is not because they are unable to serve the sovereign. Therefore I, Ju, feel puzzled. Lord Yuan of Song intended to proceed to Jin on behalf of the Lu ruler, but he died at Quji. Shusun Zhaozi pleaded to reinstate his ruler, and died, although he had no illness. I do not know whether Heaven has abandoned the Lu ruler, or whether he committed a crime toward the spirits and deities and therefore suffers this condition. Better wait at Ji and dispatch your officers to follow the Lu ruler in order to verify whether it is possible [to advance]. If it is possible, then follow the army while encountering no enemy. If the matter fails, you shall not be humiliated.³¹

Liangqiu Ju was apparently aware of Lord Jing's reluctance to make efforts on behalf of his Lu colleague, and supplied him with a convenient argument of Heaven's intent. Although political and ritual norms unequivocally favored intervention against the rebellious Lu nobles, Liangqiu Ju successfully countered these obligations by invoking Heaven's putative will. He was not alone; a year later similar arguments were invoked by the Jin leader Fan Xianzi, who likewise received Ji Pingzi's bribes and dissuaded the leaders of the northern states from assisting Lord Zhao.³² That the scribes twice emphasized that Heaven's intent was invoked to conceal the earthly and not very respectable goals of the corrupt officials is hardly coincidental. It indicates diminishing belief in the arguments based on Heaven's intent and the increasing awareness of the manipulative nature of resorting to Heaven in policy discussions.

The above stories present a complicated picture of late Chunqiu attitudes toward Heaven. Some statesmen conceived of it as an impersonal law, others manipulated their colleagues' belief in Heaven's intent, while yet others openly questioned the comprehensibility of Heaven's will. While no consensus concerning the role of Heaven in political life was

reached, the sheer plurality of approaches indicates a significant departure from the Western Zhou–early Chunqiu mode of thought. Then, arguments based on Heaven’s intent might have been compelling for many. Now, the multiple interpretations of Heaven’s role in human life undermined the efficacy of Heaven-related arguments. It was no longer possible to advocate political order based on and guarded by an unpredictable and incomprehensible Heaven.

This situation encouraged prudent statesmen to distance themselves from speculations on Heaven’s will. The person who represented this trend best was the great Zheng leader Zi Chan. This clear-sighted political thinker and reformer evidently disliked whatever political, social, or religious forces might hinder his policy; he similarly disliked those who spoke on behalf of Heaven or the deities.³³ In 525, Pi Zao, a divination specialist at the court of Zheng, predicted that Zheng would suffer firestorms and requested that a special prayer be performed in order to avert the disaster. Zi Chan did not permit the requested ritual performance. The following year Zheng did indeed suffer a great fire. Pi Zao predicted that the disaster would recur and he renewed his request to perform the fire-averting prayer. Zi Chan again rejected the request. When criticized by his deputy, Zi Taishu, Zi Chan responded:

The Way of Heaven is distant, while the Way of Men is near; unless it can be reached, how can [Heaven] be known? How can [Pi] Zao know the Way of Heaven? This man is a great talker, so why should some of his words not be true?³⁴

Pi Zao, the self-proclaimed specialist on Heaven’s affairs, represented a group of courtiers who believed in their ability to comprehend Heaven’s intent and to predict Heaven’s activities. Yet rational late-Chunqiu statesmen no longer heeded the voices of Pi Zao and his colleagues. Zi Chan did not believe that Pi Zao possessed real knowledge of Heaven. As Heaven’s intent was inscrutable, it should not influence political activities, and prayer should not be substituted for practical preparations against firestorms.³⁵ Zi Chan neither questioned the divine status of Heaven, nor did he deny its possible influence on human affairs. Yet he believed that, since Heaven remains unintelligible, its will should not be consulted in

resolving mundane matters. Men should respect Heaven, but they must resolve their problems by themselves.

Zi Chan's views, while by no means unanimously endorsed by his contemporaries, signified nevertheless the basic trend of late-Chunqiu attitudes toward Heaven. *Tian* remained the highly respected deity, it retained its symbolic significance, and for generations to come thinkers would speculate on its possible interaction with human affairs. Yet unlike in the early Zhou, Heaven was stripped of its sentient and interventionist attributes, and was no longer expected to actively restore political order. Future debates notwithstanding, the majority of Chinese thinkers would share Zi Chan's belief: mundane affairs are to be solved here and now.

Are Men Masters of the Deities?

We have seen above that, while many Chunqiu statesmen depersonalized Heaven, none questioned its transcendental nature. Deeper cleavages occurred in regard to other extrahuman powers, namely spirits and deities (*gui* and *shen*, often mentioned as a compound, *guishen*).³⁶ Whereas some continued to adhere to the ancient mode of "mechanical, *do-ut-des*-type exchange of food-tribute for supernatural protection,"³⁷ others attempted to modify this concept by emphasizing proper political and personal conduct as the primary precondition for obtaining deities' support, while yet others openly questioned the very existence of the deities. Notwithstanding these differences, the majority of the educated elite tended to downgrade the importance of the deities in social life. Not surprisingly, the phrase "men are masters of deities" is regarded by many scholars as the motto of Chunqiu intellectual life.³⁸

The extant evidence for the Shang–Western Zhou periods suggests that in that age the *do-ut-des* principle underlay human intercourse with the extrahuman powers. While the nature of our sources requires utmost caution in making generalizations, we may nevertheless assert that before the Chunqiu period this principle was not questioned. Unlike Heaven, which granted its support to the humans in exchange for their morally and politically correct behavior, the deities were apparently interested primarily

if not exclusively in the offerings. Although it is possible that already in the Western Zhou certain members of the educated elite attempted to establish moral criteria for human intercourse with the deities, their views are unattested to in the extant sources.³⁹

In the Chunqiu period, the *do-ut-des* mode of relations with the deities evidently remained prevalent at the personal level, but its validity in political life was seriously questioned. Could lavish offerings by the ruler ensure prosperity to his state? Would the deities bestow blessings on a licentious or politically inept leader? Adherents of the traditional reciprocal approach would have answered these questions positively, but an increasing number of statesmen and thinkers rejected this answer. The latter believed that only proper conduct at the personal and political level would ensure divine support for a political personality.

Reconceptualization of the nature of relations between humans and deities did not come at once. As Poo convincingly suggested, imposing moral criteria on the deities' attitudes toward human beings might have corresponded to the notion of a moral Heaven's decree.⁴⁰ Just as Heaven, the major political deity, granted its support in exchange for the recipient's *de*, so should the deities be attentive to the recipient's proper conduct rather than his sacrifices. Seeds of this attitude might have appeared already in the Western Zhou. The announcements of merit, which appear in many Zhou bronze inscriptions and extol the donor's *de*, may reflect the idea that ancestral spirits would increase their blessings to a worthy person.⁴¹ In the Chunqiu the view that only meritorious persons may rely on extrahuman support became further pronounced.

The new approach toward the extrahuman powers had profound consequences for Chunqiu thought. A leader who wanted to ensure good fortune had to care for his people, since it was the people, not the priests, to whom the deities were really attentive. Thus, just as in the case of Heaven, statesmen arrived at the conclusion that the solution for the ruler's problems lay in the mundane realm. The idea that people are the real masters of the deities was the first step toward diminishing the role of extrahuman powers in political life. Further marginalization of the deities came in the second half of the Chunqiu period, as skeptical statesmen began ques-

tioning their very existence. This skeptical atmosphere rendered deities largely irrelevant to later Chinese political thought and political culture in general.

THE IMPACT OF RITUALIZATION

ON THE PERCEPTION OF THE DEITIES' POWER

When and how did the impact of extrahuman forces on political life begin to decline? This process might have begun fairly early, already in the Western Zhou. A much-quoted passage from the *Liji* says:

The men of Yin [Shang] respected deities (*shen*); they led people to serve the deities. They advanced spirits (*gui*) and downgraded ritual (*li*) . . . The men of Zhou respected *li* and elevated generosity. They served the spirits and respected deities, but distanced [themselves] from them.⁴²

This observation looks all the more insightful for having been made more than two millennia ago. The ritualization of Chinese religion, which began already in the Shang, if not earlier, and reached its apex in the mid-Western Zhou ritual reform, changed the nature of human relations with the deities and severely diminished the possibility of the deities' whimsical intervention in human life.⁴³ Åke Hultkrantz observed that ritual "sometimes tends to move away from the belief system that once motivated it." This observation, although made in a different context, is particularly valid in the case of the Chinese ritual system, which by the late Western Zhou gained primary importance for its political and social implications rather than for its value as a means of communicating with the deities.⁴⁴ In the religious sphere ritualization minimized the scope of direct contact between humans and the deities.

Already Western Zhou bronze inscriptions may indicate that the regularity of intercourse with the deities gained primary importance in ritual performance. The so-called "auspicious words" attached to numerous bronze inscriptions record the blessings to the donor that were supposedly pronounced by the ancestral spirits. The donor who incised these auspicious words did not wait until the spirits pronounced their blessings, but

fixed what they ought to say. The spirits had to follow rigid rules of intercourse, from which they should not deviate.⁴⁵ This pattern of regularizing intercourse with the deities and minimizing spontaneous action by extrahuman powers is discernible also in the *Zuo*.

The *Liji* authors cited above correctly assessed that the aim of ritual was to respect the deities but to keep them at a distance. The *Zuo* preserved several curious anecdotes that illustrate this point. Whenever a deity demanded the establishment of new rites for itself, its demands were usually rejected on the basis of an apparent contradiction to ritual propriety. Whatever the veracity of these anecdotes, a few of which appear in the following paragraphs, they indicate the priority of ritual norms over direct contacts with the deities and the spirits.

The first story tells of Shensheng, the heir apparent of the state of Jin, who was forced to commit suicide in 655. In 651 Shensheng's half-brother, Lord Hui (r. 650–637), ascended the throne of Jin. The spirit of the deceased Shensheng disliked the situation; in 650, it met the Jin noble Hu Tu and told him:

Yiwu (Lord Hui) lacks ritual [behavior].⁴⁶ *Di* (the God) granted my request, and he will give Jin to Qin, so that Qin will sacrifice to me.

[Hu Tu] replied: I have heard, "Deities do not enjoy offerings from those who are not kin, the people do not sacrifice to nonrelatives." Won't this destroy my lord's sacrifices? Besides, what is the guilt of the people? You are abusing punishments and depriving [yourself] of sacrifices. Please, reconsider.⁴⁷

Shensheng reluctantly accepted this argument and re-petitioned *Di* to change the previous verdict. Shensheng realized, therefore, that even *Di*'s promise would not enable him to enjoy ritually inappropriate sacrifices. A similar story is told of the state of Wei 衛. In 629, Lord Cheng (r. 634–600) dreamt that Wei's founder, Kang Shu, urged him to perform sacrifices to a forgotten local deity, Xiang, the descendant of the Xia dynasty. Lord Cheng intended to comply with Kang Shu's request but was dissuaded by his advisor Ning Wuzi, who argued:

Spirits and deities do not enjoy the offerings of non-kin. What is the matter with Qi and Zeng?⁴⁸ Xiang does not enjoy their sacrifices for a

long time; this is not the guilt of Wei. It is impossible to violate sacrificial norms ordered by King Cheng and the Duke of Zhou. Please, change your order to sacrifice [to Xiang].⁴⁹

The *Zuo* preserves many other similar stories that show that ritual rules had priority over the deities' individual wishes. The deity could reveal its will directly, through dreams or divination, but to no avail; Chunqiu statesmen unequivocally preferred to abide by existing sacrificial rites.⁵⁰ New sacrifices were adopted only when their advocates found a sound historical justification for changing established rites. Otherwise, changes and modifications of ritual order were severely condemned.⁵¹

Why did Chunqiu statesmen ignore the deities' will and adhere to the existing ritual norms? Their choice might have reflected the increasing importance of political and social implications of ritual, which gradually overshadowed its original religious functions. As we discuss in the next chapter, *li* served to manifest and perpetuate social hierarchy. Establishing new sacrificial rites or modifying existing ones might have wreaked havoc in the supramundane hierarchy, which could backfire against the hierarchy on earth. Therefore, new rites, particularly when initiated by "unruly deities,"⁵² were apparently conceived as a threat to political and social order.

Chunqiu statesmen furthermore disliked any unregulated contacts with extrahuman forces. Direct appearances of the deities and their demands to change existing sacrificial patterns were detrimental to social stability in general. Again, Zi Chan of Zheng appears to be the most steadfast opponent of the violation of ritual norms. Although the *Zuo* contains what appear to be mutually exclusive anecdotes concerning his views of the divine, we can discern a general trend.⁵³ Throughout his career Zi Chan steadily rejected extrahuman interference with human affairs, and opposed performing any sacrifices that exceeded the ritual framework. His opposition to Pi Zao's suggestion mentioned above is only one of many examples of this kind. In 524 he punished officials who unsuccessfully attempted to put an end to the drought by performing sacrifices to Mount Sang. The pretext for the punishment was the destruction of the mountain's forest, which might have offended the spirits; yet it is quite probable that Zi Chan was simply apprehensive about unregulated sacrificial

activities.⁵⁴ He demonstrated this misgiving again in 523. When the Zheng people observed dragons fighting during the flood of the Wei River, and wanted to sacrifice to them, Zi Chan disagreed:

When we fight, the dragons do not watch us. When the dragons fight why should we watch them? We may ask for their removal, but the river is, after all, their home. If we ask nothing of the dragons, the dragons will ask nothing of us.⁵⁵

This anecdote epitomizes Zi Chan's approach to the divine forces. He was not an atheist, as claimed by some Mainland scholars, nor did he deny the existence of the deities and the spirits.⁵⁶ His attitude toward the supernatural was entirely pragmatic. Whenever necessary, he took into consideration the religious beliefs of the people, and he definitely respected the established ritual practices, not daring to violate them.⁵⁷ Yet Zi Chan opposed establishing additional rites and performing extraordinary sacrifices, and he likewise opposed any unnecessary contacts with the divine world. Similarly to other Chunqiu thinkers, Zi Chan respected the divine forces, but by no means invited them to interfere with human activities. His approach seems to foreshadow Confucius' dictum, "Be reverent to the spirits and deities but keep them at a distance."⁵⁸

Ritualization and the accompanying bureaucratization of Chinese religious life began well into the Shang period and was further reinforced in the course of the Western Zhou ritual reform. In the Chunqiu period, this process advanced one step further; as political and social implications of established rites constantly grew in importance, communicating with the deities turned into a secondary aspect of ritual practices. Although an indispensable part of sacrificial rites, deities were becoming part of ritual conventions rather than active partners in ritual communication. Xunzi's statement (cited in the epigraph), which dwarfed the deities to the position of mere symbols of refined culture, was a logical outcome of this centuries-old process.

A steady decline in the deities' impact on daily life was an inevitable outcome of the above process. If they could no longer influence sacrificial ceremonies—a realm of their direct responsibility—then they were even less likely to exercise a significant impact on public affairs. Indeed, the

Chunqiu period was an age of major decline in the political role of extrahuman powers, as we shall see below.

SKEPTICS, BELIEVERS, MANIPULATORS,
AND THE DECLINE OF THE DEITIES' POLITICAL POWER

Since the early Chunqiu period, a serious controversy had revolved around the relationship between deities and mortals. Many rulers, as well as some of their advisors—adherents of traditional beliefs—argued that proper performance of sacrifices and lavish gifts would undoubtedly ensure divine blessings. On the opposite side, leading statesmen unequivocally stated: “Men are masters of the deities.” They claimed that political success derived from popular support, which was garnered through proper economic, administrative, or military policies, and not bestowed by deities. The deities themselves were supposed to be responsive to popular sentiments rather than to rich gifts. Hence, the state sacrifices, important as they were, were not sufficient to achieve good fortune.

The first to question the traditional *do-ut-des* approach was Ji Liang, from the tiny state of Sui. In 706, Chu officers attempted to provoke a Sui attack by feigning their army's defeat. The Sui ruler almost fell into Chu's trap, but was saved by Ji Liang:

Ji Liang stopped [the ruler] saying: “Heaven supports Chu; Chu pretends weakness in order to entice us. Why should you be so hasty [to attack Chu]? I heard that a small [state] can oppose the large when the small follows the Way, while the large is licentious. What is called the Way is devotion to the people and trustworthiness [in contacting] the deities. Superiors think how to benefit the people—this is devotion; invocators and scribes pronounce correct words—this is trustworthiness. Now the people are starving while the ruler indulges his desires; invocators and scribes are hypocrites when they sacrifice. I wonder whether such [behavior] is acceptable.”

The lord said: “My sacrificial oxen are fat; the sacrificial vessels are full of millet—how then [can you claim that] I lack trustworthiness?”

[Ji Liang] answered: “The people are masters of the deities. Therefore, sage kings carried out the people's affairs first, and then attended

to the deities. Hence, when it is declared during the presentation of sacrificial oxen, 'broad and large, thick and fat,' this means that the people's strength is all preserved, that large animals are bred and are reproducing, that they have no diseases and epidemics, and that everyone has enough fat.⁵⁹ When during the presentation of sacrificial millet it is declared, 'clean grain, plenty of seeds,' this means that the three [agricultural] seasons have not been violated, people's lives are peaceful, and crops are plentiful. When during the presentation of sacrificial wine it is declared, 'fine, clean, beautiful wine,' it means that superiors and inferiors all possess fine virtue, and have not a delinquent heart. What is called fragrance refers to lack of wickedness. Therefore, devote your efforts to the three seasons, improve the five teachings, let [the people] treat appropriately the nine grades of relatives, and then perform sacrifices. Under such conditions people will be peaceful, and the deities will bestow good fortune, so that activities will be successfully completed. Nowadays, however, everyone has a heart of his own, and the spirits and deities lack their master. Though your [sacrifices] are lavish, what good fortune can be achieved in this way? You should improve your rule and establish close ties with fraternal states, and thus avoid difficulties.⁶⁰

The lord of Sui unequivocally adhered to the *do-ut-des* approach, according to which his lavish sacrifices were sufficient to ensure divine support. Ji Liang utterly disagreed. In his eyes sacrificial activities were important not because the rich offerings facilitated the deities' approval but because the quality of the offerings reflected the strength and welfare of the state. The true measure of success was the livelihood of the people, and only after that had been ensured would the deities respond to the ruler's prayers. Thus, to ensure good fortune and divine support, the ruler should turn his attention to human affairs, such as economic issues; sacrifices were auxiliary. Many other early Chunqiu statesmen cited in the *Zuo* share this view.⁶¹

Earlier, we saw that even the direct demand of a deity could not change established sacrificial rites. But even if new rites were established, statesmen denied any political implications to the appearance of a deity. In 661 a deity arrived in the city of Shen on the territory of the state of Guo 虢 in northwestern Henan. King Hui of Zhou (r. 676–652) asked *neishi* (inner scribe) Guo 過 to explain the unusual phenomenon. Guo replied:

"When the state is to prosper, numinous deities arrive to inspect its virtue. When the state is to be ruined, deities arrive as well to examine its wickedness. Therefore, the appearance of deities may mean prosperity as well as destruction. Yu, Xia, Shang, and Zhou all had this."

The king asked: "So, what is to be done?"

[Scribe Guo] answered: "Sacrifice the appropriate object to [the deity]. Sacrifice the appropriate object according to the day of its arrival."

The king heeded [Guo's advice]. *Neishi* Guo was about to leave when he heard that [the ruler of] Guo asked the deity for its orders. He returned and remarked:

"[The state of] Guo is to perish. It[s ruler] is despotic, and listens to the deities."

The deity resided in Shen for six months. The lord of Guo ordered Invocator Ying, Ancestral Intendant (*zong*) Qu and Scribe Yin to sacrifice to it. The deity granted him [the lord of Guo] lands and fields.⁶²

Scribe Yin said: "Guo is to perish! I heard that when a state is to prosper, [rulers] listen to the people; when it is to perish they listen to the deities. The deities are all-hearing, all-seeing, upright and correct, and they are consistent. Their behavior depends on that of the human beings. The virtue of the state of Guo is too shallow; which lands will it be able to obtain?"⁶³

These passages reflect the immensely varied picture of early Chunqiu attitudes toward the deities' prowess: the trusting commitment of the lord of Guo who "listened to the deities," the uncertainty of King Hui, and the pragmatic attitude of the scribes Guo and Yin. A ritual specialist, *neishi* Guo, found the way to absorb a new deity into the ritual framework, but he radically criticized the additional ceremonies performed by the lord of Guo, stating that "listening to the deities" was the way to perish. Yin shared his colleague's criticism, explaining, as Ji Liang did, that "all-seeing and all-hearing" deities were responsive to the people's sentiments rather than to sacrifices. Both scribes evidently believed that the lord of Guo must occupy himself with the people's well-being rather than with sacrificial gambles.⁶⁴

The creed of most speakers quoted above is simple: rulers needed to concentrate on human affairs rather than seeking deities' support. This trend was widespread from the early Chunqiu period; it was further reinforced by growing skepticism about the deities' existence. Seeds of this

skeptical attitude were evident as early as the seventh century. Whenever statesmen of that age encountered supernatural phenomena, they sought to provide rational answers.⁶⁵ By the late Chunqiu this approach became more pronounced. In 534 a stone reportedly spoke in the state of Jin. Lord Ping (r. 557–532) asked Master Kuang why it spoke. Kuang answered:

Stones cannot speak; perhaps somebody made use of it [to speak]. Or people misheard it. Yet, I heard that when [state] affairs are undertaken in improper seasons, grudges and resentment are rife among the people; in such cases mute things may speak. Nowadays, palaces are high and extravagant, people's strength is utterly exhausted, grudges and resentment arise everywhere and people cannot protect their lives. That a stone spoke—is it not appropriate?⁶⁶

Kuang sought to supply a rational explanation of a supernatural phenomenon by either relating it to a this-worldly event, or rejecting outright the possibility of its occurrence; he made no more than symbolic use of the “speaking stone.” This skeptical attitude toward extrahuman powers became fairly widespread among members of the educated elite in the second half of the Chunqiu period. Time and again we hear *Zuo* speakers pronounce the phrase “if spirits and deities exist,” indicating growing doubts concerning the deities’ existence.⁶⁷

This skepticism had immediate political implications, as statesmen were less inclined to seek divine support and were less worried about the prospect of divine punishment. The change is clearly seen in the decreasing respect toward oaths pronounced at the interstate alliance (*meng*) ceremonies. Although these oaths routinely invoked deities as guardians of the alliance, the frequency and ease with which solemn oaths were violated indicates a lack of faith in divine retribution. This topic will be discussed in great detail in Chapter 4; suffice it to say here that by the late Chunqiu most statesmen might have agreed that invoking deities during the alliance oaths was nothing but a convention. In 509 a controversy ensued between the representatives of the states of Song and Xue regarding the text of the century-old Jiantu alliance. The Xue envoy suggested consulting the archives, while Zhong Ji of Song instead suggested consulting “the deities and spirits of mountains and rivers,” namely the al-

liance's guardians. This suggestion infuriated the Jin arbiter, Shi Mimou, who remarked:

Xue proves [its case] from men, while Song proves [its case] from the spirits—the Song's guilt is great, indeed. They cannot make their case, and try to impress us with deities—they mean to cheat us.⁶⁸

That the Jin statesman considered invocation of deities in a political dispute to be cheating unequivocally testifies to the significant decline in statesmen's faith in general. Deities, the putative guardians of the Jiantu alliance, were no longer to be taken seriously, and their invocation in political disputes was considered an offence. Private beliefs notwithstanding, deities had lost their relevance in the public sphere. This trend continued well into the Zhanguo period. While actual faith in the deities' existence among certain members of the elite and among most commoners never faded entirely, widespread skepticism radically limited the political relevance of the deities, and largely confined their public impact to the lower strata of the populace.⁶⁹

The skeptical attitudes depicted above changed the nature of discourse related to the deities. The discussions about the validity of the *do-ut-des* approach, current in the early Chunqiu years, were largely discontinued in the late Chunqiu. Nevertheless, invocations of deities in political debates occasionally resurfaced in the second half of the Chunqiu period as well. Why and under what circumstances did this happen? To answer this question we must first modify our somewhat monochromatic picture of the sweeping skepticism of the late Chunqiu years.

Many if not most Chunqiu thinkers might have doubted the deities' existence, but none stated their doubts openly, preferring conditional statements instead. This may indicate that the issue of the existence of extrahuman powers remained controversial. Aside from the ritual imperative to continue a semblance of respect to the deities, religious beliefs remained influential among significant portions of elite members, as well as among the commoners. Most rulers cited in the *Zuo* expressed their belief in the deities' existence. Furthermore, some statesmen, particularly

representatives of the Zhou royal domain as well as the leading conservative thinker Shu Xiang, argued that men and deities were equally important factors in a ruler's success.⁷⁰ In addition, while the majority of the Chunqiu bronze inscriptions indicate a reorientation away from the ancestors, many continued to abide by Western Zhou norms, and by the late Chunqiu period some donors emphasized their "sincerity" in performing ancestral worship, perhaps to distance themselves from the skepticism of their contemporaries. Thus, a significant portion of the elite members did not share the skepticism of their contemporaries. We may furthermore plausibly assume that skeptical attitudes were not widespread among the lowest strata of the populace.⁷¹

For these reasons, many shrewd statesmen apparently preferred not to undermine the beliefs of their colleagues, superiors, or underlings, but, as in the case of Heaven's intent, tried to manipulate these beliefs in order to obtain political gains. Without doubt, the most brilliant of these manipulators was the shrewd Qi statesman, Yan Ying. Yan Ying painstakingly sought ways to strengthen the position of his weak patron, Lord Jing of Qi, and to convince the lord of the need to improve his behavior. To attain this end, Yan Ying did not hesitate to make use of Lord Jing's religious beliefs. In 522 the lord suffered a severe illness. His hypocritical aides, Liangqiu Ju and Yi Kuan, said:

"We present rich offerings to the spirits and deities, more than previous rulers. Now your severe illness that worries the overlords is the fault of the invocator and the scribe. The overlords do not know that and consider us irreverent. Perhaps you should execute Invocator Gu and Scribe Yin in order to avert the illness."

The lord agreed and told this to Yanzi (Yan Ying). [Yan Ying explained the stupidity of the proposed action]:

"If the ruler possesses virtue (*de*), internal and external affairs are not neglected, superior and inferior hold no resentment, [the ruler's] activities do not violate [ritual] matters; his invocators and scribes deliver trustworthy words, and there is nothing shameful. Therefore, spirits and deities enjoy the offerings, while the state, including invocators and scribes, obtains good fortune. Plenty of good fortune and longevity are brought by the trustworthy ruler because his reports to the spirits and

deities are trustworthy and loyal. Yet, sometimes, they encounter a licentious sovereign, who acts viciously in internal and external [matters], and superiors and inferiors are extremely resentful. [Such a ruler's] activities violate the norms; he follows his desires to feed his selfish aims; he builds high towers and deep ponds; he strikes the bells to make women dance; he cuts off the people's force, expropriates their wealth in order to satisfy his misconduct, and has no mercy for later generations. [Such a ruler] acts [like a] tyrant—oppressively, licentiously, and willfully; he behaves excessively and neglects the norms; disregards any restrictions, and thinks nothing of the resentment and hostility [he causes]. [Such a ruler] disrespects the spirits and deities. The deities are enraged, the people suffer, but his heart is unrepentant. If his invocators and scribes speak the truth, they must report his crimes; if they conceal [his crimes] and enumerate his beautiful [deeds], they deceive and cheat; if they present no report at all, then it means that they flatter with empty words. Therefore, the spirits and deities reject the offerings and bring misfortune on his state, including invocators and scribes. Thus, demons and calamities and orphans and sicknesses are caused by the ruler's brutality, while his words disparage the spirits and deities by deceiving them." [Yan Ying further enumerated in great detail administrative and economic malpractices of Lord Jing's government.]⁷²

Yan Ying was consistent in his arguments on the relations between mundane and divine realms. The *Zuo* tells that in 516, after a comet was observed in the sky of Qi, Yan Ying dissuaded Lord Jing from performing a special sacrificial ceremony to "avert evil," saying; "If virtue (*de*) is deficient and in turmoil, then the people intend to flee; actions of invocators and scribes cannot help [in this situation]."⁷³ Both cases are characteristic of Yan Ying's method of reinterpreting traditional approaches to achieve new results.

Yan Ying emphasized the role of the ruler's *de* in obtaining supernatural support. This view resembles the Western Zhou—early Chunqiu concept of *de* as *mana*, or a "universal mediator of sacred communication."⁷⁴ Only he who possessed sufficient *de* could expect the divine forces to respond positively to his pleas. Yet while Yan Ying resorted to the ancient concept, he imbued it with new meanings. His *de* was no longer a sacred substance but, rather, cohesion of appropriate political measures and the proper behavior of the ruler. Lord Jing lost the people's support due to his

economic and administrative mismanagement and personal misconduct; all these manifested his shallow *de*. For Yan Ying, therefore, *de* became a term of political and ethical, rather than religious, discourse.⁷⁵

Lord Jing's aides considered his illness a divine punishment resulting from improper performance of the sacrificial rites—the quintessential view of a traditional *do-ut-des* approach. Yan Ying disagreed. Without denying the possibility of the deities' responsiveness to human activities, he redefined the nature of the interaction. He argued that the deities would respond only to “trustworthy reports” of the ruler, and would ignore empty flattery. To deliver a trustworthy report, the ruler in turn ought to have “nothing shameful” to hide. Hence, Yan Ying concluded, the ruler's conduct, rather than his prayers, determined in the final analysis whether he and his state would obtain good or bad fortune. Accordingly, the responsibility for and the solution of the ruler's problems was in the human realm, not the divine.

Yan Ying apparently inherited the views of predecessors like Ji Liang, *neishi* Guo, and Scribe Yin, who claimed, “Men are masters of deities.” Yet the tone of his speech differs from that of earlier thinkers. It would be naïve to assume that Yan Ying wholeheartedly shared the beliefs of his predecessors. His detailed account of Lord Jing's malpractices leaves no doubt that it was politics, not the human interaction with the transcendental, that really mattered to Yan Ying. What he actually wanted was to persuade his weak and hesitant patron, Lord Jing, to improve his conduct and his policy. In the dozens of Yan Ying's speeches and utterances scattered throughout the *Zuo* there is no hint of what may be interpreted as a genuine belief in supernatural retribution. Yet because his ruler and his colleagues continued to rely on the deities' power, Yan Ying decided to manipulate these beliefs to obtain a desirable political goal. This manipulation was in accord with Yan Ying's personal style of persuasion, which is consistent throughout the *Zuo*.⁷⁶

Manipulative use of the personal beliefs of others was not unique to Yan Ying. The *Zuo* tells with unreserved irony how the shrewd Lu messengers Zi Gong and Zifu Jingbo took advantage of the religious beliefs, or probably superstitions, of the powerful but unsophisticated leaders of the southern superpower of Wu, to obtain political benefits for their state.⁷⁷

These stories are interesting not only as a testimony for intercultural contacts of the late Chunqiu, but also as further evidence of the tricky ways in which skeptical members of the Chunqiu educated elite made use of their opponents' religious feelings. Ironically, the deities appear in the late Chunqiu political discussions primarily as the means of cheating one's opponents, which may better explain the outrage of Shi Mimou, cited above: a serious statesman might have indeed considered the resort to deities in a political dispute as a personal offense.

DEITIES AND MORALITY

The above discussion concentrated on the political implications of the diminishing faith in the deities' efficacy. The political bias of the discussion is understandable in light of our limited sources. The *Zuo* generally pays much less attention to issues of personal morality, and even these are usually discussed in a narrow political sense; namely, what are the proper modes of behavior for a ruler or his minister. Nevertheless, several anecdotes scattered throughout the *Zuo* afford us a partial reconstruction of the Chunqiu views of the role of extrahuman forces in personal life. Here again we see a familiar argument between supporters of the *do-ut-des* approach and those who wanted to impose moral criteria on human contact with the deities.

We have no evidence that ethical issues played any significant role in human contact with the deities during the Western Zhou. By the second half of the Chunqiu, however, the situation began to change. Lothar von Falkenhausen noted that Eastern Zhou bronze inscriptions "reflect a subtle reorientation away from the ancestors . . . The ancestors are no longer referred to as potential givers of aid . . . [Success] must be a result not of ancestral help, but of the descendants' own ritually and politically correct behavior."⁷⁸ Similar views that personal success cannot derive from supernatural support alone but must be based primarily on proper conduct appear in the *Zuo* speeches.

The *Zuo* discussions on the possibility that a morally deficient person could obtain divine blessings developed along similar lines as the discus-

sions about the inept ruler obtaining good fortune for his state. Whereas some of the *Zuo* protagonists hoped that sacrifices would suffice to ensure extrahuman protection, others believed that deities would bestow favors only on the moral person; still others considered morality as important in itself and denied the immoral person even the right to communicate with the deities. These later voices evidently prevailed in late Chunqiu discourse as presented in the *Zuo*.

In 586 Zhao Ying of Jin was accused of having illicit relations with his aunt and was forced to go into exile. He dreamt of a heavenly messenger who told him, "sacrifice to me, and I shall bring good fortune." Puzzled, Zhao Ying sought advice from his colleague Shi Zhenbo. Zhenbo refused to state his opinion on the matter, but later said:

Deities bestow good fortune on the benevolent (*ren*) and send misfortune to the licentious. When the licentious escapes punishment it is [already] good fortune. [Even if Zhao Ying] sacrifices, will he escape [misfortune]?⁷⁹

Whereas Zhao Ying might have hoped to exchange sacrifices for the deity's protection, Shi Zhenbo no longer considered sacrifices a sufficient means of obtaining good fortune; personal morality had become more important. Many other *Zuo* speakers expressed a similar belief that the deities would support only those who are benevolent, loyal, and good.⁸⁰ Can it be assumed that some Chunqiu thinkers believed in a kind of divine retribution on the personal level and viewed supernatural forces as guardians of morality? Such a concept is not entirely alien to subsequent Chinese thought; it is present, for example in Mozi's writings.⁸¹ Yet the late Chunqiu atmosphere of skepticism was not altogether congenial to the concept of supernatural retribution. Morality became important in itself both as part of the elite's self-image and as the means to preserve social order.⁸² Therefore, instead of looking to transcendental authority to oversee a person's morality, other Chunqiu thinkers preferred to impose ethical norms on communication with the deities. Denying the possibility that the morally deficient person could seek divine support, these thinkers no longer considered deities as guardians of ethical norms; the norms became important in themselves and needed no supernatural protection.

Several speeches exemplify this approach. In 559 the fugitive Lord Xian of Wei intended to deliver a special message to his ancestral spirits stating that he was blameless of the events that had brought about his exile. His stepmother, Ding Jiang, did not like the belated attempt of the fugitive lord to polish his image, and angrily remarked:

[If] there are no spirits, why report? If there are, they cannot be deceived. You committed crimes; how can you report being innocent? You dismissed the chief ministers and consulted the petty ones—this is your first crime. The former ruler appointed the chief ministers to instruct and protect you, but you neglected them—this is your second crime. I served the previous ruler with towel and comb, but you mistreated me as if I were a mere concubine—this is your third crime. Declare only that you are going [into exile]; do not declare your innocence!⁸³

At the beginning of her speech, Ding Jiang expressed skepticism regarding the existence of the spirits, but she refrained from discussing this seemingly irresolvable issue. Instead, she concentrated on her stepson's deficient behavior; the immoral Lord Xian could not rely on ancestral support because he did not deserve it. Deities (if they exist), according to Ding Jiang, could not be deceived and manipulated by an immoral person and would not respond to his plea. Similarly, Yan Ying claimed in the speech quoted earlier that the morally deficient lord had no right to contact the deities and could not expect their response to his prayers. Yet the most powerful affirmation of ethics regulating the contact with deities is the speech of the Lu official Zifu Huibo. In 530 Nan Kuai, a retainer of the powerful Ji lineage, plotted rebellion against his master. Before carrying out his plans, Nan Kuai cast stalks. He obtained the hexagram Bi of Kun, with the explanation of the fifth line as follows: "Yellow skirt, primarily auspicious." Nan Kuai interpreted the oracle as auspicious, and showed it to Zifu Huibo. The latter gave him a cool reception:

I have studied this [i.e., the *Zhouyi*]. If it is a loyal and trustworthy action, then it may succeed; otherwise, it will inevitably fail. The outer strong, the inner mild—this is loyalty; harmoniously carry out faithfulness (*zhen*)—this is trustworthiness.⁸⁴ Thus it says: "Yellow skirt, primarily auspicious." "Yellow" is the color of the center (*zhong*), "skirt" is

the ornament of the inferior [part of the body], “primal” is the best of the good. If the center is not loyal (*zhong bu zhong*), it will not obtain its color; if the inferior is not respectful, he will not obtain its ornament; if the matter [which you plan] is disrespectful [of superiors], it will not obtain its ultimate development. The outer and inner [respectively] leading and harmonizing—this is loyalty; when affairs are directed by trustworthiness, this is respectfulness. Nourishing the three virtues is goodness. If these three are not, then [the results] do not match. Moreover, the [*Zhou*]*yi* cannot be used to divine on sinister matters. What matter do you plan that is so ornamented? If the center is good, it can be “yellow”; if the superior part is good, it is “primal”; if the inferior part is good, then it is a “skirt.” If the three are realized, you can cast stalks. If [one of the foregoing] is missing, then, although the casting says “auspicious,” it is not.⁸⁵

The enigmatic language of the divination specialist, Zifu Huibo, does not obscure the basic message of his speech. Even divination results had to be considered with reference to the person who inquired of the oracle. Whenever divination was used for immoral ends, it could not be successful. Immoral actions could not bring good fortune, and extrahuman powers had to follow this principle. The source of success and failure, in politics and private life alike, was in the human realm.

Summary

The Chunqiu period witnessed a profound transformation of man’s relationship with the transcendental. This change was not revolutionary: as we have seen, Chunqiu statesmen continued to disagree about the role of divine forces in mundane affairs. Nonetheless, as the skeptical voices regarding the political prowess of Heaven and the deities became more pronounced, the traditional belief in the Heaven-decreed political order faded away. While certain statesmen continued attempts to understand Heaven’s intent, and others cynically manipulated their colleagues’ beliefs, the dominant mood was that inscrutable Heaven could not serve as a guarantor of political and social stability. Even less could spirits and deities, whose mere existence was doubted by many, be relied upon in resolving mundane issues. Thus, as Chunqiu thinkers became increasingly con-

vinced that the solution for political and personal problems lay in the here and now, they began focusing on human affairs rather than on transcendental matters. This shift of the point of reference from the divine to the mundane shaped future intellectual discourse and became a turning point in China's intellectual history.

Chapter 3

The Universal Panacea

Ritual and Preserving Hierarchical Order

The Central States are the states of ritual and propriety.

—He Xiu, 129–182 C.E.

Therefore, when the Way is lost, virtue appears; when virtue is lost, benevolence appears; when benevolence is lost, propriety appears; when propriety is lost, ritual appears. Ritual is the husk of loyalty and trustworthiness, the way of calamity.

—Laozi

Confucius depicted Chunqiu history as a process of incessant erosion of power from the Son of Heaven to the overlords, from overlords to nobles, and finally from nobles to their retainers.¹ Indeed, the Chunqiu was the age of disintegration. The continuous usurpation of superiors' prerogatives by their underlings resulted in incessant strife among the states, among the major lineages in each state, and often within the lineages. The history of Chunqiu political thought may be summarized as the statesmen's painstaking efforts to put an end to the disintegration, prevent anarchy, and restore hierarchical order. These efforts resulted in a major achievement: the development of the concept of ritual (*li*). Generations of Chunqiu thinkers evolved *li* into the guiding principle of individual, social, and political life. They bequeathed this concept to Confucius and his followers, enabling them in no small measure to overcome their opponents; no other intellectual school succeeded in providing a sufficiently convincing alternative to *li* as the basic core of social order.² How the

concept of “rule by ritual” came into existence is the topic of the present chapter.

Origins of *Li*

The origins of *li* may be traced back to Shang rituals, or even to the Neolithic period, when the first sumptuary norms appeared.³ However, the ritual system (*li zhi*) that dominated Eastern Zhou society and is reflected in the Zhanguo–early Han ritual compendia emerged relatively late. Recent archaeological studies indicate that by the second half of the ninth century B.C.E., a sweeping ritual reform had occurred, resulting in profound changes in sacrificial rites, sumptuary rules, and kinship organization. Although this reform is not attested to directly in the received texts, archaeological studies suggest that it aimed to stabilize political and social life by emphasizing differences in rank, regulating intralineage succession and also, probably, by reinforcing cultural unity among the Huaxia states.⁴ While many details concerning the establishment of the Zhou ritual system are still obscure, it is likely that its emergence was one of the most important events in early Zhou history.

Ritual reform resulted in the overall ritualization of Zhou social and political life. Elaborate ceremonies encompassed not only sacrificial rites, but also court activities, the ruler’s major undertakings, interstate meetings, and even warfare. The ceremonial functions of every aristocrat were determined by his rank and seniority in his lineage. The ritual system thus preserved and solidified the hierarchical social order within the lineage, and by extension in the state in general.

During the Chunqiu period the Western Zhou ritual system came under strong pressure from those segments of society that sought to improve their status. New international and domestic hierarchies that emerged during the Chunqiu period no longer reflected proximity to the ruling house, as implied by ritual norms, but the actual balance of power between the overlords and the ministers within each state. A further challenge to the ritual system came when members of each social stratum began to usurp

the ritual prerogatives of their superiors, upgrading their privileges beyond what was assigned to their rank. These massive infractions of ritual norms endangered the functioning of the ritual system. Indeed, the entire ritual-based hereditary social order was on the verge of collapse.⁵

Chunqiu statesmen realized the dangerous implications of the disintegration of their ritual-based social order, and did their best to prevent it. A reader of the *Zuo* may conclude that *li* was the major topic of Chunqiu discourse, and that ritual criteria were used to judge almost every possible social and political undertaking. Does this so-called “pan-*liism*” of the *Zuo* reflect merely its author’s ideology, as some scholars have assumed?⁶ Without discounting the importance of the author’s input, scrutiny of the *Zuo* does not support this assertion. The picture of *li* presented in the *Zuo* is fairly complicated and it defies a simplistic attribution of the ritual-related discourse to the author’s personal views. First, the sheer plurality of views concerning *li* as expressed in the *Zuo* cannot be plausibly assumed to reflect the personal outlook of the author. Second, most importantly, far from being a mere panegyric of *li*, the *Zuo* truthfully depicts the inadequacy of ritual norms in dealing with such major areas of political activity as interstate relations and warfare.⁷ Far from being simplistic *li* propaganda, the *Zuo* seems to reflect the genuine concerns and contradictory approaches of Chunqiu political elites.

By the late Chunqiu it was evident that *li* had largely lost its relevance as the means of preserving international order, and it was similarly no longer applicable in warfare. In these fields of political activity, statesmen failed to adjust Western Zhou regulations to changing circumstances, and ritual norms were consequently either relegated to mere convention, or abandoned altogether. Yet in contrast to the international scene and military activities, *li* became a powerful means of upholding domestic political and social order. Astute Chunqiu thinkers found a way to preserve the essence of *li*—the hereditary hierarchical order—without being obliged to abide by some of the more obsolete ceremonial rules. By distilling the hierarchical principles of *li* from its ceremonial form, they succeeded in expanding its meaning to encompass ever broader spheres of activity, and to

extend the relevance of *li* from a handful of higher dignitaries to the majority of the populace. This reconceptualization of *li* had profound consequences for Chinese political thought and political culture.

Curiously enough, the term “*li*” remained marginal during the Western Zhou period, and it did not gain prominence even in the course of ritual reform. *Li* in Western Zhou texts remained largely confined to sacrificial rites, while the broad concept of ritual propriety was designated as ceremonial decorum (*yi*) or awe-inspiring ceremonies (*weiyi*).⁸ Both *yi* and *weiyi* referred to the precise, orderly performance of the complicated ceremonies, in which each participant behaved according to his rank and seniority in his lineage. Thus, ceremonial decorum presupposed hierarchic order, which may explain the increasing prominence of this concept in late-Western Zhou discourse. In some odes of the *Shi jing*, such as “Yi,” ceremonial decorum is elevated to an unprecedentedly high position of being the “counterpart of virtue” (*de*).⁹ The crucial importance of observing ceremonial decorum became a prevalent motif not only in late-Western Zhou odes, but also in many of the late-Western Zhou bronze inscriptions.¹⁰

Preserving ceremonial decorum was the primary obligation of the ruler. The late-Western Zhou thinkers believed that if the ruler properly performed the ceremonies at court, in the temple, and elsewhere, he would become a model for his subjects and thus inspire them to follow orderly rule.¹¹ This function of the ruler corresponded to his role during the performance of the sacrificial rites. Ever since Shang times, the ruler (or the head of the lineage) held primary responsibility for performing sacrifices. Accordingly, he was also considered the pivotal figure in preserving social order.

The Western Zhou concept of the ruler as the sole guardian of social order whose primary responsibility was upholding ceremonial decorum remained influential well into the Chunqiu period. This view is represented in the speeches by early Lu statesmen, Zang Xibo,¹² and particularly his son, Aibo. In 710 Lord Huan of Lu (r. 711–694) was bribed by the Song ruler, who presented him with a great caldron (*ding*) to prevent Lu’s invasion. Lord Huan decided to place the caldron in the ancestral temple. Alarmed, Zang Aibo gave a reprimand:

The ruler should clarify virtue and bar transgressions; thus he presides over his officials. Even in this case [the ruler must] fear that he commits certain errors; therefore he clarifies his great virtue to show it to his descendants. Accordingly, the bright temple is covered by a plain thatch, the grand chariot is rush-padded, the great soup is unseasoned, the sacrificial grain is unmilled—thus his frugality is clarified. His robe, cap, knee-covers, and mace; his girdle, lower robe, buskins, and shoes; the crosspiece of his cap, its stopper pendants, its fastening strings, and its crown—all clarify his [proper] standards (*du*). His gem mats and his scabbard, with its ornaments above and below, his belt with its descending ends, the streamers of his flags, and the ornaments at his horses' breasts clarify his adherence to degrees [of rank] (*shu*). The flames, the dragons, the axes, and the *fu* ornaments on his clothes clarify his refined culture (*wen*). [The sequence] of five colors [on the ornaments] corresponds to the objects [in nature]—this clarifies his colors (*wu*).¹³ The bells on his horses, carriages, and banners clarify his voice (*sheng*). The flags with sun, moon, and stars clarify his brightness (*ming*). The virtue (*de*) is thrifty and has standards, promoting and demoting have degrees; it is regulated by refined culture and colors, it is executed by voice and brightness—in this way he [the virtuous ruler] presides over his officials. Therefore, the officials are warned and fear; [they] dare not violate the regulations. At present, you have annihilated the virtue and established violations; you inserted the vessel given as a bribe into the Great Temple,¹⁴ and this was illustrated to the officials. If the officials imitate [your behavior], how would you punish them? The defeat of the state derives from vicious officials. The loss of virtue by officials is demonstrated by accepting bribes. When the Gao caldron is put into the Great Temple, what can be a more outrageous demonstration [of corruption]?¹⁵

Zang's speech, like that of his father, is in accord with the "Yi" ode of the *Shi jing* cited above: proper observance of ceremonial decorum meant "clarification of virtue." Zang concentrated on the ruler's actions; the ruler held the sole responsibility for the orderly functioning of the state. Officials were merely supposed to imitate the sovereign's behavior; their own conduct was of minor importance. The ideas of Zang Aibo and Zang Xibo remained prevalent in Lu throughout the early Chunqiu period, as represented, for instance, in the "Lu song" hymn:

Majestic and solemn is the lord of Lu,
Reverently he illuminates his virtue.

He is reverent and careful in awe-inspiring ceremonies,
He is the model for the people.”¹⁶

Interestingly, the term “*li*” is not present in the above instances. Early Chunqiu thinkers seemingly followed the lead of their predecessors, believing that preservation of proper ceremonial decorum was essential for the proper functioning of society; hence, the terms “*yi*” and “*weiyi*” overshadowed “*li*” in early Chunqiu discourse. “*Li*” was no longer coterminous with sacrificial rites, as it was in Western Zhou texts, but neither was it used in connection with broadly conceived social order. “*Li*” in early Chunqiu speeches referred primarily to interstate etiquette and, by extension, to the proper handling of international relations. In the following chapter we shall discuss in greater detail the futile attempts of Chunqiu statesmen to turn *li* into a proxy of the international law. Here we shall concentrate on *li*’s function in domestic affairs, and trace the increasing divergence between *li* and *yi* or *weiyi* in middle and late Chunqiu discourse.

Distilling the Essence of *Li*: Ritual as Sociopolitical Order

How did the process of redefining the term “*li*” begin? Facing mounting infractions of ceremonial decorum, thinkers probably became increasingly aware of the inadequacy of “awe-inspiring ceremonies” as the means to ensure social order. Instead, they began pondering the way to preserve the guiding principle of ritual, namely, maintenance of the hierarchic order. It is in this context that Chunqiu thinkers rediscovered the multifaceted term “*li*,” which could be used not only with regard to specific ceremonies or rites, but also in the broader context of ritual propriety or ritual behavior in general. Just as during ritual performances each participant had well-defined functions according to his hereditary rank and his seniority within the lineage, so, thinkers hoped, could these principles be applied to other spheres of social life. If each member of the ruling elite properly performed functions assigned to him by his rank, there would be no room for internal strife and the conflicts that plagued late Chunqiu society. Ritual norms, therefore, would preserve hierarchy,

define everyone's tasks, and ensure the smooth functioning of the state apparatus.

The eminent Jin minister Shi Hui (Fan Wuzi) inaugurated this new approach in 597, in the speech that enumerated the advantages of Jin's powerful adversary, King Zhuang of Chu (r. 613–591):

When the ruler [King Zhuang] promotes [a new appointee] from the inner families, he chooses the closest relatives, while from the outer families he chooses [sons of] the oldest [ministerial lineages].¹⁷ When promoting he does not ignore virtue, when rewarding he does not ignore merit. He bestows kindness on old [servants] and provides lodging for newcomers. Superior and petty men are distinguished by differences in badge and clothing. Nobles enjoy constant honor, whereas the humble have degrees of authority. In all these, *li* is not violated.¹⁸

This was an entirely new approach to *li*. Instead of discussing the proper performance of sacrificial rites and court ceremonies, Shi Hui concentrated on the administrative policy of King Zhuang and the ensuing social order in Chu. A century earlier Zang Aibo had emphasized the difference between the ruler and the ruled; for Shi Hui, the distinction between nobles and commoners was much more important. He praised King Zhuang's adherence to *li* because the king followed a conservative policy of selecting leading officials from either his close relatives or the oldest aristocratic lineages. Thus, the hierarchy among leading families was preserved and Chu did not witness violent interlineage strife, which characterized internal life in the state of Jin. Adherence to *li* should, therefore, ensure both political and social stability as well as the smooth functioning of the administrative apparatus.

Other statesmen evidently shared this interpretation of *li*. In 579 another Jin minister, Xi Zhi, enumerated the benefits of adherence to *li*:

When government [affairs are] completed according to *li*, the people are relaxed. The hundred officials, while carrying out their tasks, attend the court in the morning and not in the evening [since there are no extraordinary tasks]. In this way lords and princes protect their people.¹⁹

In 547 Gongsun Guisheng of Cai claimed that the administrative system should be based on the proper handling of rewards, punishments, and

care of the common people. “These three are the great restrictions of ritual (*li*). When there is ritual [the state] will not be defeated.”²⁰ Thus, for Xi Zhi and Guisheng, *li* became synonymous with the entire spectrum of administrative activities. *Li*’s expansion to the political realm is illustrated by a compound “*chen li*” (ritual [behavior] of the minister/subject), first mentioned in 588 by the Jin officer Zhi Ying.²¹ The actual use of this compound indicates that in the early sixth century the term “*li*” depicted not only specific ceremonial rules, but rather a general mode of proper political behavior.

Thus, by mid-sixth century B.C.E., “*li*” (ritual) encompassed both administrative and personnel policy and was no longer coterminous with ceremonial decorum. Consequently, maintaining *li* was obligatory, not only for the ruler but for all members of the ruling stratum. Adherence to *li* became the distinctive mark of the “superior men.” This new approach was summarized by Lord Kang of Liu from the Zhou royal domain. In 578, while criticizing the careless ritual performance of his colleague, Lord Su of Cheng, Kang of Liu said:

I heard that people accept for their living everything between Heaven and Earth; this is called destiny (*ming*). Therefore, activities have patterns of ritual and propriety (*liyi*) and of awe-inspiring ceremonies (*weiyi*): thus destiny is stabilized. He who has ability nourishes [these norms] to approach good fortune; while he who lacks ability destroys them and proceeds towards misfortune. Therefore, superior men are diligent in observing ritual (*li*), while petty men exhaust their [physical] strength. Being diligent in observing ritual, the best is to be utterly reverent, while in exhausting strength it is best to be sincere. Reverence is to nourish the deities (*shen*), sincerity is to preserve the [hereditary] occupation. The great affairs of state are sacrifices and warfare. When sacrificing one takes the meat, in warfare one receives the meat—these are the great regulations of the deities. Now, Chengzi (Su of Cheng) was careless, he discarded his destiny—will he come back [from the military expedition]?²²

Kang of Liu represented the royal domain of Zhou, the last bastion of the traditional Chunqiu “conservative” approach. Not surprisingly, he attributed equal importance to ritual propriety (*li*) and ceremonial decorum (*yi*). Yet his speech is innovative in other aspects. Abiding by ritual norms

became an obligation for all “superior men,” while “petty men” were enjoined to follow sincerely the occupations of their ancestors. Thus, although *li* was still confined to an upper stratum, it indirectly implied the stabilization of the entire social system. Moreover, although Kang of Liu stressed the ceremonial aspects of ritual, such as sacrifices and military ceremonies, he clearly stated that *li* applied to the entire spectrum of activities (*dong-zuo*) and accordingly became a major force for regulating the political and social life of the elite.

By the late Chunqiu period, the steady expansion in the meaning of *li* caused a gradual reassessment of its relationship with ceremonial decorum. The latter became increasingly inadequate in the face of changing political and social realities; hence, some practical statesmen tended to deprecate its significance. They preferred to emphasize the essence of *li*—its hierarchic principles—and not ceremonies, which became “a trivial issue.” On the other hand, thinkers adhering to tradition, like Kang of Liu, continued to regard both ritual norms and ceremonial decorum as indispensable.

Ritual norms and ceremonial decorum were clearly distinguished by late Chunqiu thinkers, as indicated by the Wei 衛 chancellor Beigong Wenzhi. In 542 he visited the state of Zheng, which had undergone profound reforms under the leadership of the energetic Zi Chan. Impressed by Zi Chan’s administrative abilities, international farsightedness, and mastery of international etiquette, Beigong Wenzhi remarked:

Zheng maintains ritual [norms] (*li*); it will enjoy good fortune for several generations; it will not be punished by the great powers. The *Shi* [*jing*] says: “Is anyone able to hold something hot, without first moistening his hand?” Ritual for the government is like moistening that cools the heat. If one uses moistening to save oneself from heat, what injury can come?²³

The narrator’s remark after Beigong Wenzhi’s speech implies that “*li*,” as mentioned by Beigong, referred to the entire mode of government in the state of Zheng, not merely to the precise performance of the proper ceremonies for a visiting guest. Thus, the Wei minister regarded “*li*” as a very broad term. At the same time, he considered ceremonial decorum as

a distinct but equally important feature of the proper rule. He explained the importance of the “awe-inspiring ceremonies” on another occasion:

The *Shi [jing]* says: “Be respectful and mindful of awe-inspiring ceremonies, be a model to the people.”²⁴ . . . If you have dignity that inspires awe, that is awe (*wei*); if your ceremonial decorum inspires imitation, that is ceremonial (*yi*). [If] the ruler has a ruler’s awe-inspiring ceremonies, his ministers are in awe of him and love him, they make a model of him and imitate him; thus he is able to keep his state and his family, and his fame will last for generations. The minister has a minister’s awe-inspiring ceremonies, his inferiors are in awe of him and love him; thus he is able to preserve his office, protect his kin, and appropriately rule his family. When all the ruled comply with this, the superior and the inferior can fix their mutual positions. The “Wei 衛 Songs” say: “The awe-inspiring ceremonies are peaceful and harmonious, they cannot be counted.”²⁵ That says that ruler and minister, superior and inferior, father and son, elder and younger brothers, interior and external [families], the great and the small—all have awe-inspiring ceremonies. The “Zhou Songs” say: “How friends help [each other], [they] help [each other] by the awe-inspiring ceremonies.”²⁶ This says that the way of friends is to instruct each other in the awe-inspiring ceremonies. In enumerating the virtues of King Wen, the “Zhou Documents” say: “Great states are in awe of his strength, small states yearn for his virtue.”²⁷ This says that they were in awe of and loved him. The *Shi [jing]* says: “Without knowing, without understanding, comply with *Di*’s pattern.”²⁸ This is said about imitating the model . . . Thus, when a superior man is in office, he can be held in awe; when bestowing favors, he is loved. His entrances and withdrawals can be made a standard (*du*); his motions can be modeled; his manners are to be observed; his deeds and actions can become a pattern; his virtuous actions can be imitated; his voice and air can become music; his movements contain refined culture (*wen*); his utterances and sayings are ordered. With these [traits] he supervises his inferiors; this is called maintaining awe-inspiring ceremonies.²⁹

Beigong Wenzhi’s speech is for all practical purposes the most explicit statement exemplifying the conservative trend of the late Chunqiu years. Beigong, like many of his contemporaries, sought a remedy for the growing turmoil in late-Chunqiu society. He found it in the centuries-old concept of ceremonial decorum; in order to stabilize the mutual position of inferiors and superiors, the latter should adhere to ceremonial rules. Perfect implementation of ceremonies, including nuances such as outer ap-

pearance, voice, speech, and so on, should be a model for inferiors—thus society will be united by common behavior, and everyone will know his proper place. Such an ideal society would not be built on reciprocity between superior and inferior, but rather on imitation. A conservative manifesto, Beigong's speech resembles that of Zang Aibo pronounced a century and a half earlier. However, there is also a significant difference. Aibo discussed ceremonial decorum with regard to the ruler, while Beigong Wenzi indicated the minister's decorum as equally important. This apparently reflected the rising position of the late-Chunqiu ministerial stratum.

Beigong's concept of the indispensability of ceremonial decorum was shared by several other late-Chunqiu personalities, such as the leading Jin minister Shu Xiang.³⁰ But the conservative appeal was not truly convincing. The expectation that all members of society would follow ceremonial norms was a utopian vision. Ceremonies were inflexible, as discussed above, and this prevented their adaptation to changing circumstances. Though most, if not all, Chunqiu statesmen shared Beigong Wenzi's hopes of restoring hierarchic order and clear delineation between superiors and inferiors, few believed that this could be achieved by advocating outdated ceremonies, a heritage of the bygone Western Zhou age. Therefore, the most clear-sighted thinkers continued the process of redefining *li* as distinct from the ceremonies; the term referred now to the entire way of governing and was predicated on maintaining social stability. This new broad definition further elucidated difference between *li* (ritual norms) and *yi* (ceremonial decorum). These differences were vividly expressed by the Jin high official Nü Shuqi (Sima Hou). In 537, the visiting Lord Zhao of Lu (r. 541–510) impressed his host, Lord Ping of Jin (r. 557–532), with the precise performance of complicated ceremonies. Nü Shuqi, however, was not impressed:

The lord of Jin told Nü Shuqi: "Is not the lord of Lu good in performing ritual?"

[Nü Shuqi] answered: "How does he know ritual?"

The lord said: "What do you mean? From the reception ceremony at the outskirts of the capital and until the granting of departure gifts he did not violate the ritual—why do you say that he does not know ritual?"

[Nü Shuqi] answered: “These are ceremonies (*yi*); you cannot call them ritual [norms] (*li*). By ritual [norms] he should protect his state, enforce his orders, not lose his people. Yet nowadays the government belongs to [great] families, and he is unable to take it back. He has [a man like] Zijia Ji but is unable to make use of him. He betrays alliances with great powers and tyrannically oppresses small states;³¹ benefits from others’ difficulties and disregards his own [problems]. The [property] of the lord’s house is distributed into four parts.³² The people get their food from others and do not think about their lord, but he does not contemplate his end. This is a ruler who is personally troubled, but he does not worry about his position. Yet there are the roots and branches of the ritual, while worrying over exercising ceremonies is a trivial issue. To say that he is good in ritual—is it not an exaggeration?³³

The *Zuo* narrator lauded Nü Shuqi’s understanding of the essence of *li*. Nü was not alone in his approach; his views were echoed in 526 by Zi Chan. During an official visit of the head of the Jin government Han Xuan-zi to Zheng, the elder statesman Kong Zhang failed to perform the appropriate ceremonies. One of the Zheng nobles, Fuzi, was annoyed by this and told Zi Chan:

[While treating a guest from the great state we cannot be frivolous; otherwise he will ridicule and offend us. Even if all of us perform ritual (*li*), they [the Jin dignitaries] will still despise us; and if our state loses ritual, how can we demand honorable treatment? The fact that Kong Zhang failed to find his place [during the ceremony] is demeaning for you, my lord.³⁴

Zi Chan angrily replied: If my commands are inappropriate, my orders cannot be trusted, punishments are partial and unjust, imprisonment is willful and disordered, I behave disrespectfully during assemblies and court visits, my commands are not fulfilled, we are offended by great powers, people are working without results, crimes are committed but I am unaware—this is demeaning for me.³⁵

Both Nü Shuqi and Zi Chan unequivocally distinguished *li* from ceremonies. Proper performance of complicated ceremonies by Lord Zhao of Lu or, conversely, the awkwardness of Kong Zhang were of little importance. What really mattered was the implementation of what Nü Shuqi and Zi Chan considered true *li*; that is, proper handling of domestic and foreign affairs in the state of Zheng and the lack thereof in Lu. *Li* in its

new meaning was to be applied to any type of political activity, such as the ruler's relations with the ruled, managing the balance of power with powerful aristocrats, efficiency of administration, and legal procedures. *Li* thus evolved into an overall pattern of governing, which was a far cry from its original applications.

It seems that a dialectical process occurred in the late Chunqiu period. As the scope of *li* increased, its meaning was gradually divorced from both religious rites and ceremonial decorum; the more *li* was disassociated from ceremonies, the broader its usage became. This process was finally summarized in a speech by Yan Ying (Yanzi), which may be regarded as the quintessence of Chunqiu intellectual developments. Yan Ying was aware of the new political and social trends that had appeared in the late Chunqiu period and continued well into the Zhanguo age. His native state of Qi suffered from incessant struggles among powerful lineages, which occasionally rebelled against the lord's power as well. After four major lineages were exterminated in the conflicts of 546–532, the Chen (Tian) lineage emerged as the main power holder in the state. These events and the ensuing crisis led Yan Ying to the belief that the only remedy to social turmoil would be the implementation of the most broadly conceived ritual norms—*li*. In 516, after expressing in a dialogue with Lord Jing his fear of the probable Chen ascendancy, Yan Ying proposed the way to stop it:

“Only ritual (*li*) can prevent it [the Chen ascendancy]. According to *li*, the family's favors do not exceed those of the state, the people do not drift, peasants do not move [to new lands], artisans and merchants do not change [their occupation], *shi* do not overwhelm,³⁶ officials do not exceed [their responsibilities],³⁷ and the nobles dare not seize lord's profits.”

The lord said: “Good! Yet I am unable [to implement this]. Now I want to know how *li* can be [used to govern] the state.”

[Yan Ying] replied: “Since time immemorial, *li* has been capable [of use in governing] the state; it exists alongside Heaven and Earth. [When] the ruler commands, ministers are reverent, fathers are kind, sons filial, elder brothers loving, younger [brothers] respectful, husbands harmonious, wives gentle, mothers-in-law kind, daughters-in-law submissive; this is ritual. The ruler commands and yet does not violate [rules], ministers are reverent and yet not two-faced, fathers are kind and yet edu-

cate [their sons], sons are filial and yet remonstrate, elder brothers are loving and amicable, younger brothers respectful and compliant, husbands are harmonious and yet act in a proper way, wives are gentle and yet upright, mothers-in-law are kind and broad-hearted, daughters-in-law are submissive and tactful: *li* is best [for managing] affairs.”

The lord said: “Good! Now I want to know the origins of *li*.”

[Yan Ying] replied: “The former kings received it from Heaven and Earth to rule their people; therefore it was elevated by the former kings.”³⁸

Yan Ying’s speech is the apotheosis of *li*, the synthesis of the intellectual achievements of his predecessors. *Li* as he advocated it had little if anything to do with ceremonial restrictions or sacrificial rites;³⁹ it concentrated entirely on what Yan Ying and many of his contemporaries considered the essence of ritual, namely, preserving hierarchic order. In Yan Ying’s reinterpretation *li* had become a means for managing society and the state. Like Beigong Wenzhi, Yan Ying searched for a way to prevent social turmoil by upholding social hierarchy. Yet instead of a simplistic belief in the inferior’s blind obedience and imitation of the superior’s behavior, Yan Ying suggested a far more elaborate vision of reciprocity. Furthermore, *li* according to Yan Ying was to unite the family and the state, which was an entirely new departure in the pre-Confucian age. Finally, Yan Ying was the first thinker who stipulated a metaphysical justification for *li*; he connected ritual to Heaven and Earth and, hence, further elevated its value.

In several aspects Yan Ying’s concept of *li* differs markedly from that of Zhanguo Confucians, and these differences can conveniently elucidate basic dissimilarities between Chunqiu and Zhanguo thought. First, Yan Ying sought to preserve not social hierarchy in general, but hereditary hierarchy in particular. Hence he enumerated the low position of *shi* as one of the major advantages of the ritual system.⁴⁰ Second, any reference to the Son of Heaven is conspicuously absent from Yan Ying’s speech. Evidently, Yan Ying’s patron, Lord Jing, would not like to be reminded of the ritual superiority of Zhou monarchs, since this would imply that the lord himself must cede his sovereignty to the king. Furthermore, Yan Ying did not mention the moral aspects of *li* at all. *Li* as a means for moral self-cultivation, a topic inseparable from the Zhanguo Confucian discourse,

remained irrelevant for Chunqiu thinkers. Later generations of Confucians noticed this difference, but could not understand its reasons. Hence, Zhu Xi (1130–1200 C.E.) ironically mentioned Yan Ying's promise to prevent the ascendancy of the Chen lineage in Qi and added: "I don't understand what he called *li* in those times, and how it could prevent this. Perhaps, he had some recommendation . . ." ⁴¹

Summary

Two and a half centuries of Chunqiu discourse resulted in a major redefinition of the concept of *li*. While in the Western Zhou texts the meaning of this term was largely confined to sacrificial ceremonies, by the end of the Chunqiu period *li* became the designation of the hierarchical sociopolitical order, a universal panacea for all social ills. By creating the notion of "rule by ritual," Chunqiu thinkers laid the foundations for China's becoming "the land of ritual and propriety" (see He Xiu's saying in the epigraph).

The most remarkable feature of this semantic expansion of the term "*li*" in Chunqiu discourse is its coincidence with the actual disintegration of the Western Zhou ritual system. Indeed, in a dialectical fashion implied by the *Laozi* (see the second epigraph), the idea of rule by ritual appeared at the period when the Way of ritual (namely, rigid application of sumptuary rules and maintenance of differences in rank) was being challenged by new social and political realities. Yet facing mounting infractions of Western Zhou ceremonial norms, Chunqiu aristocrats became ever more convinced of the need to preserve the essence of these norms ("*li*") as the only means of preventing the disintegration of the very foundations of the hereditary sociopolitical order. By distilling the hierarchical essence of *li* from its ceremonial setting they were able to accommodate certain infractions of minute ceremonial regulations insofar as these infractions did not undermine the basic principles of hereditary hierarchy. *Li*, which initially was largely coterminous with the term "*yi*" (ceremonial decorum), was therefore distinguished from "*yi*" and completely overshadowed it.

The reconceptualization of *li* in Chunqiu discourse became a first, and

the most important, step toward distinguishing *li* as basic principles of sociopolitical order from the actual Zhou ritual system. Although in the Chunqiu period *li* did not become an entirely abstract term, and it was still very much connected with the Western Zhou ritual regulations, a major precondition was achieved for the further redefinition of *li* in Zhanguo Confucian discourse. At the end of this process the new concept of ritual was crystallized in the thought of Xunzi, who inherited and further developed Chunqiu intellectual impulses.⁴² Reinterpreted principles of *li* were applicable to new social realities and were no longer associated with the bygone Zhou age. Insofar as society remained hierarchic *li* retained its social usefulness. The Zhou ritual system collapsed, but the concept of rule by ritual emerged from its ruins, and helped to recreate new ritual systems in the future.

Chapter 4

The World Falls Apart

A Futile Search for International Order

Qi intended to invade Lu. Lu dispatched Zi Gong to persuade [Qi to refrain from the attack]. The people of Qi said: “It is not that you lack good arguments, but what we are looking for is land, and this issue was not mentioned in your words.” Then they raised the army to invade Lu and drew a [new] boundary ten *li* away from the gate [of the Lu capital].

—Han Feizi

The Eastern Zhou period was unique for its multistate composition. Unlike later periods of disunion, the Chunqiu and Zhanguo multistate system was not considered by contemporaries as an anomaly, but as a political reality that had to be dealt with. Therefore, Chunqiu statesmen did their best to develop appropriate norms of international behavior, which indeed remained influential throughout the history of traditional China’s diplomacy.¹ Generations of statesmen sought to develop appropriate standards for settling interstate disputes and maintaining harmonious relations. Their efforts failed, however, and as a result “the war drums echoed for five centuries.”² In what follows I shall try to answer why the endless efforts to ensure international stability and preserve a viable multistate system ended in a fiasco.

The relative stability of the early Zhou gradually eroded in the course of Western Zhou history. As generations passed, kinship ties between the Zhou kings and the overlords weakened and could no longer ensure royal supremacy, while a steady decline in dynastic military and economic power further undermined the position of the Sons of Heaven. The collapse of

the Western Zhou in 771 ushered in a new multipolar world, where old rules of interstate hierarchy based on the overlord's rank and proximity to the Zhou house were gradually replaced by the new order, which reflected primarily an actual balance of power among rival states. The ensuing struggle for dominance in the Zhou world resulted in increasing turmoil; urgent remedies to restore order were badly needed.

Chunqiu statesmen incessantly sought to establish viable norms of interstate relations, either by turning ritual norms (*li*) into a proxy of international law, or through a closely related attempt to maintain interstate ties within the framework of the so-called alliance system. Both the ritual and alliance systems had much in common, as they combined a hierarchical principle with a certain degree of reciprocity in relations between the major powers and their small allies. In exchange for the small states' submission and tribute, the great powers were expected to protect their allies, treat them politely, and assist them in resolving domestic and foreign problems. Thus, although lacking a notion of equality, the ritual and alliance systems protected to a certain degree the interests of the small states. Aside from these common features, the two systems differed in the degree of their flexibility. While the ritual system presupposed preservation of the Western Zhou interstate hierarchy, the system of alliances was better able to adjust to the shifts in the balance of power between major international players. Yet in the final account neither the ritual nor the alliance system was an adequate remedy for international disorder.

The major factor that impeded establishment of viable norms of interstate relations is the one suggested by Han Feizi in the anecdote cited in the epigraph. The quest for land, which became in the mid-Chunqiu the major goal of an aggressive foreign policy, encouraged powerful states to attack weaker neighbors, international obligations notwithstanding. The pressure to acquire new lands derived primarily from the domestic needs of the rulers, as it was the major means to pacify the ruler's internal allies and to increase his prestige at home.³ Driven by the immanent need for territorial expansion, major Chunqiu powers routinely neglected ritual requirements and alliance oaths, thereby invalidating these means of settling international disputes.

Chunqiu statesmen were increasingly aware of the inadequacy of reciprocal norms of international relations to resolve interstate conflicts. Yet they did not abandon the hope that a viable multistate system could be preserved. Particularly, many of them hoped that international order could be imposed and maintained by a powerful leader, a hegemon (*ba*). These hopes were patterned after the model of Lord Huan of Qi (r. 685–643), who successfully imposed his will on most Huaxia states, achieving thereby a semblance of international stability. Lord Huan combined undisputed military superiority with remarkable self-restraint and concern for the weaker states, which allowed him to become a paragon of the virtuous hegemon. Yet the ideal of virtuous hegemony proved to be unattainable by Lord Huan's successors, who increasingly came to the understanding that might is right. By the late Chunqiu period, ruthless leaders and their cynical advisors undermined the appeal of hegemony as the means to restore interstate stability. The last hopes for a viable multistate order faded away.

The collapse of the Chunqiu multistate system ushered in the incessant conflicts of the Warring States era. Yet in the final account the Zhou world did not disintegrate. In the last section of this chapter we shall see that amidst centrifugal forces threatening to tear the Zhou realm apart, a converse trend toward unity appeared. This minor but nonetheless discernible tendency of the late Chunqiu period resulted in the major intellectual tide of the Zhanguo age, namely the quest for unitary rule (*da yi-tong*). This unexpected outcome of the collapse of international order may have been the most paradoxical Chunqiu contribution to the future of China.

“From Tragedy to Farce”: Ritual as Interstate Law

In retrospect, we generally consider the end of the Western Zhou as the irreversible breakdown of the Zhou world order. Yet for the early Chunqiu statesmen this outcome was not at all obvious, and the Zhou legacy continued to influence many aspects of their lives, including the functioning of the newly emerging multistate system. Particularly in the early

Chunqiu, the rules of international etiquette / ritual (*li*) remained a major stabilizing force in interstate relations.

Earlier we discussed applications of *li* in domestic affairs. Yet in the early Chunqiu period *li* was employed primarily as the means to maintain interstate relations. Its impact was prominent in three major areas. On the most basic level *li* comprised rules of etiquette that regulated interstate relations, such as norms of mutual visits, assemblies, alliances, visits to the Zhou court, punitive expeditions, and inspection tours undertaken by the Son of Heaven.⁴ Second, *li* prescribed a reverent attitude towards the Son of Heaven—the pinnacle of the Zhou international system. Third, and most interesting, *li* prescribed preserving the small polities; any polity established or enfeoffed by the Zhou founders could not be willfully annexed. As we shall see later, the two latter pivotal aspects of *li* could not withstand the pressure of Chunqiu political changes, and gradually disappeared from the statesmen's agenda, invalidating thereby the appeal of the ritual system as the means of maintaining interstate relations.

The inadequacy of the ritual system in dealing with the Chunqiu international order derived from its intrinsic links to the Western Zhou legacy. Zhou rituals were designed for a world with only one legitimate ruler, a world of a clear-cut hierarchy among the overlords, a world of stability and relative unity. However, in the period under discussion, this world was fading. As the rigid norms of international *li* could not be adjusted to these changes, *li* became a mere convention by the mid-Chunqiu, with little relevance to actual policy making; and by the end of that period even this convention had been all but abandoned.

In the early Chunqiu period, *li* was still a functioning and vital system of interstate relations. Although the authority of the Zhou house declined, it did not disappear altogether and the kings continued to play a significant role in international life. For instance, in 714 the overlords invaded Song to punish it for not paying a court visit to the Zhou king; a year later Cheng was attacked for avoiding an assembly called by the king's orders. Other overlords similarly "punished" their neighbors who violated the norms of international etiquette.⁵

The relevance of *li* in early Chunqiu international affairs is evident even from the behavior of those powerful leaders who occasionally discarded ritual norms. In 707, for instance, the most powerful overlord of the time, Lord Zhuang of Zheng (r. 743–701) defeated the coalition army, personally led by King Huan of Zhou (r. 719–697), in the course of which the king was wounded. Later, however, Lord Zhuang refused to continue his assault on the coalition forces and even sent an envoy to express his condolences to the king. Several years earlier Lord Zhuang restored the defeated state of Xu, fearing that “after I pass away, Heaven will act according to ritual (*li*) and repent misfortunes it sent on Xu.”⁶ The appeal of ritual norms might have been strong enough to prevent or at least moderate blatant transgressions of *li*.

This background may explain the unique political course adopted by Lord Huan of Qi and his advisor Guan Zhong, under whose leadership the state of Qi achieved unprecedented hegemony over the Chinese world in the 660s. Although this hegemony was attained primarily by military means, the Qi leaders seemingly felt a lack of confidence in their power. Consequently, they restored to *li* as a major source of legitimacy. Lord Huan partly redirected international ceremonies, such as court visits, from the Zhou kings to himself, but concomitantly pretended to act as the king’s surrogate and protector.⁷ Aside from revering the king and strictly observing rules of interstate etiquette, Lord Huan followed ritual imperatives in more substantive political matters. The most remarkable feature of Lord Huan’s policy, lauded throughout subsequent ages, was “preserving ruined states, continuing interrupted sacrifices.”⁸ In 659 Lord Huan restored the statelets of Xing and Wei 衛 that were earlier annihilated by the Di tribes; in 646 he likewise restored the state of Qi 杞, a victim of Song aggression.⁹ Furthermore, Lord Huan and his aides’ adherence to *li* reportedly caused them to refrain from certain political actions which, though beneficial to Qi, contradicted rules of international *li*.¹⁰ Even if some of the stories concerning Lord Huan’s adherence to ritual were embellished or even invented by later scribes and transmitters, we have no apparent reason to doubt the general picture of his policy. Seeking to solidify his dominance over the

overlords, this powerful leader was evidently eager to give up temporary gains for the sake of long-term advantages. Lord Huan definitely deserved his image as the protector of international *li*. The problem is that his self-restraint remained unique in Chunqiu history.

Lord Huan's death in 643 ushered in a century of bitter struggles for hegemony between the leading powers. During this period the Chunqiu world lacked a single locus of power, and nobody could efficiently impose uniform rules of international behavior on contesting states. Under these conditions, international *li* began to lose its appeal as a guiding norm of interstate ties.

The changing attitude toward international *li* in the mid-Chunqiu period is evident from the decay of royal authority and prestige since the reign of King Xiang. At the beginning of his reign, King Xiang enjoyed a reverent attitude from his powerful patron, Lord Huan. Two decades later, when the ousted king was restored on the Zhou throne by a new influential leader, Lord Wen of Jin (r. 636–628), the situation was markedly different. Lord Wen was a different sort of a person than his predecessor, Lord Huan. He was a self-made man who ascended the throne of Jin after nineteen years in exile, including eleven years among his Di relatives. His adherence to established ritual norms was ambivalent, while his desires were impossible to satisfy.¹¹ Now triumphant, he did not intend to demonstrate submissiveness to the powerless Son of Heaven. In 635 at the royal audience, Lord Wen boldly demanded for himself the sumptuary privileges of the Zhou kings. Alarmed, King Xiang rebuffed him:

These are royal attributes. *De* is still not replaced, but there would be two kings—you, uncle, would certainly detest this too.¹²

Lord Wen had to agree to the king's arguments and was compensated with several settlements at the expense of the ever shrinking royal domain. But he did not forgive the king's ingratitude, and soon retaliated. In 632, shortly after the decisive victory over the Chu forces at Chengpu, Lord Wen assembled the overlords and *summoned* the Zhou king. This overt violation of international ritual was so astonishing that Lu scribes dared not

record it in the *Chun qiu* and substituted it with a neutral sentence: “The heavenly king hunted at Heyang.”¹³

Lord Wen’s brief hegemony symbolized the beginning of the end of royal prestige; afterwards the Zhou kings became increasingly marginalized in international politics. Zhou traditionally allied with the northern alliance headed by Jin; yet in the second quarter of the sixth century B.C.E., royal representatives began to disappear from the alliance assemblies.¹⁴ In the late sixth century, a greatly weakened Jin occasionally invoked the shaky authority of the Son of Heaven to impose its will on allies. These pathetic attempts in 529 and 506 failed, however, since the royal prestige was no longer compelling even for tiny states. The first pillar of international ritual—the authority of the Son of Heaven—had collapsed.

Thus, king rule—even nominal—had all but vanished. The second principle of *li*, namely the preservation of weak polities, fared no better. Even a cursory glimpse at Chunqiu history reveals that in the century after Lord Huan, state annihilations rapidly intensified.¹⁵ The process was gradual, of course, and in the first decades after Lord Huan the imperative to protect the weak and restore the extinguished polities could occasionally influence policy makers. For instance, Lord Xi of Lu (r. 659–627) responded to his mother’s appeal to ritual norms and intervened in 639 against the state of Zhu to restore the extinguished polity of Xugou.¹⁶ Several years later, an appeal to ritual norms saved the state of Cao, which was on the verge of destruction by Lord Wen of Jin. In 632 Lord Wen fell ill. Cao agents bribed Jin’s divination specialist, who then linked Lord Wen’s illness with his intention to eliminate Cao:

Lord Huan of Qi assembled [the overlords] and enfeoffed those of a different clan,¹⁷ while nowadays you assemble them to eliminate [the state] of the same clan. Cao Shu Zhenduo¹⁸ is of [King] Wen’s generation, while our former ruler Tang Shu is of [King] Wu’s generation. Moreover, to assemble the overlords and eliminate the fraternal state—this contradicts ritual (*li*). You ordered [to restore Cao] together [with the state of] Wei, but you do not restore them together—this contradicts trustworthiness (*xin*).¹⁹ [Cao and Wei committed] a similar crime but were given different penalties—this contradicts [proper] punishments. Ritual is to implement propriety, trustworthiness is to protect ritual, pun-

ishments are to correct the evildoers. When all three are abandoned, how would you manage this?²⁰

It is ironic that the “moralizing speech” was delivered by a corrupt official; yet his arguments, particularly invoking *li*, were sufficiently compelling to dissuade Lord Wen of his plans. This example, however, was followed rarely, if at all, by future generations. Nothing but power calculations prevented Chunqiu overlords from annexing weaker neighbors.²¹ Toward the late Chunqiu period, many statesmen became overtly cynical in regard to the nonaggression aspects of *li*. In 548 Jin ministers accused Zheng of invading Chen. The Zheng leader, Zi Chan, responded:

In antiquity, the Son of Heaven’s territories were one *qi* [one thousand *li* squared], while the overlords’ [were only] one *tong* [one hundred *li* squared], and so on in decreasing order. Now great states already [have] many *qi*—how could this be without invading the smaller [states]?²²

Four years later Sima Hou of Jin frankly admitted:

Yu, Guo, Jiao, Hua, Di, Yang, Han, Wei—all of them belonged to the Ji clan, but thanks to [annexing] them Jin became great. If small states were not invaded, where would we obtain [lands]? Since [the time of] Lords Wu and Xian we have annexed many states—who can regulate this?²³

Sima Hou’s candor is revealing. It indicates a tremendous change in the statesmen’s attitude toward international *li*. In the mid-seventh century, Lord Huan had restored the extinguished polities. Lord Xi of Lu followed Lord Huan’s pattern, and even Lord Wen of Jin reluctantly agreed to refrain from annexations. One century later these sentiments were considered obsolete. The urgent need to acquire new lands invalidated the ritual appeal. Thus, the second of the major principles of international *li*, advocated by Lord Huan, also waned.²⁴

The only meaningful aspect of *li* that retained its appeal throughout the mid-Chunqiu period was international etiquette norms. The ceremonial framework of interstate relations remained largely intact, allowing for a semblance of international order. Violation of international etiquette could even serve as a pretext for waging war against the offender, while

conversely adherence to etiquette norms by a great power could greatly facilitate its relations with the weaker allies.²⁵ Occasionally, representatives of the small states appealed to the rules of interstate etiquette to lessen the pressure of the great powers; particularly, the Zheng leaders such as Zi Chan and Zi Taishu successfully resorted to *li* to rebuff unreasonable demands by the greedy Jin dignitaries.²⁶ However, even this ceremonial aspect of *li* came under increasing pressure from the major superpowers, Jin and Chu. Their leaders often cynically dismissed any pretension to act in accord with ritual norms whenever they were confident that the offended party would be unable to retaliate.²⁷ These violations in the final account greatly undermined the stabilizing impact of *li* on interstate relations, paving the way for the further erosion of the international ritual system in the late Chunqiu period.

In the 540s the weakening Jin had to cede international leadership to its Chu rival. A period of brutal hegemony by King Ling of Chu (r. 540–529) ensued, marking the final decline of international *li*. Chu's hegemony was a new phenomenon in Chunqiu international affairs, and it deserves special treatment. The scrutiny of the *Zuo* suggests that the "otherness" of Chu in the Chunqiu period was much less pronounced than some fashionable views hold. Certain distinct characteristics notwithstanding, Chu was a part of Huaxia culture, and was not regarded as "*manyi*" (barbarian), as the later Zhanguo sources suggested.²⁸ Yet although Chu basically belonged to the Zhou ritual culture, its leaders rarely adhered to Zhou international ritual norms. Chu rulers usurped the title of king (*wang*), questioning thereby the supremacy of the Zhou Son of Heaven. Generally, Chu statesmen quoted in the *Zuo* remained less than enthusiastic in regard to international *li*. This changed temporarily, however, after King Ling's ascendancy.

Attempting to bolster his legitimacy, King Ling initially sought to emulate Lord Huan of Qi, and displayed a keen interest in *li* as a possible means to ensure Chu superiority. This might have been the last meaningful attempt to restore the paramount position of *li* in Chunqiu international life, an attempt which soon ended, however, as the king's interest in *li* dissipated.²⁹ King Ling's conscious decision to abandon *li* in

dealing with foreign matters marked the turning point in Chunqiu international relations. Once *li* was no longer a source of international legitimacy, committing atrocities and humiliating foreign dignitaries was no longer taboo.

To illustrate the new international atmosphere created by King Ling, we shall analyze the events of 537. The Jin rulers, overawed by King Ling's power, attempted to pacify him by forging a marriage alliance. The head of the Jin government, Han Xuanzi, and the elder statesman Shu Xiang, accompanied the bride from Jin to Chu. Forewarned of King Ling's extravagance and maliciousness, Shu Xiang nevertheless dismissed his colleagues' concerns and expressed his confidence in the protective force of the ritual norms that would prevent King Ling from humiliating his guests. This confidence, however, was groundless. King Ling was not the sort of person to be impressed by the rules of international etiquette. Confident of his power, he suggested humiliating the hated Jin by castrating Shu Xiang and mutilating Han Xuanzi. None of the Chu officials dared intervene, except Wei Qijiang, who sarcastically responded:

Yes, it is possible [to castrate Shu Xiang and mutilate Han Xuanzi]. If proper preparations have been made, why should it be impossible? Even to humiliate an ordinary fellow is impossible unless proper preparations are made, so what is to be said about humiliating another state? Thus, sage kings were diligent in carrying out ritual; they did not intend to humiliate others. Thus, the *gui* is held during court visits, the *zhang* is held at the audiences and receptions;³⁰ a small state reports [its activities], a large state performs inspection tours. [At the banquet], tables are arranged but nobody leans on them; cups are filled, but nobody drinks. There are fine gifts for the banquet, an additional caldron for feasting [the guest], ceremony at the outskirts upon arrival, and farewell gifts upon departure; this is the utmost of ritual. The state is defeated when it loses this way; then disasters and calamity arise.

After the battle of Chengpu [632], Jin made no preparations against Chu and thus was defeated at Bi [597]. After the battle of Bi, Chu made no preparations against Jin and thus was defeated at Yan[ling, 575]. Since Yan[ling], Jin has not given up its preparations, adding to them ritual, strengthening them with amicability [toward Chu]. Therefore, Chu was unable to take revenge, and instead sought affiliation [through intermarriage]. Now, after achieving a marriage alliance, to humiliate

[Jin] is tantamount to inviting the enemy's invasion. So, what about our preparations? Who will be responsible? If we have appropriate men, we may humiliate [Jin], but otherwise, I suggest that you reconsider the matter.³¹

Wei Qijiang then described in great detail the military might of the Han and Yangshe (Shu Xiang's) lineages and succeeded in persuading the king to abandon his plan. The king accordingly admitted his fault and treated the Jin messengers with extreme courtesy. Despite its positive effect, however, Wei's speech illustrates the woeful decline of international *li*. True, King Ling was not a man to be convinced by purely moral arguments. Nonetheless, the motto of Wei's speech, namely that ritual is the best way of handling international relations *unless* one possesses sufficient military might, represented the common faith of his generation.

The Jin leaders escaped the gravest humiliation, but they grasped the lesson—in this world only military strength matters. Hence, immediately after the 529 coup in Chu and the subsequent decline of the southerners' power, the Jin rulers returned to power politics. Shu Xiang suggested that Jin must bolster its leadership through “manifesting awe,” which would be done by reassembling the overlords under Jin's aegis. Lord Jing of Qi (r. 547–490) refused to participate in the planned assembly, and Shu Xiang arrived at Qi to summon him. After a lengthy explanation of the importance of international ritual, Shu Xiang ended with the following argument:

Since antiquity these [international ritual] rules were never lost. The way of existence and ruin always comes from these. Jin ritually acts as a leader of alliances. We feared that [some matters] remained unsettled; so we prepared a sacrificial animal for the alliance and declared this to all the rulers in order to have the matter completed. [Now] you say, “We must dismiss it,” so what [kind of] alliance would it be? Please, reconsider. My humble ruler will heed your order.³²

Shu Xiang's speech epitomizes the cynicism that prevailed in the late Chunqiu period. After a lengthy discussion on international ritual and its significance, he concluded with a truly compelling argument, namely the threat of force. In diplomatic language the last sentence meant that Jin in-

tended to enforce participation by military means. The Qi leaders clearly understood that the only meaningful sentence in Shu Xiang's speech was the last one; hence, their straightforward reaction:

The Qi men were frightened and said; "Our small state spoke, [but] your great state issued its regulations; how dare we not accept and follow [your orders]?"³³

Later Shu Xiang employed similar arguments against the state of Lu, reminding the Lu envoys that Jin, a state that can simultaneously display four thousand war chariots, "should be feared even if it does not use them in accordance with the Way."³⁴ Jin, therefore, learned nothing and forgot nothing from its period of relative weakness. Throughout the late sixth century, Jin leaders behaved with increasing arrogance. While earlier they usually pretended to abide by ritual norms (frequent violations notwithstanding), now, disillusioned with the effectiveness of *li*, they did not hesitate to openly humiliate their allies. In 503 Wei rebelled against Jin, but in the following year their alliance was reestablished. However, the head of the Jin government, Zhao Jianzi, decided to teach Lord Ling of Wei (r. 534–493) a lesson. Two Jin nobles, acting on behalf of Jianzi, arrived at the alliance ceremony. They claimed that Wei could not be considered an independent state, but rather was a dependency of Jin; they then seized Lord Ling's arm and pushed it into the vessel with sacrificial blood.³⁵ Such an awful humiliation would have been unthinkable in early Chunqiu years but became common at the end of the sixth century. The Chu leaders behaved similarly; in 510, *lingyin* Zi Chang arrested the rulers of Chu satellites Tang and Cai. When they refused to offer him bribes, Zi Chang held them in custody for three years. Infuriated, both rulers sought Jin's help. Yet the corrupt Jin leaders likewise demanded bribes and, when refused, rejected the pleas of their potential allies. Thus, international ritual approached its tragic end.

Marx stated that history repeats itself twice: once as a tragedy, and then as a farce.³⁶ This statement is perfectly applicable to the reemergence of *li* on the international scene at the very end of the Chunqiu period, when the state of Wu suddenly emerged as a leading superpower. The state of Wu differed greatly from Chu. While Chu had close ties with the Huaxia

states throughout the Chunqiu period, Wu established initial contacts with the states of the Central Plain only at the beginning of the sixth century B.C.E. Although Wu kings claimed to be descendants of Taibo, the fraternal uncle of King Wen of Zhou, the Huaxia rulers considered them “barbarians.” Prior to the mid-sixth century B.C.E., Wu largely remained beyond the reach of the Zhou ritual culture, and it was only in 576 that its representatives first took part in the interstate assembly.³⁷ The situation changed, however, by the end of the sixth century. In 506 Wu inflicted a crushing defeat on Chu and seized and ransacked the Chu capital, Ying. In 494 Wu conquered and almost eliminated its southern neighbor and major rival, Yue. Subsequently, King Fuchai (r. 495–473) declared himself a new hegemon over the Chinese world.

Wu’s sudden hegemony deepened the crisis of *li*. Southerners did not feel committed to maintaining dated ceremonial rules and this increased the confusion among ritual-minded statesmen of the Central States.³⁸ In 488 Lord Ai of Lu (r. 494–468) met King Fuchai of Wu. On this occasion Wu representatives demanded the unreasonable tribute of one hundred *lao* units of ceremonial gifts.³⁹ Zifu Jingbo of Lu tried to persuade the Wu messengers to follow the rules of *li*:

Former kings never had [such amount of tribute].

The Wu men replied: “The state of Song granted us one hundred *lao*; Lu cannot lag behind Song. Besides, Lu granted the Jin noble [Fan Yang] more than ten *lao*, so is it impossible to grant one hundred *lao* to the king of Wu?”⁴⁰

Jingbo said: “Fan Yang was greedy and disdained ritual norms (*li*); he threatened our humble country with the might of his great state, so our humble country granted him eleven *lao*. If your ruler intends to issue his commands to the overlords according to ritual, then there are numbers [to be followed]. If he also abandons ritual, then he will likewise behave outrageously. When the Zhou kings regulated ritual, they determined that sacrificial objects would not exceed twelve, since this is considered the great Heavenly number.⁴¹ Now you abandon Zhou ritual and claim that you need one hundred *lao*; you are simply stubborn [in dealing with interstate] affairs.”⁴²

Zifu Jingbo’s resort to *li* was unsuccessful, as the Wu leaders merely ignored his arguments, leaving him no choice but to grudgingly submit the

required tribute. Other Lu statesmen quickly grasped the lesson that *li* is not to be employed when dealing with southern savages. Later in the same year, the Lu strongman Ji Kangzi rejected Wu leaders' attempt to summon him to the meeting, sending instead his steward, a disciple of Confucius, Zi Gong. The head of the Wu government, Bo Pi, himself a person of northern origin, decided to resort to *li* while dealing with the Lu messenger. He said:

The ruler [Fuchai] has been on the way for a long time, but the noble [Ji Kangzi] does not go out of the gate—what [kind of] *li* is this?

Zi Gong answered: "Do you consider fear of [your] great state as *li*? Your great state does not issue its commands to the overlords according to ritual (*li*); if [commands] are not issued according to ritual, how can we measure [our action]? Our ruler already reverently accepted your command [and arrived at the meeting]; how can the elderly statesman leave his state? [Besides], Taibo [founder of the state of Wu] wore official robes to cultivate Zhou ritual, but when Zhong Yong succeeded him, he cut his hair and tattooed his body, considering being naked [proper] adornment—is this ritual? This is another reason [for our rejection of your orders]." ⁴³

The *Zuo* author assumes that Zi Gong's bold behavior demonstrated his contempt for Wu power,⁴⁴ yet this conjecture probably reveals only one aspect of Zi Gong's derisive attitude. It seems that he was not confident that ritual remained an active force in international relations. Unlike the improvident Zifu Jingbo, who still hoped to convince the new masters to abide by *li*, Zi Gong recognized that the new realities of power calculations and state interests completely overshadowed ritual norms. That "barbarian" Wu had no right to speak on behalf of ritual norms was only a pretext for Zi Gong's dismissal of Wu claims. He evidently realized that *li* in general was no longer relevant to resolving interstate conflicts. His views on this issue remained consistent throughout his career.⁴⁵ Ironically, one of the outstanding disciples of Confucius, Zi Gong, was among the first to openly dismiss *li*-related arguments in dealing with international affairs. This marked the final demise of interstate *li*, which never resurfaced prior to the imperial unification. The major attempt to create an interstate law ended in a fiasco.

The Rise and Disintegration of the System of Alliances

The disintegration of the international ritual system did not necessarily mean the abandonment of attempts to establish a viable multistate order. Throughout the mid-Chunqiu period, particularly in 632–546, these attempts were directed toward solidifying the so-called system of alliances that replaced the unilateral hegemony of Lord Huan's time. The system of alliances was the only meaningful attempt to recognize bipolarity or even multipolarity as a norm of the Chinese world, and as such it deserves a more detailed discussion.⁴⁶ Overlords grouped themselves around a powerful leader who unified them, protected them from outside enemies, and played the role of arbiter in intra-alliance conflicts. Thus, the system of alliances could play a stabilizing role in interstate relations, provided every alliance member kept allegiance to the alliance leader. Unfortunately, this condition was never fully realized.

The system of alliances was not based on equality. The leader of an alliance (*meng zhu*) presided over the ceremony and in all likelihood was responsible for drafting the text of the common oath.⁴⁷ The sequence of smearing sacrificial blood was also of great importance, since it symbolized the position of each of the participants.⁴⁸ Nonetheless, the hierarchical principle implied by the alliance was much less rigid than that prescribed by the Western Zhou ritual system. Alliances were more flexible and could be easily readjusted to the shifting balance of power.

This flexibility was a major advantage, but also a major deficiency of the alliance system. For if the “sacred oath” could be changed, renewed, or violated, it could not prevent small states from shifting their allegiance according to changing circumstances. Indeed, shifting allegiances became the major malady of the mid-Chunqiu period. Suffice it to mention that the state of Zheng alone changed sides no less than ten times within a short period of fifteen years (612–597).⁴⁹ If we adopt Mark Lewis' statement that “the sacrifices at covenants gradually replaced those of the ancestors' cult as the primary mode of constituting a political order,”⁵⁰ it would not be surprising that frequent shifts of alliances became a major threat

to this order. To combat this dangerous tendency, mid-Chunqiu statesmen resorted to two major devices: the ethical appeal of the need to maintain mutual trust/trustworthiness (*xin*), and religious warnings of divine punishments for the violators of alliance obligations.

Xin was potentially an effective guiding principle of international conduct. First, it was a highly revered ethical principle.⁵¹ Second, it was reciprocal, obligating both the leader and the led; thus mutual trust could be ensured. Third, it presumed strict adherence to one's promise, particularly to one's alliance oaths. If implemented, such a principle could cement the international system and even become the foundation of international law. Unfortunately, implementation of *xin* was hindered for the same reasons mentioned above. Powerful states were not interested in abiding by restrictive rules; tiny states had no alternative but to join the game of mutual deceit.

To what extent could a great power be considered "trustworthy?" Let us look at the example of Jin. Before its ruler became a hegemon, trustworthiness played no role in its policies. In a famous stratagem, in 655 Lord Xian of Jin (r. 676–651) requested free passage through the territory of Jin's ally, Yu, in order to invade the state of Guo. The Yu ruler trusted his ally and permitted the Jin army to pass through Yu territory. As a result, Jin extinguished Guo and subsequently eliminated the state of Yu as well. Trust was of little importance when new territory was to be acquired!

Later, when Jin became "the leader of the alliances," it had to modify its behavior. Such explicit betrayal of the allies could not serve its long-term interests. In 585 the Jin officer Xiayang Shuo decided to launch a surprise attack on Jin's close ally, the state of Wei. Xiayang's colleague, Bo Zong, rejected this plan:

It is unacceptable. Wei trusts Jin; therefore its army stays in the suburbs and is not prepared [to withstand Jin]. If we launch a surprise attack, though we will be able to take many prisoners, Jin will be considered untrustworthy—how will it be possible to demand the overlords' [allegiance]?⁵²

Bo Zong's intervention succeeded in preventing Jin's attack, but such strict adherence to international obligations remained the exception rather

than the rule in Jin's policy. Immediate political interests often dictated behavior incompatible with the principle of *xin*. For instance, in 589 a coalition led by Jin defeated the Qi army at An; subsequently Jin granted its ally, Lu, the disputed Qi fields of Wenyang. Six years later, however, Jin decided to improve its ties with Qi and ordered the fields returned to Qi. The head of the Lu government, Ji Wenzi, protested to the Jin envoy, Han Chuan:

The great state rules according to propriety in order to become the leader of alliances. Therefore, overlords cherish virtue and fear punishments, and dare not be of two minds. You said that the fields of Wenyang are the ancient lands of our humble state, and then you used an army against Qi to force it to return [the disputed fields] to us. Now you issue a second order, saying, "Return [the fields] to Qi." By trustworthiness, propriety is implemented; by propriety, orders are completed—this is what small states are looking for and cherishing. When trustworthiness is uncertain and propriety is not established, then the overlords of the four quarters will fall apart. The *Shi* [*jing*] says: "The lady has not deviated, but the lord was of two hearts; the lord lost the norms, casting his favors this way and that."⁵³ Within seven years you have once granted [the fields] and once taken them away—this is precisely "behaving this way and that." If a lord who "behaves this way and that" loses his spouse, what should be said about the hegemon and the leader? The hegemon and the leader who "casts his favors this way and that"—will he hold overlords for long?⁵⁴

Ji Wenzi's arguments were similar to those of Bo Zong. Untrustworthy behavior of the leader of alliances was detrimental to its long-term interests: the allies would presumably lose their faith in the master who "casts his favors this way and that." Nonetheless, Jin leaders preferred to reestablish friendly ties with Qi at the expense of lesser allies like Lu, previous obligations notwithstanding. When Ji Wenzi continued to complain about Jin's untrustworthiness, he was reminded that Jin is "mild to the submissive but invades the duplicitous"—an unequivocal threat in the refined diplomatic language of those times.⁵⁵ Jin's military might, not trustworthiness or propriety, could really ensure its leadership.

Jin's readiness to discard its earlier promises and obligations was characteristic of the Chunqiu political atmosphere. Although trustworthiness

was considered an important ethical norm, it was of little use when state interests were at stake. Ethical norms could be easily twisted to justify violation of former promises and treaties.⁵⁶ Some cynical statesmen plainly stated that when the state could benefit from violating its foreign obligations, neither alliances nor talks of “trustworthiness” were relevant.⁵⁷ Deceit was a widespread mode of behavior, and moral duties were subordinate to political interests.

We saw that the ethical appeal of *xin* could not prevent mutual betrayal and the subsequent deterioration of the alliance system. There was, however, an alternative force to cement the alliance, namely the divine factor. W.A.C.H. Dobson states that throughout the Chunqiu period “*meng* [alliance] never lost its religious force and sanctions . . . [T]he religious beliefs which underlie it are never questioned.” This view is shared by other scholars.⁵⁸ Careful scrutiny, however, indicates that the deities’ authority was not sufficient to ensure adherence to solemn oaths. Similar to the cases discussed in Chapter 2, “politics took command” over religious considerations.

That deities were assigned the role of guardians of the alliance is unquestionable. This can be illustrated by the final words of the 632 alliance of the northern states:

If anybody betrays this alliance, let him be punished by the numinous deities, let him lose his army; let him enjoy no fortune in his state, and let this be extended to his great-grandsons, young and old alike.⁵⁹

Invoking deities as guardians of alliances was common throughout the Chunqiu period, as is indicated also by the “loyalty texts” of the Houma alliance documents.⁶⁰ The question is whether the participants believed that “the numinous deities” could really punish the transgressors of the oath. The answer is definitely negative. The diminishing faith in the deities’ prowess had undoubtedly contributed to participants’ willingness to “eat their words.” Only in a few cases did fear of supernatural punishment preserve mutual trust;⁶¹ usually, it was of little concern. When the Chu statesman Shen Shushi warned his colleague Zi Fan of the inevitable “bad end” for the violator of the alliance oath, the latter dismissed the warning: “When

the enemy's [situation] is beneficial to us, then we should advance—which alliance exists [in such a case]?"⁶² Shen Shushi failed to convince because he did not find sufficiently persuasive political arguments to substantiate the threat of divine punishment.

The lack of faith in the divine guardians of alliances may be vividly illustrated by the twisting politics of the state of Zheng—the major victim of the Jin-Chu conflict. Tired of incessant incursions of Chu and Jin armies throughout the 560s, Zheng ministers finally decided to resolve their troubles through a cunning plan. Zi Zhan's idea was to conclude an alliance with Jin, then to betray it, thereby provoking Jin into a renewed incursion, causing a massive Jin military build-up in Zheng. This would prevent further Chu military expeditions and stabilize the Zheng-Jin alliance. Jin would gain Zheng's allegiance; Zheng would secure itself with the help of the Jin forces. The plan was realized in 562. Its most interesting part is the initial alliance of Zheng with Jin, an alliance that Zheng immediately intended to betray. Jin attempted to enforce Zheng's submission by an extremely elaborate oath, invoking an impressive number of divine authorities not seen elsewhere in the *Zuo*:

Every participant of our alliance will neither accumulate grains⁶³ nor monopolize profits [of mountains and rivers], neither shelter criminals nor keep traitors. [Everybody] should help others in the case of natural calamity, share likes and dislikes, and support the royal dynasty. If anybody violates this order, then let the Lord Inspector,⁶⁴ the Lord of Alliances, [deities] of famous mountains and rivers, all the deities and all those who accept sacrifices, [spirits of] former kings, former lords, ancestors of the seven clans and the twelve states⁶⁵ [—let all these] numinous deities punish him; may he lose his people, may his life be cut short and his lineage destroyed, his state and family overthrown.⁶⁶

Let us remind ourselves that this oath was pronounced in the presence of others by the Zheng leaders who intended to violate their obligations immediately thereafter, and indeed carried out their plans. It demonstrates the deep decline in the value of alliances in the late Chunqiu period. The religious formula of the oaths remained intact, but it became a mere convention in the eyes of shrewd politicians. As statesmen's belief in divine retribution declined, invoking the entire divine army to guard the oath

became meaningless; only actual armies carried weight, as their systematic incursions wreaked havoc in the state of Zheng.⁶⁷

Thus, neither ethical appeals to trustworthiness nor religious implications of the oaths could stabilize the shaky alliance system. Its final decline was ushered in by two peace conferences of 546 and 541. In 546 the Song *simin* Xiang Xu used the stalemate in the Jin-Chu struggles to gather the conflicting superpowers and their allies for the unprecedented peace conference.⁶⁸ Theoretically, it should have meant the merger of two conflicting groups into one “superalliance,” headed simultaneously by Jin and Chu. The idea of equality, however, was inherently alien to the alliance system. Consequently, a quarrel over precedence occurred: who would be the first to smear sacrificial blood on his lips? The Chu delegates resolved the problem in the easiest way; they arrived at the meeting wearing armor, indicating therefore their readiness to obtain precedence by force. The *lingyin* Zi Mu dismissed his colleagues’ criticism: “Chu and Jin have lacked mutual trust for a long time, [seeking] only benefit in [their] undertakings. If [our] wishes are fulfilled, who needs to talk of *xin*?”⁶⁹ The bitter resentment of the Jin delegates and Shu Xiang’s claims that untrustworthy Chu would “lose the overlords’ [support]” were of little consequence. Jin ceded its right to smear sacrificial blood first, indicating thereby that naked force was by far a more compelling argument than discussions of mutual trust. Five years later, in 541, Zi Mu’s successor (*lingyin* Wei, future King Ling of Chu), again overawed overlords with military might. To avoid another humiliation, the Jin envoys agreed to “rewarm” the 546 alliance without conducting a new alliance ceremony. By avoiding a new oath ceremony, Jin and Chu confirmed that they no longer trusted the alliance system as a whole. Magnificent but inefficient blood oaths were no longer an adequate means to ensure international stability.

Along with ushering in the collapse of the international ritual system, the brutal hegemony of King Ling of Chu in 540–529 marks the demise of the system of alliances. Frequent violations of alliance obligations discredited the order based on alliance ceremonies; leaders of

the states realized that solemn oaths were valid only when enforced by military might. Sporadic attempts to revive the system of alliances under Jin leadership in 529 and 506 and under Wu leadership in the first decades of the fifth century B.C.E. were negligible, and *meng* gradually disappeared from Eastern Zhou international affairs.⁷⁰ The only significant attempt to establish a viable multipolar international system on Chinese soil faded into oblivion.

Between Power and Virtue: The Changing Concept of Hegemony

Why did ritual, ethical, and religious norms fail to stabilize the Eastern Zhou multistate system? The main reason, apparently, was that these norms did not deal adequately with the shifting balance of power between major political actors. It was because of power considerations that the state of Zheng repeatedly shifted alliances (solemn oaths notwithstanding); that Lord Wen of Jin summoned King Xiang of Zhou to the interstate meeting, overtly defying his ritual obligations; and that the state of Lu transgressed both ritual norms and alliance duties when it repeatedly invaded its weaker neighbors.⁷¹ Rational Chunqiu statesmen could not fail to realize that norms of international behavior did not suffice to ensure interstate order, unless enforced by the military power of the strongest state(s). It is in this connection that the institution of hegemony played its extraordinary role in the Chunqiu world.

The above discussion of Lord Huan's policy explains why this leader became a paragon of the good hegemon for future generations. Despite his undisputed military superiority, Lord Huan generally refrained from humiliating, conquering, or annexing weaker neighbors. His policy of adherence to ritual norms ensured relative international stability, and was lauded throughout the Chunqiu period. Nevertheless, in the decades that followed Lord Huan's death, statesmen began to reconsider the nature of hegemony. Whereas early Chunqiu statesmen emphasized noncoercive virtue (*de*) as the major characteristics of the hegemon, late Chunqiu hegemons were expected to display resoluteness and military prowess rather

than *de*. By the end of the Chunqiu period, power considerations had completely overshadowed the earlier vision of the virtuous leader. Accordingly, the hegemon's role as protector of the international order gradually lost its appeal.

Early Chunqiu statesmen unanimously conceived of *de* as the major attribute of the hegemon. The term "*de*" is one of the most multifaceted terms in ancient Chinese political and ethical discourse. In the context of hegemony discussions, "*de*" primarily, although not exclusively, referred to mild, noncoercive means of exercising power; it was often mentioned along with complementary opposites such as "force" (*li*), "punishments" (*xing* or *fa*) and "awesomeness" (*wei*). Kominami Ichirō assumed that originally the use of force and punishments were inseparable aspects of *de*, along with grace and kindness, but toward the mid-Western Zhou period the noncoercive aspects of *de* became prevalent.⁷² Indeed, early Chunqiu statesmen commonly regarded noncoercive *de* as the major characteristic of the hegemon.

The first and the most prominent of the Chunqiu hegemonies, Lord Huan of Qi, was also the one who was most frequently called to rule by means of "virtue." In 656 the victorious armies of Qi and its allies invaded Chu. The frightened King Cheng of Chu (r. 671–626) dispatched his envoy, Qu Wan, to resolve the conflict peacefully. Lord Huan arranged his troops in battle formation and asked Qu Wan:

"Who can resist the fighting of these multitudes? Which walled city would not fall if attacked by these?"

[Qu Wan] replied: "If you try to pacify the overlords by virtue (*de*), who will dare not to submit? If you act by force, then Chu will turn Fangcheng into its walls, and the Han river into a moat: you shall have nothing to do."⁷³

Qu Wan expressed the common belief of his contemporaries in the importance of *de* as the major requirement of the hegemon. Both advisors and opponents of Lord Huan shared this view.⁷⁴ Perhaps, since Qi's military superiority was obvious, statesmen preferred to invoke *de* to limit the excesses of Lord Huan's power. Their arguments apparently succeeded in modifying Lord Huan's behavior. However, when Lord Huan's successors

endorsed reliance on *de* as the major guideline of their politics, the results were different.

The abortive hegemony of Lord Xiang of Song (r. 650–637) in 643–638 showed the limits of *de*'s capability to cope with the challenges of Chun-qiū international turmoil. During the decisive battle against the Chu forces at Hong in 638, Lord Xiang decided to display his adherence to *de* and to ancient military ritual; accordingly, he refrained from attacking the unprepared Chu army. The results were disastrous: the Song army was badly defeated by Chu, and Lord Xiang himself was mortally wounded. His destiny might have served as a warning for future contenders for international leadership; *de* alone did not suffice, unless supported by considerable military power.

This trend to reevaluate the role of force versus virtue in assuring hegemony became apparent already in the second half of the seventh century. In the speeches of this period, recorded in the *Zuo*, statesmen unanimously emphasized punishments and awesomeness as indispensable features of a hegemon, along with noncoercive *de*.⁷⁵ That *de* gradually lost its role as the most important of the hegemon's attributes is suggested by the following discussion. In 597 the commanders of the Jin army debated whether to attack the Chu forces that had recently invaded and defeated the state of Zheng. Shi Hui (Fan Wuzi) urged his fellow officers to refrain from engagement with the powerful King Zhuang of Chu (r. 612–591):

[One who] does not deviate from virtue (*de*), punishments, proper government, political undertakings, discipline and ritual, cannot be opposed and should not be invaded. When Chu's ruler punished Zheng, he hated its duplicity and yet pitied its humiliation. When it rebelled he invaded it; when it submitted, he forgave it; thus virtue and punishments were completed. To invade the rebellious is punishment; to be mild toward the submissive is virtue (*de*): both are established [in Chu].⁷⁶

After a long explanation of King Zhuang's advantages, Shi Hui presented his credo:

The *Zhong hui* [a lost document] has a saying: "Seize the calamitous, overwhelm the doomed"; that is to annex the weak. The *Zhuo*

[hymn] says: “Oh, splendid is the king’s army, he led it to seize this darkness”; that is to attack the benighted. The *Wu* [hymn] says: “Incomparable was his valor.” To help the weak and attack the benighted and thereby to pursue valor—[this] is acceptable.⁷⁷

Another eminent Jin commander, Xian Hu, disagreed with Shi Hui’s proposals:

It is unacceptable. Jin achieved hegemony because its commanders possessed martial spirit, and [its] ministers were forceful. Now, to lose the overlords cannot be called forcefulness; not to pursue the enemy cannot be called martial spirit. If because of us hegemony should be lost—it is better to die.⁷⁸

This discussion marks a further reappraisal of what was required to achieve international supremacy. Along with the proper handling of virtue and punishments, Shi Hui mentioned other components of King Zhuang’s power, principally his wise military, social, and economic policy that assured Chu’s strength. Chu’s invulnerability was based on its military and political advantages; kindness (*de*) was only one of its components. For the less provident Xian Hu, martial spirit and force were the sole attributes of the hegemon; he did not even mention *de*. Thus, despite the differences between the two, both agreed that *de* alone was insufficient to ensure superiority.

Furthermore, Shi Hui’s speech inaugurated a new “realpolitik” approach characteristic of late Chunqiu thought. His attitude toward settling international problems was based on calm calculations of the balance of power; he rejected attacking Chu not because it was morally unjustified (Shi Hui’s opponents proposed numerous reasons for assaulting King Zhuang’s army), but because Chu was simply too powerful an enemy. Concomitantly, Shi Hui proposed to attack the “benighted” states (i.e., those which suffered from internal problems and were easy prey). Power considerations, not virtue, were of primary concern to the Jin leaders.

The sixth-century *Zuo* speeches reflect the bifurcation of the concept of hegemony between the traditional view that emphasized virtue and the new, cynical assumption that naked force is the most important precon-

dition for attaining international superiority. Not surprisingly, the first view prevailed among statesmen from the weak states, who yearned for Lord Huan's age when small polities were relatively secure from humiliations and incursions by the great powers. The Qi envoy Guo Zuo presented the most coherent view of the virtuous hegemon. In 589, after the Jin-led force defeated the Qi army at the battle of An, the victorious Jin leader Xi Ke made unreasonable and humiliating demands of the defeated. Guo Zuo, whose state by then had abandoned its pretensions for international leadership, was appalled. To moderate Xi Ke's demands, Guo made an appeal to the regulations of the former kings and to the moral obligations of the hegemon. He summarized his speech as follows:

To contradict [the policy] of former kings is unrighteous / improper (*bu yi*); how then can you be a leader of alliances? Jin really lacks [this ability]. The four kings became [real] kings by implanting virtue (*de*) and assisting the common wishes; five leaders (*bo*) became hegemonies by being diligent and nurturing [virtue] in order to obey the kings' commands.⁷⁹ Now my lord tries to unite the overlords while satisfying your boundless desires. The *Shi* [*jing*] says: "He spread his government gently, thus he collected a hundred blessings."⁸⁰ You are actually not gentle, thereby casting away a hundred blessings; but is it harmful to the overlords?⁸¹

Guo Zuo outlined the major concept of hegemony. First, hegemonies could reach prominence only by acting as executors of the kings' orders. Second, their supremacy should be based on conformity with other overlords' wishes. Third, *de*, which in this context undoubtedly refers to grace and kindness, must be a guiding principle of their policies. Significantly, these principles exclude reference to the hegemon's strength as a precondition of his ascendancy. Perhaps because he was speaking on behalf of the defeated Qi, Guo Zuo felt it unnecessary to refer to Jin's military supremacy.

The traditional concept of hegemony, as presented by Guo Zuo, was endorsed by many other statesmen from small and weak states; their views were occasionally echoed even by certain Jin leaders.⁸² The hope for a good international leader increased in direct proportion to the deterioration of the world order. In 584, when the state of Wu—a new player on the in-

ternational scene—attacked the tiny state of Tan in Shandong, the leading Lu statesman, Ji Wenzi, sighed:

The central states are in disorder; “*manyi*” (barbarians) are invading and nobody cares. There is no good / merciful [leader]! The *Shi* says: “Oh merciless Heaven, disorder is never settled”;⁸³ is this not said of such a situation? When there is nobody good / merciful above, who will not be subject to calamity? We shall be ruined in no time.⁸⁴

Ji Wenzi’s desperate hope for a strong and “merciful” leader, echoed sixty years later by another Lu statesman, Shusun Zhaozi, reflected the tragic conditions of the state of Lu.⁸⁵ The disintegration of the ritual order and the system of alliances turned hegemony into the only effective means to restore stability. When leaders of alliances failed to take up the challenge on behalf of small states attacked by their powerful neighbors, this meant the collapse of the status quo and ensuing anarchy. The only hope was that a powerful and virtuous hegemon would prevent the world from falling apart.

Unfortunately for the Lu statesmen and their colleagues from other small states, their calls for a “merciful” hegemon were not heeded. Jin and Chu leaders realized that, in the life-or-death struggle of the middle to late Chunqiu period, kindness and virtue were of little value. They knew that they were living according to the jungle law, where “the flesh of the weak is the food of the strong” (*ruo rou qiang shi*).⁸⁶ Accordingly, they stressed the hegemon’s power, not *de*, as the most significant attribute of his leadership. In 582 Jin invited its allies to “rewarm” their alliance. Lu resented Jin’s arbitrary policies, and declined the invitation:

[The head of the Lu government] Ji Wenzi said [to the head of the Jin government] Fan Wenzi: “Your *de* is not strong, of what use is the renewal of the alliance?”

Fan Wenzi answered: “We are diligent in consoling [the overlords], broad-hearted in treating them, firm and strong in controlling [them], [use] numinous deities to tie them [by alliances], mild to the submissive, and yet invade the duplicitous—this is second to *de*.”⁸⁷

Fifteen years earlier Fan Wenzi’s father, Shi Hui, was among the first to reassess the position of virtue, pronouncing it one, but not the only, of

the hegemon's attributes. Now, Fan Wenzi took a further step toward re-assessing the importance of *de*. Although he politely admitted that force is "second to virtue," Fan disillusioned his partner, Ji Wenzi, reminding him of Jin's ability to "invade the duplicitous." Power considerations were more compelling arguments in a political dispute than invoking *de*.

The idea that might is right gained legitimacy in sixth-century discourse. In 579, *siman* Zi Fan of Chu candidly stated that the battlefield was the only appropriate place for the meeting between Chu and Jin rulers. Several years later, Zheng ministers plainly admitted that the only principle that guided their foreign policy was "to follow the strongest." This view might have inspired the Chu statesmen whose haughty behavior during the 546–541 peace conferences was mentioned earlier. Displaying power instead of virtue became a rule, as was exemplified in King Ling's brutal hegemony of 540–529. Henceforth no serious statesman ever evoked *de* while discussing the issue of hegemony, and even Shu Xiang of Jin realized that "manifesting awe" was the only way to ensure international dominance.⁸⁸

The reappraisal of the nature of hegemony in the late Chunqiu period is best represented by the great southern statesman Wu Zixu. A self-made man whose family was executed in Chu, Wu Zixu climbed to the highest positions in the newly emerging superpower of Wu, a state that never adhered to the Zhou norms of international behavior.⁸⁹ Wu Zixu represented an entirely new approach to political questions. Restricted neither by moral nor ritual considerations, an outsider of the Central States, he was not burdened by traditional values. Wu Zixu believed that military superiority was the only way to ensure Wu supremacy. He explained this in 494 after the young King Fuchai decided to spare Wu's archenemy, the state of Yue, instead of annihilating it. After mentioning the miraculous resurrection of Shao Kang's family, the remote ancestors of King Goujian of Yue (r. 496–465), Wu Zixu continued:

Goujian is able to [treat people as] relatives, and devotes himself to bestowing goodness; in bestowing goodness nobody is forgotten, and in [treating people as] relatives, no one's achievements are cast away. [Yue] has existed on the same lands as we do, and for generations they have

been our enemy. Therefore, to overcome it but not to seize its territory, and moreover to preserve its existence, is to contradict Heaven and prolong [the life of] the adversary. Even if you repent later, you will be unable to reverse the case. The decline of the Ji clan can be expected every day. Living among the barbarians (*manyi*) and prolonging the life of adversaries, [trying] thereby to obtain hegemony, [you] shall certainly fail.⁹⁰

Wu Zixu's speech is a manifesto of a new era. Neither virtue nor any other moral or legal obligations were required of the hegemon. To achieve supremacy he had to resolutely pursue his political course and spare no enemy. That the enemy, Goujian, was apparently a virtuous ruler made him even more dangerous and the task of annihilating him more urgent. In the late seventh century preserving ruined states was recognized as one of the major achievements of Lord Huan of Qi, and was seen as the quintessence of the legitimacy of his hegemony. In the early fifth century, Wu Zixu's attitude, conversely, may be summarized by an ugly modern Chinese proverb: "beat down the drowning dog" (*da luo shui gou*). Harsh political reality and increasing experience made the moral appeal of hegemony obsolete. Hegemons continued to play a stabilizing role (or at least were expected to do so), but their rule was to be based on resoluteness and power rather than virtue and propriety.

The changing views of hegemony marked the decline of the hopes that a powerful leader would guarantee the interstate order. If virtue was no longer required of the hegemon, then why should he be expected to impose norms of international ritual, propriety, and mutual trust on other states? Hegemony remained a political goal of powerful leaders throughout the Zhanguo period and thereafter, but it lost the aura of legitimacy, and was no longer considered the appropriate means to save the world from incessant turmoil. New approaches were required, but these were to be suggested mostly by the later Zhanguo thinkers.

The Quest for Unity and Attaining All under Heaven (*Tianxia*)

The Chunqiu period was, then, the age of the disintegration of the Zhou multistate system. The royal authority faded away; old norms of interstate

relations could not adequately deal with the ever changing balance of power between major states, while new rules of settling conflicts had not yet come into existence. Neither the alliance system nor unilateral hegemony could curb the centrifugal forces that seemed to be tearing the Zhou world apart. Nevertheless, paradoxical as it may seem, this era of disintegration was also the age when the first seeds of future unification were sown.

Despite the political disintegration, several major developments contributed toward tighter ties between various parts of the Zhou realm. Whereas economic integration of the Chinese world is mostly a Zhanguo phenomenon,⁹¹ a kind of military integration occurred already in the Chunqiu period. In the early Chunqiu, military conflicts were mostly confined to neighboring states, while long-distance expeditions were infrequent. The first military encounter of the Qi and Chu forces in 656 was an astonishing experience to the participants. The Chu envoy told Lord Huan: "You live near the northern sea, I live near the southern sea, even the smells of [sacrificial] horses and oxen do not reach each other; now, unexpectedly, you entered my lands—what is the reason?"⁹² Chu leaders evidently considered Qi as too remote to become a real enemy. Within a century, however, the situation changed completely. Deep penetration into enemy lands became a common tactic, and states formerly considered remote became active participants in military conflicts throughout the Central Plain and beyond.⁹³ Powerful armies that crossed the Chinese world might not have directly acted as an integrative force, but they certainly contributed to the sense of a common destiny among the elites and the commoners. No single state could seek stability and prosperity unless the world order could be ensured.

Furthermore, by the late Chunqiu, international affairs had become an important factor of domestic politics. Dynastic troubles or any major internal conflict routinely enticed powerful neighbors to intervene, seeking their own benefits.⁹⁴ It was again not realistic to seek stability at home unless foreign factors were dealt with efficiently. As no state could concentrate on its internal problems without taking into consideration their international dimensions, statesmen's sense of common destiny further increased.

In addition, statesmen's migration across the Chunqiu states perpetuated cultural links between these states and thus served as an important integrative force. Even before Zhanguo "peripatetic advisers" appeared on the political stage, Chunqiu states already witnessed statesmen's movement across the borders. Ministers and members of their lineages who left their native states for various reasons settled in other parts of what would soon be China, bringing with them their cultural heritage, thereby strengthening cultural links across the Chinese world.⁹⁵ This change of allegiance by leading statesmen evidently weakened the feeling of separatist identity among the elites.

Thus, by the late Chunqiu multiple factors combined to provide statesmen with the feeling of belonging to a common economic, political, and cultural realm—All under Heaven (*tianxia*). This feeling of commonality is reflected in the increase of the use of the term "*tianxia*" in the *Zuo* speeches. The term "*tianxia*" remained marginal in pre-sixth century discourse, but from the mid-Chunqiu its usage visibly intensified, indicating that "All under Heaven" had become the focus of major political concern.⁹⁶

The increasing interest in the affairs of *tianxia* had immediate political implications. As attempts to ensure international stability failed, and as statesmen became increasingly aware that domestic stability could not be attained unless foreign affairs were settled, they began searching for new ways to achieve peace in All under Heaven. In the late Chunqiu, first attempts had been made to unify the realm by military means. King Ling of Chu, the one who openly discarded traditional norms of international behavior, was apparently the first ruler to seriously consider unification of All under Heaven. The goal of gaining *tianxia* was implicit in King Ling's discussions with his chief advisors like Shen Wuyu.⁹⁷ Furthermore, the *Zuo* tells in the year 529:

Earlier, King Ling divined by making cracks, saying: "Let me attain All under Heaven!" [The response] was inauspicious. [The king] threw down the tortoise shell, and cursed Heaven, shouting, "Such a paltry thing and still you will not give it to me! I must take it by myself!"⁹⁸

This blatantly stated goal of attaining universal rule was unprecedented; indeed, the *Zuo* adds that the people considered King Ling "insa-

tiable" (*bu yan*). Nevertheless, the idea of winning the world became increasingly popular with the late-Chunqiu Chu statesmen, as indicated by their speeches cited in the *Zuo*.⁹⁹ This overt inclination of the southern superpower to attain universal rule showed that *tianxia* was becoming the ultimate goal of political action.

Few Chunqiu and early Zhanguo thinkers could share King Ling's hopes for military unification of the realm. They did, however, agree that consolidation of the fragmented Zhou world was the only reasonable solution to the mounting international turmoil. The quest for unification became ever more pronounced from the late Chunqiu period. It appears already in the *Lunyu*; later, Mozi further elaborated the ideal of unity, and other Zhanguo thinkers followed him. The quest for unification culminated with Mencius' imperative that "stability is in unity."¹⁰⁰

This quest for unity, which dominated Zhanguo thought and had profound implications on China's political culture, was a logical outcome of two major trends of Chunqiu political life. On the one hand, Chunqiu statesmen failed to establish a viable multistate system and to prevent incessant conflicts and wars; on the other hand, seeds of economical, political, cultural, intellectual, and even military integration of their world urged them to seek a universal solution for the entire *tianxia*, rather than searching for stability and prosperity for a single state. This contradiction between the sense of a common destiny and actual political fragmentation was resolvable in one possible way: establishment (or restoration, if we consider the Zhou precedent) of the unified rule in All under Heaven. Thus, the "great unity" (*da yitong*) ideal of the Zhanguo and later ages is an important, albeit indirect, legacy of Chunqiu thinkers.

Chapter 5

When a Minister Mounts the Ruler

Chunqiu Views of Loyalty

Now, the reason why a ruler builds lofty inner walls and outer walls, looks carefully to the barring of doors and gates, is [to prepare against] the coming of invaders and bandits. But one who murders the ruler and takes his state does not necessarily climb over difficult walls and batter down barred doors and gates. [He may be one of the ministers] who, by limiting what the ruler sees and restricting what the ruler hears, seizes his government and monopolizes his commands, possesses his people and takes his state.

—*Shen Buhai*

The international turmoil discussed in the previous chapter was not the only source of concern for Chunqiu statesmen. Suppressed tension between rulers and ministers was equally inimical to political stability. Mencius dramatically but correctly described the Chunqiu era as an age when “ministers murdered rulers” and “sons murdered fathers.”¹ Bewildered by incessant struggles at the top of the ruling stratum, Chunqiu thinkers were in constant search for the means to restore harmonious relations between the overlords and their chief aides.

The notorious deterioration in ruler-minister relations did not come all at once. It reflected deep changes in the overlords’ and ministers’ power throughout the Chunqiu period. In the Western Zhou through the early Chunqiu, most ministers were related to the overlord either by descent or by intermarriage, and they owed him the allegiance due to the head of the lineage. Overlords furthermore exercised considerable control over their administration; they possessed the land of their state, granting it as emoluments to their officials, and appointed chief functionaries from among

their closest kin. By the mid-Chunqiu, however, this situation changed due to the emergence of two closely related systems of hereditary appointments and hereditary land allotments. A few high-ranking aristocratic lineages virtually monopolized ministerial positions in each state, effectively preventing outsiders from ascending to the top of the government apparatus. Land allotments, previously distributed to the ruler's relatives and meritorious servants, similarly became hereditary possessions of ministerial lineages. As a result, Chunqiu overlords were deprived of much of their administrative power, while hereditary officeholders relied on the independent economic and military resources of their allotments and enjoyed unconditional support of their relatives and retainers.² Furthermore, as we shall see in the next chapter, the ritual center of gravity shifted during the Chunqiu period from the high-ordered lineage (*zong*) to its branches (*shi* 氏), which greatly undermined the overlords' prestige as heads of the ruling lineages. As a result of these processes, many late Chunqiu overlords became powerless figureheads, manipulated by their nominal aides.³

This background of powerless overlords and powerful ministers had a profound impact on the Chunqiu intellectual atmosphere. Most Chunqiu thinkers belonged precisely to those ministerial lineages that had usurped the political, economical, and military rights of their lords, and they were naturally eager to consolidate their gains. Concomitantly, however, most leading Chunqiu statesmen were aware of the inimical impact of the overlords' weakness on the overall political stability, and did not dare to institutionalize their enhanced position. This immanent conflict between the public and private goals of Chunqiu ministers imbued ruler-minister relations of that age with deep tension.

The first two sections of this chapter discuss the political ethics of the Chunqiu period, particularly the views of the rulers' and ministers' obligations. Chunqiu thinkers eagerly supplied justifications for the decline of the ruler's power. Their arguments—moral, pragmatic, and philosophical—contributed to the redefinition of the ruler's position. Simultaneously, these thinkers developed a flattering image of a good minister—an obedient servant of the ruler who would, however, give priority to the state's long-term

interests over the ruler's immediate orders. Accordingly, Chunqiu ministerial loyalty was to "the altars of soil and grain"—that is, the state—rather than to a specific ruler. However, the notion of personal loyalty appeared as well. This concept existed not among the high ministers but among the ministers' personal retainers, who swore indisputable allegiance to their masters. The idea of personal loyalty, which is discussed in the third section, had a strong impact on Zhanguo thought.

The concepts of the good ruler and the good minister belong to the realm of political ethics. They shape the ruler's and the minister's self-image, but do not teach them how to deal with actual problems, nor how to resolve the contradictions among themselves. These issues had to be addressed by administrative devices. And while many Chunqiu thinkers sought to ensure the smooth functioning of the ruling apparatus, few if any dared to propose significant administrative changes. Unwilling either to institutionalize their enhanced position or to strip themselves of extra power, Chunqiu ministers suggested few innovations concerning the proper way of maintaining ruler-minister relations. The reasons for this apparent lack of creativity will be discussed in the fourth section.

Chunqiu Views of the Ruler's Authority

The steady decline in the influence of rulers and the ascent to power of their ministers undermined the early Zhou rationale of ruler-minister relations. During the Chunqiu period these conditions transformed the relationship from that of a sovereign and his servant to relations of near equality. Save for their ritual supremacy, most late-Chunqiu rulers appeared as mere *primus inter pares* with respect to their powerful aides.⁴ In the late-Chunqiu political landscape, rulers' loss of control over their administration became so widespread that thinkers had to supply explanations for this phenomenon. On the whole, these thinkers, many of whom were directly or indirectly involved in power struggles against their lords, tended to view the decay of the ruling houses as a *fait accompli*. Some suggested that the rulers' personal misconduct or political weakness were major reasons for their misfortune, while others promulgated philosophical justi-

fications for the decline of the overlords' power, arguing that rise and decline are inevitable in general, and for ruling houses in particular. All these arguments evidently served the "treacherous ministers" in their bids for power.

It would be unjust to state that Chunqiu ministers invariably sought to replace their rulers and appropriate their prerogatives. The *Zuo* mentions several exemplary ministers who regarded the ruler's orders as undefiable, akin to Heaven's decree, and preferred to die rather than violate the sovereign's command. This attitude might have been particularly pronounced in the fairly centralized state of Chu.⁵ However, such examples of indisputable obedience to the ruler's command are not characteristic of the conduct of Chunqiu ministers. Since the mid-Chunqiu, the increase in ministerial power and the parallel decline of the ruler's authority brought about escalating conflicts between rulers and their aides, and these conflicts frequently resulted either in assassinations or expulsions of the rulers by their nominal subordinates.⁶ This obvious decline in the ruler's authority brought about a major reconsideration in late-Chunqiu discourse of the ruler's position.

A new approach toward the nature of the ruler's authority was vividly expressed by a prominent Jin personality, Master Kuang. After the 559 expulsion of Lord Xian of Wei, Master Kuang discussed the matter with Lord Dao of Jin (r. 572–558):

The lord of Jin asked: "The people of Wei expelled their ruler—is it not too much!"

[Kuang] answered: "Perhaps it was their ruler who was too much [for them].⁷ A good ruler rewards the good and punishes the licentious; he nourishes his people like his own children, shelters them like Heaven, bears them up like Earth. The people serve their ruler, they love him like their own parents, look up to him like the sun and moon, revere him like the deities and the numinous [spirits], fear him like thunder and lightning. Could they then expel him?

The ruler is the master of the deities, the hope of the people. But if he fatigues the people's lives,⁸ neglects the deities, and ignores the sacrifices, then the hundred clans⁹ will lose their hope, and the altars of soil and grain will have no master. What use is [such a ruler]? What can one do but expel him?

Heaven gives birth to the people and sets up the ruler to serve as their supervisor and pastor, not to make them lose their nature. As these are rulers, they are given helpers to teach them and protect them and to prevent them from exceeding [proper] measures. Hence, the Son of Heaven has his lords, overlords have ministers, ministers have collateral lineages, nobles have collateral branches, *shi* have [young] brothers and sons,¹⁰ commoners, artisans, merchants, lackeys, shepherds, and grooms all have close relatives and associates who help and assist them.

When [the ruler] is good he is rewarded;¹¹ when he exceeds he is corrected; when he is in distress he is rescued; when he loses [the proper way] he is replaced. From the king down, everyone has a father and elder brothers, sons and younger brothers to assist and scrutinize his way of management. Scribes compile documents, blind musicians compose poems, [musical] masters chant admonitions and remonstrance, nobles correct and instruct, *shi* pass on remarks, commoners criticize, traveling merchants [voice their opinion] in the markets, and the hundred artisans contribute through their skills. Hence the “Xia Documents” say, “The herald with his wooden-clappered bell goes about the roads, officials correct each other, while artisans would take up their crafts as a means of remonstrance.”¹² This happened in the first month at the beginning of spring,¹³ [so that people could] remonstrate [with the ruler] for losing the constant [norms].

Heaven loves the people immensely. Would it then allow one man to burden them in order to give free rein to his lewdness, casting away the nature allotted to him by Heaven and Earth? Surely this would not happen!”¹⁴

Master Kuang’s speech is undoubtedly one of the most important ideological speeches in the entire *Zuo*. It explicitly states that the ruler’s authority rests on how well he performs the sovereign’s duties. When the ruler becomes a burden to the people, when he neglects his obligations toward the deities, he may be expelled or overthrown. Although the entire population participates in some form of remonstrance—probably vestiges of ancient communal life¹⁵—the key role of admonishing, correcting, and instructing the ruler definitely belongs to the high ministers, supposedly the ruler’s close relatives.¹⁶ The most interesting point is an ambiguous passage that begins with the words “when [the ruler] is good he is rewarded” and ends with “when he loses [the proper way] he is replaced.” Master Kuang did not specify whether replacing the ruler was the prerogative of

Heaven or of the ruler's deputies/relatives. Perhaps the ambiguity is intentional. Whoever had the supreme authority to depose the ruler, the overlord had to take into consideration the possibility that his aides would act on behalf of Heaven and replace him. Master Kuang unequivocally granted the minister the right to execute the will of Heaven, deities, and the people, even if this required direct conflict with the ruler. Only few thinkers in later generations dared to elevate the ministers' position versus the sovereign to such an extent.

Master Kuang promulgated two major theses. First, the ruler's authority rests on his ability to respond adequately to the needs of the altars, that is, the populace in general;¹⁷ second, should he fail to do so, his aides have the right to protect the altars and replace the inept sovereign. Both ideas were echoed eleven years later by Yan Ying (Yanzi). In 548 the Qi strongman Cui Zhu assassinated Lord Zhuang, massacred the lord's supporters, and forbade mourning the deceased ruler. Yan Ying disobeyed Cui Zhu's orders and refused to leave the site of the crime:

Yanzi stood at the gate of the Cui lineage [mansions]. His followers asked: "Are you going to die?"

[Yanzi] said: "Was he only my ruler, the one for whom I should die?"

They asked: "So, will you go into exile?"

[Yanzi] said: "Have I committed any crime that I should flee?"

They asked: "Will you then return [to your house]?"

[Yanzi] said: "The ruler is dead—where shall I return to? To rule the people, does it mean to abuse the people? [The ruler] should preside over the altars of soil and grain. To serve the ruler, does it mean to think of one's emoluments? [The minister] should nourish the altars of soil and grain. Therefore if the ruler dies for the sake of the altars of soil and grain, then [the minister] should die with him. If he flees for the sake of the altars of soil and grain, then [the minister] should flee with him. But if he dies or flees for personal reasons, then unless one is among his personal favorites, who will dare to be responsible for this?¹⁸ Moreover, this man [Cui Zhu] first established the ruler and then murdered him¹⁹—why should I die for this or flee the state for this? And how can I return [home without mourning the lord]?"²⁰

Yan Ying clearly distinguished between the ruler as a private person and the ruler as a political institution. The minister ought to serve the ruler

only in public matters, but he had no mandated responsibilities toward the ruler as a private person. Moreover, the ruler could not count on the obedience and loyalty of his ministers unless he performed his duties and upheld “the altars of soil and grain.” Just like Master Kuang, Yan Ying suggested that the ministers shared the ruler’s responsibility for the altars. Later we shall return to this point, but here we shall concentrate on Yan Ying’s views of the ruler. Yan Ying suggested that the fraudulent ruler—one who neglects his basic duties—could not command the allegiance of his ministers merely by virtue of his position.²¹ To ensure his authority, the sovereign must abide by the rules regulating the sovereign’s behavior; otherwise he may be abandoned, expelled, or even murdered.

Master Kuang and Yan Ying formulated a moral view of the ruler’s authority. They attributed the decline of the ruler’s position to the ruler’s personal misconduct. Yet the harsh reality of the late Chunqiu supplied many examples of rulers who lost power not because of immoral behavior but simply because of the inherent weakness of their position as compared with powerful ministers. Many pragmatic statesmen realized that the changing power balance at the top of the ruling stratum, rather than the moral deficiency of the rulers, was the real reason behind the incessant coups. Their views crystallized in discussions that accompanied the decline of the ruling house in the state of Lu. In 517, following an unsuccessful attack on the Ji (Jisun) lineage, Lord Zhao of Lu (r. 541–510) was forced to flee his state. On the eve of the ill-fated attack, Yue Qi from Song explained to his ruler why the Lu overlord would inevitably fail in his future clash with the Ji supporters:

If this [attack] occurs, Lu’s ruler will certainly leave [his state]. For three generations the government of Lu has belonged to the Ji lineage, whereas [Lord Zhao] is the fourth lord since the Lu rulers lost their power.²² Nobody can satisfy his desires without the [support of the] people; therefore the ruler should care for his people. The *Shi* [*jing*] says: “The people flee, there is sorrow in [my] heart.”²³ The ruler of Lu has lost the people; how will he be able to satisfy his desires? He can still quietly wait for [Heaven’s] decree, but by acting he will inevitably achieve sorrow.²⁴

Yue Qi's prediction proved correct, and unlucky Lord Zhao had to flee. His fate astonished many state leaders, who considered interfering on behalf of the ousted lord. These proposals were blocked by other statesmen, such as the Jin leader Fan Xianzi, who in 515 dissuaded his Wei and Song colleagues from attempting to restore Lord Zhao. Like Yue Qi, Fan Xianzi emphasized the people's support of the Jisun lineage as the major reason behind its success. He furthermore added:

The Ji lineage utterly won the people's [hearts]; the Yi of the Huai [River] support them, they have ten years of preparations, and are assisted by Qi and Chu. They have Heaven's support, the people's assistance, firm determination, and [their] power is equal to that of the overlords' states . . . For these reasons I, Yang, consider that it is difficult [to restore Lord Zhao].²⁵

In the speeches quoted earlier, Master Kuang and Yan Ying blamed the rulers for their licentious ways, for forgetting the altars of soil and grain, and for abandoning their functions as masters of the state. These violations were allegedly the primary justification for dismissing a deviant sovereign. In the case of Lord Zhao the situation was different. Yue Qi and Fan Xianzi did not stress Lord Zhao's violation of moral norms or his mismanagement. He lost his state simply because he was too weak. The people did not resent Lord Zhao's oppression. They merely ignored his existence, since it was the Ji lineage who held the real reins of power in the state of Lu for almost a century. Yue and Fan's explanations for the ruler's decline in Lu were not so much moral as entirely pragmatic, anticipating later discussions of "power" (*shi*) as the major attribute of the ruler.²⁶ Pragmatism, however, is not the only reason for Yue Qi and Fan Xianzi's perfunctory attitude toward the expulsion of Lord Zhao. Both headed powerful ministerial lineages in Song and Jin and probably sympathized more with their Ji colleagues in Lu than with the ousted lord.²⁷ That persons whose interests were at odds with those of the overlords dominated late Chunqiu intellectual life was a further factor in the decline of the ruler's authority.

Moral justifications by Master Kuang and Yan Ying of coups, and the cynical pragmatism of Yue Qi and Fan Xianzi are but different aspects of

the same intellectual search for the reasons behind the deterioration of the ruler's power. This search resulted in a major reappraisal of the position of the ruler. No longer could a ruler take his position for granted unless he behaved properly and/or preserved power in his hands. Yet along with moral and practical considerations there was another factor that encouraged late Chunqiu statesmen to regard frequent coups as unavoidable; namely, the philosophical view that, since everything changes and nothing is eternal, no ruling house would continue forever.

Ever since the establishment of the Zhou dynasty, Chinese thinkers expressed an awareness of the inevitable vulnerability of mundane rule. Those Zhou rulers who had brought about the end of the Shang dynasty never forgot that "the [Heavenly] mandate is not granted forever."²⁸ Chunqiu thinkers likewise understood that decline is inevitable both in nature and in social life; as Wu Zixu expressed it, "Fullness is inevitably destroyed—this is the Way of Heaven."²⁹ The increasing social disorder and decay of formerly powerful lineages and ruling houses encouraged Chunqiu thinkers to deduce from this universal law of Heaven the inevitability of political decline. In 522 Lord Jing of Qi feasted Yan Ying (Yanzi):

The lord said: "If the ancients had not died, how pleasant it would be."

Yanzi replied: "If the ancients did not have to die, it would be pleasant for them; how would you share [their joy]? In ancient times the Shuangjiu lineage was the first to settle here; they were followed by Ji Ce, followed by Youfeng Boling, followed by the Pugu lineage, and finally followed by Tai Gong [the founder of the current ruling house of Qi]. If the ancients had not died, this would be a joy of the Shuangjiu lineage, which is not what you desire."³⁰

Yan Ying's speech is more ideologically loaded than it may seem at first glance. In the late sixth century B.C.E. the position of the ruling house of Qi rapidly deteriorated. Yan Ying had frequently expressed his fear that the Chen (Tian) lineage might deprive the Qi lords of their power in the near future. In the above conversation with Lord Jing, Yan Ying underlined—although in mild terms—the inevitability of the demise of ruling houses; such historical references were perhaps meant to pave the way for the acceptance of a new coup.

Scribe Mo of Jin made the most explicit use of philosophical arguments to justify the decline of the ruling houses. In 510, fugitive Lord Zhao of Lu died in exile. The Jin leader Zhao Jianzi discussed the fate of the Lu ruler with Scribe Mo:

Zhao Jianzi asked Scribe Mo: "The Ji lineage expelled its ruler; the people submitted to them, and the overlords associated with them. The ruler died outside his state, but none blamed [the Ji lineage]. How did it happen?"

[Scribe Mo] answered: "Living things have pairs, threes, fives, and even numbers. Hence, Heaven has three celestial bodies, Earth has five elements, the body has right and left, everyone has his spouse. The king has lords, overlords have ministers, everyone has his deputy. A long time ago Heaven gave rise to the Ji lineage to be deputies of the lords of Lu. Is it not appropriate that the people submitted to them [the Ji lineage]? For generations the Lu rulers were losing power, whereas the Ji lineage for generations diligently improved its position. The people have forgotten their ruler, and although he died in exile, who pities him? Altars of soil and grain have no constant protector, rulers and ministers have no constant position; since the ancient [days] it is so. Hence, the *Shi* [*jing*] says, 'High banks turn into valleys, deep valleys turn into cliffs.'³¹ The families of three rulers have turned into commoners, as you know.³² In the *Yi* [*jing*], when *Zhen* (Thunder) mounts *Qian* (Heaven), it is called *Da zhuang* (Great prowess)—this is the way of Heaven.³³

... After [the founder of the Ji lineage, Chengji You] attained great merit in the state of Lu, he was granted an allotment in Bi, and was appointed chief minister. Later [Ji] Wenzi and [Ji] Wuzi increased their accomplishments from generation to generation and did not lose previous achievements.³⁴ After the death of Lord Wen (in 609), Dongmen Sui killed a son of the principal wife and established a scion from a minor line. Since then the rulers of Lu began losing their state. The Ji lineage held power during the rule of four lords. [Now] people do not know their ruler; how will he possess his state? That is why the ruler should carefully guard his insignia and title (*ming*); they should never be lent to others."³⁵

Scribe Mo synthesized the ideas of his predecessors. First, he reinforced Master Kuang's view on the necessary role of the ruler's deputy (*er*) in the normal functioning of the political apparatus. Second, similar to Yue Qi and Fan Xianzi, he stressed the importance of the ruler's actual power in preserving his position. But the most prominent aspect of Scribe Mo's

speech deals with historical explanations of the inevitable decline of the ruling house. He not only invoked Heaven to justify the Ji lineage's ascendancy, but made broader generalizations. The phrase "there is no constant protector for the altars of soil and grain, no constant position of ruler and minister" is the most daring statement regarding the future prospects of rulers. It justified a priori any potential coup and future usurpation. Although Mo mentioned the merits of the progenitors of the Ji lineage, he did not attribute their current success to any moral reasons. Like his contemporaries, Mo was perfectly aware that Ji Pingzi, the current head of the Ji lineage, was a mediocre minister who did not deserve any real success. Nonetheless, Pingzi benefited from the universal law of rise and decline which allowed a minister, in the language of the *Yi jing* hexagram, to "mount" the ruler, exercising thereby his "great prowess."

It is worth noticing that Mo's conversation with Zhao Jianzi was not just idle talk. Jianzi was the main architect of the ascendancy of the Zhao lineage to the position of an independent polity, at the expense of the lords of Jin, while Mo was Zhao's retainer.³⁶ Master Kuang's speech, quoted above, was a warning to the lord that his neglect of the ruler's duties might cause the loss of power. Scribe Mo, on the other hand, provided one of the "treacherous ministers" with historic and philosophical justification for a future usurpation.³⁷ The picture presented in the *Zuo* suggests that Chunqiu ministers and their aides not only dominated economy and politics, but intellectual life as well, and they created a favorable atmosphere for their further ascendancy to the top of the ruling apparatus. It therefore comes as no surprise that by the late Chunqiu period none of the Central Plain overlords held effective political power.

Obedience or Loyalty? Chunqiu Ministerial Ethics

Chunqiu thinkers' ready approval of the situation when "minister mounted the ruler" reflected the enhanced position of the contemporaneous ministerial stratum. Chunqiu ministers, as the above speeches by Master Kuang and Yan Ying suggest, considered themselves not as mere servants

but as the ruler's partners, who shared his responsibilities for the altars. This ministerial self-esteem is reflected also in Chunqiu views of the model minister. Such a minister had to prefer long-term state interests over the immediate ruler's commands, and his supreme loyalty was directed to the altars, not to the ruler personally. This flexible interpretation of loyalty allowed ministers to defy the ruler's orders under the pretext that they were thereby protecting the true interests of the altars. Needless to say, such remarkable freedom of action further strengthened the ministers' position at Chunqiu courts.

The above observation does not imply of course that Chunqiu ministers invariably hailed defiance of the ruler's orders. To the contrary, on the surface they professed unquestionable obedience to the superiors and undisputed allegiance to the lord. Particularly important was the demand of the minister to hold no duplicity (*bu er*); namely, to wholeheartedly serve the sovereign without conniving with other contenders for power. The following story illustrates the importance of this virtue for Chunqiu ministers. In 680 the fugitive Lord Li of Zheng (r. 700–696 and 680–673) returned to his state, murdered his brother Zi Yi, reascended the throne, and began settling accounts with his brother's ministers. First, he executed Fu Xia despite Fu Xia's previous assistance in Lord Li's return, and then he turned to Yuan Fan:

"Fu Xia was duplicitous. Zhou has set penalties; hence, he received his punishment. To all those who assisted my return and were not of two minds, I promised appointments of high-ranking nobles. I wanted to consider the matter with you, my uncle. Yet when I left [the country] my uncle did not report to me on [state] affairs. Now that I have returned, you still do not think about me. I detest this."

[Yuan Fan] answered: "Our former ruler, Lord Huan,³⁸ ordered my ancestors to be in charge of [his] ancestral shrine. When the altars of soil and grain have their master, to give one's mind to another outside [the state] is the greatest duplicity. Insofar as [Zi Yi] presided over the altars, who of the people in the state was not his subject? [According to] Heaven's regulations, a subject must not be of two minds. Zi Yi held the [ruler's] position for fourteen years. [So], were not those who planned to invite you duplicitous? There are still eight other sons of [Lord Li and Zi

Yi's father,] Lord Zhuang. If each of them encouraged duplicity by using offices and titles as bribes to settle his matters, how will you cope with this? But I received your command." And then he strangled himself.³⁹

Yuan Fan did not claim that Zi Yi was a more legitimate or more righteous ruler than Lord Li. His fidelity relied on the assumption that the minister/subject could not indulge in any double-dealing; he had to be faithful to the ruler who currently held power. The ruler who presided over the altars and performed sacrifices was a legitimate ruler who deserved unquestionable obedience of his subjects. This view remained particularly popular in the early Chunqiu, the age of frequent dynastic conflicts, and it is voiced in many other speeches in the early *Zuo*.⁴⁰

Struggles over succession, however, were of minor importance for most Chunqiu ministers, whose major dilemma was not whom to choose as a proper candidate for the throne, but whether or not they should indubitably obey the overlord's commands. Again, theoretically, a good minister was supposed to display unconditional obedience to the ruler. This notion of wholeheartedly fulfilling the superior's orders is usually designated as "trustworthiness/faithfulness" (*xin*). The primary meaning of "*xin*" was "keeping one's word," "fulfilling one's promise," and in the context of ministerial virtues, "truthfully fulfilling the ruler's commands."⁴¹ In 594 the Jin commander Xie Yang underscored the importance of *xin* to a minister:

I heard that when a ruler is able to issue orders, this is propriety, while when a minister is able to carry them out, this is faithfulness (*xin*). When faithfulness implements propriety and one acts, this is beneficial. He whose plans do not lose benefit, and with these he protects the altars of soil and grain, is the master of the people. Propriety [permits] no dual faithfulness, faithfulness [permits] no dual orders.⁴²

Xie Yang underlined the major meaning of "*xin*" as a ministerial virtue. Each order issued by the ruler was by definition a proper one, and the minister had to obey without further deliberation. Many other speakers similarly emphasized *xin* (obedience) as a major requirement of the minister.⁴³ Yet self-confident Chunqiu ministers could by no means accept the role of blind tool of the ruler, as implied by Xie Yang's speech. Even if not ex-

plicitly, many of them wondered what they should do if the ruler were not a “real ruler” (*bu jun*). Should they obey the ruler’s command even if it contradicted the long-term interests of the state, endangering the altars of soil and grain? Should they follow unrighteous commands? These questions might have induced a subtle reassessment of *xin*; in the late *Zuo* this virtue figures less prominently in discussions about ministerial conduct.⁴⁴ Critical evaluation of *xin* is a late-Chunqiu development, but already in the early Chunqiu period, ministers tended to assess critically the ruler’s orders. This understanding that orders should be carried out only insofar as they benefited the ruler and the state is embedded in the major ministerial virtue of the Chunqiu age—loyalty (*zhong*).

The term “*zhong*” apparently did not exist before the Chunqiu period. It does not appear either in Western Zhou texts or in the bronze inscriptions.⁴⁵ Thus, in early Chunqiu discourse, “*zhong*” was a new term and its meaning differed greatly from the “personal loyalty” of later periods. For the Chunqiu ministers “*zhong*” primarily referred to the devotion to altars of soil and grain, while personal loyalty to the ruler was a marginal or even a nonexistent dimension.

Unlike trustworthiness, which was demanded of the ruler as well as of the minister, *zhong* was not reciprocal. There is only one instance when *zhong* is mentioned as the ruler’s attribute. In 706 Ji Liang of Sui stated:

What is called the Way is devotion (*zhong*) to the people and trust towards the deities. Superiors think how to benefit the people—this is *zhong*.⁴⁶

This is the first occurrence of the term “*zhong*” in the *Zuo* and in extant ancient Chinese texts in general, and it is the only case that refers to the ruler’s obligations towards the people.⁴⁷ This usage of the term remained unique; perhaps it reflected an early meaning that subsequently disappeared. In later years, *zhong* became a minister’s attribute and no longer implied reciprocity.

The *Zuo* usage of *zhong* refers primarily to two qualities of the minister: first, a loyal minister had to consider the long-term interests of the state, and act accordingly; second, he was expected to act selflessly and prefer

state interests to his own.⁴⁸ *Zhong* assigned a minister the role of independent and intelligent political actor, and this inevitably led to a conflict with the concept of obedience embedded in *xin*.

Ideally, *zhong* and *xin* should complement each other. The good minister should be obedient as well as intelligent, selfless, not duplicitous, and should act on behalf of the state. Whenever Chunqiu statesmen praised a colleague, they tended to emphasize that he was trustworthy as well as loyal.⁴⁹ They introduced the compound “*zhongxin*,” implying that both virtues were complementary. Harsh reality, however, challenged this assumption. Intelligent loyalty was often at odds with blind obedience, as implied by Xie Yang in the speech cited above. Several stories and anecdotes in the *Zuo zhuan* elucidate the conflict between the two obligations. These stories illustrate the immanent tension in Chunqiu political ethics and deserve a more detailed discussion.

In 657 Lord Xian of Jin ordered Shi Wei to fortify the cities of Pu and Qu—the allotments of Princes Chonger and Yiwu, whose relations with their father were increasingly tense and mistrustful. Shi Wei performed his job carelessly and was reprimanded by the lord. He explained his actions as follows:

I heard that when there is grief without [a reason for] mourning, [real] sorrow is sure to come; fortifying cities without [an external] military threat would allow an [internal] adversary to occupy them. Why should I carefully [fortify the future] holdings of bandits and adversaries? When an official neglects orders, this is irreverent (*bu jing*), but strengthening the holding of an adversary is disloyal (*bu zhong*). He who loses loyalty and reverence, how can he serve the ruler?⁵⁰

Unable to resolve the contradiction between his perception of the ruler's interests and the ruler's orders, Shi Wei resigned. His carelessness in carrying out the ruler's orders was implicitly praised by the *Zuo* author, who immediately clarified that Shi Wei's prediction was correct: the newly fortified cities became bases of insurrection of the lord's sons. Thus, Shi Wei's view of loyalty inspired him to defy the ruler's orders.

In 655, Lord Xian's cunning concubine, Li Ji, removed the elder scions and established her son, Xi Qi, as heir apparent. Most officials objected to

this violation of succession norms. On his sickbed, the dying Lord Xian summoned Xi Qi's grand tutor, Xun Xi, and requested him to enthrone Xi Qi.

[Xun Xi] kowtowed and answered: "I shall use to the utmost the power of my limbs and add to it loyalty and faithfulness (*zhen*). If [our plan] succeeds, then it is due to your luck; if not, I shall pursue it till my death."

The lord asked: "What do you mean by loyalty and faithfulness?"

[Xun Xi] answered: "Doing whatever I know will benefit the lord's house—this is loyalty; to follow the deceased and serve the living without any hesitation—this is faithfulness."⁵¹

When Li Ke intended to kill Xi Qi, he first reported to Xun Xi saying: "Three resentful [groups] will act,⁵² Qin and [their supporters in] Jin will assist them. What will you do?"

Xun Xi said: "I will die for [Xi Qi]."

Li Ke said: "It is useless."

Xun Shu (Xun Xi) replied: "I gave a promise to the late ruler and cannot be duplicitous. Can I violate my promise because of my love of life? Although it is useless, how can I avoid it? Yet others want a good [ruler], just as I do. I want to escape duplicity, but how can I tell others to stop [pursuing their plans]?"⁵³

Xun Xi encountered a similar dilemma between loyalty and obedience as Shi Wei. His promise to the former lord demanded acting on behalf of the illegitimate heir, but his sense of benefiting the lord's house apparently suggested establishing one of the elder scions. Unable to resolve this contradiction, Xun Xi was paralyzed. After Li Ke murdered Xi Qi, Xun Xi tried to establish Xi Qi's younger half-brother, Zi Zhuo; after Zi Zhuo was also murdered, Xun Xi committed suicide. The first impression is that Xun Xi kept his promise to the late lord, but a deeper analysis suggests otherwise. Twice he did nothing to prevent Li Ke from fulfilling his plans and he definitely refrained from stopping the plotters. In committing suicide, Xun Xi found the only way out of his dilemma—unable wholeheartedly to preserve the will of the late Lord Xian, he acted finally in what he believed to be "the interests of the lord's house."

Another famous example of the contradiction between *xin* and *zhong* is the anecdote about Chu Ni. In 607 the vicious Lord Ling of Jin (r. 620–607) dispatched Chu Ni to murder the upright head of government, Zhao

Dun. When Chu Ni arrived at Zhao's residence he was impressed by Zhao's outlook. Embarrassed, Chu Ni uttered:

"He who does not forget respect and reverence is the master of the people. To murder the people's master is to be disloyal (*bu zhong*), to disregard the ruler's order is to be untrustworthy (*bu xin*). Being one of these, is it not better to die?" He dashed his head against a cassia tree and died.⁵⁴

These three examples reflect the complicated nature of ministerial ethics. Ideally, trustworthiness and loyalty should complement each other, as reflected in the term "*zhongxin*." In fact, however, on some occasions the minister's concern for the interests of the state contradicted the principle of obedience to the ruler. Such a conflict was not easily resolved; in two of the three cases the unlucky minister/servant committed suicide. Yet importantly, none of these ministers submitted wholeheartedly to the ruler's order. The outcomes of their actions corresponded to the demands of loyalty and not of faithfulness.

Many other examples suggest that the Chunqiu concepts of the loyal minister differed greatly from those of the subsequent Zhanguo age. For instance, Yu Quan of Chu was considered a paragon of loyalty despite his odd behavior: he threatened King Wen (r. 689–675) with weapons and prevented the king from entering the royal capital in order to encourage him to conquer more lands.⁵⁵ Another odd paragon of loyalty is Qing Zheng of Jin, who in 645 deliberately caused the Jin army defeat at the hands of Qin and effected Lord Hui's imprisonment; by this means Qing Zheng wanted to persuade Lord Hui to improve his rule. Later, Qing Zheng refused to flee Jin, and accepted the deserved punishment. Both the *Zuo* and the *Guoyu* leave no doubt that Qing Zheng was continuously revered as a loyal minister.⁵⁶ That loyal ministers would resort to violence against the ruler and betray him on the battlefield would be inconceivable to Zhanguo and later thinkers. In the Chunqiu period, however, such ministers continued to enjoy high prestige because their actions presumably served the altars—the ultimate focus of ministerial concern.

The most striking example of Chunqiu loyalty is, doubtless, the case of the head of the Jin government, Zhao Dun. Since Lord Ling did not heed Dun's incessant remonstrance and even attempted to assassinate his faithful aide, Dun's relative, Zhao Chuan, retaliated in 607 by assassinating Lord Ling. Although Zhao Dun admitted his indirect responsibility for the murder of the ruler, later generations regarded him a paragon of the loyal minister, and even Confucius praised him. Thus, even a *de jure* murderer of his ruler could claim loyalty insofar as his actions seemed to correspond to state interests!⁵⁷

What is behind these unique interpretations of loyalty? Perhaps, due to their unusually high status, Chunqiu ministers considered themselves more as a ruler's companion than his subject. Consequently, they regarded their primary duty to be toward the state and the altars, whereas serving the lord was a secondary task. The truly loyal minister need not necessarily be obedient, provided his behavior was unselfish and was aimed at profiting the long-term interests of the state and the ruling house. Needless to say, this flexible interpretation of loyalty was advantageous to the ministers, who could thereby justify almost any action they committed. Just as in the case of changing views of the ruler's authority, discussed earlier, the governmental ethic of the Chunqiu age served the ministers and weakened the overlords.

Chunqiu ministerial views of loyalty deeply influenced the subsequent ministerial ethic. Many Zhanguo thinkers, of whom Mencius may be the best example, shared the notion of their Chunqiu predecessors that the ministers' understanding of the state interests is superior to that of the ruler's. An importance of critical assessment of the ruler's orders is manifest in Xunzi's famous dictum "Follow *Dao*, do not follow the ruler."⁵⁸ And yet, there are major differences between Zhanguo views of loyalty and those outlined above. Particularly, while Chunqiu ministers owed allegiance to the altars and not to the ruler personally, Zhanguo thinkers usually conceived of loyalty as a much more personalized obligation. The roots of this interpretation of loyalty are also to be found in Chunqiu period—not among the ministers, but among their retainers.

Personal Retainers: Another Kind of Loyalty?

The discussion thus far has dealt with the relationships between the overlords and their high ministers. This is, however, only one aspect of ruler-minister ties of the Chunqiu period. An entirely different mode of relations existed between the high ministers and their personal retainers, usually named “household servants” (*jia chen*). The notion of personal loyalty that developed among retainers had a profound impact on reconceptualization of the term “*zhong*” in the Zhanguo period.

In the pyramid-like Chunqiu society, high nobles (*qing dafu*) occupied a dual position. They were ministers with regard to the overlords but also omnipotent rulers of their allotments (*cai yi*).⁵⁹ To rule these allotments the nobles established minicourts staffed by personal retainers. These retainers were usually, though not necessarily, recruited from the minor siblings of the master’s lineage; most of them belonged to the *shi* stratum. Their positions often were not hereditary but contractual, and their prosperity depended entirely on the emoluments granted by their master. Therefore, their dependence on the master was nearly absolute, and so was their allegiance to their lord.⁶⁰

This dependence encouraged retainers to conceive of loyalty in entirely different terms than the ministers did. Unlike the ministers, who cared for the altars of soil and grain, retainers cared only for their master’s person. A *Guoyu* story illustrates this concept. In 527 Xun Wu of Jin conquered the city of Gu ruled by the Di tribesmen and imprisoned its ruler, Yuanzhi. The *Guoyu* tells:

Sushaxi, the servant of the Gu ruler, gathered his family and followed [the imprisoned ruler]. The military official wanted to stop him, but [Sushaxi] refused, saying: “I serve the ruler, not the land. Am I called the ruler’s servant, or the land’s servant? Now the ruler is transferred [to another place], why should I depend on Gu?”

Muzi (Xun Wu) summoned him saying: “Gu has a [new] ruler. If you will wholeheartedly serve the [new] ruler, I shall assure your emolument and rank.”

[Sushaxi] answered: “I presented gifts [of initiating my service] to the Di ruler of Gu, not to the Jin ruler of Gu. I heard that after one pre-

sents gifts as a servant he should not be of two minds. Presenting gifts [at the beginning of service] and [keeping the servants' name] on the bamboo tablets [until] death is an ancient law.⁶¹ [In this case] the ruler has a prominent name, while servants do not rebel [against the master]. How dare I pursue private profits thus causing troubles to the *sikou*⁶² and bringing further confusion into ancient laws? Will this not cause unexpected [troubles]?"

Muzi sighed and said to his attendants: "How should I devote myself to virtue to gain such a servant!"⁶³

Xun Wu's last phrase may well be a moralizing appendix of the *Guoyu* compilers. In fact, there are no signs that Sushaxi's devotion to his master resulted from Yuanzhi's extraordinary virtue. Personal qualities of the master were not relevant; the servant should simply serve his superior according to the lifelong contract. The home state and its altars were of little concern to Sushaxi; his fate was connected only to that of the master. Personal loyalty prevailed over political and moral considerations.

What happened when this personal loyalty came into conflict with state interests? What happened when the retainer's master rebelled against the legitimate ruler of his state? The evidence presented in the *Zuo* suggests that retainers unequivocally gave preference to the interests of their masters, on whom they were dependent. This may be demonstrated by the story about the followers of Prince Chonger of Jin. In 637, at the beginning of his abrupt rule, Lord Huai issued an order that forbade Jin nobles to follow the fugitive Chonger.⁶⁴ A leading noble, Hu Tu, refused to recall his sons, Mao and Yan, from Chonger's service. Lord Huai ordered the arrest of Hu Tu, but the latter continued to defy the ruler's orders:

Sons are able to hold office when a father teaches them loyalty: this is an ancient regulation. When the name is written on the bamboo tablet [to confirm the grant of an office] and official gifts are presented [at the beginning of a retainer's career], to be duplicitous is a crime. Now, my sons for many years are named as Chonger's [retainers]. If I recall them, that means teaching duplicity. If a father teaches sons duplicity, how is it possible to serve the ruler?⁶⁵

Hu Tu did not try to justify his sons' behavior in terms of state interests. Chonger's retainers should indeed have been considered rebels, since

they plotted against the legitimate rulers of Jin, Lords Hui and Huai. However, they also owed personal allegiance to the fugitive scion, and these bonds, in the case of the retainers, were more binding than state interests. Thus, a retainer must be obliged to follow his master even if the latter rebelled against the legitimate ruler.

Some overlords also recognized the right of a retainer to keep allegiance to a rebellious master, effectively ceding thereby part of the overlords' sovereignty to the nobles. In 552 Lord Ping of Jin (r. 557–532) pardoned Xin Yu, a retainer of the rebellious Luan Ying, accepting Xin Yu's claim that his only ruler was Luan Ying and not the lord of Jin. Not surprisingly, two years later the retainers of the Luan lineage joined Luan Ying's rebellion in Quwo.⁶⁶ In 530, Nan Kuai, a retainer of the Ji lineage, intended to overthrow his master and restore the power of Lord Zhao of Lu. His plot failed and he fled to Qi. At the banquet, Lord Jing of Qi (r. 547–490) called him a rebel. "I only wanted to strengthen the lord's house," replied Nan Kuai. Then a Qi noble, Zi Hanzan, stated: "When a household servant intends to strengthen the lord's house—this is the greatest crime."⁶⁷

Acknowledging that the bonds of personal loyalty between the retainer and his master were of more importance than allegiance to the overlord is astonishing. This attitude further contributed to the decline of the lords' power. During the late Chunqiu political troubles, retainers unequivocally sided with their masters, not with the overlords.⁶⁸ In 517 Zong Li, the *sima* of the Shusun lineage who decided to side with the Ji lineage against the forces of Lord Zhao of Lu, plainly stated: "I am a household servant and dare not interfere in state matters. What is more beneficent for us: existence or elimination of the Ji lineage?" After the Shusun elders answered, "Without the Ji lineage there would be no Shusun lineage either," Zong Li gave the order to help the Ji forces and attack the lord's army.⁶⁹ The ideas of legitimacy and benefit of the altars were of no concern to Zong Li, or to other retainers. They did their utmost to benefit their masters, following them in all cases, and refraining from involvement in high matters of the state and overlords. The retainers' fidelity to their masters should be limitless; a master could be right or wrong, but he was the master.⁷⁰

A master demanded devotion and loyalty from his retainer, but this

loyalty was not entirely unconditional. An emphasis on contracts recorded on the bamboo tablets in the speeches cited above indicates that a retainer's allegiance remained flexible. Unlike high-ranking ministers who held their court positions for generations, and for whom serving the altars might have been conceived as a manifestation of filial obligation to the ancestors, retainers had the right to change masters, should the contractual relations end. Furthermore, retainers were not expected to display selflessness; personal interest was a legitimate motivating factor for wholeheartedly serving the master. For example, the master's success could greatly benefit his retainers. The followers of Chonger, mentioned above, became high-ranking officials of the state of Jin after Chonger's victory, and founded some of the most powerful ministerial lineages. Many other retainers sought to emulate this success. In 479 Shi Qi, the retainer of the rebellious Chu noble Sheng, Lord of Bai, plainly stated:

"In such an undertaking [i.e., the rebellion], if you succeed you become high minister (*qing*), and if not, you are boiled alive."⁷¹

Shi Qi's saying is more easily reconcilable with the cynical *Zhanguo* than the moralizing *Zuo*. This saying further elucidates the difference between the loyalty of the high minister and that of his retainer. The minister owed allegiance to the altars and not to the overlord, rendering himself selfless. The retainer, in contrast, owed allegiance only to his master and the master's lineage and was not expected to give up personal interests.⁷² Thus, two different concepts of loyalty coexisted in the Chunqiu period: the intelligent and selfless loyalty of the ministers, and the personal loyalty of the retainers, based on self-interest.

Personal interpretation of loyalty by Chunqiu retainers had a profound impact on the *Zhanguo* political atmosphere. When the former retainers, members of the *shi* stratum, reached the apex of the political apparatus, they introduced their distinct political ethics into the highest strata of *Zhanguo* society. Most *Zhanguo* ministers considered their loyalty as directed personally to the ruler, rather than to the altars, and when the ruler failed to satisfy their demands they felt free to abandon him and his state. A concept of ruler-minister friendship that dominated *Zhanguo* discourse

was a logical outcome of this personification of political bonds.⁷³ In the long term the idea of personal allegiance to the ruler or to the ruling dynasty overshadowed ministerial intelligent loyalty, although the two distinct concepts of *zhong* continued to coexist, contributing in no small measure to the immanent tension of loyalty discourse in imperial China.⁷⁴

Chunqiu Administrative Thought

The previous discussion has shown that political ethics of the Chunqiu period reflected—and contributed to—the situation of weak rulers and strong ministers. Can we say the same about Chunqiu administrative thought? Did the self-confident ministers try to institutionalize a favorable balance of power with the overlords by suggesting new modes of ruler-minister relations? Or did they conversely try to curb the forces of disintegration by strengthening centralized rule? The discussion below suggests that they generally tried to avoid discussing these issues.

Chunqiu administrative thought is characterized by general ambivalence, which reflects the ambiguous position of the Chunqiu ministers. As chief administrators they sought to enhance the efficiency of the government, which implied strengthening the overlord's authority. As heads of ministerial lineages, however, they opposed any change that would undermine their position. Unable to resolve this conflict of interest, minister-thinkers generally refrained from suggesting innovative approaches. Chunqiu administrative thought thus is characterized by a lack of creativity that is obviously at odds with the sophisticated political ethics of that period. No Chunqiu thinker—insofar as our sources may be trusted—proposed restructuring the government; nobody advocated significant institutional changes. Most Chunqiu minister-thinkers preferred to discuss problems within the ruling stratum in ethical terms and not as administrative issues.

What are the reasons for this evident desire to avoid entangling questions? Perhaps the Chunqiu ministers realized that their *de facto* power was much greater than it ought to be. The right to hereditary office and hereditary possession of allotments was at odds with Western Zhou and

early Chunqiu practice; these rights were usurped by the ministerial lineages, but had no institutional background. Being aware of the dangers of continuing disintegration, ministers shunned advocating institutional change that would further strengthen their position. On the other hand, they were not interested in changes that would restrict their privileges. Hence, Chunqiu ministers generally remained silent regarding administrative aspects of ruler-minister relations.

As discussed in Chapter 3, the most important of the proposed devices to stabilize ruler-minister relations was adherence to ritual (*li*). Aside from *li*, Chunqiu statesmen followed mainly Western Zhou concepts of proper administration. The most popular was the body simile—a view that the ruler and the ministers were interdependent and indispensable, like the head and the limbs of the body. This concept, which appeared already in the Western Zhou and remained popular throughout the Chunqiu period and thereafter, was invoked to prevent the ruler from committing atrocities toward his aides. Whenever a ruler tyrannically oppressed his ministers, he was reminded that such behavior was similar to cutting off limbs.⁷⁵ Yet as we saw above, most of the Chunqiu states suffered less from tyranny than from the weakness of centralized authority. How to deal with ministers who defied the ruler's orders? How to establish efficient rule? These problems demanded a solution the body simile could not supply.

Another concept that likewise derived from the Western Zhou was model emulation. If the ministers imitated the ruler, claimed some thinkers, there would be no conflict in the government. These views were discussed in Chapter 3, and need not be restated here.⁷⁶ Nevertheless, this centuries-old concept of model emulation had obvious limitations. Astute thinkers realized the naïveté of the belief that imitating the ruler would restore proper functioning of the administration. Furthermore, the concept of emulation assigned ministers a passive role, which was at odds with their actual power. Hence, this view did not gain popularity in Chunqiu discourse.

The discussion thus far may be puzzling. Indeed, the concepts of ruler-minister relations surveyed above contradict the notion of weak rulers, strong ministers presented in the previous sections. The body simile leaves

the ministers in the position of the ruler's limbs, while the concept of model emulation likewise assigns the ministers a passive role—they are mere imitators of the ruler's example. We may assume that, despite their self-confidence, Chunqiu ministers dared not openly claim even partial equality with the ruler in guiding political processes. They did not use their dominant position at court to institutionalize their power. In the early Zhanguo their stratum had to pay a high price for this intellectual cowardice; lacking institutionalized legitimacy for their power, hereditary ministers ceded most of their rights to the new generations of overlords who sought to recover centralized rule.

Nonetheless, it cannot be claimed that no one among the Chunqiu thinkers dared to redefine ruler-minister relations. The *Zuo* records at least one instance of a radically innovative approach. Not surprisingly, Yan Ying—by far the most creative thinker of the Chunqiu age—offered a new view. A long-term aide of the Qi rulers, Yan Ying witnessed several coups and bloody confrontations in the Qi capital and abroad, and was aware of the mounting contradictions within the ruling stratum of Chunqiu states.⁷⁷ He searched for ways to soften these contradictions without undermining either the sovereign's power or the ministers' interests. He expressed his views during an occasional conversation with Lord Jing in 522. The lord remarked:

“Only [Liangqiu] Ju is harmonious (*he*) with me.”

[Yan Ying] answered: “Ju conforms (*tong*) with you; how can he be harmonious?”

The lord asked: “Are harmony and conformity different?”

[Yan Ying] answered: “They are different. Harmony is like a stew. Water, fire, jerky, mincemeat, salt, and plum [vinegar] are used to cook fish and meat; they are cooked over firewood. Then the master chef harmonizes them, mixes them according to taste, compensating for what is insufficient and diminishing what is too strong. The superior man (*junzi*) eats it to calm (*ping*) his heart.

It is the same with the ruler and minister. When there is something unacceptable about what the ruler considers acceptable, the minister points out the unacceptable in order to perfect the acceptability [of the ruler's plan]. When there is something acceptable in what the ruler considers unacceptable, the minister points out the acceptable in order to

eliminate the unacceptable. In this way the government is equalized (*ping*) and without transgressions, and the people have no contending (*zheng*) heart.⁷⁸ . . .

As for Ju, he is not like this. Whatever you consider acceptable, Ju also says it is acceptable, whatever you consider unacceptable, Ju also says it is unacceptable. This is like complementing water with more water: who will be able to drink it? If the zithers and dulcimers were to hold a single tone, who could listen to it? This is how conformity (*tong*) is unacceptable.⁷⁹

Yan Ying's vision was the most radical expression of a late Chunqiu minister's self-confidence. The mutually complementary ruler and minister are reminiscent of the body simile, but Yan Ying went further in defining the role of the minister.⁸⁰ In the body simile ministers are indispensable but have no active role; they are merely limbs, obedient servants of the head—the ruler. The simile of harmony is different. Harmony of tones and flavors does not require an ultimate leader and implicitly refers to *equality* of the minister and the ruler.⁸¹ Yan Ying, therefore, implied that the ruler is merely *primus inter pares*, while the minister does not passively receive the ruler's influence but is an active participant in decision making. As for the ruler, instead of ignoring his powerful ministers, he stood to benefit from their advice, creating a team that would compensate for his weaknesses. This radical reassessment of ruler-minister relations is indicative of the intellectual boldness of Yan Ying, and reflects the severe deterioration of the ruler's power in the late Chunqiu. Yet although Yan Ying's vision probably influenced Confucius, it remained too radical for either Chunqiu ministers or for later thinkers.⁸² Nobody dared to institutionalize Yan Ying's concept of complementary ruler and ministers. Perhaps the thinkers were aware of the dangers of imposing further limitations on the ruler's power.

Summary

Ruler-minister relations of the Chunqiu period were marked by the uniquely strong position of ministerial lineages and weakness of the rulers. Aside from political, economic, and military power, ministers monopolized

the realm of political thought, which allowed them to further bolster their position versus hapless sovereigns. In particular, political ethics of the Chunqiu period were marked by ministerial self-esteem and ministers' treatment of the ruler as mere *primus inter pares*. On the one hand Chunqiu ministers eagerly supplied justifications for the decline of the ruling houses, while on the other hand they proudly asserted their role as the ruler's companions who shared his responsibility for the state's well-being and had the right to defy the sovereign's orders in the name of the "altars." In addition, ministers enjoyed the undisputed allegiance of their retainers, who put the interest of the master above those of the overlord. By the late Chunqiu period ministerial power was seemingly unshakeable.

Chunqiu ministers might have been the most powerful officeholders in Chinese history. Nonetheless, their advantageous position was soon to decline in the ensuing Zhanguo age. The excessive strength of the ministerial stratum immanently threatened political stability, for which reason even ministers themselves dared not institutionalize their power. Their neglect of administrative issues enabled Zhanguo overlords to gradually decrease the privileges of ministerial lineages with only meager opposition. Then, as ministerial power dwindled, new generations of statesmen-thinkers, members of the *shi* stratum, reappraised the rationale of ruler-minister relations, restoring the superiority of the sovereign and elevating his position above that of his aides. While the Chunqiu legacy of ministerial self-esteem continued to influence Zhanguo thinkers, particularly the followers of Confucius, deep changes occurred in the realm of Zhanguo administrative thought. Those Zhanguo thinkers concerned with issues of government and administration, such as Mozi, Shang Yang (d. 338), Shen Buhai (d. 337), and later Han Feizi (d. 233) contributed greatly toward theoretical justifications of a strong ruler's position, and supplied the overlords with adequate means to control their ministers. Due to these efforts the Chunqiu situation of ministers who mounted the rulers largely disappeared by the end of the Zhanguo period.⁸³

Thus, the Chunqiu legacy suggested different departures for Zhanguo thinkers. Again, as we saw in the previous chapter, Zhanguo disputers of

the *Dao* not only expanded the foundations, prepared by Chunqiu statesmen, but also rejected some of their legacy and followed new ways. Paying attention to this ever-present diachronic dialogue throughout the Eastern Zhou period is a precondition for the better understanding of Zhanguo political and ethical thought.

Chapter 6

Nobility of Blood and Spirit

Chunqiu Ethical Thought

Therefore, a petty man can become a superior man, but he is not willing to become a superior man. The superior man can become a petty man, but he is not willing to become a petty man. It is not impossible that the petty man and the superior man exchange their positions, but they do not do it; it is possible, but it cannot be caused.

—*Xunzi*

The Chunqiu period was a triumphant age for the hereditary aristocracy. Between the late seventh and the early fifth centuries B.C.E., this stratum dominated the political, economic, and intellectual life of the Chinese world. In most Huaxia states aristocratic lineages overshadowed the ruling families and successfully withstood outsiders' attempts to break their power monopoly. The aristocrats were increasingly aware of their distinctive status, which differed both from the overlords above and the *shi* and the commoners below. This self-awareness resulted in the development of a new self-image for this stratum: the concept of the "superior man" (*junzi*).

Initially, the term "*junzi*" was defined in terms of descent. The Chunqiu aristocrats, however, realized that hereditary rights were insufficient to legitimize their dominance. Consequently, they imbued the term "*junzi*" with moral content. Although the social dimension of this term remained evident in Chunqiu discourse and thereafter, the moral dimension became ever more pronounced; in the late Chunqiu period "*junzi*" referred primarily to moral conduct and not to pedigree. This development was of the utmost significance for the emergence of Chinese ethical thought in gen-

eral, and for the self-image of ruling elites throughout Chinese history in particular.

The first two sections of this chapter will outline the changing meaning of the term “*junzi*,” concomitant with the broader process of creating a new self-image for the elite. The moral conduct of the elite was largely patterned after that of the rulers. Appropriation of the ruler’s values reflected both the high status and the growing self-confidence of Chunqiu aristocrats.

The following sections will discuss in greater detail this process of appropriation. Some of the ruler’s attributes, like *de* (charisma/virtue) and *ren* (benevolence), became part and parcel of the nobility’s self-image. However, other ethical attributes of the ruler were inapplicable to the broader segment of the population and consequently were reevaluated, as in the case of the term “*li*” (benefit/profit). Of particular interest is the fate of the term “*xiao*” (filial piety), which almost disappeared from Chunqiu discourse, only to be revitalized at the end of the Chunqiu era, apparently due to the efforts of Confucius and his disciples. This revival of “*xiao*” was accompanied by a significant shift from its initial meaning as “ancestral worship” to “filiality,” and its redirection from the head of the lineage to the parents.

Chunqiu ethical thought had a profound impact on ethical views of the Zhanguo age. Moreover, development of the ethical self-image of the aristocrats deeply affected pre-imperial social structure and in the long term facilitated the ascendancy of the *shi* stratum. These important developments will be discussed below.

From Noble Birth to Noble Behavior: The Changing Meaning of the Term “*Junzi*”

Hsu Cho-yun stated with regard to the term “*junzi*”: “The word *jun* means ‘lord’ and *zi* ‘son’; thus the compound *junzi* may originally have meant ‘children of lords.’ The scope of this meaning enlarged to include all the persons related to the ruling group by kinship, which makes *junzi* a synonym for ‘noble.’” Hsu then traced the emergence of the moral definition of the

term “*junzi*” and opined: “It is . . . likely that the new [moral] usage of the term had already begun to arise around the time of Confucius.”¹ Scrutiny of the *Zuo* suggests that the change in the meaning of the term “*junzi*” began even earlier, and its seeds can be seen already in the early Chunqiu period.

In Western Zhou texts and bronze inscriptions the term “*junzi*” invariably refers to a person’s ascribed status, designating either a ruler, a member of the nobility, or (rarely) a husband. While many of the *Shi jing* odes laud the physical and spiritual beauty of the superior man, nowhere in that period does the term “*junzi*” seem to pertain specifically to a person’s moral qualities.² This social definition of the term “*junzi*” frequently appears in the *Zuo* speeches as well, for instance, in the following saying of the Jin leader Shi Hui, who praised in 597 the good social order in the state of Chu:

Superior and petty men are distinguished by differences in badge and clothing. Nobles enjoy constant honor, whereas the humble have degrees of authority.³

The phrase “superior and petty men” in Shi Hui’s speech definitely refers to social status without any implications regarding the moral qualities of these persons. *Junzi* remained a status designation in many other *Zuo* speeches, and well into the Zhanguo period.⁴ Yet from the early Chunqiu period many speakers, while referring to *junzi* primarily in terms of pedigree, began to imbue this term with moral overtones. The two following dialogues may exemplify this trend. In 645 Qin defeated the Jin army at Han and imprisoned Lord Hui of Jin. Shortly after the victory, the Jin envoy to the Qin court, Yin Yisheng, had the following conversation with Lord Mu of Qin (r. 659–621):

The lord of Qin asked: “Is the state of Jin harmonious?”

“It is not,” answered [Yisheng]. “Petty men are ashamed of having lost their ruler and they mourn their kin. They fearlessly make military preparations in order to enthrone [Lord Hui’s son] Yu, saying, ‘We must take revenge; it is better to serve the Rong and Di [than Qin].’ Superior men love their ruler, although they are aware of his wrongdoing. They fearlessly make military preparations, in order to await Qin’s orders,”⁵ say-

ing, 'We must repay [Qin's] kindness (*de*); until our death we shall not dare hold duplicity.' Therefore, there is no harmony."

The lord of Qin asked: "What does the state think about its ruler?"

[Yisheng] answered: "The petty men despair, saying that he will not escape. The superior men are charitable; they are sure he will return. The petty men say, 'We have offended Qin, how will Qin allow the lord back?' The superior men say, 'Since we are aware of our wrongdoing, Qin will certainly allow the lord back. To arrest him when he was duplicitous, to release him when he submitted—this is the greatest virtue and the most awe-inspiring punishment. The submissive will cherish virtue, while the duplicitous will be in awe of punishments: through this sole undertaking Qin will become the hegemon. If [Qin] will reestablish him but not stabilize [his status], depose him and give him no position, then [praising Qin's] virtue will turn into resentment—Qin certainly would not follow this course.'"6

A very similar dialogue occurred in 634 between Lord Xiao of Qi (r. 642–633), who had invaded Lu, and the Lu envoy Zhan Xi:

The lord of Qi asked: "Are the people of Lu afraid?"

[Zhan Xi] answered: "Petty men are afraid, but superior men are not."

The lord of Qi asked: "Their houses look like empty hanging satchels; not even grass is left in the fields—what do they rely on if they are not afraid?"

[Zhan] answered: "They rely on the former kings' orders. Formerly, the Duke of Zhou and Duke Tai acted as the limbs of the Zhou house, supporting from both sides King Cheng. King Cheng rewarded them by granting them an alliance which says, 'From generation to generation your descendants will not harm each other.' The text is in the archives; grand scribes are responsible for it."7

Both speakers contrast superior and petty men. While in both cases the definitions unmistakably refer to the person's status, the real difference between the two groups lies elsewhere. The superior men are broad-hearted and open-minded, while petty men are definitely not. Moreover, the superior men better understand the international situation, which is quite likely a result of better historical knowledge and acquaintance with current diplomatic activities. The distinction was twofold: social, but also moral, and probably intellectual as well.

This fusion of social and moral status is not surprising. In the Chun-

qiu period, aristocratic position determined a distinct behavioral pattern. As performing sacrificial rites, including ancestral worship, was the exclusive prerogative of hereditary aristocrats, ritual behavior became a markedly aristocratic feature.⁸ We may further assume that ritual education and education in general remained largely limited to the members of nobility. Therefore, as Hsu Cho-yun asserted, “the *junzi* (in the terms of social status) should also behave according to the moral code befitting his position.”⁹ This explains the frequent emphasis on proper conduct and far-sightedness as a primary characteristic of the *junzi* in the *Zuo*, particularly in the second half of the narrative.¹⁰

The statesmen’s increasing emphasis on the moral qualities of the superior man might have contributed to the gradual reinterpretation of the term “*junzi*.” From the late seventh century the *Zuo* speakers began referring to a person as a superior man not because of his social status, which was after all obvious to the speakers, but because his behavior accorded with the norms appropriate to the *junzi*. In 615, for instance, Xiang Zhong of Lu praised a visiting Qin dignitary who impressed him with unexpectedly refined behavior as a *junzi*; his conduct proved that Qin was not an “uncouth” state. In 582 Fan Wenzi called a Chu prisoner “*junzi*” since the latter demonstrated “benevolence, trustworthiness, loyalty, and cleverness” in a conversation with the lord of Jin. In 543 Ji Wuzi of Lu hailed the court of Jin, which harbored plenty of *junzi*, implying that the Jin leaders really deserved this status. Two years later, Lord Ping of Jin praised the visiting Zheng leader, Zi Chan, as a *junzi* of vast understanding, after the latter impressed him with his knowledge. There are many more examples.¹¹

The speakers cited above knew of course that the subjects of their discussion were persons of the noble rank. By designating them “*junzi*,” the speakers emphasized that pedigree alone is insufficient to become a superior man. Just as not every overlord was a true ruler (see Chapter 5), so not every noble was a true noble, a *junzi*. To acquire this status a noble had to behave accordingly. Otherwise, he could sink to the unpleasant position of a petty man (*xiao ren*). In 542, the nominal head of the government of Zheng, Han Hu, told his deputy, Zi Chan:

I, Hu, am not clever. I heard that the superior man is concerned with knowing the great and the distant, [whereas] the petty man is concerned with knowing the small and the near. I am a petty man (*xiao ren*). The garment that fits my body I know and am careful of, while the great office and the great settlement that protect my body I regard as distant and am slack about.¹²

Han Hu's position was nominally superior to that of Zi Chan; hence, his self-definition as *xiao ren* had nothing to do with his rank but pertained to moral deficiency. Similarly, in 526 Zi Chan mildly reminded his colleagues that, should the visiting Jin leader, Han Xuanzi, display avarice, he would lose his status of a *junzi* and descend to the position of a petty man.¹³ Thus, while a person's status was inborn, a noble could lose it were he to abandon proper behavioral norms.

The danger of losing *junzi* status was not theoretical. Powerful as they were, Chunqiu aristocrats were never entirely secure in their positions, and every aristocratic lineage was under constant threat. Even after several generations of dominating the state apparatus, a lineage could be eradicated by the ruler, by rival lineages, or by its own rebellious retainers.¹⁴ Pedigree alone could not guarantee the nobles' well-being. Chunqiu aristocrats evidently realized that in an age of constant social upheaval one could not rely exclusively on ancestral merits. This understanding may explain, among other things, the shrinking reference to meritorious ancestors in Chunqiu bronze inscriptions, as compared with the Western Zhou antecedents. This apparently reflected the lack of confidence among the new generations of aristocrats that ancestral accomplishments would secure the exalted positions of the heirs.¹⁵

Increasing instances of downward social mobility made many aristocrats realize that maintaining proper behavioral norms was required not just to avoid moral degradation but primarily to preserve their status. All too often the stupid, avaricious, or licentious behavior of a single leading noble could bring disaster on his lineage, ancestral merits notwithstanding. In 532 Shusun Zhaozi of Lu summarized the lessons of the fall of the Gao lineage in Qi as follows:

A son cannot but be careful! Formerly, after the destruction of Qing Feng, Zi Wei received many settlements, but returned part of them to the ruler.¹⁶ The ruler considered him loyal and greatly favored him. When [Zi Wei] was dying, he was treated in the ruler's palace, his coffin was placed on the ruler's chariot, and the ruler personally accompanied him. [However], his [Zi Wei's] son was unable to maintain his position, and therefore it turned out to be this way.¹⁷ Loyalty is the best of virtues, but if the son is unable to maintain his position, punishment will reach him. How can one be careless? He lost [Zi Wei's] merits, abandoned virtue, cut off the sacrifices [to his ancestors], and involved himself in troubles. Is it not really harmful? The *Shi* [*jing*] says: "Why did the troubles not [occur] before me or after me?" This is told in this case!¹⁸

Zi Wei's son, a shortsighted drunkard, was the one who brought about the disaster to his kin because of his imprudent and intemperate behavior. His loss of the moral standing of a *junzi* resulted in the loss of social status as well. Many similar examples proved to Chunqiu nobles that maintaining proper behavior was not a mere adornment of their status, but could have far-reaching consequences for their family fortunes.¹⁹

The lack of security Chunqiu aristocrats had in their positions encouraged them to reconsider the basis of their status. The sheer increase in the number of times the term "*junzi*" is mentioned in late Chunqiu speeches reflects the growing need to redefine elite status in general.²⁰ While we cannot speak of an unequivocal departure from the earlier pedigree-based definition of the term "*junzi*" in the *Zuo*, the overall tendency is clear. Although the nobles continued to inherit the ranks and offices of their forebears, they preferred to claim that their supremacy derived from personal virtue rather than descent. Just as the European term "nobility" gradually came to designate moral qualities and a behavioral code rather than pedigree, so by the late Chunqiu the term "*junzi*" had become primarily a moral category with only loose ties to social status.

This development had unforeseen results. Chunqiu aristocrats emphasized the moral superiority of the true *junzi* and occasionally referred to their fellow nobles as "petty men," but they never intended to open their stratum to newcomers of *shi* origin. Indeed, none of the *Zuo* speakers ever refer to a *shi* as a superior man. However, if "moral man" meant "superior

man," then anyone could become a *junzi*. This redefinition of elite status allowed outstanding members of the *shi* stratum to claim that their moral and intellectual qualities elevated them to equal status with the aristocrats. Confucius and his disciples obviously realized this; their adherence to the purely moral definition of "*junzi*" served their needs. Thus, what began as a minor semantic transformation became an important source of social mobility. Moral qualities became the all-important characteristics of the new elite, while the importance of pedigree steadily declined.

Acquiring the Ruler's Virtues: The Moral Image of the Superior Man

Having ascertained the increasing emphasis on the moral content of the term "*junzi*," we should now ask what kind of behavior was required of a superior man. Which virtues did he have to be endowed with? Heiner Roetz stated in this connection, "Whenever pre-Confucian literature talks about ethical matters, it refers to the established detailed code of conduct, known as *li* . . . There is no real center of ethics beyond the multiplicity of the *li* and 'the virtues' (*de*). Confucius is the first one to seek a '*one*' that 'pervades all' . . . His predecessors, in contrast, select rather unsystematically from the traditional catalogue of virtues. The difference can be understood between a pre-philosophical ethics and, at least in tendency, a philosophical one."²¹

Roetz's observation may serve as a useful departure point for our discussion, even though I believe that the selection of virtues was not entirely "unsystematic." As the following discussion will show, Chunqiu aristocrats sought to adopt primarily those virtues that were characteristic of the ruler's moral image. For instance, as we have seen in Chapter 3, in the early Chunqiu period maintaining ritual norms was a specific prerogative of the ruler, while by the end of this period it became obligatory for superior men in general. A similar pattern occurred in regard to other attributes of the ruler's behavior. This may be a cause of the "decidedly aristocratic" nature of Chunqiu ethics, mentioned by Roetz elsewhere.

William Savage insightfully noticed that the Confucian concept of "*junzi*" was based primarily on emulating the archetype of the ruler's

behavior.²² Emulating meritorious ancestors and one's superiors was indeed recommended as proper behavior, at least since the Western Zhou. Yet it seems that the Chunqiu aristocrats' willingness to emulate their rulers might have sprung in no small measure from their increasing self-confidence, which reflected their growing power. As discussed in the previous chapter, the position of many Chunqiu dignitaries resembled that of the rulers, and their high status evidently influenced their self-image. To illustrate this ruler mind-set of the Chunqiu aristocrats, I want to compare the bronze inscriptions by two late-Western Zhou ministers with those made by two of their late-Chunqiu colleagues. I tried to choose structurally similar inscriptions that contain the donors' self-praise; and the comparison indeed suggests a fascinating change in the elite's self-image that occurred from the Western Zhou to the Chunqiu period.

First, let us look at the Western Zhou ministers. In the mid-ninth century a head of the Wei 微 lineage who held the hereditary position of scribe in the Zhou capital ordered the following inscription on what is currently known as *Xing-zhong*.²³

I, Xing, proclaim: "My great and manifest high ancestor, my subordinate ancestor and my accomplished deceased father, being able to make their minds evermore resplendent and to be righteous in their management of affairs, displayed their awe-inspiring propriety, which they used to protect the former kings.

I, Xing, would not dare not to follow [the model of] my ancestors; holding fast to their resplendent virtue, careful and ceaselessly active from morning to night, I assist the superintendent official.

The august king, facing me, Xing, extended his encouragement to me; he presented me with a jade belt. I dare to make for [my ancestors,] the accomplished men, a great treasure: this harmonizing, harmonically tuned set of chime bells.

May they be used in striving to practice filial piety, in presenting sacrifice to those who splendidly arrive, [in order to] make the Great Spirits rejoice. The Great Spirits ascend and descend; [looking on] sternly, [they dispense] favor and help. May they let me [enjoy] at ease [evermore] ample and manifold good fortune. May they richly and abundantly bestow on me unadulterated happiness, a powerful official rank and eternal life-mandate, long life, and a good end.

May I, Xing, live for ten thousand years, forever treasuring [these bells], daily striking them.²⁴

A short time after the Xing-*zhong* inscription was cast, Shuxiang Fu Yu made a caldron to commemorate his successful expedition against the Huai Yi tribes. The initial part of the inscription on the Yu-*ding* says:

Yu said: "Illustrious and great august ancestor Lord Mu was capable of standing beside and assisting the earlier kings and settling the four quarters. And so Lord Wu has also not distanced and forgotten my sagely grandfather and deceased father You Dashu and Yi Shu, commanding [me,] Yu, to continue my grandfather and deceased father's governance at Jing state. And so Yu also does not dare to be disordered and myopic in supporting my ruler's command."²⁵

Another inscription by the same person on the Shuxiang Fu Yu-*gui* says:

Shuxiang Fu Yu says: "I, the small child, am an heir of my august deceased father. I continue to follow the model of the former accomplished ancestors, I am reverent to the resplendent virtue, hold fast to awe-inspiring propriety. Respectfully following [my ancestors' achievements,] I protect my state and my family. For my august deceased grandfather You Dashu, I made this sacrificial *gui* vessel.

Sternly he [looks from] above. He will bestow plenty of good fortune and affluent blessings. He will prolong my life and make me [enjoy] the eternal mandate.

Let me live for ten thousand years and forever treasure and use [this vessel]."²⁶

Both donors emphasized reliance on their ancestors' merit as well as a reverent attitude towards superiors. Both adhered to their ancestral model, which assumed loyalty to the Zhou. Prevalent in their inscriptions is a strong sense of veneration and deference.

The picture differs greatly in late Chunqiu inscriptions. Let us look, for instance, at the Wangzi Wu-*ding* inscription made by the Chu *lingyin* Zi Geng:

It was the first month, first quarter, *dinghai*, that the king's son Wu selected his auspicious metal and on his own initiative made [these] sacrificial *liding*. I will use them to make sacrificial offerings and thereby

show filial devotion to my august ancestors and refined deceased father, and will use them to pray for longevity.

Being mild and respectful and at ease and composed, cautiously standing in awe, I respect their [the ancestors'] bright sacrifices and eternally receive their blessings. I will not be in fear and not err. I am kind-hearted in my political virtue and careful at awe-inspiring propriety. So magnanimous and so composed, I, the *lingyin* Zi Geng, am one whom the people cherish. For ten thousand years without end, sons and grandsons will be benefited by this.²⁷

Zi Geng's inscription mentions the ancestors, but significantly omits the ruler, his nephew King Kang (r. 559–545). The last part of the inscription contains unrestrained self-glorification appropriate to one who might conceive himself as the sole leader of his state. Indeed, readers of the inscription might assume that Zi Geng, "one whom the people cherish," was the ruler of Chu, rather than a mere minister. In Zi Geng's case this assertion is understandable; after all, he was the most powerful executive in his state. This unrestrained self-glorification is not unique to Zi Geng, however, but occurs in other contemporary inscriptions as well. We may compare Zi Geng's inscription with that of his probable relative, Wangsun Yizhe. The Wangsun Yizhe-*zhong* inscription runs as follows:

It was the first month, first quarter, *dinghai*, that the king's grandson Yizhe selected his auspicious metal and on his own initiative made this harmonizing bell. [Its tone] is both sonorous and resounding, and [its] fine sound is very grand. [I] will use it to make sacrificial offerings and thereby show filial devotion to our august ancestors and refined deceased father, and will use it to pray for longevity.

I am mild and respectful, and am at ease and composed; cautiously standing in awe, I am reverent, wise, sagacious and martial. I am kind-hearted in my political virtue and careful at awe-inspiring propriety. My strategies and plans are greatly prudent.

Loud and strong is this harmonizing bell. [I] will use it in feasting to rejoice and to please honored guests, elders and elder brothers, together with our associates and friends. I make responsible my heart and make far-reaching and constant my virtue. I harmonize and settle the people. I am omnipresent in the state.

Brilliantly and extensively, for ten thousand years without end, for

ten thousand generations [may] my sons and grandsons eternally safeguard and strike [this bell].²⁸

The precise identity of Wangsun Yizhe is unknown; scholars initially considered him a royal grandson from the tiny state of Xu; recently it has been asserted that he was a late-sixth-century Chu personality.²⁹ Certainly he did not enjoy an exalted position comparable to that of a *lingyin*, but the tone of his inscription is even more exalted than that of Zi Geng. Kind-heartedness and propriety, virtue and martial spirit, wisdom and far-reaching plans—all these are the attributes of the ruler. Significantly, similar to Zi Geng, Wangsun Yizhe failed to mention his superiors. Although other inscriptions of the Chunqiu period are usually more modest, they nonetheless differ from their Western Zhou predecessors in the degree of self-aggrandizement. They testify to the ruler mind-set of the late Chunqiu aristocrats.³⁰

The self-confident aristocrats thus felt themselves rulers rather than subjects; this might have been their true impetus to emulate the rulers' conduct. Consequently, Chunqiu aristocrats developed what Roetz has called a catalogue of virtues, patterned on the ruler's image. Which virtues were considered to belong to the ruler? The Western Zhou rulers had to manifest their *de* and abide by the norms of ritual propriety. In the Chunqiu, certain elements of virtue (*de*) became more pronounced. In 646 Qing Zheng of Jin reprimanded Lord Hui, who refused to send relief to his starving Qin neighbors:

To ignore [former] favor will leave you without relatives; to benefit from others' disaster is not benevolent (*bu ren*); to be greedy is not auspicious; to anger the neighbors is unrighteous/improper (*bu yi*). When all four virtues are lost, how can the state be protected?³¹

Ten years later Fu Chen explained the norms of virtue to King Xiang of Zhou:

The greatest virtue is rewarding the meritorious, being intimate with relatives, being attached to those who are near and upholding the worthy. The greatest evil is to be attached to the deaf, to follow the ignorant, to advance the stubborn, and to make use of the stupid and wicked. To abandon virtue and uphold evil is the greatest misfortune.³²

In 630 Lord Wen of Jin refused to attack his former ally, Qin, saying:

To use a person's force and then betray him is not benevolent (*bu ren*); to lose one's ally is unwise (*bu zhi*); to substitute proper order by calamity is unmartial (*bu wu*).³³

Although the three quoted sets of the ruler's virtues are not identical, they have several common features, which are reflected in other early *Zuo* speeches. First, the ruler was assumed to behave benevolently (*ren*), as Qing Zheng and Lord Wen stated. Fu Chen's demand "to be intimate with relatives" is also akin to benevolence. Other speakers likewise mentioned benevolence among a ruler's major attributes.³⁴ Second, the ruler was expected to embrace propriety/righteousness (*yi*), which was closely related to ritual propriety. In addition to Qing Zheng's speech, propriety is mentioned as the ruler's virtue by several other early Chunqiu speakers.³⁵ Furthermore, the ruler had to be intelligent enough to adopt a proper political course and to be able to select worthy advisors, namely to be farsighted and wise (*zhi*).³⁶ Finally, the "martial spirit" (*wu*), mentioned by Lord Wen, was clearly an important feature in an age of incessant warfare.³⁷ These qualities, unsurprisingly, resemble the famous trinity of benevolence, wisdom, and courage frequently mentioned in early Confucian texts.³⁸ Indeed, as we shall see, Chunqiu thinkers gradually adapted the virtues of the ruler, enumerated above, as attributes of the superior man.

The initial attempts to designate a set of normative virtues for the superior man may be traced to the late seventh century. In 621 Yu Pian, the servant of the head of the Jin government Zhao Dun, was ordered to escort the family of his enemy, Jia Ji, into exile. Yu Pian's followers suggested to him to seize this opportunity and to murder Jia Ji's family, thereby avenging previous grievances. Yu Pian rejected their offer:

Unacceptable. I heard that *The Former Documents* (*Qian zhi*) states: "Kindness and resentment toward the other do not reach his descendants." This is the Way of loyalty (*zhong*). The master [i.e., Zhao Dun] acted toward Jia Ji according to ritual; if I use [Zhao Dun's] favorable attitude to me in order to requite private resentment—how will it be acceptable? To hide behind others' favorable attitude is not courageous (*yong*); to eradicate resentment by adding enmity is not wise (*zhi*);³⁹ to

hurt public [affairs] for the sake of personal ones is not loyal (*zhong*).
How can I serve my master by abandoning these three?⁴⁰

A slightly different set of virtues was mentioned in 614, when the Jin ministers discussed which of the two fugitives—Shi Hui (Fan Wuzi) or Jia Ji—should be summoned back to Jin. Xi Que preferred Shi Hui:

Jia Ji is rebellious, and his crime is great. Sui Hui [Shi Hui] is better. He can withstand humiliation, and has a sense of shame (*chi*); [he is] mild and not villainous. He is sufficiently wise (*zhi*) to be made use of.⁴¹

In 582 Lord Jing of Jin (r. 599–581) interrogated a Chu prisoner, court musician Zhong Yi. Zhong Yi demonstrated his knowledge of his ancestral occupation, played native southern melodies, expressed his admiration of the Chu ruler, King Gong (r. 590–560), and politely flattered Lord Jing. The Jin dignitary Fan Wenzhi, who learned of Zhong Yi's behavior, expressed his admiration:

The Chu prisoner is a superior man (*junzi*). In his words he named his ancestral occupation: he does not neglect his roots. In his music he played the airs of his homeland: he does not forget the past. When asked about the king, he mentioned his being the heir apparent: he is not selfish.⁴² He referred to two high ministers by their names: he respects you.⁴³ Not neglecting one's origins is benevolence (*ren*); not forgetting the past is trustworthiness (*xin*); unselfishness is loyalty (*zhong*); to respect you is cleverness (*min*). If he undertakes affairs with benevolence, keeps to them with trustworthiness, completes them with loyalty, and executes them cleverly, he will certainly succeed, no matter how great the affair.⁴⁴

In 574 Lord Li of Jin (r. 580–574) intended to exterminate the powerful Xi lineage. The Xi brothers discussed whether or not to rebel. Xi Zhi opposed rebellion:

A man obtains his position thanks to trustworthiness (*xin*), wisdom (*zhi*), and courage (*yong*). Trustworthiness is not to rebel against the ruler, wisdom is not to harm the people, courage is not to make calamity. If we lose these three, who will support us?⁴⁵

All four speeches have much in common. Their structure indicates that the speakers had in mind the catalogue of virtues mentioned by Roetz,

which served as criteria for proper conduct. The speakers appear to have selected certain terms from their catalogue of virtues and superimposed them on whatever worthy behavior was under discussion. The result could be somewhat clumsy. Why is it that “not neglecting one’s roots is benevolence?” Why is it that “wisdom is not to harm the people?” Might the speakers have felt that merely mentioning the proper virtues would strengthen their arguments? The structural similarity of the speeches encourages me to assume so.

What virtues were considered normative? All the speakers regarded wisdom (*zhi*; or cleverness, “*min*,” in Fan Wenzi’s version) as one of the major features of the superior man. Courage was mentioned twice as a counterpart to the ruler’s martial spirit. The most important features, however, were those connected with the minister’s ethics: trustworthiness and loyalty (or the ability to withstand humiliation, in Shi Hui’s case). Significantly, benevolence was mentioned only once. The reasons for this will be discussed below; here suffice it to say that benevolence and kindness originally were attributes of the ruler’s *de*; hence, mid-Chunqiu aristocrats might have hesitated to attribute this quality to themselves. The picture of an aristocrat’s set of virtues, therefore, is a combination of ministerial virtues, such as submissiveness and loyalty, and the ruler’s virtues, such as wisdom and courage.

By the late Chunqiu, one important change in the set of virtues occurred: the ministerial virtues of trustworthiness and loyalty were replaced by the ruler’s virtue of benevolence. This change is demonstrable in several speeches. In 522 the cunning Chu minister Fei Wuji persuaded King Ping (r. 528–516) to arrest Fei’s rival, Wu She, and then to summon She’s sons Shang and Yun to the capital, promising them to spare their father’s life. Shang knew that the promise was false, but decided to go; before proceeding to certain death, he told his younger brother Yun (the famous Wu Zixu):

Flee to Wu; I will return to die. My wisdom cannot compare with yours; [hence], I am able to die, while you are able to take revenge. When you hear the order that your father might be spared, it is impossible not to rush [to fulfill it]; when close relatives are executed, it is impossible not to take revenge. To rush toward death to let a father be spared is filial

piety (*xiao*); to estimate [the possibility of] success and then to act is benevolence (*ren*); to choose the mission and then to proceed is wisdom (*zhi*); to be aware of death and yet not [try] to escape is courage (*yong*). Father cannot be abandoned; a good reputation cannot be destroyed.⁴⁶

Exactly the same set of virtues—namely, filial piety, benevolence, wisdom, and courage—was mentioned in another late Chunqiu speech. In 506 Wu Zixu led the army of Wu to invade Chu. The Chu army was badly defeated and King Zhao (r. 515–489) fled from the capital. He found shelter in Yun—the administrative district under Chu’s jurisdiction in present-day Hubei. Yun was ruled by Dou Xin, whose father, Chengran, was executed in 528 by King Zhao’s father, King Ping. Xin’s younger brother, Dou Huai, suggested seizing the opportunity for revenge, saying:

“King Ping killed our father, now I will kill his son—is it not acceptable?”

Xin answered: “The ruler punished the minister—who dares to consider him an enemy? A ruler’s command is like [that of] Heaven. To die at Heaven’s command—who is then considered an enemy? The *Shi* [*jing*] says: ‘He does not gobble up the soft, he does not spit out the hard; he does not abuse the lonely and the widowed, does not fear the strong and the mighty.’⁴⁷ Only the benevolent (*ren*) can behave in this manner. To avoid the strong and oppress the weak is not courageous (*yong*). To take advantage of a man’s dire straits is not benevolent. To destroy the lineage and cut off sacrifices is not filial (*xiao*).⁴⁸ To act without gaining a good reputation is not wise (*zhi*). If you transgress these [norms] I shall kill you!”⁴⁹

The similarity between both speeches is indicative of a shift in the ethical views of Chunqiu aristocrats. Both speeches are better organized than those quoted earlier, and leave no impression of the random selection of virtues that was characteristic of early-sixth-century speeches. The structural similarity between these speeches may not be coincidental, as it is quite possible that they derive from the Chu lore of oral anecdotes, and that they were edited by the Chu scribes. This should not discourage us from discussing these speeches: insofar as they were created by the late Chunqiu scribes they still reflect late Chunqiu ethical thought.⁵⁰ Indeed, they differ from the mid-Chunqiu speeches cited above not only by their better organization, but also by their content. The ministerial virtues of

trustworthiness and loyalty evidently disappeared from the gentleman's set of norms and were replaced by the ruler's virtue of benevolence. That loyalty was not mentioned when considering the proper course of action toward the ruler is revealing. Humility was a low priority for late Chunqiu nobles!

There are other indications that in the late Chunqiu period benevolence, wisdom, and courage became a standard set of norms.⁵¹ This trinity is closely related to the trio of "benevolence-wisdom-martial spirit" mentioned above by Lord Wen as the ruler's attributes. The resemblance between both sets of virtues further strengthens Savage's observation that emulating the ruler's archetype was the major method of creating the gentleman's self-image. The superior man should behave like the ruler. But was it possible for a subject to merely emulate the ruler while disregarding the difference in their status? The following discussion will show that acquiring the ruler's self-image was a complicated process that required reevaluation of certain moral categories, attributes of the ruler that were inapplicable to a broader segment of the population.

Popularization of Virtue: The Changing Use of the Term "*De*"

The discussion above indicated that the new self-image of the Chunqiu nobility was shaped through appropriating the ruler's values. In the following sections we shall trace how particular items from the ruler's "catalogue of virtues" were adapted to the nobility. This analysis will begin with the most important of the ruler's attributes, *de*.

"*De*" is perhaps the most multifaceted and disputed term of ancient Chinese political, ethical, and religious discourse. It originally referred to the ruler's charisma or *mana*, the possessor of which was worthy of Heaven's decree and divine support in general.⁵² This initial meaning made *de* strongly associated with the ruler, and some scholars have even suggested that in the Western Zhou period, *de* was the exclusive attribute of the supreme sovereign.⁵³ This view is not entirely accurate, since both in the *Shi jing* and in the bronze inscriptions, "*de*" occasionally refers to min-

isters.⁵⁴ A more convincing analysis was suggested by Kominami Ichirō, who asserted that “*de*” was equivalent to “*ming*” (decree, order, command): initially Heaven conferred *de* on the ruler, who then conferred it on his ministers, and they transmitted *de* to their descendants. The ministers, therefore, were primarily passive recipients of *de* and not active possessors. It was the ruler’s obligation to improve and clarify his charismatic *de*; shallow *de* could endanger his position and eventually lead to the loss of Heaven’s decree.⁵⁵

Although “*de*” originated as a religious category, it soon acquired new semantic dimensions, such as “power” and “potency.” By the late Western Zhou period “*de*” became associated primarily with kindness or grace, referring to the mild treatment of the subjects by the sovereign. Concomitantly, “*de*” acquired ethical facets as well, since the possessor of *de* was expected to behave in accord with moral norms appropriate to his position, particularly refraining from extensive drinking and licentious conduct. All three major dimensions of “*de*” coexist in Western Zhou texts and thereafter, allowing for the unique semantic inclusiveness of this term.⁵⁶ Nonetheless, the extant evidence suggests that in the Western Zhou “*de*” remained primarily a religious and political term, while its ethical aspects remained less pronounced. It was apparently in the Chunqiu period that the ethical dimension of “*de*” became much more manifest than earlier. This process was connected with what I call the downward dissemination of “*de*” from being primarily a ruler’s attribute toward becoming characteristic of all “superior men.”

Kominami’s above-mentioned suggestion that the ruler conferred *de* on his subordinates may well reflect the Western Zhou situation, but in the Chunqiu period it began to change. Chunqiu ministers appear as active possessors of *de*, which gradually became an inalienable feature of a high dignitary. Originally, active possession of *de* might have been limited to extraordinarily powerful executives, such as the great Qi statesman Guan Zhong (d. 645), who is the first Chunqiu minister whose *de* is mentioned in the *Zuo*. In 648, after defeating the Rong tribes, Guan Zhong was hailed by King Xiang of Zhou:

Uncle! I admire your achievements and respond to your marvelous *de*: it is completely unforgettable.⁵⁷

Guan Zhong, the most powerful of the early Chunqiu ministers, acted as the *de facto* protector of the royal house, for which reasons the king admired his “marvelous virtue.” “*De*” in the above utterance definitely refers to Guan Zhong’s political potency, to his rulerlike charisma, and not necessarily to his moral qualities. In this case, although applied to the minister, the term “*de*” remains semantically close to its original meaning of “charisma.” This, however, is not the case with later usages of this term in ministerial context. No Chunqiu minister could match Guan Zhong’s power, and the *de* they claimed to possess little resembled the ruler’s potency. Thus, while since the mid-Chunqiu period, possessing *de* was routinely required of the ministers, as it was formerly required of the rulers,⁵⁸ the content of this term began to change. This new content is evident for instance from the speech by Xu Chen of Jin, who in 628 urged Lord Wen to appoint the virtuous Xi Que to the position of minister:

Reverence is the accumulation of virtues (*de*). He who can be reverent certainly possesses *de*. *De* is [necessary] to rule the people. Please, make use of [Xi]!⁵⁹

The *de* of Xi Que had nothing to do with rulerlike charismatic power, but on the contrary was based on the purely ministerial virtue of reverence (*jing*). In the Western Zhou, “*de*” was used in conjunction with reverence, but this was reverence toward Heaven and deities, not toward men.⁶⁰ The reverence that Xu Chen considered “the accumulation of virtues” referred to the minister’s reverence toward his superiors, which, as we saw in the previous chapter, implied obedience to the ruler’s orders. Thus interpreted, “*de*” lost its uniqueness as an exclusive characteristic of the ruler and the highest dignitaries, and became a ministerial way of conduct.

In the late Chunqiu period “*de*” became characteristic of superior men as a whole. The frequency of its usage in identifiable nonruler contexts increases more than twofold in the last century of the *Zuo* narrative as compared to the preceding century and a half.⁶¹ While in some of these cases “*de*” refers to the charismatic power of the leading ministers, usually its

meaning was further diversified, as the following discussion exemplifies.⁶² In 546, Zhao Wenzi of Jin explained to the visiting *lingyin* Zi Mu of Chu the virtue of the late Jin leader, Shi Hui:

The family affairs of the master were well managed; in his service for the state of Jin he was open-hearted; his scribes and invocators delivered true words to the spirits and deities and had nothing to be ashamed of.⁶³

Shi Hui's *de* cannot be summarized either as the ruler's charisma or as ministerial reverence. It referred to his successful management of the affairs of his lineage, and meritorious service to his rulers, to his proper communication with the deities, and to his moral conduct, which explains why his scribes and invocators "had nothing to be ashamed of." In this short passage Zhao Wenzi succeeded in combining political, religious, and moral aspects of "*de*," turning this term into a generic term for all kinds of proper behavior, virtue rather than *virtus*.⁶⁴ On other occasions, "*de*" remained more closely related to purely ministerial norms of conduct. In 540, Shu Xiang of Jin praised the polite and submissive behavior of the Lu envoy Shu Gong:

Zi Shuzi (Shu Gong) [really] knows ritual! I have heard, "Loyalty and trustworthiness are instruments of ritual; submissiveness and yielding are masters of ritual."⁶⁵ In declining [excessive treatment by his host] he did not forget his state—these are loyalty and trustworthiness; he advanced the [interests of the] state and lowered himself—these are submissiveness and yielding. The *Shi* [*jing*] says: "Be careful and reverent in ceremonial demeanor, thus you shall keep close to *de*." The master (Shu Gong) is [already] close to *de*!⁶⁶

Shu Gong was "close to *de*" because he conducted himself like a subject: he was trustworthy, loyal, submissive, and yielding. In the early Chunqiu, these qualities were not part of the term "*de*," but in the late Chunqiu discourse identifying ministerial qualities as "*de*" became quite common. Thus in 532, Yan Ying defined yielding as "the master of *de*," and in the same year Shusun Zhaozi claimed that "loyalty is the best of *de*."⁶⁷

The appropriation of "*de*" by "superior men" brought about further expansion of its semantic field. As well as a manifestation of moral conduct,

in the latter part of the *Zuo* the term “*de*” is also used to depict a morally neutral virtue or quality, as evident from the discussions of the *de* of “barbarians.”⁶⁸ As the meaning of “*de*” became more vague it could be applied to a broader segment of the population, including even personal retainers, members of the *shi* stratum.⁶⁹ We may speak, therefore, of a continuous popularization, or downward dissemination, of the term “*de*.” The semantic inclusiveness of “*de*” and its broad applicability ensured the unique position of this term in future Zhanguo and imperial discourse.

The transformation of the term “*de*” reflects the overall pattern of Chunqiu ethical development in which aristocrats, searching for a new self-image, appropriated attributes of the ruler’s behavior. In this process, these attributes were reconceptualized in accordance with their new usage and extended to a larger portion of the population. In the following sections we shall trace similar patterns of change in other ethical categories.

The Increasing Impact of “*Ren*” (Benevolence)

“*Ren*” is the pivotal ethical category in the *Lunyu* and in Chinese ethical thought in general. Its origins, however, are unclear. The paucity of occurrences of the term “*ren*” in Western Zhou sources has encouraged scholars to suggest numerous, sometimes quite misleading assumptions as to its pre-Confucian meaning.⁷⁰ Scrutiny of the *Zuo* speeches suggests that “*ren*” was introduced into ethical discourse in the mid-Chunqiu and grew in importance well before Confucius’ time. Confucius apparently inherited and reinforced existing tendencies to elevate *ren* into the most significant of the virtues.

Ren is mentioned only three times in pre-*Zuo* sources: twice in the *Shi jing* and once in the “Jin teng” chapter of the *Shu jing*.⁷¹ These appearances are too few and too enigmatic to provide a definitive answer on the initial meaning of this term. Among the various conjectures about the early meaning of “*ren*,” the most plausible is that this term was initially synonymous with the political dimension of “*de*” (i.e., kindness, grace, or benevolence).⁷² Similar to *de*, *ren* had a downward orientation, the ruler’s kindness for his subjects.⁷³ This meaning prevailed during the early to mid-

dle Chunqiu period. In the first half of the sixth century B.C.E., however, aristocrats began appropriating *ren*. Unlike the case of “*de*,” this appropriation did not result in a major transformation in the meaning of “*ren*,” except that in the late Chunqiu period, “*ren*” was no longer confined to kindness toward inferiors but could be applied in relations among equals.

In the early *Zuo* speeches “*ren*” is basically coterminous with “*de*.” In 717 Prince Wufu of Chen urged his ruler to be “benevolent with relatives”; that is, to establish peace with the state of Zheng, the rulers of which were affinal relatives of the Chen lords. In the mid-seventh century, Prince Mu of Song was praised for his benevolence, which he later manifested by his firm opposition to the expansionist policy of his half-brother, Lord Xiang (r. 650–637). In 646 Qing Zheng warned Lord Hui of Jin: “to benefit from others’ disaster is not benevolent”; in 630 Lord Wen of Jin stated: “to use another person’s strength and then betray him is not benevolent.”⁷⁴ In all these instances “*ren*” refers to a mild, noncoercive policy that was, as discussed earlier, the political manifestation of “*de*”; moreover, in all the speeches “*ren*” is interchangeable with “*de*,” which further suggests that both terms were basically synonymous.⁷⁵

In the above instances “*ren*” referred exclusively to the behavior of the ruler, or, alternatively, of the heir apparent. Since the mid-Chunqiu, however, *ren* along with *de* became attributes of aristocrats. Concomitantly, the frequency of its invocation in discussions on the desirable behavior of the elite increased. This increase, however, was accompanied by a strange vagueness in the meaning of “*ren*.” While previously “*ren*” referred invariably to benevolence, in early to mid-sixth century discourse its precise meaning is broader and harder to define. One speaker refers to *ren* as an antonym of toughness and stubbornness; another considers it as an antonym of licentious behavior (*yin*); another says simply that “not neglecting one’s origins is *ren*”; while yet another considers *ren* as a kind of an all-encompassing virtue that combines “*de*,” “*zheng*” (correctness), and “*zhi*” (uprightness).⁷⁶ These and other speakers definitely regarded *ren* as one of the important virtues; yet its use remained imprecise, and the above definitions are not consistent. One explanation of this phenomenon is that the increasing usage of “*ren*” imbued it with additional meanings. This as-

sertion, however, cannot be supported by later Chunqiu speeches, in which “*ren*” clearly refers to benevolence. I prefer an alternative explanation for the diffuse meaning of “*ren*” in early-sixth-century discourse. “*Ren*” was a relatively new and fashionable term. Arguably, the speakers were eager to invoke it even if they were uncertain about its precise meaning.⁷⁷ This sense of uncertainty, however, disappeared—or at least decreased—in the late Chunqiu years.

In the late *Zuo* speeches, starting with the second half of the sixth century B.C.E., the use of “*ren*” increased while its semantic ambiguity disappeared. In almost all these speeches, “*ren*” refers to benevolence, humaneness, and goodness, just as it did in early Chunqiu discourse; the only change is that it acquired a new dimension of kindness and compassion among persons of equal status, and was no longer confined to the ruler’s grace.⁷⁸ As its definition became clearer, “*ren*” became an indispensable—in fact the most significant—component of the set of values that defined the superior man’s image. Earlier I quoted two speeches by Wu Shang and Dou Xin, both of whom emphasized *ren* as one of the most important virtues of the superior man.⁷⁹ Other speeches likewise indicate that “*ren*” acquired extraordinary prominence in the late Chunqiu. In 501 Yang Hu, whose attempts to become the Lu dictator failed, fled to Qi and proposed to Lord Jing a plan for conquering Lu. The leading Qi noble, Bao Wenzi, feared that if this plan were to be adopted, Yang Hu’s position at the Qi court would overshadow that of the hereditary nobles. Therefore, he dismissed Yang Hu’s proposition as not feasible, and then attacked Yang personally:

Yang Hu was a favorite of the Ji lineage, but he plotted to murder [the head of the lineage] Jisun [Ji Huanzi], to damage the state of Lu and take possession of it. He is intimate with the rich and not with the benevolent: how can you use him? You are richer than the Ji lineage, and [Qi] is larger than Lu, therefore Yang Hu wants to upend it. Lu escaped from this malady, but you accept it—is it not harmful?⁸⁰

Bao Wenzi considered “being intimate with the rich and not with the benevolent” the strongest accusation against Yang Hu. This remark apparently indicates a growing gap between wealth and the image of moral-

ity in the late Chunqiu period.⁸¹ Moreover, Bao Wenzi emphasized *ren* as the ultimate equivalent of morality and goodness. Thus, *ren* was no longer one of the virtues, but *the* virtue, the most important characteristic of the superior man. That *ren* became the pivotal virtue is illustrated by a remark of Zi Gao, Lord of She in Chu. In 479 he was told that the royal grandson Sheng was trustworthy and courageous (*yong*). Zi Gao reacted:

To be attached to benevolence (*ren*) is called trustworthiness; to act according to propriety / righteousness (*yi*) is called courage. I heard that Sheng likes to stand by his words, and looks for *shi* [prepared] to die [for him]—it seems that he has private [plans]. To stand by one's words is not trustworthiness; to be predestined to die is not courage.⁸²

Benevolence here is a standard by which to measure other virtues; trustworthiness is no longer regarded as an important virtue in itself, unless substantiated by benevolence. This further exemplifies the increasing importance of *ren*.

The case of *ren* may be considered, along with *de*, the most successful appropriation of the ruler's virtue by the aristocrats. Despite the confusion of the early sixth century, *ren* had been finally adopted without redefining its meaning or reevaluating its position. Moreover, even before Confucius turned "*ren*" into "one that pervades all" this virtue had already acquired preeminence among other moral values.

The Rise, Fall, and Revival of "*Xiao*" (Filial Piety)

The fate of the term "*xiao*" in the Chunqiu period remains a mystery. In the late Western Zhou period "*xiao*" was second only to "*de*" in the frequency of its occurrences, both in the written texts and the bronze inscriptions. Later, in the Zhanguo period, "*xiao*" became one of the pivotal terms of political and ethical discourse. In the intermediate Chunqiu period, however, our sources suggest that "*xiao*" was all but forgotten; apparently it played only a marginal role in Chunqiu thought.

The strange disappearance of "*xiao*" from the Chunqiu bronze inscriptions was first mentioned by Li Yumin. He noticed that whereas in the last century of the Western Zhou "*xiao*" is mentioned in almost sixty

inscriptions, in the 250 years of the Chunqiu period the frequency falls to only eighteen appearances.⁸³ A similar phenomenon is observable in contemporary texts. “*Xiao*” appears seventeen times in the late Western Zhou odes of the *Shi jing* but never in the “*Guo feng*” poems, which were mostly compiled in the Chunqiu period. Similarly, “*xiao*” appears in the *Zuo* speeches only sixteen times, less than any other ethical or political term.⁸⁴ Finally, the decrease in the importance of “*xiao*” may be seen from the changing frequency of its use as the ruler’s posthumous title. In the 225 years from 700 to 476, only two Chunqiu rulers received the posthumous title “*xiao*,” as compared to five rulers in 925–701, and five rulers in 475–245.⁸⁵ Although the nature of our sources requires extreme caution whenever statistical analysis is undertaken, we may nevertheless assume that “*xiao*” played a relatively insignificant role in the Chunqiu, in contrast with both the preceding Western Zhou and ensuing Zhanguo periods. Moreover, as suggested below, the meaning of “*xiao*” in late Chunqiu–Zhanguo discourse differs radically from its meaning in the Western Zhou period. Can we therefore speak of the decline and the subsequent revival of “*xiao*”? Is there a continuity between Western Zhou and late-Chunqiu–Zhanguo use of “*xiao*” or should we rather talk of two different terms designated by the same character? To answer these questions, we must first clarify the initial meaning of the term “*xiao*” and its changing social and political functions.

THE MEANING AND FUNCTION OF “XIAO” IN THE WESTERN ZHOU

Scholars often tend to impose the later Confucian definition of “*xiao*” on the earliest occurrences of this term.⁸⁶ Nonetheless, careful scrutiny of Western Zhou sources suggests that “*xiao*” was primarily confined to ancestral worship and lacked the frequently assumed meaning of “nurturing the parents” (*yang fumu*).

The term “*xiao*” is not documented in the Shang period.⁸⁷ It became, however, the prominent term in Western Zhou discourse. What was its meaning? Zha Changguo’s study convincingly demonstrated that in none of the Western Zhou texts and bronze inscriptions did “*xiao*” refer to nur-

turing the living parents; it solely referred to deceased forefathers.⁸⁸ The *argumentum ex silentio* based on bronze inscriptions may be misleading because these inscriptions by definition refer to deceased ancestors. However, linguistic analysis corroborates Zha Changguo's assertion. "Xiao" in Western Zhou texts and bronze inscriptions is closely related to, and even interchangeable with "kao"—a term that referred to the deceased father or, according to Michael Carr, "[performing ceremonies] to [the] deceased father."⁸⁹ Moreover, Keith Knapp observes that in Western Zhou texts "xiao" is used mostly as a verb, and its meaning accordingly is "to present the offerings"; it is often accompanied by the synonymous "xiang." Nowhere does "xiao" appear as a noun that may be defined as "filial piety."⁹⁰ This usage strongly suggests that "xiao" had a primarily religious-ritualistic meaning. This observation, however, should not prevent us from noticing that the religious functions of *xiao* imbued it with important social and political functions, which later allowed an ethical interpretation as well.

In the Western Zhou period, the major function of *xiao*—or broadly speaking, ancestral worship—was to consolidate the high-ordered lineage (*zong*).⁹¹ Aside from the members of the senior branch, participants in the sacrificial ceremony included members of collateral branches, retainers of the head of the lineage, and sometimes even members of affinal lineages.⁹² This broad participation in the sacrificial ceremony and the ensuing banquet was the major means of ensuring lineage unity. The religious communality among lineage members played a crucial role in the lineage's perpetuity; even when different branches became independent economic units, their members continued to perform common sacrifices to the ancestors.⁹³ The lineage, which possessed political, economic, and military power, sanctioned by religious ritual, was the major source of personal security. Thus, in the late Western Zhou age of turmoil we see a rapid increase in the occurrences of "xiao" in the bronze inscriptions, while contemporary odes of the *Shi jing* frequently appeal to lineage unity in the face of external adversaries.⁹⁴

Enhancing lineage unity was not the sole contribution of *xiao* to social stability. Similarly important was the function of *xiao* in preserving social hierarchy, specifically bolstering the position of the head of the line-

age, who held sole responsibility for performing sacrifices to the ancestors, and was the only person who could ensure ancestral blessing. The sacrificial privilege ensured his exalted position as well as that of his branch (*da zong*) over the minor branches (*xiao zong*). This had far-reaching political consequences. Most of the Western Zhou and early Chunqiu states were basically family states, with leading positions being held exclusively by the members of the ruling lineage.⁹⁵ Ministers usually headed minor branches of the ruling lineage, and owed the overlord the allegiance due to the head of the lineage. *Xiao*, performed by the rulers, symbolized their supreme authority.

The appeal to common ancestors, furthermore, bolstered the shaky authority of the Zhou kings. The king headed the Ji clan, which ruled more than half of the Western Zhou polities. Accordingly, he enjoyed the ritual-religious advantage of the clan leader and did not hesitate to make use of it.⁹⁶ The earliest appeals to *xiao* in the *Shu jing* are related to the Duke of Zhou's attempt to stabilize Zhou rule after the disastrous rebellion of his brothers (King Cheng's uncles), Guan Shu and Cai Shu. In the declarations attributed to the Duke of Zhou an appeal to family unity was intended to allay another rebellion of royal relatives.⁹⁷

The Zhou kings had additional reasons to encourage *xiao* in their realm. Obedience to ancestors presumed following in their footsteps; namely, being the loyal servants of the king. This was the means of perpetuating the Zhou dominance over their allies.⁹⁸ In addition, as the last Western Zhou kings could not claim sufficient charisma (*de*) to maintain allegiance of the overlords, the appeal to *xiao* could serve as the alternative source of their authority. The more the position of the Sons of Heaven deteriorated, the more they were inclined to invoke ancestral authority instead of an impartial—and therefore potentially malevolent—Heaven.⁹⁹

Thus, *xiao* played an important political role in the Western Zhou, and this importance increased in direct proportion to the deterioration of dynastic rule. *Xiao*, as we saw, strengthened the rule of the Zhou kings, elevated the position of the overlords over their ministers, and contributed generally to social stability and hierarchic order. Why, then, did the position of *xiao* decline in the Chunqiu?

THE CHANGING ROLE OF *XIAO* IN CHUNQIU SOCIETY

Several reasons can explain the apparent decline of *xiao* in the Chunqiu period. The ready answer is the diminishing faith in the deities' influence on human affairs. As argued earlier, during the Chunqiu period many elite members no longer believed in the ability of ancestral spirits to help their living offspring. A resultant shift of interest from the ancestors to the living is clearly seen in Eastern Zhou bronze inscriptions (among others), which explains the decrease in occurrences of the term "*xiao*" in these inscriptions.¹⁰⁰ Yet this explanation, valid as it is, is not entirely satisfactory. The impact of religious change on the decline of *xiao* should not be exaggerated. Devotion to ancestors did not disappear, and cutting off sacrifices (*jue si*) was considered a major tragedy.¹⁰¹ Reasons for the decline of *xiao* should be sought elsewhere, most likely in the change in its social and political functions. This change reflected a deep transformation of the kinship structure in the Chunqiu period.

The process of disintegration that was characteristic of Chunqiu political life also included the kinship unit. Whereas in the Western Zhou period a high-ordered trunk lineage was the primary social unit, in the Chunqiu period the economic, political, and ritual center of gravity shifted toward the smaller unit, the branch lineage (*shi* 氏).¹⁰² This process occurred primarily due to the changing mode of landownership in the Eastern Zhou period. In the Western Zhou, land was not private property. It was granted as an emolument to the head of the trunk lineage, who further subdivided it among the minor branches of his lineage and his retainers. If the head of the lineage lost his position, the land returned to the ruler; thus, the head of the lineage was the primary source of well-being for his kin. Consequently, his authority derived from economic factors along with religious ones. The situation changed in the Chunqiu period. The Western Zhou system of land emoluments gradually gave way to a system of private landownership. Lands became the possession of the branch lineage (*shi*) rather than the trunk lineage, and the *shi* became an independent economic unit.¹⁰³

Economic fragmentation of the high-ordered lineage was accompanied

by a ritual-religious change. Chunqiu sacrificial vessels indicate that the *shi* became an independent religious unit as well. The participants in the sacrificial ceremony and the ensuing banquet no longer comprised members of collateral branches, such as the uncles (*zhu fu*) or other distant relatives; instead, the head of the *shi* tended to invite his superiors and underlings, subordinating blood relations to political ties.¹⁰⁴ Since the religious community of the trunk lineage weakened, its head no longer enjoyed the religious authority as the sole source of obtaining the ancestors' blessings. As unity collapsed, collateral branches became increasingly engaged in struggles for land, riches, and positions at court; and this rivalry could turn them into mortal enemies. Intralineage feuds that intensified from the mid-Chunqiu onward indicate that fragmentation of trunk lineages was an ongoing process.¹⁰⁵

As a result of these developments, the role of *xiao* in upholding the ruler's authority also weakened. Zhou kings could no longer rely on the ephemeral unity of the Ji clan, which had become a huge and unmanageable entity; and a similar process undermined the position of the overlords, whose former advantage as heads of the major branch of the ruling lineages vanished. In many Chunqiu states, such as Lu, Zheng, and Song, the collateral branches of the ruling lineage became the major threat to the overlord's power.¹⁰⁶ We have no evidence that any of the embattled lords ever invoked *xiao* to reimpose his authority on rebellious kin. We may suggest, therefore, that unlike its role in the Western Zhou, *xiao* was ineffective in consolidating the trunk lineage and upholding the lord's power in the Chunqiu period.

Yet, although *xiao* lost its potential for consolidating the trunk lineage, it retained importance as the means of enhancing the authority of the head of the branch lineage among the members of his *shi*. This function was of particular importance with regard to the ruling houses, bewildered by frequent and violent succession struggles. Throughout the Chunqiu period, disaffected scions, sometimes assisted by brothers and uncles, frequently resorted to arms to ensure their ascendancy.¹⁰⁷ Accordingly, many statesmen invoked *xiao* in order to soften the constant tension within the ruling houses.

The first occurrence of “*xiao*” in the *Zuo* refers to the events slightly preceding the Chunqiu period. Lord Zhuang of Wei (r. 757–735) favored his minor son, Zhouxu, despite Zhouxu’s evident intentions to seize the throne from his brother, the future Lord Huan (r. 734–719). Lord Zhuang’s aide, Shi Que, reprimanded the ruler:

I heard that one who loves his son educates him according to the rules of propriety, and does not allow him to be wicked. Wickedness derives from arrogance, luxury, lewdness, and dissipation. These four appear when [the ruler’s] favor and emoluments are excessive. If you intend to appoint Zhouxu, you should settle [the matter] firmly; if you leave it unsettled, you accumulate disasters. For few are able to enjoy favor and yet not become arrogant, to be arrogant and yet be able to step down, to step down and yet not resent, to resent and yet be able to restrain themselves. Moreover, the humble obstructing the worthy, the junior overbearing the senior, the distantly related replacing the closely related, the new alienating the old, the petty overcoming the great, the licentious destroying the righteous—these are called the six perversities. [When] the ruler is righteous, the ministers carry out [his orders], the father is kind, the son is filial (*xiao*), the elder brother is loving, the younger brother is reverent—these are the six compliances. To abandon compliance and act perversely will only hasten disaster. The ruler must strive to eradicate future disasters; [but] if he hastens [them], how is it acceptable?¹⁰⁸

A first impression of Shi Que’s speech suggests a resemblance to the later Confucian concept of the identity between family and the state, but a more careful examination suggests that the speech reflects a much earlier intellectual milieu. All the perversities mentioned by Shi Que refer to the particular problem of the “humble, junior, distant, new, petty, and licentious” Zhouxu overcoming the legitimate heir apparent. Similarly, “six compliances” including “the father is kind, the son is filial” are not broad generalizations of government principles, but refer primarily—if not exclusively—to the ruling house. Since in the tiny state of Wei the lord’s house and the state might well have resembled one another, Shi Que’s suggestions had important political implications.¹⁰⁹ Resolving problems in the ruler’s house meant eliminating a major threat to political stability. The identity of the family and the state in early Chunqiu was not imaginary but quite real.

In the early Chunqiu there are several instances of the recourse to *xiao* to impose parental rule on disaffected scions.¹¹⁰ *Xiao* was frequently invoked to resolve the succession crisis of the 650s in the state of Jin, particularly to dissuade the heir apparent, Shensheng, from disobeying his father's decision to depose him for the sake of a minor scion. Li Ke, one of the major Shensheng supporters, urged him:

The son should fear being unfilial, not fear lacking the position [of heir apparent]. Improve yourself and do not accuse others—thus you shall escape troubles.¹¹¹

Similar arguments based on *xiao* were invoked by Shensheng's other aides. Finally, Shensheng, "a figure tragically paralyzed by the dictates of filial piety,"¹¹² committed suicide, while his brothers, Chonger and Yiwu, fled Jin. None dared oppose his father. These examples suggest that by the early Chunqiu *xiao* had already acquired a clear ethical dimension.¹¹³ It was no longer confined to sacrificial activities but presumed proper behavior with regard to ancestors in general, and fathers in particular. Recourse to *xiao* was a means of asserting parental authority.

Consolidating the ruling house was not the sole function of *xiao* in the Chunqiu period. In the late Chunqiu it was also frequently invoked to consolidate ministerial *shi*, which were also plagued by bitter succession struggles.¹¹⁴ In this period, disparaging attitudes toward *shi* authority could be heard; some aristocrats even ridiculed their ancestors.¹¹⁵ As a result, *xiao* was invoked once more to consolidate the disintegrating kinship unit. For instance, an appeal to *xiao* played an important role in moderating struggles within the Ji *shi* of the state of Lu. In 550 Ji Wuzi deposed his elder son, Gongzhu, from the position of the *shi* heir and appointed him to a position of a mere *mazheng*.¹¹⁶ Disappointed, Gongzhu neglected his new duties. A prominent Lu noble, Min Zima, encouraged him to obey the father's command:

Do not behave this way. There are no gates for good and bad fortune; only men themselves summon them. As a son, worry that you are unfilial, do not worry that you have no position. Respect your father's orders; is there anything that lasts? If you are able to be filial and reverent, your good fortune¹¹⁷ may be greater than that of [the head] of the Ji *shi*.

If you are wicked, corrupt, and deviant, your misfortune may be greater than that of the lowest folk.¹¹⁸

Min Zima's speech resembles that of Li Ke to Shensheng a century earlier. The same principles that were mandatory for the lord's scion became mandatory for the son of the leading aristocrat. Aristocrats became increasingly eager to invoke *xiao*, thereby enhancing the unity of their *shi*. Several late-Chunqiu speeches indicate that *xiao* gained prominence in proportion to the disintegration of the *shi*. In the speeches of Wu Shang and Dou Xin, quoted above, filiality (*xiao*) appeared along with benevolence, wisdom, and courage as a standard attribute of the superior man. Moreover, in his 516 B.C.E. panegyric to ritual, Yan Ying mentioned "filial sons" as one of the major positive results of the implementation of ritual in social life.¹¹⁹ These examples are few, but they may indicate a broader trend of thought.

If *xiao* could effectively enhance the power of the head of the *shi*, then why did its invocations remain rare? The answer, I would suggest, may be found in the changing political implications of kinship unity. No longer a consolidating factor, when late Chunqiu society fractured into rival *shi*, kinship affiliation encouraged aristocrats to advance the interests of their kin over their political duties, thereby endangering the overlords. In the previous chapter I discussed the immanent conflicts between overlords and ministerial *shi* in each of the Chunqiu states. These clashes posed a problem of conflicting allegiances for many aristocrats. Whenever a conflict between the *shi* and the ruler arose, each member of the *shi* had to decide whether he was a loyal subject or a filial son. Whom should he follow: a rebellious father and head of the *shi*, or the ruler? The dilemma was painful, and the solutions highly individual. The following story illustrates the problem:

Guan Qi of Chu was a favorite of the *lingyin* Zi Nan, and he accumulated dozens of chariot teams without having been granted any increase in his emolument. The people of Chu were disturbed about it, and the king [King Kang] decided to punish the two. Zi Nan's son Qiji was a personal retainer of the king, and the king would weep whenever he saw him. Qiji said: "Three times my lord has wept in my presence. May I ask, whose fault this is?"

The king said: "You know of [your father] the *lingyin*'s incompetence. The state is about to punish him. Will you remain here [in court]?"

[Qiji] replied: "If the son should remain when his father has been executed, how could the lord make use of him? To leak news of your order and aggravate the punishment is also something I cannot do."

The king executed Zi Nan in court and had Guan Qi torn with chariots and the pieces scattered.

Zi Nan's servants said to Qiji: "Please, allow us to remove the master's body from court."

He said: "There are ritual norms (*li*) for the ruler and ministers. It is up to the high officials."

After three days, Qiji asked for the body, and the king gave his permission. After the burial, [Qiji's] attendants asked: "Will you depart [from the state]?"

He answered: "I participated in the execution of my father. If I depart, where would I go?"

They said: "Then, would you serve the king as minister?"

He said: "I cannot bear to abandon my father and serve the enemy." With that he strangled himself and died.¹²⁰

Qiji was probably one of the most loyal subjects, but even he could not bear to serve the king—the executioner of his father. The contradiction between loyalty and filiality led him to commit suicide. Sometimes, this contradiction could be resolved peacefully. For instance, in 506 Dou Xin prevented his brother, Huai, from avenging the death of their father upon King Zhao of Chu. Dou Xin pointed out the inevitable retaliation that would follow and destroy their lineage (*zong*), saying, "to destroy the lineage and cut off sacrifices is not filial."¹²¹ In this case, the interests of the lineage prescribed the avoidance of regicide. Such a peaceful resolution of conflicting allegiances was, however, the exception rather than the rule. In a famous story, Wu Zixu avenged the execution of his father by almost annihilating the state of Chu.¹²² Others followed his path. Many aristocrats identified themselves primarily as members of their *shi* and secondly as subjects; accordingly, they were first *xiao* and then *zhong* (loyal).

This conflicting allegiance posed incessant problems for the ruler. Whenever he intended to take decisive action against an incompetent minister, the ruler had to first consider a possible armed response by the ousted

official's kin.¹²³ Nobody could be trusted. In 552 the eminent Jin statesman Shu Xiang barely escaped execution when the ruler learned of his brother's affiliation with the rebellious Luan Ying. The ruler, thus, could not trust even the most glorious and loyal statesman when the latter's *shi* was in conflict with the lord's house. Indeed, Chunqiu history supplies plenty of examples of the highest dignitaries who rebelled against the lord whenever the interests of their kin were at stake.¹²⁴

The situation of immanent conflict between powerful *shi* and the overlords turned *xiao* into a divisive and almost subversive value. While encouraging the unity of the *shi*, *xiao* undermined the position of the ruler. Although no Chunqiu statesman dared to pronounce the bold words written three centuries later by Han Feizi—"the filial son of his father is the unreliable subject of his ruler"—many in the Chunqiu period might have agreed with this statement.¹²⁵ It is understandable, therefore, that *xiao* was not generally advocated in court; it was not in the ruler's best interest.

CONFUCIUS, REINTERPRETATION OF "XIAO," AND ITS REVIVAL

We have seen so far that the decline in the importance of *xiao* derived primarily from the fragmentation of kinship units throughout the Chunqiu period. In the Western Zhou, by consolidating a trunk lineage, *xiao* served the ruler and the political stability in general; in the Chunqiu, by consolidating a single branch (*shi*), *xiao* became a divisive and potentially subversive force. Why then did *xiao* reemerge shortly after the end of the Chunqiu period as the most important moral value? We may assume that this comeback resulted from the reinterpretation of *xiao* by Confucius and his disciples.¹²⁶

Even a cursory reading of the *Lunyu* reveals the great difference between the *xiao* advocated by Confucius and that of the Western Zhou and Chunqiu era. *Xiao* is mentioned nineteen times in the *Lunyu*. It refers only once to sacrificial rites; on all other occasions it is definitely related to serving the parents in life and death, following a father's will, and treating parents reverently. In all these cases, *xiao* refers to the household / family (*jia*) and not to the larger kinship unit (*zong* or *shi*).¹²⁷

This interpretation of *xiao* was clearly innovative. Although Confucius is cited as saying, “today’s *xiao* is called being able to nourish [parents],” it seems that this meaning of *xiao* was not prevalent before his lifetime. It may be no coincidence that Confucius’ pupils asked him four times about the meaning of *xiao*.¹²⁸ This confusion regarding the precise meaning of a term five centuries old indicates that Confucius used the old term in a new way. Presumably, his innovation was redirecting *xiao* from the large kinship unit to the household. In particular, the three years’ mourning period advocated by Confucius was dedicated exclusively to parents and completely overshadowed mourning obligations to distant ancestors and other members of the *shi*. As Keith N. Knapp states, “the mourning rites shifted the center of mortuary cult from the lineage temple to the household.”¹²⁹ Significantly, this reinterpretation and redirection of *xiao* occurred in the age of the emergence of the household as the primary economic, social, and political unit, replacing the *shi*.¹³⁰

This reinterpretation had far-reaching consequences. Formerly, performing *xiao* worship was an aristocratic privilege; one who lacked hereditary rank could not perform sacrificial rites to his ancestors.¹³¹ The Confucian *xiao* was no longer confined to the ancestral temple (*zong*), and could be performed by almost everyone; indeed, the *Lunyu* mentions *xiao* as characteristic of the *shi* 士.¹³² In addition, since *xiao* was confined to the household, it no longer posed a danger to the overlords. Although certain contradictions between the father’s and the ruler’s authority still existed, they were less detrimental to the ruler.¹³³ No single household—unlike the lineage—could ever possess sufficient power to challenge the sovereign’s authority. Henceforth, the road was open for Confucius and his followers to claim that the family and the state shared common interests. Confucius accordingly argued that teaching the people filiality and parental kindness would ensure their loyalty,¹³⁴ while his disciple You Ruo stated:

Few are those who, being filial and fraternal (*di*), are still inclined to disobey superiors; and never is he who is not inclined to disobey superiors inclined to initiate calamity. The superior man is devoted to the roots; when the roots are established, the Way is born. Filiality and fraternal feeling are the roots of benevolence.¹³⁵

Thus, the reinterpretation of *xiao* by Confucius and his disciples provided two significant reasons for it to become a major moral value. First, Confucius minimized the aristocratic nature of *xiao* and rendered it applicable to virtually every social stratum. Second, he wisely succeeded in significantly softening the apparent conflict between allegiance to the family and to the ruler. Although the separation between *xiao* and *zhong* (loyalty) remained intact, engendering countless personal tragedies throughout Chinese history, it ceased to be a major political factor, as no single household could effectively challenge the ruler's position. This partial resolution of the contradiction between the family and the state, facilitated by Confucius' reinterpretation of *xiao*, was the major precondition for the later adoption of *xiao* as the major part of the officially approved ideology.¹³⁶

Reinterpretation and Rejection of "Li" (Benefit/Profit)

The term "*li*" acquired a unique position in pre-Qin ethical discourse. Unlike "*ren*" and "*xiao*" it stood at the center of a bitter controversy. Whereas Confucius and Mencius clearly despised benefit seeking and viewed it as the opposite of the principle of propriety/righteousness (*yi*), their opponents, like Mozi and the legalists, considered *li* to be a legitimate political goal. To some extent, the attitude toward benefit may be considered a dividing line between ethically oriented Confucians and their more practical opponents. Zhu Xi stated: "the theory [of the distinction between] propriety/righteousness and benefit/profit is of utmost significance for Confucians (*Ru*)."¹³⁷ Yet although the Confucian affinity of the *Zuo*'s author may be considered axiomatic, his attitude toward *li* differs from that of Confucius and Mencius. This may be the reason for Zhu Xi's criticism of the *Zuo*: "It knows only benefit and harm, and does not know righteousness and principle."¹³⁸ Whatever the personal views of the *Zuo* author, the attitude toward *li* expressed in the speeches is more complex than assumed by Zhu Xi. From a legitimate political goal in the early Chunqiu period, *li* became a despised feature of petty men, toward the end of the Chunqiu era.¹³⁹

The term "*li*" does not appear as an independent ethical category in

Western Zhou classical books, nor are there any indications of a negative attitude toward *li* in these texts. In the *Zhouyi* it acquired the positive meaning of “beneficent.” The *Shi jing* and the Western Zhou chapters of the *Shu jing* stress the necessity of benefiting the people and condemn those who hurt them (literally, “nonbenefit,” [*bu li*]).¹⁴⁰ In most of these occurrences “*li*” appears in the verbal form “to benefit”; nowhere is *li* identified as an independent category in ethical discourse. A similar verbal usage of “*li*” characterizes the earlier speeches of the *Zuo*. In 706 Ji Liang of Sui urged the ruler to manifest his devotion to the people by considering how to benefit them; in 653 Xun Xi of Jin claimed that his loyalty to the ruler was expressed by tirelessly acting to benefit the ruler’s family.¹⁴¹ In none of the early Chunqiu speeches is there even the slightest negative connotation attached to benefit seeking.

The second half of the seventh century B.C.E. was a period of growing interstate tension, which accompanied the struggle for hegemony over the Chinese world. The efforts of statesmen were directed toward strengthening their states. Under these conditions *li* emerged as a legitimate political goal, the *raison d’être* of mid-Chunqiu politics. In 638 the Song minister of war (*sima*) Zi Yu condemned Lord Xiang (r. 650–637) for steadfastly adhering to ritual norms on the battlefield, saying, “the three armies are used according to what is beneficial,” thus replacing ritual as a guiding principle of military action with benefit. *Li* gradually became a most prestigious goal, as evidenced in the following quotations: “Virtue (*de*) and righteousness (*yi*) are the root of benefit”; “Some people are eager to sacrifice their lives to benefit the state”; “When faithfulness (*xin*) relies on righteousness and one acts, this is benefit. He whose plans do not lose benefit, thereby protecting the altars of soil and grain, is the master of the people”; “By righteousness benefit is established.”¹⁴² These quotations indicate that *li* was not opposed to moral values like righteousness and virtue, but was considered the result of and reason for moral action. The most striking expression of this sentiment was provided by Lord Wen from the tiny state of Zhu, in 614:

Lord Wen of Zhu divined by reading cracks about moving the capital to Yi. The scribe said: “It will benefit the people but not benefit you, my lord.”

The lord of Zhu said: "If it benefits the people, then it is also my benefit. Heaven gives birth to the people and sets them a ruler in order to benefit them. If the people are to gain benefit, then I, the lonely man, must be with them."

The advisors said: "You can prolong your life (*ming*); how is it possible that you are not doing this?" The lord of Zhu replied: "My mandate (*ming*) is nourishing the people. To die sooner or later is [a function of] time. If people are to benefit, let us move the capital—nothing is more auspicious."¹⁴³

Lord Wen's speech definitely indicates that by the mid-Chunqiu period *li* was not only a policy goal but had also become a moral category, a completely positive one. The obligation to benefit the people, or, more broadly, to benefit the altars of soil and grain, was so strong that the ruler was willing to sacrifice his life to achieve this goal. Pursuing *li* was, therefore, of the utmost significance for policy makers.¹⁴⁴

Toward the mid-sixth century B.C.E., the political situation changed. The tension among states decreased considerably after the 546 peace conference. The concern of statesmen shifted to the internal turmoil of their respective states, where strong aristocratic lineages were trying to consolidate their political, economic, and military power by expanding their landholding.¹⁴⁵ Consequently, along with the old sense of *li* as "benefit," the new sense of "profit" became more pronounced. Moreover, the implications of benefit seeking in political life rapidly changed. Whereas rulers benefited from establishing orderly government (*zheng* 政), aristocrats benefited from acquiring more lands and riches. This opened the way to mutual struggles (*zheng* 爭) and disorder (*luan*). Thus, the appropriation of *li* as an ethical norm by the aristocrats would have grave consequences for the state.

The new conditions required a gradual reassessment of attitudes toward *li*. In 551 Zi Zhang of Zheng returned his allotment to the lord, asserting that it is better to remain noble and poor in order to avoid troubles.¹⁴⁶ Yet the major contribution to the reassessment of benefit seeking was made by Yan Ying. His native state of Qi suffered from severe calamities when four of the major aristocratic lineages were exterminated and their lands seized by rivals in 546–532; hence Yan Ying realized the dan-

ger of the relentless pursuit of *li*. In 545, after the powerful Qing Feng was defeated, his lands were distributed among the victors. Yan Ying, however, refused to accept sixty settlements in the fief of Beidian. Zi Wei, a leading Qi aristocrat, was surprised:

Zi Wei said: "Riches are what men desire. Why do you alone not desire [them]?"

[Yanzi] answered: "The settlements of Mr. Qing [Feng] satisfied his desires; therefore he fled [into exile]. My settlements do not satisfy my desires, but if I add Beidian, they will satisfy my desires. When desires are satisfied, the day of exile is not distant. Abroad I shall not have a single settlement to preside over. I do not accept Beidian not because I hate riches, but because I am afraid to lose the riches. Besides, riches are like cloth and silk that are measured and restricted by *fu* units to prevent change [of measures]. When the people's life is plentiful, they pursue benefit (*li*). Therefore, proper virtue serves as a *fu* unit to prevent deficiency and excess; this is called "to restrict (*fu*) benefit." When benefit exceeds [the limits] it will turn into defeat. I dare not be too greedy; this is called restriction (*fu*)."¹⁴⁷

As a farsighted statesman, Yan Ying realized that the norms of the aristocrats would become the norms of the whole populace; relentless pursuit of benefit would, therefore, result in disastrous turmoil. Accordingly, he suggested restricting benefit seeking by "proper virtue" (*zheng de*). In subsequent years Yan Ying became increasingly critical of benefit seeking, considering it the ultimate source of the domestic turmoil in his state. In 532 Yan Ying clarified his approach when he urged Qi's powerful leader Chen Wuyu to yield his newly acquired lands to the lord:

Yielding is the master of virtue. Yielding is "a resplendent virtue." Whoever has blood and breath, his heart tends to struggle. Therefore, benefit/profit-seeking cannot persist. Try to excel in righteousness. Righteousness is benefit's root. Accumulating benefit/profit will bring misfortune.¹⁴⁸

Though Yan Ying continued to juxtapose propriety/righteousness and benefit/profit, *yi* apparently replaced *li* as the goal of the superior man's behavior. Only giving up benefit seeking could calm the competitive heart of the people. Yielding, accordingly, became, in Yan Ying's eyes, "the mas-

ter of virtue.” In another speech Yan Ying connected *li* to the profit seeking of merchants, emphasizing it as a feature of mean people.¹⁴⁹ These speeches indicate his determined effort to reevaluate *li*.

Yan Ying might have been the first to reassess *li*, but he was by no means the only one. The numerous speeches of the late Chunqiu period provide a fascinating picture of an overall shift in attitude toward benefit seeking: a legitimate policy goal of the seventh century became a despised feature in the late sixth century B.C.E. In 522 Zong Lu of Wei criticized himself because he continued to serve unrighteous Gong Meng merely for the sake of benefit/profit. In 515 opponents of Fei Wuji and Yan Jiangshi of Chu accused the two of deceiving the king and the *lingyin* for the sake of their own benefit; in 506 Lu Jin of Chu “did not dare to benefit/profit from [others’] straits”; and in 480 Zifu Jingbo of Lu reprimanded Gong-sun Cheng: “You enjoyed great benefits, but still think about unrighteous [ways]: not only did you fail to obtain benefits and furthermore hurt your ancestors’ state—who will make use of you?” One year later Xiong Yiliao of Chu was praised: “He is not moved by the prospect of benefit.”¹⁵⁰ The later *Zuo* repeatedly expresses a negative attitude toward “monopolizing benefits/profits” (*zhuan li*).¹⁵¹ Significantly, none of the late-*Zuo* speakers expressed a positive attitude toward *li*. A profound change in attitude, therefore, seems to have taken place.

The process of reassessing *li* reflects the complicated process of adopting the ruler’s values. Chunqiu aristocrats did not mechanically imitate rulers. If the moral category that befitted rulers was inapplicable to their stratum, they rejected it. While benefit seeking by the rulers contributed to stability and order, when applied to aristocrats it encouraged interlineage feuds and widespread turmoil. When the aristocrats realized this, they reevaluated this term and rejected it. Benefit seeking was not to be a characteristic of the superior man.

Summary

Chunqiu aristocrats revolutionized Chinese ethical thought by creating a new definition of elite status. The term “*junzi*” (superior man), which orig-

inally pertained to the person's ascribed status, was reinterpreted as primarily a moral concept. Henceforth a superior man meant above all a virtuous man. This generated a new self-image of the ruling elite, which was patterned after that of the rulers. Assertive Chunqiu aristocrats developed a distinct ruler mind-set, which reflected their high status. They consciously acquired behavioral norms of the ruler, emulating the moral image of the overlords. Yet Chunqiu "superior men" did not merely imitate the superiors' behavior, but, rather, creatively adapted the ruler's virtues to their own distinct social requirements. This resulted in a changing mode of usage or even complete redefinition of certain ethical terms, such as "*de*," "*ren*," "*xiao*," or "*li*" (benefit/profit). The complicated process of creating the new self-image of the elite engendered therefore a new ethical vocabulary, which continued to shape ethical discourse of the subsequent generations.

The evolution of the ethical self-image of the elite had unintended consequences for the hereditary aristocrats. They developed an ethical self-image to provide further legitimization for their dominant position, but this paved the way for the upward mobility of the *shi* stratum. The rising *shi* began emulating the behavior of superior men, thereby laying claim to their eligibility to *junzi* status. The aristocrats remained powerless in the face of this challenge. Ironically, those who imbued the term "*junzi*" with ethical meaning were unable to find ideological justifications to repel the *shi* attack on their hereditary privileges, and eventually had to give up their hereditary privileges.

Chapter 7

The Chunqiu Legacy

The present study tried to expose the roots of the Zhanguo intellectual breakthrough by exploring intellectual developments that preceded the age of Confucius. What did Confucius transmit? And what was the role of his immediate predecessors and contemporaries in the history of Chinese thought? By reconstructing the intellectual life of the Chunqiu period an attempt was made to locate some major sources of the Zhanguo intellectual flowering.

The Chunqiu period was “an age of transition.”¹ The political system, inherited from the Western Zhou, was increasingly unable to deal with the new social and political realities. As the centuries-old order deteriorated and a process of disintegration set in, Chunqiu statesmen were confronted by major challenges. Bewildered by the lack of stability, these statesmen searched for solutions. They raised new questions and gave new answers. In the process, they introduced new categories of political and ethical discourse, such as *ren* (benevolence), *zhong* (loyalty), and *Dao* (the Way), and significantly reevaluated others like *li* (ritual) and *de* (virtue). Thus, much of the vocabulary of the Zhanguo “disputers of the Dao”² was bequeathed to them by their Chunqiu predecessors. Other Chunqiu ideas, particularly the rule by ritual (*li zhi*), had a far-reaching impact on future generations. The concept of the virtuous “superior man” (*junzi*), raised by Chunqiu thinkers and further elaborated by Confucius, was to become an important part of ethical thought throughout the history of China.

Chunqiu thought had several distinct characteristics. The most important was the apparent absence of private thinkers, the peripatetic

philosophers that were part of the Zhanguo landscape. Rather, it was the outstanding statesmen, heads of the major aristocratic lineages, who created and developed new ideas. Chunqiu society lacked either full-time thinkers or contending schools of thought. In all likelihood, no single polemical treatise was written during the Chunqiu period. Instead, ideas and concepts developed in broad discourse that included eminent statesmen from what was then the Chinese world.

Significant portions of this discourse are contained in the *Zuo zhuan*, the major repository of Chunqiu history. For generations scholars doubted that the speeches quoted in the *Zuo* represented the views of Chunqiu statesmen, suggesting that they could be the product of a later intellectual milieu. In the preceding pages, evidence was marshaled for the reliability of the *Zuo* speeches. The author/compiler of the *Zuo* apparently reproduced most of the speeches from his original sources, the scribal records of various Chunqiu states. The obvious intellectual change reflected in these speeches from the beginning to the end of the *Zuo* narrative, accompanied by subtle yet recognizable grammatical and lexical changes, indicate that in the process of the compilation of the *Zuo* the author/compiler did not significantly intervene in the content of his original sources. Hence, the *Zuo* may serve as an invaluable source for Chunqiu thought. Other written and paleographical sources, particularly bronze inscriptions, provide further glimpses into Chunqiu intellectual life.

Chunqiu statesmen made every effort to restore stability and to reintroduce the hierarchical order that was expected to prevent the further disintegration of the political system. Political issues dominated Chunqiu thought, contributing in no small measure to the political orientation of subsequent Chinese philosophy. This common concern of Chunqiu and Zhanguo thinkers with political issues is the source of the intellectual continuity between the Chunqiu and the Zhanguo periods. Yet there is an important difference as well. Unlike their Zhanguo followers, Chunqiu thinkers belonged, with few exceptions, to the stratum of the hereditary aristocracy. As such, they were intent not only on preserving social stability, but also on ensuring the privileged position of their lineages. Hence, Chunqiu thought also reflects the conflict of interest between the states-

men's commitment to their political goals and their similarly strong commitment to their stratum. These conflicting interests often inhibited Chunqiu statesmen from proposing radical political innovations that might have been detrimental to the hereditary aristocracy. As a result, Chunqiu thinkers remained ambiguous on many crucial political issues. Some of Zhanguo intellectual trends must be understood as a rejection of Chunqiu aristocratic views by Zhanguo philosophers, who belonged mostly to the *shi* stratum.

A precondition to the intellectual upsurge of the Chunqiu period was "the breakdown of the moral and political order which claimed the authority of Heaven."³ The Chunqiu period witnessed a profound transformation of man's relationship with the transcendental. This change was not revolutionary; on the surface, sacrifices, oaths, divination, and consulting omens and portents continued as before. Yet while upholding the ceremonial order, a serious reconsideration of the role of the transcendental in mundane affairs occurred. As most members of the educated elite came to the conviction that the reliance on Heaven and deities would not suffice to safeguard the deteriorating sociopolitical order, they began searching for the solution in the here and now.

Heaven remained the highest and the most revered deity, but its impact on everyday life changed. Chunqiu statesmen gradually abandoned the early Zhou belief in Heaven as an active deity that safeguards the political order and guides human affairs. Members of the Chunqiu educated elite questioned their ability to comprehend Heaven's intent and were no longer confident that Heaven would directly respond to human actions. For some, Heaven remained a powerful symbol of justice, the last resort of the weak and the oppressed; others conceived of Heaven as an impersonal law, possibly lacking moral features; still others simply argued that the Way of Heaven is distant, and that inscrutable Heaven's will cannot be a reliable guide in everyday affairs. These differences notwithstanding, the way to success or failure was in the realm of men, not of Heaven.

An even more significant change occurred in attitudes toward deities. The ritualization of Zhou religious practices resulted in a gradual move from

direct communication with the deities to an emphasis on ritual propriety in the intercourse with extrahuman powers. Accordingly, the deities were no longer expected to directly intervene in human affairs. Many Chunqiu thinkers furthermore reevaluated the traditional notion of *do-ut-des* relationships with the deities, arguing that the deities were responsive not to lavish sacrifices but to the people's sentiments on the political level and to proper moral conduct on the personal level. Consequently, to ensure good fortune, a ruler was required to improve the people's livelihood, and a statesman had to improve his behavior. By the late Chunqiu, as many members of the educated elite became increasingly skeptical regarding the deities' political prowess, and even regarding the actual existence of the deities and the spirits, the political relevance of extrahuman powers further diminished. While the overall picture of Chunqiu religious attitudes was by no means monochromatic, the prevalent point of reference definitely shifted from the realm of the sacred to that of the mundane.

These developments contributed to profound intellectual change. Once Chunqiu thinkers became convinced that the key to solving political and personal problems lay in the here and now, they focused their attention on human affairs. Neither disparaging nor neglecting the transcendental, they nonetheless increasingly concerned themselves with political and ethical issues. This tendency had a great impact on subsequent Zhanguo thought. Political and ethical problems, rather than transcendental matters, came to dominate Zhanguo discourse. This shift of the point of reference from the divine to the mundane was a turning point in China's intellectual history.

The major intellectual achievement of the Chunqiu period was the concept of the rule by ritual. By the end of the Chunqiu period, ritual (*li*) evolved as a major stabilizing force, a remedy for all political and social evils, the guiding principle of personal and political conduct. This development had a profound impact on future generations.

Chunqiu society inherited the Western Zhou ritual system that regulated sacrificial rites, sumptuary rules, and kinship organization. The ceremonial functions of every aristocrat were determined by the rank and seniority he held in his lineage. The ritual system thus preserved and solidified

the hierarchial social order within the lineage and by extension in the state in general. However, starting in early Chunqiu years, the Western Zhou ritual system faced a serious challenge. Political and social changes rendered many established ritual regulations obsolete. The increasing infractions of ritual norms by rulers and ministers alike threatened the social order based on these norms. Chunqiu statesmen were aware of this danger and made concerted efforts to prevent the demise of ritual-based order. In the process, they redefined the term “*li*” and turned it into a universal panacea for all social ills.

Throughout the Chunqiu period, “*li*” became an ever more encompassing term. New dimensions of *li* gradually overshadowed its initial narrow meanings. Thus, although *li* originated in religious rites, and the religious dimension of *li* was never entirely dismissed, its political and social functions became much more pronounced than its function as an interface with the transcendental. Furthermore, Chunqiu statesmen partly dissociated *li* from its ceremonial form, abandoning an early belief that precise performance of complicated ceremonies by rulers and ministers would suffice to ensure proper functioning of the entire sociopolitical order. By the sixth century B.C.E. many thinkers realized that some infractions of the outdated ceremonial norms were inevitable. They agreed to certain transgressions of ceremonial rules, provided the essence of *li*—stability and hereditary hierarchic order—remained intact. Thus, as *li* was no longer confined to ceremonial demeanor, it became applicable to ever broader spheres of public activities, such as the ruler’s relations with the ruled, maintaining a balance of power with powerful ministers and general efficiency of administration.

This ongoing redefinition of “*li*” ushered in a dialectical process. As the term “*li*” became ever more encompassing, it was progressively divorced from its original narrow meaning as religious rites and ceremonial demeanor, and the more *li* was dissociated from its ceremonial framework, the broader its usage became. By the late Chunqiu, *li* became the ultimate guiding principle of political and social life. Accordingly, *li* was no longer confined to the upper stratum but embraced an ever broadening segment of the populace. This resulted in the idea of rule by ritual—

arguably the single most important legacy bequeathed by Chunqiu thinkers to their Zhanguo descendants.

Zhanguo thinkers further modified the Chunqiu notion of *li*. Confucius was the first to add moral dimensions to this term, reinterpreting *li* as primarily ritual behavior, rather than the mere equivalent of the sociopolitical system. By adopting ritual-based behavioral norms, a member of the *shi* stratum could claim equality with other “superior men,” which allowed Confucius and his followers to downgrade the hereditary dimensions of ritual-based order. Later, Xunzi further developed this notion, arguing that ritual hierarchy should not be based on pedigree but rather on a person’s ability to internalize ritual norms. Zhanguo thinkers succeeded therefore in adapting *li* to changing social circumstances without undermining its basic functions of ensuring stability and hierarchic order.⁴ The efforts of generations of Chunqiu thinkers and their Zhanguo successors culminated in early imperial China, when reinterpreted *li* became the paramount political, social, and ethical principle, the most solid foundation of Chinese imperial culture.

Whereas the concept of rule by ritual is a major achievement of Chunqiu thought, the Chunqiu thinkers’ futile attempts to bring about international order may be considered their most significant failure. Definitely, this failure contributed to the ensuing disdain toward the multistate system and the subsequent emergence of the ideal of unified rule (*da yitong*).

Chunqiu statesmen failed to restore international stability, which was disappearing as the Zhou house declined. The attempts to establish common rules for international life, based either on ritual norms or on the system of alliances, ended in disaster. None of these devices adequately dealt with the shifting balance of power among major states and the resultant unwillingness of the strong powers to abide by reciprocal rules. No international norms could prevent strong and medium-sized states from following their own individual interests, particularly the acquisition of land. In a situation in which “the flesh of the weak is the food of the strong,” no fixed rules of international life could stop the interstate struggle and the subsequent annihilation of the losers.

The failure of reciprocal norms to ensure international stability en-

couraged statesmen to seek a solution by reestablishing an international hierarchy under the aegis of a powerful hegemon. Early Chunqiu statesmen, inspired by Lord Huan of Qi, viewed the hegemon as a powerful surrogate of the Zhou king, and expected him to use noncoercive *de* to restore interstate order in accord with the norms mentioned above. Yet the harsh reality of sixth century B.C.E. disillusioned most proponents of the virtuous hegemon. The quest for a leader who would abide by norms of *de*, advocated by the representatives of small states, was hopelessly naïve in the eyes of the pragmatic statesmen from the great powers like Jin and Chu. These latter statesmen emphasized the hegemon's power and willingness to act resolutely as being of primary importance for his rule. By the late Chunqiu, as power replaced *de* as the hegemon's major attribute, nothing could prevent reckless rulers and their cynical advisors from pursuing their own interests at the expense of weaker neighbors.

The failure of Chunqiu thinkers to build a viable international order was the reason why, during the Zhanguo period, "no outlook emerge[d] that [was] prepared to treat the multistate system as normative or normal."⁵ Yet amidst the incessant wars of all against all, and increasing fragmentation, new forces of integration appeared. The economic, political, military, and ideological impetus for reintegration encouraged late Chunqiu statesmen and thinkers to begin pondering the need for unity. The resultant demand for unified rule that dominated Zhanguo thought symbolized both the rejection of the Chunqiu multistate legacy, and the affirmation of deep-seated tendencies of late Chunqiu politics and thought by the Zhanguo thinkers. Thus, in the final account, the collapse of the Chunqiu multistate order had the most profound impact on later Chinese political culture.

Aside from the international turmoil, the tense relationships in the ruling stratum were another source of instability during the Chunqiu period. In most Huaxia states, the heads of powerful aristocratic lineages effectively stripped their rulers of political, economic, administrative, and military power. This condition of weak rulers "mounted" by their strong ministers was detrimental to political stability. It brought about mutual struggles, mistrust, and competition between the rulers and their aides,

and exacerbated the process of disintegration and fragmentation of centralized rule. Much of Chunqiu political thought was aimed at improving relations in the upper echelon of the ruling stratum and enhancing administrative efficiency in general.

Most Chunqiu thinkers whose voices we hear in the *Zuo* belonged to powerful ministerial lineages, whose leaders challenged the ruler's position. These thinkers pursued mutually incompatible aims of strengthening their states and preserving the superior position of their lineages. The first aim meant enhancing the efficiency of centralized rule, particularly the ruler's authority, while the latter prescribed preserving the status quo. This tension between the private and public commitments of Chunqiu thinkers had a far-reaching impact on their ideas. Unable to resolve this contradiction, they concentrated on the ethical aspects of ruler-minister relations, while their remedies for administrative change remained ambiguous and generally unsophisticated.

The political ethics of the Chunqiu period reflected the exalted position of the ministers and the weakness of the rulers. Chunqiu thinkers eagerly supplied moral, pragmatic, and philosophical justifications for the decay of the overlord's power. The ruler whose conduct was unacceptable, who neglected the altars of soil and grain, oppressed the people, or simply lost the reins of power was not a genuine ruler, and could be dismissed, expelled, or even murdered. The thinkers' philosophical awareness of the inevitability of decline further encouraged Chunqiu statesmen to accept the decay of the ruling houses.

Conversely, Chunqiu thinkers evolved a flattering image of the good minister. For the good minister, obedience and fidelity to the overlord were important but of secondary value. Of primary importance was the minister's intelligent loyalty, namely the ability to consider the long-term interests of the state and to take selfless action on behalf of these interests. This interpretation of loyalty enabled the ministers to defy the ruler's orders and act as independent political players, further undermining centralized authority. Simultaneously, a completely different view of loyalty emerged in the relationships between Chunqiu ministers and their personal retainers. Retainers were dependent on their masters and owed them

complete personal fidelity, even at the expense of the interests of the state and the overlord. This concept of personal loyalty became dominant in the Zhanguo period and thereafter, although ministerial intelligent loyalty likewise remained an important feature of China's political culture.

Chunqiu administrative thought developed to a lesser extent, in comparison with political ethics. As stated above, Chunqiu minister-thinkers generally refrained from radical innovations with regard to ruler-minister relations. Instead they relied on the centuries-old body simile and the concept of model emulation that emphasized the indispensability of the minister while assigning him a passive role of recipient of the ruler's decisions. The only major exception to these views was the harmony simile proposed by Yan Ying, which saw the minister, along with the ruler, as an active participant in decision making. This expression of ministerial self-confidence remained unique in Chunqiu discourse, however, and was later also rejected by mainstream Zhanguo thinkers.

Zhanguo thinkers inherited Chunqiu ideas about ruler-minister relations but took them in different directions. The Chunqiu proministerial view, particularly the imposition of moral limitations on the ruler, the search for the genuine ruler, and the elevation of the minister influenced Confucius and his followers. In particular, Confucius' and Mencius' preoccupation with ethical problems and lack of interest in purely administrative matters may have derived from their strong attachment to the mainstream Chunqiu heritage. Similarly, their notion of intelligent loyalty was akin to the Chunqiu ministerial concept. Concomitantly, other Zhanguo thinkers, most of whom belonged to the *shi* stratum, evidently adopted the Chunqiu retainers' view of personal loyalty. Distinctly varied visions of loyalty continued to coexist throughout Chinese history.

The ruler's interests, as we saw, remained underrepresented in Chunqiu discourse. This situation changed rapidly in the Zhanguo period, when new generations of thinkers, none of whom represented hereditary powerholders, rejected the Chunqiu legacy of the weak ruler. Those Zhanguo thinkers concerned with issues of government and administration, such as Mozi, Shang Yang (d. 338), Shen Buhai (d. 337), and later Han Feizi (d. 233), contributed greatly toward theoretical justifications of a strong

ruler's position, and supplied the overlords with adequate means to control their ministers. Due to these efforts the Chunqiu situation of ministers who mounted the rulers largely disappeared by the end of the Zhanguo period.

Ethics are considered to be the hallmark of Chunqiu intellectual life. Chunqiu aristocrats, eager to legitimize their elevated position, developed a distinct self-image of the *junzi*—the superior man. Unlike their predecessors, who defined the term and person of *junzi* primarily if not exclusively in terms of descent, Chunqiu aristocrats began to imbue this term with ethical content. The superior man also became a virtuous man. This development had a most profound impact on the future self-image of the Chinese ruling elite.

In the process of creating a new self-image, Chunqiu aristocrats furthermore evolved a set of virtues attributed to superior men. The process was not haphazard; most of the virtues were appropriated from the moral image of the rulers. The conscious emulation of the ruler's image reflected the self-importance and assertiveness of the Chunqiu aristocrats. Thus, such terms as "*de*" (originally, "charisma" or "kindness/grace") and "*ren*," which appeared in the early Chunqiu discourse almost exclusively as the ruler's attributes, became by the late Chunqiu characteristic of the entire stratum of "superior men." In the process, a slight change in the semantic meaning of both terms occurred. "*De*" acquired an additional meaning of "moral virtue" while the meaning of "*ren*" was slightly modified to connote benevolence among equals, not just the ruler's grace toward his subjects.

Unlike "*de*" and "*ren*," the term "*xiao*" (filiality) was subject to major changes throughout the Chunqiu period. In the Western Zhou this term was primarily confined to performing sacrifices in the ancestral temple. *Xiao* consolidated high-ordered trunk lineages (*zong*), particularly the ruling lineage, thereby solidifying the rule of the Western Zhou kings and overlords. In the Chunqiu period, as the trunk lineage disintegrated into rival branches (*shi*), the importance of *xiao* declined; it could no longer ensure the dominant position of the ruler's lineage versus its collateral branches. Whereas *xiao* remained an effective means of consolidating the

shi, its political implications rapidly changed. Kinship unity became a divisive rather than a consolidating factor, fracturing society along lines of rival *shi*. Moreover, *xiao* encouraged allegiance to the head of the *shi*, potentially at the expense of the ruler. These dangerous implications discouraged Chunqiu thinkers from openly advocating *xiao*. In the late Chunqiu, however, Confucius and his disciples reappraised *xiao*, designating it as a major ethical obligation toward living and deceased parents. This new approach had a profound impact on the role of *xiao*. The reinterpreted *xiao* redirected personal allegiance away from the head of the *shi* to the head of the household (*jia*), reducing its potential threat to the ruler's authority. Henceforth, *xiao* could also be practiced by broader segments of the population that lacked lineage temples. This facilitated the reemergence of *xiao* as a pivotal ethical value in the Zhanguo period.

Another instance of the challenges facing the aristocrats' efforts to appropriate the ruler's virtues is the case of "*li*" (benefit/profit). Originally, *li* was not an ethical category, but as the interstate struggles intensified during the mid-Chunqiu, *li* turned into a legitimate aim, if not the *raison d'être* of political action. On the other hand, increasing interlineage struggles during the late Chunqiu period, deprived benefit seeking of legitimate goals. Benefiting the ruler and the state was tantamount to achieving stability, orderly government, and strength. At the same time, benefiting the lineage was a threat to political stability, since it primarily meant the acquisition of new lands, and this, in turn, engendered incessant intrastate feuds, strife, and turmoil. Consequently, by the late Chunqiu period, the term "*li*" was completely reevaluated and held in contempt as a characteristic of mean people.

The evolution of ethical codes in reference to political conduct and social intercourse had unintended consequences for the hereditary aristocrats. They developed a new ethical self-image to provide further legitimization for their dominant position, but this paved the way for the upward mobility of the *shi* stratum. The rising *shi* began emulating the behavior of superior men, thereby laying claim to their eligibility to *junzi* status. The aristocrats remained powerless in the face of this challenge. Ironically, those who imbued the term *junzi* with ethical meaning were

unable to find ideological justifications to repel the *shi* attack on their hereditary privileges. Therefore, by developing an ethical self-image, the Chunqiu aristocrats undermined and contributed to the dismantling of the very social order that had enabled their elevated status. The new age belonged to the new men.

Chunqiu thought prepared the ground for the flowering of the intellectual milieu of the Zhanguo period. Chunqiu thinkers bequeathed to their Zhanguo descendants their achievements and failures, concepts and problems, and even their vocabulary. Therefore, the Chunqiu legacy is crucially important if we are to understand the continued Zhanguo discourse. But the Chunqiu legacy was not adopted in its entirety. Some of its components, like attempts to stabilize the multistate system or severely restrict the ruler's authority, were largely rejected by Zhanguo thinkers. Other features, like the rule by ritual and the concept of the virtuous "superior man," became the cornerstones of the Chinese political culture of the future, despite occasional criticism in Zhanguo polemical texts. The precise relationship of Zhanguo schools of thought to the Chunqiu legacy is a complex problem that deserves a special and more extensive treatment. From the evidence presented here, we may cautiously corroborate Benjamin Schwartz's assertion that it was Confucius and his followers who "more truly represented some of the *dominant* cultural orientations of the past than did some of their later rivals."⁶ It is precisely their role in accepting and transmitting large aspects of the Chunqiu legacy that may well explain the unique position of Confucians in relation to other schools of thought.

Appendix 1

Grammatical Change in the *Zuo*

Case Studies of the “Yu” and “Qi” Particles

Can we discern temporal layers in the language of the *Zuo*? Namely, are there any changes in the language of the *Zuo* from the beginning to the end of the narrative? If changes could be discerned, they would indicate that the language of the *Zuo* follows at least partly the language of its primary sources, and would significantly bolster my argument that the *Zuo* derived primarily from the written records of Chunqiu scribes.

He Leshi was apparently the first to notice that the language of the *Zuo* changes from the beginning to the end of the narrative. In the following pages I shall follow and further develop her analysis by providing two instances of the grammatical change in the *Zuo*.¹ The first case study to be discussed deals with the use of “yu” (於 and 于) particles in the *Zuo*. The use of these synonymous particles changed during the Zhou period; 于 prevails in Western Zhou texts, whereas 於 dominates Zhanguo writings.² The *Zuo*, in contrast to any other known text, contains an almost equal number of both “yu” particles: 1707 of “於” and 1427 of “于,” a ratio of 54 percent to 46 percent. If the author resorted mainly to written sources during the compilation of the *Zuo*, we should expect the ratio of “于” to “於” in the text to change, since earlier sources should prefer “于,” while the later sources should prefer “於.” “于” should, therefore, occur more frequently in the earlier part of the *Zuo*, while the later *Zuo* should contain a higher percentage of the “於” particle. Bernhard Karlgren argued that the ratio of occurrence of both particles “is typical for the work throughout.”³ As we shall see, closer investigation calls Karlgren’s statement into question.

The second case study deals with the practice “*qi*” used for rhetorical questions. Modes of its use are less clear than those of the “*yu*” particles, and the temporal parameter of change is less explicit. Of the Western Zhou texts, the *Shu jing* invariably resorts to the multifunctional particle “其” to define a rhetorical question, whereas the *Shi jing* uses “豈.” The Zhanguo texts, however, invariably substitute “其” as a rhetorical question particle with “豈.” Thus, we may cautiously assume that whereas in the Western Zhou both particles could be used interchangeably in rhetorical questions, by the Zhanguo period “豈” replaced “其” in this function. If this suggestion is correct, then we should expect in the *Zuo* a gradual increase in the “new” “豈” at the expense of “ancient” “其.”⁴ I have divided the *Zuo* narrative into five periods, each fifty years long (the last four years were omitted). The results are seen in Table 3.

Let us discuss first the issue of the “*yu*” particle. In the early *Zuo* the “于” particle predominates, while the last century of the narrative is dominated by “於.” The temporal sequence of substitution of “于” with “於” is less pronounced, however, than is the case with the “*qi*” particles; particularly, after the peak in the fourth period, the ratio of 於 versus 于 declines in the fifth period. Several factors distort the cleanness of “*yu*” distribution. First, the narrator’s remarks, which should in fact belong to the last stratum of the *Zuo*, are spread throughout the entire narrative. Second, the *Zuo* frequently quotes the *Chun qiu* text, which invariably uses “于.” Third, the *Zuo* speakers sometimes cite the *Shi jing* and the *Shu jing* in which, again, “于” predominates. Yet by far the most important factor is the stylistic one. In a recent study, Jens Petersen convincingly argued that the usage of “*yu*” particles throughout the *Zuo* is determined by different styles of the documents used by the *Zuo* author, and not only by these documents’ dating. The earlier particle (于) appears in those passages which speak in a solemn and dignified way, such as citations of the classics, annalistic remarks, and records of diplomatic intercourse. The later particle (於) is used less rigidly, and it appears to be more colloquial; accordingly, it dominates the speeches.⁵ Uneven distribution of stylistic components throughout the *Zuo* narrative, particularly the relatively high percentage of direct speech in the narrative of the years of Lords Xiang

TABLE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF THE PARTICLES
“YU” AND “QI” THROUGHOUT THE ZUO

	於	于	Ratio (於/于)	豈	其	Ratio (豈/其)
722–673 B.C.E. (Yin 1–Zhuang 21)	118	180	0.65	3	9	0.333
672–623 B.C.E. (Zhuang 22–Wen 4)	199	225	0.88	11	9	1.222
622–573 B.C.E. (Wen 5–Cheng 18)	281	334	0.841	14	18	0.778
572–523 B.C.E. (Xiang 1–Zhao 19)	710	389	1.825	36	23	1.565
522–473 B.C.E. (Zhao 20–Ai 22)	409	299	1.368	18	5	3.6
Average	1707	1427		82	64	
Totals			1.19			1.28

and Zhao (572–510) may partly explain the peak of “colloquial” “於” in the fourth period.

Stylistic differences, important as they are, should not obscure the temporary parameter of substituting “于” by “於.” In Table 4, I compare in greater detail the distribution of the “*yu*” particles at the beginning and the end of the *Zuo* narrative. I tried to choose stylistically similar periods: eleven years of Lord Yin (722–712) and eleven years of Lord Ai (494–484). The relative length and the composition of the narrative during both periods (i.e., percentage of speeches in the narrative) are fairly similar, which makes the comparison more valid. I separated the speeches from the rest of the narrative and also counted separately instances of “*yu*” in the quotations from the *Shi jing*, the *Shu jing*, and the *Chun qiu* text, as well as in the narrator’s remarks.

The results presented in Table 4 support both my and Petersen’s analyses. First, we see a clear influence of the stylistic parameter on the distribution of the “*yu*” particles: even in the early *Zuo* “於” dominates direct speech, while “于” dominates the narrative. However, the temporal parameter is evident as well: by the end of the *Zuo* text, the percentage of

TABLE 4: DISTRIBUTION OF THE “YU” PARTICLES
IN THE EARLY AND LATE ZUO

	Narrative	Speeches	<i>Chun qiu</i>	<i>Shi Shu</i> <i>jing jing</i>	Narrator	Total
	於 于	於 于	於 于	於 于	於 于	於 于
Yin 1–11 (722–712) B.C.E.	29 42	11 5	0 17	0 3	4 0	44 67
Ai 1–11 (494–484) B.C.E.	43 32	41 3	0 5	0 2	0 0	84 42

“於” significantly increases in narration as well as in the speeches. These results would seem to confirm my assertion that most of the speeches in the *Zuo* derive from written records.

This assertion is further corroborated by the second case study: the change in the use of rhetorical question particle, “*qi*.” The ancient “其” dominates the early *Zuo*, while in the last century of the narrative it is replaced by “豈.”⁶ This change is particularly important for my study, since in all but a few cases the “*qi*” particles are used in the speeches, which means that the language of the speeches changes in a manner similar to the language of the *Zuo* in general.⁷

These significant changes indicate that the language of the *Zuo* follows, at least partly, the language of the primary sources; hence, the earlier *Zuo* language corresponds to Western Zhou grammatical norms, whereas the later *Zuo* resembles early Zhanguo texts. These findings further support my claim that the *Zuo*’s author relied primarily on written sources while compiling his narrative, and that these written sources contained speeches by Chunqiu statesmen.⁸

Appendix 2

Zhanguo Data in the *Zuo*

Thirteen passages in the *Zuo* contain information that was unavailable by the date of the last entry in *Zuo* narrative.¹ These passages are usually mentioned as proof of the Zhanguo origin of the *Zuo*. I summarize their content in Table 5; in Table 6, I present instances of wrong predictions in the *Zuo*, which could not have been made by a Zhanguo personality. After presenting the data, I shall discuss whether Zhanguo predictions in the *Zuo* belong to the original text or whether they derive from additions made by the later transmitters of the text.

Some scholars add to Zhanguo predictions contained in the *Zuo* those speeches that refer to the ascendancy of the Tian (Chen) lineage in the state of Qi. They assume that these speeches refer to the final stage of the Tian power seizure in 386.² However, Yang Bojun convincingly proved that all predictions of the Tian ascendancy in the *Zuo* refer to the 481 coup d'état by Tian Chang, and none indicates the author's acquaintance with the dismissal of the last heir of the "legitimate" Qi rulers, Lord Kang, in 386.³ The Tian-related predictions are, therefore, not included here among the evidence of Zhanguo data in the *Zuo*.

An attempt to date the *Zuo* according to successful and unsuccessful predictions contained in its narrative is based on the assumption that all predictions—or at least most of them—were made by the *Zuo* author; accordingly, if some predictions correctly foretell Zhanguo events, then the author might have witnessed these events. As I argued in Chapter 1, this assumption may be disputed. Even some of the short-term predictions in the *Zuo* cannot be plausibly attributed to its author; and this attribution

TABLE 5: ZHANGUO ANACHRONISMS IN THE *ZUO*

Item	Year (Source)	<i>Zuo</i> Content	Zhanguo events
1	661 B.C.E. (Min 1:259–60)	Bu Yan and Xin Liao predict the ascendancy of the Wei 魏 lineage to the overlord rank.	Wei officially achieved overlord rank in 403, sixty-one years after the end of the <i>Zuo</i> narrative.
2	629 B.C.E. (Xi 31:481)	Divination by making cracks predicts that after 300 years (329) the state of Wei 衛 will perish or move its capital.	Wei perished only in 209; the prediction may refer to degrading the lord of Wei to the position of a mere “ruler” (<i>jun</i>) in 320. In any case the prediction is imprecise.
3	606 B.C.E. (Xuan 3:669–672)	Wangsun Man of Zhou tells that after moving the capital to Jiaru (c. 1037), King Cheng divined by making cracks and found that Zhou would “preserve its caldrons” (i.e., persist) for 30 generations and 700 years.	Zhou perished in 256, that is 780 years and 33 generations after moving the capital to Jiaru (Wangcheng). The prediction may refer to the Early Han legend, according to which the Zhou caldrons were sunk in the Si River in 336 or 327. ¹
4	545 B.C.E. (Xiang 28: 1140–1141)	Zi Shen of Lu predicts famine in Song and Zheng on the basis of Jupiter’s movements.	Zi Shen’s calculations of Jupiter’s position are incorrect, and were retroactively made by a person who lived no earlier than 365 B.C.E. ²
5	544 B.C.E. (Xiang 29: 1161–1167)	Prince Ji Zha of Wu visits Huaxia states and predicts the division of the state of Jin (among the Han, Wei, and Zhao lineages), and the imminent end of the state of Zheng.	Jin was divided between Han, Wei, and Zhao in 403, and finally eliminated in 376. Zheng perished in 375.
6	543 B.C.E. (Xiang 30: 1177–1178)	Pi Zao predicts the future destruction of the Bo You lineage of Zheng.	Miscalculation of Jupiter’s position, as in item 4.
7	538 B.C.E. (Zhao 4:1255)	Hun Han predicts the imminent decline of the Guo lineage in Zheng, that Zheng will perish before Wei, and that the states of Cai, Cao, and Teng will perish before other states of the royal Ji clan.	No data is available on the fate of the Guo lineage. ³ Zheng perished a century and a half before Wei, in 375. Cao was annexed by Song in 487. Cai was annexed by Chu in 531, restored in 529, and finally eliminated in 447. Teng was annexed by Yue in 414. ⁴
8	534 B.C.E. (Zhao 8:1305)	Scribe Zhao from Jin predicts the seizure of power in Qi by the Chen lineage and the sub-	Both events occurred in the late Chunqiu (481 and 479 respectively); yet Scribe Zhao’s

Continued

Item	Year (Source)	<i>Zuo</i> Content	Zhanguo events
		sequent destruction of the state of Chen by Chu.	prediction is based on miscalculations of Jupiter's position as in item 4.
9	533 B.C.E. (Zhao 9:1310–1311)	Pi Zao from Zheng predicts the elimination of the state of Chen.	Miscalculation of Jupiter's position, as in item 4.
10	531 B.C.E. (Zhao 11:1322)	Chang Hong predicts annihilation of Cai by Chu later that year, and its restoration after two more years.	Miscalculation of Jupiter's position, as in item 4.
11 12	479 and 477 B.C.E. (Ai 16, 18: 1702, 1713)	Accounts of events in the state of Chu.	Refer to posthumous name of King Hui of Chu, who died thirty-two years after the end of the <i>Zuo</i> narrative.
13	464 B.C.E. (Dao 4:1735–1736)	Zhi Bo's assault on Zheng, and his later destruction by a coalition of the Han, Wei, and Zhao lineages in 453.	Refers to posthumous name of Zhao Xiangzi, who died only in 425.

Notes: 1. For details, see Hong Ye 1937, xc–xcii.

2. See Hu Nianyi 1981a, 22. According to Leopold de Sausurre's calculations (as quoted in Hart 1973, 220). Jupiter's movements were calculated according to the data available from 375 B.C.E.

3. *Han Feizi* ("Waichu shuo you shang" 34:319) mentions a certain Guo Yang, a chancellor of King Xuanhui of Han (r. 332–312). Han inherited the capital of Zheng, and some of Zheng's nobles became Han officials. If Guo Yang was a descendant of the Guo lineage, then Hun Han's prediction is inaccurate.

4. For details, see Tong Shuye 1980, 265.

is even more misleading when we deal with the long-term predictions surveyed above. As Tables 5 and 6 indicate, some of the *Zuo* speakers correctly foresee relatively late events, while others fail to foresee events of the early Zhanguo period. It is implausible that a single author made all these predictions.

In Chapter 1, I suggested that using predictions in historical narrative was a common practice among Chunqiu scribes, as evident from the abundance of short-term predictions in the scribal records incorporated in the *Zuo*.⁴ Perhaps, by retroactively predicting future events, the court scribes sought to enhance their prestige and the credibility of their records. They definitely refrained from making random predictions and eliminated what-

TABLE 6: UNFULFILLED PREDICTIONS IN THE *ZUO*

Item	Year (Source)	Prediction	Real Outcome
14	637 B.C.E. (Xi 23:409)	King Cheng of Chu states that among the Ji clan, descendants of Tang Shu (i.e., the state of Jin) will be the last to perish.	Jin perished in 376, long before states of the Ji clan such as Lu, Wei, Zhou, and even Zheng.
15	621 B.C.E. (Wen 6:549)	The <i>Zuo</i> narrator (“the superior man”) states: “Qin will no more invade the East.”	From the 360s Qin launched a series of successful attacks against Wei, and occupied several Wei regions to the east of the Yellow River.
16	542 B.C.E. (Xiang 31:1191)	Beigong Wenzi of Wei claims: “Zheng abides by ritual norms, it will enjoy good fortune for several generations and will not be punished by the great powers.”	Zheng indeed enjoyed relative stability for several decades; yet later it suffered serious calamities, including three assassinations of rulers (in 456, 423, and 396), and several Jin and Han incursions beginning in 465.

ever unsuccessful predictions they might have originally made. We may assume that the *Zuo*’s compiler / author and the later transmitters followed a similar pattern. Indeed, in all but a few cases the predictions quoted in the *Zuo* are correct. Therefore, the unfulfilled predictions, particularly item 15, may serve as a solid *terminus ante quem* for the *Zuo* compilation. Clearly, the author / narrator did not witness the ascendancy of Qin in the 360s;⁵ we may also assume that he did not witness the destruction of the states of Jin and Zheng in 376 and 375 respectively (items 14 and 16).⁶ It is highly likely therefore, that the *Zuo* text not only existed in the early fourth century B.C.E., but that it did not undergo significant editorial changes thereafter. Otherwise, we may assume that the editors would have eliminated wrong predictions such as item 15, which significantly compromises the author’s wisdom. This in turn suggests that the *Zuo*’s author could not have possibly made those predictions that refer to post–360 B.C.E. events.

The thirteen instances of “Zhanguo anachronisms” can be divided into three groups. The first consists of speeches that predict events that occurred during the Zhanguo period (items 1, 2, 3, 5, 7). The second includes

speeches that contain post-365 B.C.E. miscalculations of Jupiter's position (items 4, 6, 8, 9, 10). The third group includes the last entries of the *Zuo*, which contain posthumous titles of personalities that died long after the end of the *Zuo* narrative (items 11–13). Can we verify whether or not these passages belong to the original text of the *Zuo*?

The case of Zhanguo predictions (items 1, 2, 3, 5, 7) is quite complicated. Scholars disagree on their interpretation, as well as on whether certain predictions failed or not. The discussion about these was initiated by Gu Yanwu (1613–1682 C.E.) and continues until the present day.⁷ Only two predictions, namely items 1 and 5, correctly foresee Zhanguo events;⁸ item 7 is basically correct, but it misplaces the annihilation of Cao between Cai and Teng, although in fact Cao perished earlier than these states. The other two fail to predict the correct date or correct sequence of the events that took place after the mid-fourth century B.C.E. They cannot be plausibly attributed to the *Zuo* author, since it is unlikely that he would make random predictions, which, should they fail, would inevitably damage the credibility of the entire text. Items 2, 3, and probably 7 as well, must have been added by later transmitters whose historical knowledge was less accurate than that of the *Zuo*'s author, and this resulted in mistaken dating.⁹

There is little doubt that later interpolators are responsible also for the correct predictions (items 1 and 5). Prediction of the Wei ascendancy (item 1) belongs to a series of pro-Wei entries that are discussed in greater detail in Appendix 4 below. As I argue there, it is most likely that all pro-Wei entries were added to the *Zuo* by one of its first transmitters, Wu Qi (d. 381 B.C.E.), who served as a chancellor at the court of Wei and probably intended to promote the *Zuo* by adding the pro-Wei data.¹⁰

The account of Ji Zha's visit to the Huaxia states (item 5) is also of later origin. Ji Zha's unique sagehood alone paves the way for doubts in the authenticity of this personage. Besides, Ji Zha's utterances contain a prophetic assessment of Qin's greatness.¹¹ It is unlikely that the *Zuo* author, who had unequivocally denied Qin's good fortune, would express so definite a pro-Qin sentiment; the latter is more appropriate to a person who had witnessed Qin's success. Moreover, Ji Zha's didactic discussion on the *Shi jing* allows us to assume that his speech was invented for ped-

agogical reasons of teaching the greatness of these poems. I would therefore agree with those scholars who consider the account of Ji Zha's voyage a later interpolation, possibly of the late Zhanguo period.¹²

The five speeches that contain anachronistic astronomic data are more problematic. Although Hu Nianyi suggested that all five are disconnected from the original narrative and can be easily removed from the text without altering its meaning, this argument is insufficient to declare these passages later interpolations.¹³ As I argue in Appendix 4, an interpolator should have had sound political or ideological reasons to add a certain passage to the *Zuo*. So far I have failed to discern such motives for predictions based on the miscalculation of Jupiter's position.¹⁴ On the other hand, if the *Zuo* author did not witness the Qin ascendancy in 360s B.C.E. and the Jin destruction in 375, how could he know of astronomic data that became available only in 365? These passages remain puzzling, and this unresolved puzzle is the main reason for my reluctance to claim fifth century B.C.E. provenance for the *Zuo*.

The last three items from the later *Zuo* (11–13) include posthumous names of persons who died in the late fifth century, long after the alleged compilation of the bulk of the *Zuo* occurred. Editing and even slightly extending the original text by the author's followers (disciples?) was a common practice in Chinese historiography. For instance, several chapters of the *Shiji* contain additions to the original narrative by Chu Shaosun (late first century B.C.E.) and others.¹⁵ This may be the case with the *Zuo* as well.

Like that of any other pre-Qin text, the process of transmission of the *Zuo* was subject to editing, embellishment, and also interpolations. This is the source of most if not all Zhanguo data in the *Zuo*. Therefore, it is imprudent to rely on the passages discussed in this appendix as a major criterion for dating the *Zuo*. For this reason I wholeheartedly support Wang He's suggestion that the *Zuo* should be dated on the basis of thorough investigation of the entire text, and not on the basis of a small number of isolated passages that might have been added at a later date.¹⁶

Appendix 3

Comparing Scribal Accounts in the *Zuo*

The *Zuo* is a sophisticated compilation from scribal records of several Chunqiu states. Generally, the author/compiler produced a remarkably unified narrative, eliminating whatever inner contradictions his original sources might have contained. He preserved in all but one case a single account of each event. The only slip occurred in the late *Zuo* in regard to the late 510–early 509 interstate meeting in Diqian, aimed at fortifying the Zhou capital of Chengzhou. The *Zuo* contains two accounts of this meeting: one prepared by Jin scribes, another by their Lu colleagues.

Calendrical problems are responsible for this lapse of the otherwise accurate author of the *Zuo*. The state of Jin used the Xia calendar, which lagged two months behind the Lu calendar that was used in both the *Chunqiu* and the *Zuo*. According to the Jin (Xia) calendar, the meeting at Diqian occurred in the eleventh month of 510, the thirty-second year of Lord Zhao of Lu, whereas according to the Lu calendar the meeting took place in the first month of the next year (the first year of Lord Ding). The *Chunqiu* recorded the Diqian meeting in the winter of 510, possibly dating the meeting according to the arrival of the Lu delegation. This may be the reason for the *Zuo* slip; the detailed account in the *Zuo* clearly shows that the fortification was completed in early 509. This slip of the *Zuo* author allows us to better understand the nature of his primary sources and particularly the treatment of speeches by Chunqiu scribes.

First, the content of the two accounts. According to the Jin version,

in the thirty-second year of Lord Zhao of Lu, King Jing 敬 of Zhou (r. 519–476) dispatched in the eighth month (of the Jin calendar) two envoys to the court of Jin, with the request to fortify the Zhou capital, Chengzhou. The Jin ministers agreed to his plea; after mutual consultations they decided to gather the overlord's ministers and to take charge of the fortification efforts. Then the narrative tells:

Winter, the eleventh month. Wei Shu and Han Buxin of Jin arrived at the [Zhou] capital and assembled the nobles of the overlords at Di-quan.¹ [They] rewarmd the alliance, and then ordered the fortification of Chengzhou. Weizi (Wei Shu) [sat] facing the south.² Biao Xi of Wei 衛 said: “Weizi must receive great punishment! To occupy [the ruler's] position while conducting the great affair is not of his authority. The *Shi* [jing] says: ‘Revere heavenly wrath, dare not be playful, revere heavenly rage, dare not be raging.’³ So, what can be said about [one] who dares to seize [the ruler's] position and thereby carries out the great affair?”

On [the day] *jichou* [fourteenth day of the month] Shi Mimou planned [the fortifications] at Chengzhou.⁴ [The story supplies further details about fortification efforts directed by the Jin noble Shi Mimou under the supervision of the Jin minister Han Buxin].

According to the Lu version:

First year [of Lord Ding], the first month. On *xinsi* [the seventh day of the month], Wei Shu of Jin assembled the nobles of the overlords at Di-quan, intending to fortify Chengzhou. Weizi oversaw the administration [of this enterprise, instead of the Son of Heaven]. Biao Xi of Wei said: “One who intends to establish [the capital for] the Son of Heaven and yet seizes [the superior's] position, thereby issuing commands, violates [the rules of] propriety (*yi*). One who [conducts] the great affair and yet violates propriety will be inevitably punished. Either Jin will lose the overlords, or Weizi will not escape [a bad end].”

On this occasion, Wei Xianzi [Wei Shu] borrowed the servants of Han Jianzi [Han Buxin] and Yuan Shouguo [of Zhou] and hunted in the fields of Dalu. He burned [the grass in the field for hunting]; upon returning [from hunting] he died at Ning. Fan Xianzi deprived him of the cypress-made outer coffin because he hunted before returning [to Jin to report on the fulfillment] of his mission.

Meng Yizi [of Lu] participated in the assembly to fortify Chengzhou. On [the day] *gengyin* [the sixteenth day of the month] [the wooden planks for the earthen walls] were established.⁵ [The *Zuo* continues with the af-

termath of the meeting and the subsequent arrest of the Song envoy by Han Buxin.]

Commentators have taken great pains to explain the double report about the same event; most explanations, however, are far from convincing.⁶ The outline of the narrative is simple. In the eighth month of 510 according to the Jin calendar (tenth month according to the Lu calendar), King Jing requested to fortify Chengzhou, and the Jin ministers approved his request. The ministers of the northern states assembled on the seventh day of the eleventh month (the first month of the next year for Lu); possibly they met earlier without Lu representatives to rewarm the 529 alliance. During the meeting on the seventh day, Wei Shu usurped the position of the sovereign, and was consequently censured. On the fourteenth day the work began, and the wooden planks for the walls were built in three days. Then a conflict between the Jin leaders and the Song envoy occurred, which resulted in the arrest of the Song envoy in the third month of the Lu calendar (the first month of the Jin calendar). Wei Shu died before this; hence the arrest of the Song messenger was carried out by Han Buxin. Both accounts coincide, and they are definitely confined to a single event, discussed by two different scribes.

The different state affiliation of each scribe is easily seen from the details of the account. Jin scribes depicted in great detail the background for the decision to fortify Chengzhou, the details of the Diqian meeting, and the activities of Shi Mimou who actually carried out the fortification plan. The Lu scribes do not mention these. For them the only important part of the meeting was the arrogance of the Jin leader, Wei Shu, and the resultant criticism by Biao Xi, since this episode was characteristic of the increasing tension between Jin and its allies. The Lu narrative also identifies the Lu messenger (Meng Yizi) whose presence was not mentioned by the Jin scribes. Thus, each scribe included in his account of the Diqian meeting those details which were of more interest or of more importance for his fellow statesmen.

Both accounts have also overlapping parts. They tell of Wei Shu's usurpation of the superior's position and they quote Biao Xi's criticism.

For the Jin scribes Biao Xi's speech remained a marginal episode in the great enterprise of fortifying the Zhou capital. The Lu scribes, however, presented a longer quotation and added the verification of Biao Xi's prediction: Wei Shu did indeed die soon after the Diquan meeting and was stripped of his posthumous privileges because of his misconduct. The Lu scribes were less interested in the fortification efforts, and concentrated instead on the moralizing story about the bad end of the arrogant Jin minister.

Thus, we have two versions of Biao Xi's speech. Of course, we cannot know the exact wording of the original speech. The quotations in the *Zou* may be abridged versions of the original record, and different scribes might have decided to embellish the speech in accord with their aesthetic and political views; hence the Jin version contains a quotation from the *Shi jing* that is not present in the Lu version, while the Lu version sounds more moralizing than the Jin account and contains a separate reference to a minister's responsibility to abide by the rules of propriety (*yi*). The most significant difference between the two versions concerns the precise content of Biao Xi's prediction. The Jin version contains only a promise of a "great punishment" to Wei Shu for his arrogance, while the Lu version is more specific: "Either Jin will lose the overlords, or Weizi [Wei Shu] will not escape [a bad end]." Perhaps the Lu scribes used their account to retroactively predict the subsequent decline in the international prestige of Jin, which indeed "lost the overlords" four years later due to the arrogant behavior of its leaders. Yet, notwithstanding these differences, both versions agree on the basic content of Biao Xi's speech: criticism of Wei Shu's usurpation of the superior's position, and prediction of a bad end for the Jin minister.

Comparison of the two versions allows us to better understand the nature of the speeches in the *Zuo*. The similarity in the content of both quotations rules out possible scribal invention. The quotations may not reproduce the original words of the speaker—the speech might have been polished, edited, or embellished—nonetheless, the basic content of the speech does not appear to have been distorted. Certainly, a single example is insufficient to arrive at definite conclusions. We may, nevertheless,

assume from the analysis above that speeches cited in Chunqiu scribal records represent to a considerable extent the views of contemporary statesmen. It may be appropriate, therefore, to conclude with the quotation by the great Tang historian, Liu Zhiji (661–721 C.E.):

Then we know that when men of that age (Zhou) spoke, scribes recorded [those speeches]; although [the records] have certain embellishments, they do not lose the basic content [of the speeches].⁷

Appendix 4

Spurious Speeches and Interpolations in the *Zuo*

Like almost any other pre-Qin text, the *Zuo* contains several passages that were added by later transmitters and interpolators. These include, among others, speeches attributed to various statesmen. Several Chinese scholars have attempted to distinguish these interpolated portions from the original text. In the following discussion I use their methods, although I do not necessarily accept their conclusions.¹

There are two kinds of interpolations. First, some glosses by early commentators were erroneously copied into the original text. Zhang Handong pointed out three instances of such unintentional interpolations, and I accordingly omit these passages from the following discussion.² These cases, however, are few. More significant are those passages that were deliberately interpolated into the *Zuo* text by later transmitters.

My attempt to distinguish spurious from authentic speeches is based on the assumption that the interpolator (presumably the *Zuo* transmitter) had a purpose in inventing a speech and attributing it to an ancient statesman. The purpose may have been to promote the *Zuo* or certain political ideas by means of the *Zuo*. In the first case the transmitters of the *Zuo* may have attempted to impress their patrons with the *Zuo* protagonists' foreknowledge by correctly predicting events that occurred long after the text had allegedly been compiled, or, alternatively, to flatter the patron by telling of the patron's meritorious ancestors (for instance, flattering the Wei and the Ji lineages, as discussed below). Promoting ideological needs might

have been achieved by attributing an ideologically loaded speech to a former sage statesman.

No single criterion is sufficient to distinguish spurious speeches from the original text, unless the interpolator was particularly clumsy. Yet most of the spurious speeches share several common features. First, they are unrelated to the main text. The *Zuo* narrative is sophisticated in its composition, and the majority of speeches and utterances are an inseparable part of the narrative: they predict or explain the future course of events, analyze the events of the past, or indirectly comment on the entries of the *Chun qiu*. These speeches are integrated in the narrative, and are subordinated to the development of the events. Spurious speeches, in contrast, may be easily removed from the text without altering its meaning. Second, spurious speeches often contain predictions related to events that post-date the end of the *Zuo* narrative by centuries. Not only Zhanguo predictions are suspicious; long historical discourses that disguise attempts to construct a favorable biography for some patron of the *Zuo* transmitter may also be unreliable. Finally, spurious speeches often contain terms, concepts, or rhetorical devices not seen elsewhere in the *Zuo*. When all or most of these criteria apply to a particular speech, I regard it as spurious. To illustrate the criteria that I use in defining spurious speeches, I shall discuss in detail three examples, and then briefly summarize the reasons why I doubt the authenticity of several others.

The Speech of Taishi Ke (Wen 18:633–643)

In 609 the rebellious heir apparent, Pu, from the state of Ju murdered his father, Lord Ji, robbed his treasures, and fled to Lu. Lord Xuan of Lu granted Pu an allotment, but the Lu prime minister, Ji Wenzi, defied the ruler's command and instead gave the order to expel Pu immediately. To explain his motives, Ji Wenzi dispatched Grand Scribe (*taishi*) Ke to the Lu ruler. Ke delivered a long speech:

Our former dignitary Zang Wenzhong taught Xingfu [i.e., Ji Wenzi] to serve the ruler in accord with ritual. Xingfu ceaselessly followed [this teaching] and dared not relinquish it, saying: "When you see one who

behaves toward his ruler according to ritual, serve him like a filial son who nourishes his parents; when you see one who behaves toward his ruler not according to ritual, punish him like a hawk and a falcon who hunt a sparrow." Our former ruler, the Duke of Zhou, established the Zhou ritual, saying: "Observe virtue according to [fixed] patterns, perform tasks according to virtue, measure merits according to tasks, nourish the people according to [their] merits." He made the "Oath Command," saying: "He who destroys the patterns is a bandit, he who conceals villains shelters [criminals]. He who steals riches is a robber; a robber's belongings are viciousness. To get the reputation of master of a shelter [for criminals], to rely on viciousness and use it, is the most inauspicious virtue; it is forever unforgivable; it will not be forgotten among the nine punishments."

Xingfu thoroughly inspected [the case] of Pu of Ju, and [considers Pu] unworthy to become a pattern. Filial piety and reverence, loyalty and trustworthiness are auspicious virtues, while robbery and banditry, sheltering [criminals] and viciousness are inauspicious virtues. Now, if we inspect the filial piety and reverence of Pu of Ju, then [we find] that he murdered his father and his ruler; if we inspect his loyalty and trustworthiness, then [we find] that he stole [his father's] treasures and jades. This man is a robber and a bandit, and his belongings are the repository of viciousness. To preserve him and benefit from [his belongings] is to become the master of a shelter [for criminals]. These are dire lessons that the people cannot [accept as a] pattern. [These actions] are not measured according to the good, and they all belong to inauspicious virtue. Therefore I expelled him.

Formerly, the Gaoyang family had eight gifted children: Cangshu, Kui'ai, Taoyan, Dalin, Pangjiang, Tingjian, Zhongrong, Shuda. Even-minded, sagely, broad-hearted, deep, intelligent, trustworthy, keen, and sincere, the people under Heaven called them "the eight kind ones." The Gaoxin family had eight gifted children: Bofen, Zhongkan, Shuxian, Jizhong, Bohu, Zhongxiong, Shubao, Jili. Loyal, reverent, respectful, resplendent, all-embracing, kind, good-hearted, harmonious, the people under Heaven called them "the eight excellent ones." These sixteen families from generation to generation accumulated splendor and did not lose their fame. When the time of Yao arrived, Yao was unable to promote them. Shun served as Yao's minister; he promoted "the eight kind ones," appointing them to preside over the *houtu* office.³ They arranged all matters so that nothing violated the order of the seasons; the earth became balanced and Heaven, accomplished. He promoted "the eight excellent ones," appointing them to spread the five teachings in the four corners [of the earth]. [Then] fathers [became] righteous, mothers kind, elder

brothers fraternal, younger brothers respectful, and sons filial; internal [affairs] became balanced and external ones, accomplished.

Formerly, the Dihong family had an inept son who concealed righteousness and secretly committed crimes; [he] liked following inauspicious virtues, and became a sort of evil person. He made friends with the stubborn and raucous, and those lacking fraternal feelings; the people under Heaven called him Hundun.⁴ The Shaohao family had an inept son; he destroyed trustworthiness and smashed loyalty, adorned himself in evil words, was tranquil regarding slanders and trusted the deviant, followed falsehood and concealed the vicious, thereby deceiving those of flourishing virtue. The people under Heaven called him Qiongqi. The Zhuang family had an inept son, who was unable to learn, knew nothing of proper words, when told [of proper words] became stubborn, when left alone became raucous; [he] despised and disapproved of bright virtue. The people under Heaven called him Taowu. These three families from generation to generation accumulated evil and increased their infamy. When the time of Yao arrived, Yao was unable to get rid of them. The Jiyun family had an inept son, greedy for food and drink, avaricious for riches and wealth, following his desires and upholding exorbitance. He was insatiable, knew nothing of norms and regulations, distributed nothing to orphans and widows, and had no pity toward the miserable and the poor. The people under Heaven compared him to the three inauspicious [sons; i.e., Hundun, Qiongqi, and Taowu] and called him Taotie. When Shun served as Yao's minister, "he opened four gates to accept guests";⁵ he expelled the four inauspicious families, Hundun, Qiongqi, Taowu, and Taotie, and threw them [into the areas] of the four boundaries to repulse evil demons. Therefore, when Yao died, all under Heaven unanimously united their hearts in admiring Shun and made him the Son of Heaven. This is because he promoted sixteen chancellors and drove away the four inauspicious ones. Therefore, the *Yu shu* summarized Shun's merits, saying: "He carefully [upheld] the beauty of the five statutes, the five statutes can be followed," meaning that he did not defy the teaching. It says: "He arranged a hundred affairs, a hundred affairs are ordered according to seasons," meaning that he let no undertaking decline. It says: "Open four gates to guests, four gates are stately, stately," meaning that there were no [longer] inauspicious people.⁶

Shun had twenty great merits and became the Son of Heaven. Now, Xingfu, although he did not succeed in attaining even one auspicious person, expelled one inauspicious one; this is one-twentieth of Shun's merits, but it suffices to escape punishment [for neglecting Lord Xuan's order].

REASONS FOR CONSIDERING THE SPEECH SPURIOUS

Taishi Ke's speech is one of the longest in the *Zuo*. This in itself is surprising, because the speech concerns a petty matter of a fugitive heir from the tiny state of Ju, and he does not appear in the subsequent narrative; neither does Taishi Ke appear elsewhere in the *Zuo*. The same story of Pu and Ji Wenzi is told in the *Guoyu*,⁷ but the speech of Taishi Ke there bears no resemblance to that quoted above. Generally, the speeches in the "Lu yu" chapters of the *Guoyu* resemble those of the *Zuo*, and may well derive from a common source. Ke's speech is the only significant exception, and the versions have nothing in common. Doubts about the authenticity of the speech are therefore justified. Several other aspects of Ke's speech further strengthen our doubts.

Taishi Ke's vocabulary has a strong Zhanguo flavor. For instance, in no other place does the *Zuo* mention the term "inauspicious virtue" (*xiong de*), but it appears four times in the speech. As argued in Chapters 2 and 6, the term "*de*" in the *Zuo* refers invariably to positive qualities such as charisma or moral virtue; for the Chunqiu speakers "inauspicious virtue" was a contradiction in terms. Furthermore, throughout his speech Ke constantly refers to the affairs of "All under Heaven" (*tianxia*). This term was not common in Chunqiu discourse; it appears only twenty-two times in the rest of the *Zuo* and is never mentioned more than twice in one speech. Ke, however, mentions *tianxia* no less than seven times as a standard reference to the world—an unmistakable Zhanguo usage. The term "sincerity" (*cheng*) mentioned by Taishi Ke among "auspicious virtues" is likewise not seen elsewhere in the *Zuo*.

The long historical-mythological narrative in Taishi Ke's speech is particularly suspect.⁸ The story of Yao and Shun, including Shun's peacefully attaining all under Heaven through the will of the people, is not mentioned elsewhere in the *Zuo* and in all likelihood did not exist in pre-Zhanguo historiography. The most striking anachronism are the quotations from the "Shun dian," a part of the "Yao dian" chapter of the *Shu jing*. Although scholars disagree regarding the precise dating of the "Yao dian," it is widely

accepted that this document could not have been compiled before the mid-Zhanguo period.⁹ The quotations from the *Yu shu* (i.e., “Shun dian”) are, therefore, the most clear indication of the later origins of Taishi Ke’s speech.

These definite anachronisms permit us to assume that Taishi Ke’s speech was composed and interpolated in the Zhanguo period by one of the *Zuo* transmitters. It may be one of the ideological interpolations, aimed at persuading the rulers to refrain from sheltering foreign evildoers, but the interpolator might have had additional aims. The last sentences explicitly flatter Ji Wenzi, whose deeds are compared to that of Shun. The powerful Ji lineage remained the major political force in the state of Lu well into the Zhanguo period, and perhaps the transmitters of the *Zuo* intended to gain the support of Ji Wenzi’s descendants by comparing their ancestor to the paragon of the good ruler—the legendary emperor, Shun.¹⁰ This is not the only example of a *Zuo* personage flattering the Ji lineage: we may add to it the curious self-criticism by the archenemy of the Ji lineage, Mu Jiang, and the favorable prediction about the future of the Ji lineage.¹¹ Taishi Ke’s speech may belong to a similar series of pro-Ji entries; in any case, it is definitely of later origin than the rest of the *Zuo*.¹²

The Speech by Cheng Zhuan (Zhao 28:1495–1496)

In 514 two powerful Jin lineages, Yangshe and Qi, were eliminated by their rivals. The head of the Jin government, Wei Shu, distributed the dependencies (*xian*) of the defeated dignitaries between six major ministerial lineages, and granted one of these dependencies to his younger son, Wu. Annoyed by possible opposition, Wei Shu sought the advice of the Jin noble Cheng Zhuan. The following conversation ensued:

Wei Xianzi (Wei Shu) said to Cheng Zhuan: “I granted a dependency to [my son,] Wu; would not the people consider me partisan?”

[Cheng] answered: “Why should they? Wu is such a man that when he is far away he does not forget the ruler, and when he is close he does not menace those of a similar [position]; while being in beneficial [conditions], he thinks of propriety/righteousness, and being in dire straits he thinks of purity. He restrains his heart and is not excessive in his actions. Even if you grant him a dependency—what is unacceptable about

that? In ancient times, when King Wu overcame Shang, his radiance [filled] All under Heaven; fifteen states were ruled by his brothers, while over forty states were ruled by the Ji clan—all these appointees were his relatives. In appointing others [think] only who is good; the relatives and strangers are the same [for this matter]. The *Shi jing* says:

'Oh, this King Wen, Tranquil was the sound of his virtue, Could shine, could be good, Reigning over these great states, They united with King Wen, And thus he obtained <i>Di</i> 's blessings,	<i>Di</i> ['God'] measured his heart, His virtue could shine, Could lead, could rule, He could bring compliance and unity. Whose virtue none regretted, Extending them to sons and descendants. ¹³
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When the heart is restricted according to propriety/righteousness, it is called 'measured'; when virtue is corrected and is responded to harmoniously, it is called 'tranquility'; radiating right down in the four directions is called 'shining'; giving assiduously and selflessly is called 'being good'; teaching tirelessly is called 'to lead'; when rewards [inspire people to] celebrate, and punishment strikes awe in them, it is called 'to rule'; when kindness and harmony spread universal submission it is called 'compliance'; to select the good and let them follow you is called 'unity'; establishing the warp and woof of Heaven and Earth is called 'refined culture' (*wen*). Never erring in these nine virtues, performing tasks without anything to regret, one thereby obtains the rewards of Heaven and his sons and descendants can rely [on him]. Your appointments were close to the refined virtue, and they will have far-reaching effects."¹⁴

REASONS FOR CONSIDERING THE SPEECH SPURIOUS

The effusive panegyric to the Wei family is almost embarrassing, especially when we consider that both heroes of Cheng Zhuan's speech are relatively marginal figures who by no means deserve such flattery. Wei Wu does not appear in the *Zuo* narrative except later in the same year when he indirectly reprimanded his father for taking bribes; as for Wei Shu, he by no means can be considered a prominent leader. Four years after the above events, Wei Shu died and was posthumously punished by being

stripped of his sumptuary privileges; his behavior in his lifetime also gave no reason to compare him with King Wen (see details in Appendix 3). Moreover, the very distribution of the Yangshe and Qi lands—the reason Wei Shu is praised in the text—was criticized by later historians as a step toward the dissolution of the state of Jin among powerful ministerial lineages.¹⁵ We have, therefore, good reason to suspect Cheng Zhuan's speech of having been fabricated by Wei supporters.

The content of Cheng Zhuan's speech likewise indicates its later origin. Consider first the speech's sophistication. In his exegesis on the "Huang yi" ode of the *Shi jing*, Cheng Zhuan presented a well-developed sequence of the evolution of King Wen's virtue from the inner to the outer realm. According to Cheng Zhuan, King Wen first "restricted his heart," then proceeded toward "correcting his virtue" and making others "harmoniously respond," an initial step from the internal toward the external. The third stage included "clarifying virtue" (*ming de*) to others—the first purely external action. Further steps toward King Wen's elevation to the position of ruler are of ever expanding scope: King Wen selflessly acted for others; taught them and finally established rewards and punishments, thereby "becoming a ruler." The next steps are directed toward stabilizing rule, first by encouraging compliance, and then through unity (*bi*) with the leader. At this stage, after firmly stabilizing his earthly rule, King Wen proceeded toward the cosmic level, and, by "establishing the warp and woof of Heaven and Earth," became "refined" (*wen*). Not coincidentally, the nine steps of the emanation of King Wen's virtue resemble the eight stages of proceeding from the internal to the external as depicted in the "Da xue."¹⁶ Yet, unlike the presumably later "Da xue," Cheng Zhuan's sequence includes only one purely internal stage ("restricting the heart"), while other aspects of King Wen's virtue are directed toward the ever expanding external circles. It is noteworthy that the last stage goes beyond purely political and social action and ascends to the level of the transcendental.

Such a sophisticated view of the connection between inner and outer virtue is not seen elsewhere in the *Zuo*. Shall we assume that the otherwise unknown Cheng Zhuan single-handedly effected an intellectual breakthrough, unifying the internal, social, and cosmic levels of human

activities in a single sequence of emanating virtue? I strongly doubt this possibility. This well-elaborated concept presumes the existence of previous discourse on related topics. But nowhere in the *Zuo* is there the slightest trace of such a discourse. Presumably, the interest in a person's inner attributes appeared first in the circle of Confucius and his disciples. The author of Cheng Zhuan's speech must have had sufficient knowledge of the preceding discourse, and possibly incorporated it in the speech. Thus, along with pursuing the immediate political aim—to flatter the powerful Wei lineage—the author of Cheng Zhuan's speech used this opportunity to present his complicated views of human virtue.

In most cases we have no idea of the identity of the possible interpolator. However, in the case of Cheng Zhuan's speech we are on firmer ground. In his bibliographic treatise *Bielu*, the Han librarian Liu Xiang (77–6 B.C.E.) named the chain of *Zuo* transmitters from its alleged author, Zuo Qiu-ming, down to Han times.¹⁷ One of the earliest transmitters is Wu Qi (d. 381), an eminent political and military leader of the early Zhanguo. Wu Qi, a native of Wei 衛, was a disciple of Confucius' disciple Zi Xia,¹⁸ and served in the courts of Lu and Wei 魏. He arrived in Wei 魏 during the reign of Lord Wen (r. 445–396). This was a crucial period in the history of the state of Wei, which was in process of transformation from a nominal allotment of the Jin minister to an independent political entity. The Wei rulers were seeking legitimacy, and must have welcomed the praise for their ancestors in a respected historical text. Indeed, we may assume that Wu Qi satisfied the hopes of his patrons.¹⁹ In addition to the panegyric quoted above, the *Zuo* contains two other explicitly pro-Wei passages. One is the double prediction of the future ascendancy of the Wei lineage (Min 1:259–260), and another is an even more effusive panegyric to the Wei lineage by Confucius himself. Shortly after Cheng Zhuan's discussion about the abilities of Wei Wu, Confucius is quoted as praising Wu's father, Wei Shu, who correctly distributed the lands of the Yangshe and Qi lineages, and also gave proper orders to his appointee, Jia Xin:

Zhongni heard of the appointments by Weizi, and considered them in accord with propriety/righteousness (*yi*). He said: "Near at hand, he does not forget relatives, afar he does not forget [proper] appointments;

this may be called propriety / righteousness.” He also heard about [Wei Shu’s] orders to Jia Xin and considered him [Wei Shu] as loyal. The *Shi* says: “Forever speak of matching the orders, by this you seek plenty of good fortune for yourself”—this is loyalty. Appointments of Weizi are [in accord with] propriety, his orders are loyal, he will have descendants in the state of Jin for a long time to come.²⁰

Confucius’ speech appears in the same context as that of Cheng Zhuan, and both are closely interrelated. We may assume with a high degree of certainty that both were produced by a single person—presumably Wu Qi—who intended to flatter the Wei rulers. Accordingly, neither speech, nor the earlier prediction by Xin Liao can be considered authentic Chunqiu materials.

Zi Taishu’s (Zi Chan’s) Speech (Zhao 25:1457–1459)

The following conversation presumably occurred during the 517 Huangfu meeting of the northern states:

Summer. Assembled at Huangfu. Planned [to settle the problems inside] the royal house. Zhao Jianzi ordered the nobles of the overlords to transfer grains to the king, and to prepare garrisons, saying: “Next year we shall let the king in.”²¹

✧ ✧ ✧

Zi Taishu met Zhao Jianzi. Jianzi asked about the ritual of mutual greetings and treating guests.

[Taishu] answered: “These are ceremonies, not ritual.”

Jianzi said: “I dare to ask what is called ritual?”

[Taishu] answered: “[I], Ji, heard our former dignitary Zi Chan saying, ‘Ritual is the warp of Heaven, the propriety / righteousness of Earth, the conduct of the people. It is the warp of Heaven and Earth that people actually make their model. Thus, the brightness of Heaven relies on the [immanent] qualities of Earth, gives birth to the six ethers (*qi*), makes use of the five phases. The ethers become the five tastes, develop into the five colors, and are patterned as the five notes. With excess they become disordered and chaotic, and the people lose their nature. Therefore, ritual was created to support them: six domestic animals, five vic-

tims, and three sacrifices were made to support the five flavors; nine weave-patterns, six color-mixtures, five color-patterns were made to support the five colors; nine songs, eight airs, seven tones, and six pitches were made to support the five notes. Ruler and subjects, superiors and inferiors were made to pattern the propriety / righteousness of Earth; [distinctions between] the husband and the wife, the inner and the outer were made to support the two things;²² [divisions between] father and son, elder and younger brother, aunt and elder sister, uncle and nephew, married couples, and wives' relatives were made to imitate the brightness of Heaven; political affairs, physical labor, activities, and undertakings were made to follow the four seasons; punishments and penalties, [manifestation of] dignity and prisons, causing the people fear and awe were made to pattern the killing force of lightning and thunder; mildness, kindness, generosity, and harmony were made to emulate Heaven's force of giving birth, nourishing, and nurturing.

The people have likes and dislikes, tranquillity and anger, sorrow and joy—these are born of the six ethers. Therefore, one must investigate the models and check the kinds in order to restrict the six desires. There is crying in sorrow, singing and dancing in joy, being generous in tranquillity and fighting in anger; tranquillity is born of likes and anger is born of dislikes. Therefore, [make your] conduct careful and orders trustworthy, [use] good and bad fortune, rewards and punishments to restrict [the matters of] life and death. Life is a good thing and death is a bad thing. A good thing is joyful, a bad thing is sorrowful. He who loses neither sorrow nor joy, is able to conform to the [immanent] qualities of Heaven and Earth and thereby prolong [his life] for a long time.”

Jianzi said: “Extreme indeed is the greatness of ritual!”

[Taishu] answered: “Ritual is the norm of superior and inferior, the warp and woof of Heaven and Earth. It gives birth to the people, hence, the former kings elevated it. Therefore, the man who is able to twist and correct himself and thereby proceed towards ritual is the accomplished man. Is it not appropriate that [ritual] is great?”

Jianzi said: “[I], Yang, would like to keep these words until the end of my life.”²³



Yue Daxin of Song said: “We shall not transfer grains. We are the guests of Zhou.²⁴ Is it possible to force the guests [to work]?”

Shi Boof Jin said: “Since the Jiantu alliance (632) did Song escape any assembly to perform work duties? Was it not a partner in every al-

liance? [The alliance oaths say] ‘Jointly support the royal house’—how can you escape it? You are carrying the orders of your ruler and participating in an assembly that discusses a great matter, whereas Song betrays the alliance—is it acceptable?²⁵

REASONS FOR CONSIDERING THE SPEECH SPURIOUS

I have presented the passage in three sections so as to highlight the position of Zi Taishu’s speech in the structure of the narrative. It is clear that Yue Daxin’s complaint about enforcing labor duties on Song in the third section is a direct reaction to the announcement by Zhao Jianzi in the first section regarding transferring grains and preparing garrisons. Thus, the exchange between Zi Taishu and Zhao Jianzi on the subject of ritual artificially breaks the original narrative into two separate parts; Zi Taishu’s speech is an obvious and clumsy interpolation.

The speech’s content further supports this conclusion. The *Zuo* abounds in discussions on ritual (see Chapter 3), but none even slightly resembles Zi Taishu’s speech. Zi Taishu (or Zi Chan, whom he allegedly quoted) presents a complicated picture of ritual as a universal force patterned along the model of Heaven and Earth, and closely related to the five phases (*wu xing*) and six ethers (*liu qi*). This unmistakably relates Zi Taishu’s speech to correlationist views that flourished in the late Zhanguo to early Han and culminated in such books as *Xunzi*, commentaries on the *Zhouyi*, and portions of the *Liji*.²⁶ The “tripartite” division of Heaven, Earth, and Man is not seen elsewhere in the *Zuo* or other late Chunqiu to early Zhanguo writings.²⁷ The same is true of the concept of the “accomplished man” (*chengren*) mentioned at the end of Zi Taishu’s speech: this concept does not occur elsewhere in the *Zuo*, nor are there sophisticated discussions on human nature.²⁸ Thus, the content, the terminology, and the structural flaw in the narrative all indicate later origins of Zi Taishu’s speech.

Other Spurious Speeches

In Appendix 2 we discussed several speeches that can be considered later interpolations because they contain Zhanguo data. These are predictions

by Bu Yan and Xin Liao (Min 1:259–260); Ji Zha (Xiang 29:1161–1167); Pi Zao (Xiang 30:1177–1178; Zhao 9:1310–1311); Hun Han (Zhao 4:1254–1255); Scribe Zhao (Zhao 8:1305); Chang Hong (Zhao 11:1322). To these we can add a speech by Wangsun Man (Xuan 3:669–672), who predicted the sinking of the Zhou caldrons in the Si river. The latter case, however, is more complicated: it is possible that the speech itself is authentic and only the prediction about the fate of the Zhou caldrons was added at a later date.

Several other easily recognizable interpolations should be mentioned, such as a long-term prediction on the fate of the Jin ruling house made by Shi Fu (Huan 2:92–93), or Hou Yi's story interpolated in Wei Jiang's speech (Xiang 4:936–939).²⁹ A passage on the origins of the Liu lineage (Wen 13:596), Fan Xuanzi's genealogy (Xiang 24:1087–1088), and Scribe Mo's story of dragons (Zhao 29:1500–1503) join to create a complicated pattern of a favorable genealogy for the Liu lineage—founders of the Han dynasty. Accordingly, Gu Jiegang considers all these to be Han interpolations.³⁰ The speech of Meng Xizi (Zhao 7:1294–1296) on Confucius' sagehood seems to be an apocryphal story invented by Confucius' disciples or followers. In addition, I tend to mistrust the discussion by the lord of Tan on “bird officials” of the remote past (Zhao 17:1386–1389), and Scribe Mo's astronomic prediction about the decline of the state of Wu (Zhao 31:1513–1514).

Zhao Guangxian has argued that all the speeches that deal with the ascendancy of the Chen lineage in the state of Qi should be considered later interpolations. Zhao claims in particular that several speeches by Yan Ying in which he expressed his fear of the potential Chen ascendancy are unreliable: if Yan Ying foresaw the coup by the Chen followers, why then did neither he nor his patron, Lord Jing, do anything to prevent it?³¹ Zhao's arguments may be disputed. The Chen ascendancy was a visible process, and the reader of the *Zuo* can recognize it even without numerous predictions by Yan Ying and others. By 546 the Chen lineage was one of the four major power holders in the state of Qi, and by 532 one of the two. What could Lord Jing do to prevent it? A possible assault on the powerful and popular Chens could have cost him his life or his position—

exactly what happened to his neighbor, Lord Zhao of Lu, who attempted to expel the powerful Ji lineage in 517. An astute thinker, Yan Ying foresaw the process of Chen ascendancy; yet he never claimed that this process was inevitable and irreversible, and I see no reason to doubt the reliability of his speeches.

It would be imprudent to suggest that all instances of later interpolations have been or can be easily identified and separated from the original text. Further efforts are required to distinguish later layers in the *Zuo* and other pre-Qin texts.³² The combined efforts of linguists, historians, and specialists in textual criticism will, it is hoped, provide more conclusive results in the future.

Notes

Notes on Translation, Terms, and Quotations

1. See Zhu Fenghan 1990, 492–515. This interchangeability complicates the matter of translation. Lothar von Falkenhausen, for instance, has suggested that *shi* may be a larger unit than *zong*, and that the term “*zu*” may be more appropriate for a branch lineage. Nevertheless, I prefer the above designated usage, which is accepted in most Mainland studies.

Introduction

1. Hereafter, unless indicated otherwise, all the dates are B.C.E. (Before Common Era), except for references, of course.
2. For the Chunqiu period as the age of “intellectual breakthrough,” see Yu Yingshi 1985.
3. “The Master said: I transmit but do not create. I trust antiquity and like it” (*Lunyu*, “Shu er” 7.1:66).
4. See Graham 1989, 3.
5. For more detailed discussions of Chunqiu political and social life, see Hsu Cho-yun 1965; 1999; Zhao Boxiong 1990; Zhu Fenghan 1990; Falkenhausen 1999.
6. It goes without saying that this division is purely for heuristic purposes. Different opinions exist with regard to the beginning and the end of the Chunqiu period. I have chosen the dates of the first and the last entries in the *Zuo zhuan*—the main source for the present study.
7. The Huaxia were mostly relatives and allies of the Zhou house; their states were concentrated on the Central Plain, but also included some peripheral states to the south and to the northeast. They shared a common culture and, particularly, common rituals, which differentiated them from the states and polities established by the Rong, Di, Man, and Yi ethnic groups. Later tradition, not necessarily relevant to the Chunqiu period, also excludes the peripheral states of Chu and Qin from the Huaxia.

8. The Yue hegemony ended in all likelihood with the death of King Goujian in 465. According to the *Mozi* (“Fei gong xia” 19:221), Yue was still considered a superpower in the late fifth century.
9. The discussion whether the Chunqiu world was “feudal” or not is too complicated to be dealt with in sufficient detail in this study. Suffice it to say that the answer depends not only on the peculiarities of the Chunqiu economic, social, and political structure, but also on the definition of “feudalism” (compare Anderson 1974 and Bloch 1961). The best discussion of Zhou “feudalism” to my mind is in Creel 1970, 317–387; cf. earlier views of Marcel Granet (1952, 19–30), and recent approaches of Wang Lanzhong (1984) and Li Jun (1996). I use the term “quasi feudalism” to underline the peculiarities of the Chunqiu system.
10. See Creel 1960, 113.
11. The dating of the *Lunyu* is one of the most controversial topics in modern research (see, for instance, Makeham 1996; Brooks and Brooks 1998; Schaberg 2000), and cannot be adequately dealt with here. I tentatively concur with Yang Bojun’s suggestion that most of the *Lunyu* was compiled within two or three generations following the death of Confucius (479) (see his introduction to the *Lunyu*, 26–30).
12. Hou Wailu’s *Comprehensive History of Chinese Thought* remained for many years a textbook for the history of Chinese philosophy for Mainland scholars; it also had a strong impact on Soviet scholars, of whom F. S. Bykov (1966) is the best representative.
13. This approach is characteristic of Creel 1960; Wing-tsit Chan 1969; Schwartz 1985; Mote 1989; see also Opitz 1968; L. Vasil’ev 1989. Some scholars completely neglect the Chunqiu period and move from the Western Zhou directly to Confucius: Lin Yusheng 1974–1975; Nikkila 1982 and 1992; Kozlovskij 1982; Graham 1989. Most recently, Edward L. Shaughnessy in the introduction to the collection of his articles (1997, 1–12) paid due attention to the Western Zhou antecedents of Confucius’ ideas, but remained silent regarding the possible Chunqiu impact on Confucius’ thought. Authors of the *Cambridge History of Ancient China* similarly confined their discussion of Chunqiu thought to no more than three pages (see Hsu 1999; Nivison 1999). Curiously, this approach resembles the traditional view that Confucius transmitted the Way of the ancient sages but remained uninfluenced by his immediate predecessors and contemporaries. Of course, this resemblance is mostly superficial; in most cases scholarly reservations toward further investigation of Chunqiu thought are evidently caused by the dubious authenticity of the sources.
14. See, for instance, Takeuchi Yoshio 1953; Hsiao Kung-chuan 1979; Luo Guang 1982; Lao Siguang 1984; Zhou Daoji 1986; Chen Ruoshui 1986. The recent two-volume *History of Chinese Thought*, edited by Hihara Toshikuni, entirely omitted pre-Confucian thought from its discussion.
15. See Feng Youlan 1980; Liu Zehua 1991; 1992; 1996. Far less impressive are discussions by Xu Datong 1981; Zhu Yiting 1989; Zhu Riyao 1988; and Zhou Lisheng 1988. Earlier, Guan Feng and Lin Lüshi attempted to comprehensively discuss the Chunqiu legacy. Their study (1963; see also the English translation, Kuan and Lin 1970–1971), however, was severely biased by their pre-Cultural Revolution ideologi-

- cal commitments (Guan Feng was a close associate of Kang Sheng; see MacFarquhar 1997, 395ff.) and, hence, is of little scholarly value.
16. See Mori Mikisaburo 1971; Qi Sihe 1981, 193–200; Suzuki 1982; Lü Shaogang 1984; Xu Fuguan 1982; 1984; Yang Zhao 1985; Uno 1987; Liu Baocai 1988; Huang Weihe 1990. Less impressive are the studies by Chen Xiyong 1992; He Huaihong 1994; Xu Nanyu 1995. One should also mention several interesting works that deal with the intellectual content of the *Zuo zhuan* and *Guoyu*, the most important of which is that by Zhang Duansui (1987); see also Zhang Ai et al. 1979; Zhan Ziqing 1983; Zheng Junhua 1983; Li Xinlin 1991; Lin Xudian 1991; Liu Jiahe 1996.
 17. See, for instance, Feng Youlan 1980; Zhu Riyao 1988; Zhu Yiting 1989. For a different approach, see Liu Zehua (1991; 1992), whose lead I follow in the present study.
 18. Borrowed from Hsu 1965.
 19. Almost all the studies mentioned in note 15 above uncritically resort to the *Guoyu*, including those portions of this text which bear the unmistakable imprint of Zhanguo thought (the book of Qi [“Qi yu”], for instance); others quote the even less reliable *Yanzi chunqiu* and *Guanzi*. For the reliability of these and other sources and their relevance to Chunqiu intellectual history, see Chapter 1. In Chapter 1 I shall present in detail the successes of Chinese, Japanese, and Western scholars in exploring the authenticity and the reliability of the sources for Chunqiu thought.
 20. This problem is particularly common among scholars who discuss “Zuo thought” (see note 16). All of them, with the major exception of Zhang Duansui (1987) and Pu Weizhong (1990) fail to clarify whether they discuss Chunqiu thought as reflected in the *Zuo* in general or particular views of the *Zuo* author.
 21. There are, however, several excellent discussions on the relevance of archaeological and paleographical sources to Chunqiu intellectual history. See Falkenhausen 1993b; 1994; Emura 1988; 1989–1991; Ikezawa 1992.
 22. Marx [1859] 1975, 263.

Chapter 1: Sources of Chunqiu Thought

1. The absence of the primary sources places the *Zuo* scholars at a major disadvantage in comparison with their colleagues who study the *Shiji*. The latter achieved remarkable results in tracing the ways in which Sima Qian (c. 145–90 B.C.E.) utilized and edited earlier historical works such as the *Zuo*, and were able to distinguish Sima Qian’s personal input from that of his sources (see, for instance, Rubin 1966; Durrant 1995, 71–122; Hardy 1999, 148–150ff.). Many of the *Zuo* scholars, to the contrary, leave aside the question of its primary sources, discussing its interpretative devices as if those were created ex nihilo by the author of the *Zuo*.
2. Henri Maspero (1978) inaugurated the literary approach toward the *Zuo* when he traced its origins to a putative “historical romance.” Maspero was followed by later scholars like John Wang (1977), Egan (1977), Johnson (1981), B. Watson (1989); see also Petersen (1992) and Eno (2000). The literary approach to the *Zuo* culminated in

- the comprehensive studies by David Schaberg (1996a; 1997; 2001). See Wang He 1993a; Yoshimoto 1991; Pines 1997a, 80–95; Schaberg 1999; Zhao Boxiong 1999. See also the Warring States Workshop Archives for the years 1999–2000.
3. For these four definitions, see Johnson 1981; Egan 1977; Watson 1989; and Schaberg 1997.
 4. See Egan 1977; Wang He 1993a.
 5. The changing coverage of major Chunqiu states is best exemplified by the disappearance of several major powers from the last years of the *Zuo* narrative (see Table 1 and the adjacent discussion). Similar patterns may be observed elsewhere. For instance, the *Zuo* discusses in meticulous detail the internal life of the Zhou royal domain for the second half of the sixth century B.C.E., but provides no information about Zhou for the early fifth century; conversely, internal affairs of the state of Qi are all but absent from the *Zuo* narrative for the first quarter of the sixth century, but rapidly resurface thereafter.
 6. See Maspero 1978, 361–362; Gardner 1961, 10–12; Van der Loon 1961, 25–26; Schaberg 1996a, 13–28.
 7. The *Lu Chun qiu* is traditionally attributed to Confucius, although many modern scholars question both his authorship and/or editing of this text (Kennedy 1942; Karapet'iants 1988; Wang He 1993b; Chao Yuefeng 2000; for the opposite view, see Zhang Yiren 1990a; Zhao Shengqun 1999; 2000). Whether or not Confucius was involved in the *Chun qiu* editing, it is generally accepted that the present text is based on the official annals of the state of Lu. Similar annals existed in most Chinese states. Mencius (c. 379–304 B.C.E.) mentions the *Sheng* of the state of Jin and the *Taowu* of the state of Chu, which were presumably identical to the *Chun qiu* of Lu (*Mengzi*, “Li Lou xia” 8.21:192). The *Sheng* annals might have served as a source for the *Zhushu jinian* (The Bamboo Annals)—revised extracts from the Zhou, Jin, and Wei 魏 annals discovered in 280 C.E. in a tomb of King Xiang of Wei (r. 318–296 B.C.E.) (*Jin shu* 51:1432). For different views about the reliability of the extant version of *Zhushu jinian*, see Prusek 1970, 35–48; Keightley 1978c; Nivison 1983; Shaughnessy 1986; Pankenier 1992; Shao Dongfang 2000.
 8. See a detailed discussion in Pines 1997a, 80–86. Cultic origins of Chinese historical writing in general have been extensively discussed in recent years in Keightley 1978b, 12–56; 1999; Falkenhausen 1993b; and, most recently, in Lewis 1999a, 14–18ff.
 9. Falkenhausen 1993b, 152. The ritual nature of the *Chun qiu* has been extensively discussed by Karapet'iants in his insightful study (1988); cf. Van der Loon 1961, 25; Vandermeersch 1992; Chao Yuefeng 2000.
 10. In the winter of 712 the state of Zheng invaded Song. The *Chun qiu* did not mention this event. The *Zuo* explains: “Whenever the overlords issue an order (*ming*), if they report it, then it is recorded; otherwise it is not. The same is true about success and failure of military expeditions. Even if the state were annihilated, unless the defeat is reported, or the winners reported their victory, it would not be recorded on bamboo tablets [i.e., in the annals]” (*Zuo*, Yin 11:78; for the annals being written on bamboo tables (*ce*), see Pines 1997a, 82–83). Even such an outstanding event as the 494 de-

- feat of the state of Yue by its rivals from Wu was not mentioned by the *Chun qiu*, since “Wu did not report victory, Yue did not report defeat” (*Zuo Ai* 1:1607). On other occasions, however, the *Chun qiu* reported on hostilities between the southern superpowers (see *Chun qiu*, Ding 14:1593).
11. See for instance the *Zuo* entries discussed below in the text (Yin 1:18; cf. Huan 14:138; Xi 2:281; Wen 7:562). The *Chun qiu* never recorded cases of assassination of the Lu rulers, but simply declared that the slain lord had “passed away” (*Chun qiu*, Yin 11:71; Huan 18:151; Min 2:261). Similarly, when in 609, Xiang Zhong murdered the heir apparent, Wu, the *Chun qiu* laconically noted: “Winter, the tenth month. The son died” (*Chun qiu*, Wen 18:629). The *Zuo* explains: “The book [*Chun qiu*] says ‘the son died’ because of the taboo” (*Zuo*, Wen 18:633; cf. a similarly censored report on the assassination of the heir apparent Zi Ban in 661 [*Chun qiu*, Zhuang 32:251]). Also because of taboo the annals concealed the occasions when the lord of Lu was detained or otherwise humiliated by foreign powers (*Zuo*, Xi 17:373; Wen 2:522; Cheng 10:851; Zhao 16:375). Likewise, in 517, when Lord Zhao (r. 541–510) was defeated by the coalition of the three powerful aristocratic lineages and forced into exile, the *Chun qiu* laconically mentioned: “Ninth month; on [the day] *jihai*, the lord left for Qi” (*Chun qiu*, Zhao 25:1454; when other dignitaries went into exile the *Chun qiu* reported them as “fleeing” [*ben*]). The rules of taboo were extended to the Zhou kings: in 632 when King Xiang (r. 651–619) was humiliatingly summoned to the interstate meeting at Wen by the powerful Lord Wen of Jin (r. 636–628), the *Chun qiu* laconically stated: “Heavenly King hunted at Heyang” (*Zuo*, Xi 28:473). For further examples, see Chao Yuefeng 2000, 10–11.
 12. In 612, the Song envoy Hua Ou declined polite treatment by Lord Wen of Lu (r. 626–609) because a century earlier Hua’s ancestor Du had participated in the assassination of his ruler and “was named in the bamboo tablets of the overlords” (*Zuo*, Wen 15:609). The last wish of the Wei dignitary Ning Huizi was to conceal his condemnation “on the bamboo tablets of the overlords,” which referred to his role in expelling Lord Xian of Wei in 559 (*Zuo*, Xiang 20:1055).
 13. One of the most famous of the *Zuo* anecdotes tells of the futile attempt by the Qi dictator Cui Zhu to conceal his role as the murderer of Lord Zhuang (r. 553–548). Three of the Qi scribes sacrificed themselves but refused to change the record in the Qi annals: “Cui Zhu murdered his ruler” (*Zuo*, Xiang 25:1099; see the *Chun qiu* record on p. 1094). Not all scribes, however, were so resolute in defending their principles. In 566, the Zheng leading minister, Zi Si, masterminded the assassination of Lord Xi (r. 570–566), but managed to arrange a false record according to which the slain lord passed away because of illness (*Zuo*, Xiang 7:953–954; see the *Chun qiu* entry on p. 949).
 14. In 607, supporters of the head of the Jin government, Zhao Dun, murdered Lord Ling (r. 620–607). Though Zhao Dun himself neither participated in nor initiated the assassination, the scribe Dong Hu recorded in the annals and reported to the court: “Zhao Dun murdered his ruler” (this report appears in the *Chun qiu*, Xuan 2:650). Being asked for his reasons, the scribe explained that Dun could not dismiss his responsibility, since he neither left the Jin territory before the assassination, nor punished the

- murderers afterwards. The *Zuo* records Confucius' approval of the scribe's behavior: "Dong Hu is a good scribe of ancient times: his rules of recording (*shufa*) do not conceal [criminals]" (*Zuo*, Xuan 2:663).
15. In the Chunqiu period mere access to the annals was extremely limited; in 540 the Lu hosts allowed the visiting Jin dignitary to read the Lu *Chun qiu* as an extraordinary personal favor (*Zuo*, Zhao 2:1226–1227). By publishing or editing the *Chun qiu*, Confucius (if he really did so) completely changed its destination, readdressing it from the spirits to living contemporaries. Perhaps he had cause to doubt whether this act was in accord with ritual norms; this may explain his famous saying, cited by Mencius: "I will be understood only because of the *Chun qiu*; I will be condemned only because of the *Chun qiu*" (*Mengzi*, "Teng Wen Gong xia" 6.9:155).
 16. According to the *Han shu* (30:1715), already in the Zhanguo period, the *Chun qiu* was accompanied by three to five commentaries, while earlier classics written in ancient and less comprehensible language, like the *Shi jing* and the *Shu jing*, did not acquire systematic commentaries until the early Han. This shows the difficulty that faced those eager to properly understand the *Chun qiu*. The Han scholar Huan Tan (c. 20 B.C.E.–56 C.E.) exclaimed: "If the [*Chun qiu*] classic lacked [the *Zuo*] commentary, this would cause the sage to close the door and ponder over it for ten years—and even then he would not understand it!" (cited by Zhu Yizun 1998, 169:875).
 17. These cases of distorted reports are discussed in notes 11 and 14 above.
 18. For the tradition of oral transmission of historical anecdotes, see, for instance, Kaizuka 1957; Qi Xia 1993; Zeng Hailong 1993. Doubtless, the best discussion on the role of oral tradition in early Chinese historiography in general, and in the composition of the *Zuo* in particular, is by David Schaberg (1996a; and especially 2001). My disagreement with Schaberg is twofold. First, I believe that he exaggerates the extent of the role of oral tradition in the composition of the *Zuo*. Second, and most importantly, for the reasons presented below, I believe that most of the orally circulated anecdotes were incorporated into the *Zuo* not directly, but from the Chunqiu scribal records, which largely mediated between Chunqiu (real or imagined) historical events and the text of the *Zuo*. Hence, although many of these anecdotes may not reflect events "as they really happened" or speeches "as were really pronounced," they nevertheless belong to the Chunqiu intellectual milieu and are highly relevant for the present study.
 19. The Chinese calendar uses the sixty-day cycle based on the so-called *ganzhi* dates, so, only half of the possible *ganzhi* dates may occur in a specific month. The *Zuo* usually mentions both the month and the date and aside from a few occasions there are no contradictions between them, which rules out random dating.
 20. See *Zuo*, Yin 1:17–18.
 21. See *Zuo*, Zhao 26:1473–1474.
 22. These three genres were assumed to be backbones of the *Zuo* primary sources by Egan (1977), Johnson (1981), and Maspero (1978), respectively.
 23. The Zhou year began in the month that contained winter solstice; the Shang, one month later; and the Xia, two months later than the Zhou (see Shaughnessy 1999a, 20).

24. For more on different calendars used in the *Zuo*, see Yoshimoto 1991. One of the examples of the calendrical discrepancies in the *Zuo* accounts will be discussed below; for another, see Appendix 3. For additional evidence on the more or less verbatim incorporation of primary source texts in the *Zuo*, see Zhao Boxiong 1999, 27–30.
25. See Karlgren 1926. Although many scholars have pointed out inaccuracies in Karlgren's analysis (see Sin 1991; Petersen [in progress]), this cannot diminish the pioneering role of Karlgren's efforts, which are even more remarkable when we consider that he worked on the *Zuo* before the appearance of the first concordance. Imposing current grammatical rules on the language of a historian's primary sources was not unique to the *Zuo*; see also similar editing of the *Zuo* text by Sima Qian (Kamata 1962, 111–169).
26. For more on grammatical changes in the *Zuo* text, see He Leshi 1988; Zhang Wenguo 1997.
27. This term is borrowed from Sima Qian, who mentioned scribal records of various states, burned after the 221 B.C.E. Qin unification (*Shiji* 15:686). Sima Qian also mentioned scribal records as primary sources of the *Zuo* author (*Shiji* 14:510).
28. See constant references to the importance of the past lessons in such Western Zhou texts as *Shi jing*, "Dang" (Mao, 255); *Shu jing*, "Kang gao," "Jiu gao," "Da gao," and others.
29. The *Zuo* mentions that scribes were preparing accounts of the important events, and that these accounts were available for those eager to study from historical lessons (Zhuang 23:226–227; Xi 7:318–319). For the importance of historical argumentation in Chunqiu political discussions, see for instance the *Zuo*, Xi 26:439–440; Wen 18:633–642; Xuan 3:669–672; Zhao 26:1475–1479; Ding 4:1535–1542. If the *Guoyu* evidence may be trusted, then mastering historical documents was part and parcel of Chunqiu aristocrats' education (see *Guoyu*, "Chu yu 1" 17.1:582–583; cf. *Zuo*, Zhao 15:1371–1373). The *Zuo* mentions archives (*fu* or *mengfu*) that contained various historical documents; these documents were available for consultation whenever necessary (see *Zuo*, Xi 5:308; Xi 26:440; Xiang 11:994; Ding 1:1524; Ding 4:1542). Frequent reference to these archives implies a relatively high importance of written evidence in historical debates.
30. The indirect evidence of the instructional origins of the scribal records are annotations scattered throughout the *Zuo* that are not related to the *Chun qiu* text. Possibly these are the remnants of the commentaries on the annals of different states, which were incorporated into the scribal records of these states. If my assertion is correct, then much of what is usually considered as the *Zuo* commentary on the *Chun qiu* may likewise derive from brief explanations of the "rules of recording" by the Lu scribes. For a different assertion of the nature of non-*Chun qiu* commentary remarks in the *Zuo*, see Jens Petersen's views presented in the Warring States Workshop (wsw) online discussion (items 1438, 1453, and the ensuing discussion) and Zhao Boxiong 1999, 34–37; for a more traditional approach toward the non-*Chun qiu* commentary passages, see Zhao Shengqun 1998.
31. Chunqiu and Zhanguo texts mention different kinds of earlier historical documents,

- such as *zhi* (documents, maxims; see *Zuo*, Wen 2:520; Wen 6:552–553; Xiang 25:1006; Zhao, 1220; *Lüshi chunqiu*, “Gui dang” 24.6:1629), *ji* (records; see *Gongyang zhuan*, Xi 2, 10:2248; *Han Feizi*, “Shuo yi” 44:405, 407, 409; “Zhong xiao” 51:466; *Lüshi chunqiu*, “Zhi zhong” 11.2:577), *shiji* (scribal records; see *Lüshi chunqiu*, “Chafu” 22.6:1527), and *Chun qiu* (see *Guanzi*, “Shanquan shu” 75:366; *Han Feizi*, “Beinei” 17:115–116). Of particular interest are the “ghost stories” that Mozi (c. 460–390) had read in the *Chun qiu* of the various states (*Mozi*, “Ming gui xia” 31:337–339). From the content of this quotations we may surmise that these *Chun qiu* refer to detailed narratives and not to laconic official annals. Another interesting historical genre is *yu* (speeches), a genre probably represented by the *Guoyu* (cf. *Zuo*, Zhao 20:1415–1416; *Xunzi*, “Yao wen” 31:551–552; for more about the genre of *yu*, see Petersen 1995; Taniguchi 1998).
32. By far the best and most detailed analysis of these interpretative strategies is presented by Schaberg 1996a; 1997; 2001; see also Watson 1989; i–xxiv and Lewis 1999a, 130–139.
 33. See Mori Hideki 1976; Zhang Weizhong 1997; Lewis 1999a, 136–138. For a more attenuated argument, which attempts to connect predictions to the oral transmission of the *Zuo* speeches, see Schaberg 1997, 136–137. For a radically different approach, to which I owe much of my analysis, see Wang He 1984.
 34. See *Zuo*, Xi 5:311.
 35. For more examples of the predictions copied into the *Zuo* from its sources, see Wang He 1984.
 36. See Lewis 1999a, 132–133ff.
 37. For these, and for ideological differences between “the superior man” and putative Confucius, see Henry 1999.
 38. Of 122 evaluative statements (*li ye* and *fei li ye*) noted by Defoort (1999), only one occurs in the last fifty years of the *Zuo* narrative.
 39. This is not the only evidence that suggests that the *Zuo* author / compiler used different sources of the last years of his narrative. See also Table 1 and the adjacent discussion.
 40. For further discussion about *Chunqiu* scribal records, see Wang He 1993a.
 41. See *Shu jing*, “Jin teng” 13:195–197; “Luo gao” 15:214–217; cf. Shaughnessy 1997, 4–6.
 42. This tradition is perhaps referred to by the “Yu zao” chapter of the *Liji*: “[The king] acts—then the left scribe records it; speaks—then the right scribe records it” (*Liji jiji* 29:778; cf. *Han shu* 30:1715). The *Lüshi chunqiu* anecdote tells that when King Cheng of Zhou had jokingly enfeoffed his younger brother, Tang Shu, the Duke of Zhou told him: “The Son of Heaven does not joke in his words. The speech of Son of Heaven is recorded by the scribes, recited by musicians, praised by *shi*” (*Lüshi chunqiu*, “Zhong yan” 18:1156; cf. a slightly different version in the *Shiji* 39:1635). The anecdote itself is of dubious reliability, but it may reflect the original scribal ritual of the Zhou court.

43. For instance, according to the *Guoyu*, in the late seventh century a leading Lu statesman, Zang Wenzhong, ordered the recording of an ideologically important speech by Liuxia Ji (“Lu yu 1” 4.9:170). The *Zuo* mentions Confucius’ reading and later recording of “polite speeches” by Xiang Xu from the state of Song, originally pronounced in 546 (Xiang 27:1130). In 546 Confucius was still a child; hence, he must have used original accounts of Xiang Xu’s speeches, which means that these were originally recorded. The truth of these cases is impossible to verify; nevertheless, we may reasonably assume that they reflect a relatively widespread practice of recording speeches. In a Zhanguo text, Mozi complained that people praise aggressive politicians, overlook their unrighteous nature, and moreover “write down their speeches to be transmitted to future generations” (*Mozi*, “Fei gong shang” 17:198). Sima Qian tells of Tian Wen of Qi (fl. 300–280 B.C.E.) whose attendant scribe recorded Tian Wen’s conversations with his retainers or “guests” (*ke*) (*Shiji* 75:2354). The mid-Zhanguo “Qu li” chapter of the *Liji* mentions among the routine functions of the ruler’s entourage that “scribes record with brushes, attendants record speeches.” Commentators disagree whether the speeches concerned refer to the interstate meetings or to a broader range of activities (*Liji jijie* 4:83; cf. Chen Hao 1987, 13). From the context it may be assumed that “Qu li” refers to speeches recorded during military expeditions. “Attendants” perhaps refers to the assistants to the scribes. For the mid-Zhanguo dating of the “Qu li,” see Yoshimoto 1995.
44. See *Yu shu* 1990, 13–14. The twentieth year is the twentieth year of King Zheng (future first emperor of Qin); that is, 227 B.C.E. Nanjun (the southern commander) was established in 278 on the territory of the former Chu capital, in modern Hubei.
45. More light will probably be shed on the recording of speeches in Chunqiu and Zhanguo historiography after the publication of newly excavated historical texts from the mid-Zhanguo grave at Shibancun, Hunan. According to a preliminary report these texts contain 4,371 bamboo slips that include numerous speeches, similar in style to the *Guoyu* and *Zhanguo ce* (Hunan sheng 1995, 199–202).
46. An example of a purely imaginary speech is the presuicide monologue of Chu Ni of Jin who reportedly refused to assassinate the upright head of the government, Zhao Dun, and committed suicide instead (*Zuo*, Xuan 2:658). For examples of what is perhaps the verbatim transcription of the original speech (or letter), see, for instance, *Zuo*, Cheng 13:861–865; Zhao 6:1274–1276; Zhao 26:1475–1479.
47. I follow here Benjamin Schwartz’s suggestion according to which the *Lunyu* presents Confucius’ vision rather than the original words of the Master (Schwartz 1985, 61–62).
48. See *Han shu* 36:1970. See also Liu Xin’s memorial to the throne in *Han shu* 86:3619.
49. For the Han controversy over the *Zuo*, as well as for the general framework of the “new” and “old” texts controversy, see Ma Yong 1992, 115–133; Nylan 1994, 102–108.
50. For accusations against Liu Xin, see Liu Fenglu 1955; Kang Youwei 1955; Cui Shi 1955; Qian Xuantong [1931] 1963. The most thorough refutation of Liu Fenglu’s theses is by Zhang Binglin (1982); cf. Zhao Guangxian 1982, 147–153. For the background of Liu Fenglu and his views, see Elman 1990, 214–256. In his summary of twentieth-century *Zuo* scholarship, Wu Xifei (1992, 113) claimed that the assump-

- tion that the *Zuo* is not a commentary is “unanimously accepted” in contemporary research. This sweeping generalization is misleading; scholars like Xu Fuguan (1985, 3:270–275), Zhang Yiren (1990b, 106), and most recently Shen Yucheng (1992, 373–382), Zhao Shengqun (1997; 2000), and Zhao Boxiong (1999), among others, support the view that the *Zuo* is a commentary to the classic.
51. “*Chun qiu* is not a historical text. Supporters of the *Zuo* treat the *Chun qiu* as a historical text, and inevitably lose its meaning” (Liu Fenglu 1955, 599; cf. Zhu Xi 1986, 93:2151; Pi Xirui 1998, 39–45). For the opposite view, see Zhao Shengqun 2000, 301–314.
 52. See *Shiji* 14:510. Cui Shi (1955, 626–668) argued that this passage is a later interpolation in the *Shiji*, while Tsuda Sakichi (1958, 4–17) conjectured that the *Zuoshi chunqiu* mentioned in the *Shiji* differs from the presently known *Zuo zhuan*. For a refutation of their views, see Jin Dejian 1963, 105–115; Lin Zhen’ai 1981; Hu Nianyi 1981a, 8–12. Ban Gu (32–92 C.E.) added a further conjecture that Zuo Qiuming was grand scribe of the state of Lu (*Han shu* 30:1713). For details of the *Zuo*’s circulation in early Han, see Yang Bojun 1981, 48–52; Zheng Junhua 1984, 16–17; and the comprehensive study by Ma Yong (1990, 281–332).
 53. See *Han shu* 36:1967. Liu Xin referred to Confucius’ alleged high esteem of Zuo Qiuming (*Lunyu*, “Gongye chang” 5.25:52). For Liu Xin’s arguments, see also *Lun heng*, “An shu” 29:1163. Later, during a court discussion in 28 C.E., the “modern text” supporter Fan Sheng concurred in Zuo Qiuming’s authorship, although he criticized the *Zuo* for not being connected personally with Confucius (*Hou Han shu* 36:1228). For similar arguments of the Han *Gongyang* supporters, see Chang Qu 1987, 10b:618. We have no evidence of Han scholars who doubted Zuo Qiuming’s authorship.
 54. Dan Zhu claimed that Zuo Qiuming began the compilation of the *Zuo* from different historical sources, but that he transmitted the explanations on the classic orally, and before these were written down they were seriously distorted. Zhao Kuang argued that “mistakes and absurdities” in the *Zuo* commentary prove that its author could not have been Confucius’ contemporary. Tang critics of the *Zuo* concentrated therefore on its flaws as commentary, but did not question its historical reliability. For their views, see Lu Chun 1:380–381 and 1:384–386 respectively.
 55. Wang Anshi’s eleven-point criticism of the *Zuo*’s dating has not survived (*Siku zongmu*, 143). For Zheng Qiao’s eight-point argument on the post-Chunqiu dating of the *Zuo*, see Zheng Qiao 4:92–93. Ye Mengde was apparently the first to date the *Zuo* according to predictions of Zhanguo events therein; he attributed the *Zuo* to the late Zhanguo or even Qin period (Hong Ye [1937] 1983, xlvii–xlviii). Song scholars were the first to criticize the *Zuo* on historical grounds, and not only as an inaccurate commentary.
 56. For a summary of pre-Qing views regarding the *Zuo* dating, see Zhu Yizun 1998, 169:875–878; for the later scholarship, see Zhang Xinzheng 1939, 360–411 and Shen and Liu 1992, 356–413.
 57. Kang Youwei’s motives were political, rather than scholarly; hence his argumentation is seriously flawed. See the excellent discussion by Hans Van Ess (1994, 148–150);

- cf. Qian Xuantong [1931] 1963, 12–13; Qi Sihe 1938, 51; Zhao Guangxian 1982, 48. For further criticism of Kang Youwei's arguments, see Hu Nianyi 1981a, 6; Chen Enlin 1982. For the arguments of other *Zuo* skeptics, some of whom were inspired by Kang Youwei, see Gu Jiegang 1988a, 60–84 (a summary of Gu's 1940s lectures); Tsuda 1958, 1–60; Hong Ye [1937] 1983, lxxii–xlv; Bai Shouyi 1986, 228–232; Needham 1956, 350–365.
58. In recent years the only attempt to revive the “Liu Xin authorship” theory was made by Xu Renfu (1978; 1981); Luo Zhuohan (1984) suggested a late-Zhanguo or early-Han dating. The early-to-mid-Zhanguo dating of the *Zuo* compilation is unanimously advocated by scholars outside China, as well as most Chinese researchers; see Karlsgren 1926; Rubin 1959; Kamata 1962, 305–330; Hsu 1965, 184–185; Creel 1970, 475–477; Kaizuka 1975, 336–337; Xu Zhongshu 1980, 76–80; Tong Shuye 1980, 351–352; Yang Bojun 1981; Zhao Guangxian 1982, 52–58; Wang He 1984; Niu Hongen 1994; Hirase 1998; and Brooks and Brooks 1998, 6. Others, like Mou Runsun 1987; Yang Gongji 1980, 387–389; Hu Nianyi 1981a, 28–31; Zhang Menglun 1983, 79–82; Jiang Lifu 1984; and Zhang Handong 1988, 156–158 attribute the *Zuo* to either late-Chunqiu or early post-Chunqiu years (i.e., fifth century B.C.E.). Besides, several Japanese scholars have postulated that the *Zuo*'s ideology cannot but indicate its Early Han origins (Itano 1975; Mori Hideki 1976; Kondō 1983). The latter argument will be discussed below.
 59. One of the forceful proponents of single authorship was the Tang historian Liu Zhiji (661–721 C.E.), who stated: “I argue that the *Zuo* did not undergo preliminary editions; it was produced at one time, its polishing and refining were completed by a single hand” (Liu Zhiji 1990, “Shen *Zuo*,” 846). This is of course not an authoritative statement, but one should not neglect Liu's textual sensitivity.
 60. See Karlsgren (1926) for the grammatical unity of the *Zuo* (for a modification of his views, see Appendix 1). The structural unity of the *Zuo*'s narrative is discussed in Tagami Yasuaki 1975; Guo Yuheng 1982, 7; Jiang Lifu 1984, 737–742; Hu Nianyi 1981b, 150–151; and Schaberg 1996a, 35; and passim; see for instance his excellent discussion of the *Zuo*'s presentation of King Ling of Chu (r. 540–529), pp. 484–531. It is out of respect for the compiler's outstanding efforts to unify his narrative that I prefer to speak of him as an “author/ compiler” (see also John Wang 1977, 4n3). For a different view of the *Zuo*, see Hightower 1950, 15; Watson 1958, 237n51.
 61. See Tagami 1975; cf. Henry 1999.
 62. See Schaberg 1996a, 37–40; see also the general discussion on the notion of “authorship” (or the lack thereof) in pre-imperial China by Lewis (1999a, 54–63ff.).
 63. The *Zuo* contains approximately 180,000 characters (Xu Beiwen 1981, 115; Yang Gongji 1980, 441). The sum total of interpolations pointed out by various scholars (Gu Jiegang 1988a, 68–81; Zhao Guangxian 1982, 54–56; 1990, 40–42; Hu Nianyi 1981a, 18, 21–22; Zhang Handong 1988, 158–160; Wang He 1993a, 22–24) amounts to no more than 6,000 characters, just 3 percent of the narrative. It is misleading, therefore, to claim, as Gu Jiegang did, that the *Zuo* is “a multi-layer text, written by numerous authors over generations” (Gu Jiegang 1988a, 68–83).

64. Zhu Xi was among the first to suggest that the *Zuo* author was a Chu personality (Zhu Xi 1986, 93:2153), and he was followed by dozens of traditional scholars, whose views are partly summarized by Zhu Yizun (1998, 169:875–878). Many scholars, beginning with Yao Nai (1732–1815 C.E., for whose views, see Zhang Xinzheng 1939, 362) attributed the *Zuo* to the early Zhangguo statesman Wu Qi (d. 381 B.C.E.); see Zhang Binling 1982; Wei Juxian 1934, 109–112; Tong Shuye 1980, 351–352; Qu Wanli 1983, 363–370. Others named Confucius' disciple Zi Xia (Ma Yong 1992, 18–21), or even Confucius himself (Yao Manpo 1994). Alternatively, Tsuda Sakichi attributed the compilation of the *Zuo* to the first century B.C.E. statesmen Yin Xian and Difang Jin (Tsuda 1958, 1–60); Hong Ye named Zhang Cang (d. 152? B.C.E.) ([1937] 1983, xlii–xliv), while Kang Youwei and his followers named Liu Xin as the possible author. For other conjectures, see Zhang Jun 1991, 97–98; Zhang Pingzhe 1990. Bernhard Karlgren (1926) questioned the Lu provenance of the *Zuo* assuming that it was written in a different “dialect” than the *Lunyu*. This assertion was thoroughly criticized and convincingly refuted by Sin Chou-yiu (1991). For more on the Lu origin of the *Zuo*, see Zhao Guangxian 1982 and Hu Nianyi 1981a.
65. For quotations of the *Zuo* by Zhangguo sources, see Yang Xiangkui (1936, 47–61). Liu Zhenghao (1980) points out dozens of cases of alleged quotations from the *Zuo* in pre-Qin treatises beginning with the *Lunyu*, but most of his examples are either based on a vague resemblance or can be explained otherwise. The earliest work to quote from the *Zuo* was probably the *Shi chun*, unearthed from the tomb of King Xiang of Wei together with the *Zhushu jinian* and several other writings. According to the *Jin shu*, the *Shi chun* recorded divination cases from the *Zuo* (*Jin shu* 51:1433; cf. Du Yu 1991, 2188).
66. “The lord of Zheng” refers to the late Lord Zhuang (r. 744–701); Lord Zhao was only an heir apparent when he tried to prevent the appointment of Gao Qumi.
67. See *Han Feizi*, “Nan 4,” 39:384. The identity of Prince Yu (Da in the *Zuo*) is unknown.
68. See *Zuo*, Huan 17:150.
69. See Hu Nianyi 1981a; cf. Wang He 1984.
70. See *Zuo*, Wen 6:549. In the 360s B.C.E., Qin armies launched a series of successful attacks eastward against the state of Wei 魏; these campaigns resulted in the gradual occupation of Wei lands to the east of the Yellow River in the 350s. Qin expansion continued thereafter almost uninterrupted. It is clear, therefore, that the *Zuo* author's prediction must have been made before the mid-fourth century B.C.E.
71. See Cui Shu (1983, 394). Calculations by modern scholars support Cui Shu's observation. The approximate numbers of characters per year are 490 characters per year for the first 150 years of the *Zuo* narrative (Yin 1–Cheng 18); 1, 262 for the next 63 years (Xiang 1–Zhao 32) and only 654 per year for the last 42 years (Ding 1–Ai 27). See Yang Gongji 1980, 441; Dong Lizhang 1993, i–iii.
72. I have used Yang Bojun's edition of the *Zuo zhuan* in counting the entries.
73. A similar attempt was made by Wei Juxian, who compared the number of characters devoted to each state in the later *Zuo* with the average (Wei Juxian 1934, 90–92). His

- results, although differing slightly from Table 1, provide a similar trend of geographical limitation of the *Zuo* narrative.
74. This conjecture supports Ban Biao's (3–54 c.e.) claim that the *Zuo* was compiled during the reigns of Lords Ding (r. 509–495) and Ai (r. 494–468) of Lu (*Hou Han shu* 40:1325).
 75. See Zhao Fang 1:261. Similar differences between the *Zuo* vocabulary and that of the *Zhanguo* treatises were mentioned in Cui Shu 1983, 394; see also He Leshi 1988, 56–62.
 76. "*Cheng*" is mentioned once in a speech that is definitely a later interpolation (Wen 18:636; see Appendix 4). For the early usage of this term, see An 1997, 40–52. "*Zhi*" (智) is substituted by "*zhi*" (知). "*Li*" appears only in verbal form "to arrange" (the divisions among the fields) or in a compound "*xingli*" (a messenger). The terms "*cheng*," "*zhi*," and "*li*" (principle) do not occur in the extant pre-*Zhanguo* texts. "*Renyi*" is first attested to in the *Mozi*, although Nivison for unexplained reasons suggests that this compound preceded "the age of philosophers" (1999, 751).
 77. The crossbow appeared in the late Chunqiu period in the state of Chu (Ma Chengyuan 1988, 79; Zhu Fenghan 1995, 274), but it entered the Central Plain relatively late, perhaps by the mid-*Zhanguo* (Yang Kuan 1998, 304); the earliest archeological evidence for it in the Central Plain is from the early *Zhanguo* Lu grave (Zhu Fenghan 1995, 274). The earliest text that mentions the crossbow and crossbow-related technology is *Sunzi bingfa*, which perhaps originated in the early to mid-*Zhanguo* period (see Li Ling 1995, 207–223). Neither "*mu*" nor "*ji*" nor "*shu*" are mentioned in the early *Zhanguo* texts, but "*ji*" figures prominently in middle to late *Zhanguo* writings and thereafter.
 78. See He Leshi 1988. Karlgren was the first to discuss the grammatical uniqueness of the *Zuo*; for the later studies, see Dobson 1967, 233–234; Hu Nianyi 1981a, 25–28; Sin Chou-yiu 1991, but none of these studies can be compared with He Leshi's. Dobson relates the *Zuo* to the early *Zhanguo* (1967, 238), yet he fails to explain linguistic disparities between the *Zuo* and *Zhanguo* texts. Dobson's dating of pre-Qin texts leaves a "lacuna of the fifth century B.C.E." (1967, 239), which can obviously be filled by the *Zuo*. Recently Edwin Pulleyblank suggested (1999) further indications that the *Zuo* grammar is earlier than that of the *Zhanguo* texts (see also his views expressed during wsw online discussion, summer-autumn 2000).
 79. Chen Kejong's analyses of the *Zuo* vocabulary (1979; 1982) are confined to a comparison with Western Zhou and Han texts; further comparison between the *Zuo* and early *Zhanguo* treatises is necessary. Recently Takagi Satomi (1993, 69–72) suggested pre-*Zhanguo* dating for the *Zuo*'s vocabulary.
 80. See Gu Jiegang 1988b, 16; Maspero 1978, 363–364. Jacques Gernet (1982, 86) called the *Zuo* "a semi-fictional chronicle." For similar criticism see Qian Xuantong [1931] 1963; Qian Zhongshu 1979, 184–186.
 81. Reservations regarding the authenticity of the speeches were expressed in Hsu Choyun 1965, 185; K. Vasil'ev 1968, 86–87; Creel 1974, 111n21; Henry 1999, 125. For an extremely critical attitude, see Needham 1956, 365 note d; Tsuda 1958, 307–348; Eno 1990, 289–290. For a position of complete reliance on the *Zuo* speeches, see,

- for instance, Feng Youlan 1980, 99–123; Suzuki 1982; Xu Fuguan 1984, 47; Liu Bao-cai 1988; Liu Zehua 1991, 52–85; and Takagi 1993. For critical reliance on the speeches, see Poo 1998, 43–44. For the general verity of the historical data of the *Zuo*, see Felber 1966. For discussions of the authenticity of selected speeches, see Hu Nianyi 1981a, 17–28; Qi Sihe 1981, 193–200; Zhao Guangxian 1982, 54–56; 1990, 40–42; Wang He 1984; 1993a, 22–24; and especially Zhang Handong 1988, 158–160. I have relied on their studies to distinguish between reliable speeches and later interpolations.
82. Schaberg (1996a; 1997) is doubtless the most eloquent representative of this approach; but see also Tsuda 1958, 307–348; Eno 1990, 289–290; Lin Yu-sheng 1974–1975, 201–202. Itano Chōhachi (1975) and Kondō Noriyuki (1983) argue that the *Zuo* bears the imprint of late-Zhanguo Confucian thought. Conversely, Hirase Takao has suggested that the *Zuo* author edited his primary sources not for purely ideological reasons, but to bolster legitimacy claims of the mid-fourth-century B.C.E. kings of the state of Han (Hirase 1998, 156–162 passim), while Bruce Brooks argues that the authors of the *Zuo* edited their materials in order to assist the state of Qi to achieve “world domination” (Brooks 2000).
 83. Tsuda 1958, 311–314; Watson 1989, xxi. For a different kind of criticism of the *Zuo* by Bruce Brooks, see note 94 below.
 84. King Wen’s father, King Wu, was married to Deng Man, probably Lord Qi’s sister.
 85. That is, you shall regret a lost opportunity.
 86. See *Zuo*, Zhuang 7:169–170.
 87. See *Zuo*, Zhuang 23–25:226–233.
 88. See *Zuo*, Xiang 25:1106; Xiang 29:1160; Ai 1:1605–1606; cf. Cheng 17:902–903; Zhao 13:1348. These speeches will be discussed in Chapter 4.
 89. See Schaberg 1996a, 127.
 90. Any attempt to confine the *Zuo* to the status of a mere polemical treatise serving a single ideological agenda inevitably simplifies its narrative, and cannot be upheld with thorough scrutiny of the text. For instance, Mark Lewis in his otherwise excellent study suggested that the “organizing principle” of the *Zuo* is “the essential role of ritual (*li*) in defining and maintaining human society” (Lewis 1999a, 132). This observation is basically correct, but Lewis takes it to an extreme, arguing that the *Zuo* invariably denies the possibility of military victory from the side that defies *li* (136–137 and 414–415n141). Lewis neglects a series of stories in the *Zuo* that favor resolute military action as superior to ritual considerations on the battlefield; see, for instance, the *Zuo* account of the inglorious defeat of the staunch adherent of *li* Lord Xiang of Song at the hands of the Chu army in 638 (Xi 22:397–398; cf. Zhao 1:1215–1216). Similarly unconvincing are claims of Hirase, Brooks, and others that the *Zuo* was compiled in order to bolster legitimization claims of certain Zhanguo rulers (see note 82 above). Too often the *Zuo* text defies this imagined political agenda by presenting highly critical views of its putative “patrons.”
 91. See Lewis 1990, 16. Lately, however, Lewis has modified his position, claiming that

- the *Zuo*'s aim was "to validate *Ru* teachings . . . through writing them into a narrative of the past" (1999a, 132; see also Lewis' remark in 1999b, 589).
92. Zhu Xi exclaimed: "The malady of the *Zuo* is that it discusses what is right and what is wrong from the point of view of success or failure . . . it knows only benefit and harm, and knows nothing of propriety and principle" (Zhu Xi 1986, 93:2149–2150). Cf. Liu Fenglu 1955, 599; Pi Xirui 1998, 4:44–45ff.
 93. See Watson 1989, xxi.
 94. Kidder Smith made a first step in this direction. In his discussion of the changes in attitude toward divination in general, and toward the *Zhouyi* in particular, as reflected in the *Zuo* speeches, Smith states: "These developments . . . establish a pattern, no Warring States or Han forger could have built in the *Zuo*. They are therefore strong evidence that . . . the *Zuo zhuan* records of the *Yi* are highly accurate and reliable" (Smith 1989, 448–449). The only scholar, to my knowledge, who considers instances of intellectual (and institutional) change in the *Zuo* as being constructed by the *Zuo* author(s), is Bruce Brooks, whose suggestions, however, are not substantiated by sufficiently convincing evidence. It is less than plausible that anonymous author(s) would not only invent intellectual change (for what reason?) but also make it so sublime that it would not be noticed for over two millennia.
 95. The relative paucity of occurrences of "*ren*" and particularly "*xiao*" may be detrimental to statistical validity, but the changing pattern of their distribution throughout the narrative is nevertheless meaningful, particularly when provided in addition to "*Dao*" and "*de*."
 96. The attempts to trace changes in the meaning of political and ethical terms in the *Zuo* were made in my previous studies (Pines 1997a; 1998a); for the synchronic differences among the *Zuo* protagonists, see Pines 1997b and Onozawa 1974.
 97. At this point we must mention the issue of spurious speeches. Most scholars agree that some of the speeches in the *Zuo* were added by later transmitters and interpolators. In Appendix 4, I present my attempts, based on earlier research, to distinguish between authentic and dubious speeches.
 98. Sima Qian wrote in his "Epilogue," "Zuo Qiu lost his eyesight and then compiled the *Guoyu*" (*Shiji* 130:3300). Most scholars, beginning with Wang Chong (c. 27–97 C.E.), Ban Gu, and Wei Zhao (204–273 C.E.) identified this Zuo Qiu with Zuo Qiuming; some named the *Guoyu* an "outer commentary" to the *Chun qiu* classic (see *Lun heng*, "An shu" 29:1165; *Han shu* 30:1713; Wei Zhao 1990, 661). Cui Shu (1983, 395), and later Wang Shumin (1989, 46) argued that Zuo Qiu mentioned by Sima Qian is a mid-Zhanguo personality, different from Zuo Qiuming, who was the supposed author of the *Zuo zhuan*. For a different opinion, see Zhang Yiren 1981, 677.
 99. For comprehensive accounts of traditional and modern scholarly discussions on the *Guoyu*, see Zhu Yizun 1998, 209:1071–1075; Zhang Yiren 1990b; Tan Jiajian 1994.
 100. For the corresponding passages in the *Zuo* and the *Guoyu*, see Schaberg 1996a, 894–899.

101. See Zhang Yiren 1962; 1963. Zhang Yiren's study was preceded by those of Bernhard Karlgren (1926) and Feng Yuanjun (1936), who reached the same conclusion.
102. See Liu Jie 1958, 315–322; K. Vasil'ev 1968, 81–85; Hart 1973, 237–253; John Wang 1998; and especially the stimulating isocolometrical analysis by Boltz 1990. All these claim common written sources; Schaberg (1996a; 2001) asserts that both texts shared common oral sources. Others assume that the relatively refined language of the *Zuo* proves that the *Zuo* author used the *Guoyu* among his primary sources. This argument was first proposed by Ye Shi (1150–1223 C.E.) (see Zhu Yizun 1998, 169:877); followed by Gu Jiegang 1988a, 107; Xu Zhongshu 1980, 73–76; Tan Jiajian 1985, 6; and Xiong Xianguang 1994, 31–32. However, linguistic comparisons between the two texts definitely indicate that the language of the *Guoyu* is of later origins; hence, Yoshimoto Michimasa assumed that, conversely, the *Guoyu* cited the *Zuo* (Yoshimoto 1989; cf. Zhang Jun 1991, 96). I consider the hypothesis of common primary source(s) of the *Zuo* and *Guoyu* as more plausible.
103. For instance, the second book of Lu contains apocryphal stories about Confucius (*Guoyu*, “Lu yu 2” 5.9; 5.21) and stories about the mother of Lu's official Gongfu Wenbo, which resemble the *Liji* “Tan Gong” examples of proper ritual behavior (“Lu yu 2” 5.10–17). These anecdotes are incompatible with the much more historicized narrative in the first part of the book, and may have been added by a different compiler. See also Wang Shumin 1981, 14–15.
104. This assertion may be corroborated by the fact that only three of the *Guoyu* books dealing with the states of Chu and Jin were excavated from the tomb of King Xiang of Wei (*Jin shu* 51:1433), which suggests that in the late fourth century B.C.E., parts of the present text circulated independently. Several attempts have been made to trace the separate origin of each book, but no persuasive theory has emerged (see Wei Juxian 1934, 117–164; Gu Jiegang 1988a, 94–103; Zhang Jun 1991). An interesting attempt to distinguish the books linguistically was undertaken by Feng Yuanjun (1936). She indicated grammatical differences between the books of Zhou, Jin, and Yue. Further research in this direction may clarify the separate origins of the *Guoyu* books.
105. Yoshimoto discussed only the books of Zhou, Lu, Jin, and Chu. Other short books, which were apparently compiled slightly later than the rest of the *Guoyu*, deserve separate discussion.
106. The middle or late Zhanguo dating of the *Guoyu* is adopted by Wei Juxian 1934, 117–164; K. Vasil'ev 1968, 80; Zhang Yiren 1981, 676; Yin Heng 1982, 37; Shen Changyun 1987, 135–137; Bai Shouyi 1986, 226–228; Zhang Jun 1991; see also an independent astronomic corroboration of this dating by Pankenier (1999). An earlier date, including attribution of the *Guoyu* to Zuo Qiuming, is advocated by Jin Yufu 1957, 27; Zhang Menglun 1983, 78–82; Yin Menglun 1984; Tan Jiajian 1985, 6; Chen Yingguan 1990, 53–58; Dong Lizhang 1993, vii–ix; Xiong Xianguang 1994, 31–32, but their arguments are not sufficiently persuasive. Some scholars related the *Guoyu* to Qin and even Han times (Tong Shuye 1980, 350; Sun Haipo 1936), but this view is incorrect, since the *Guoyu* is quoted already in the *Han Feizi* (see Mou Runsun 1987, 130); besides, three of its books were unearthed in the mid-Zhanguo tomb of King Xiang of Wei (*Jin shu* 51:1433).

107. See *Guoyu* “Lu yu 1” 4.10:171 and the discussion by Tong Shuye (1980, 259). The *Guoyu* also contains a few instances of predictions of or references to Zhanguo events. These are the prediction on the fall of the state of Jin (375 B.C.E.) (“Jin yu 4” 10.2:342); mention of the 440 B.C.E. turmoil in the Zhou ruling house (“Zhou yu 3” 3.3:123); and an implicit prediction on the ascendancy of the Shan lineage in the Zhou royal domain (ca. fourth century B.C.E.; see Tong Shuye 1980, 263).
108. Zhang Yiren 1990b, 106.
109. For instance, Sima Hou of Jin suggested to Lord Dao (r. 572–558), “You should have alongside yourself one who will daily [discuss] the deeds of the overlords, encouraging you to act according to their good deeds and beware of the bad” (*Guoyu*, “Jin yu 7” 13.9:445). Another protagonist, Shen Shushi, discussed in great detail the importance of historical texts for the education of the heir apparent of the state of Chu (*Guoyu*, “Chu yu 1” 17.1:528). Aside from Zhang Yiren, several scholars mention this peculiarity of the *Guoyu* as moralizing text; see Xu Beiwén 1981, 103–104; Jun Heng 1982; Shen Chengyun 1987, 134–135; Li Kun 1988, 49; Taniguchi 1998. Egan states that, unlike the *Zuo*, which is “moralistic and rhetorical history . . . [*Guoyu*] is philosophy and rhetoric in a historical setting” (1977, 351). The structure of the *Guoyu* strongly resembles a collection of Zhanguo polemical speeches, the *Zhanguo ce*; the historical accuracy of both is questionable.
110. See *Guoyu*, “Zhou yu” 1.1:4–7; 1.8:23; 3.3:108; “Jin yu” 10.7:350; 10.13:368; 11.4:397; 14.1:448; 14.13:469; “Zheng yu” 16:516; “Chu yu” 17.1:527–528; 17.3:533; 18.7:580.
111. “The speeches of the [*Guoyu*] . . . show a striking uniformity in language and style. There is also a remarkable consistency in the ideas being presented . . . The uniformity indicates that all of the speeches are probably in large part the work of the editor (or author) who put them in their final form” (Hart 1984, 37).
112. For this suggestion, see Fu Gengshen 1959, 3.
113. The separate origins of these books is argued by Fu Gengsheng 1959, 7–8; Dong Zengling 1989, 3; Wang Zhichang (as quoted in Tan Jiajian 1994, 35); Wei Juxian 1934, 183–186; Wang Shumin 1981, 14–15, (who argues that the book of Wu is likewise unconnected to the rest of the *Guoyu*); Shen Chengyun 1987, 135–137. See also Xiong Xianguang 1994, 29, for the book of Zheng. The separate origins of the books of Qi, Zheng, Wu, and Yue are advocated by Sun Haipo 1934, 192; Gu Jiegang 1988a, 94–100; Yoshimoto 1989. However, I included the books of Zheng, Wu, and Yue 1 in the general discussion, since their difference from the rest of the *Guoyu* is much less explicit and remains questionable.
114. The book of Qi is discussed by Gu Jiegang 1988a, 94–97 and Wang Entian 1993; the second book of Yue, by Zhou Xuegen 1984; see also Pines 1998a, 68–70. Both treatises, although meaningless in regard to Chunqiu history, are interesting documents of Zhanguo thought.
115. See *Guoyu*, “Jin yu 1” 7.8:274–275; “Jin yu 2” 8.8:302–313; “Lu yu 2” 5.10–17:202–217; “Jin yu 5” 11.2:394–396.

116. The *Guoyu*'s extensive reliance on oral tradition is discussed by Kaizuka 1957; Tong Shuye 1980, 350; Jun Heng 1982, 37; Shen Chengyun 1987, 137–140; Zeng Hailong 1993, 18; Taniguchi 1998. This may be the major reason for the factual inaccuracies in the *Guoyu*, in addition to its neglect of dates and precise factual settings for most of the recorded speeches. For legendary material absorbed into the *Guoyu*, see Xu Beiwen 1981, 105–114; Yang Gongji 1980, 414–431.
117. See *Guoyu*, “Zhou yu 3” 3.3:107.
118. See the detailed discussion in Chen Pan 1969, 298–305.
119. See *Guoyu*, “Jin yu 8” 14.9:462.
120. For additional examples of historical inaccuracies and anachronisms in the *Guoyu* speeches, see Creel 1974, 111–112n21; Bilsky 1975, 128–129; Peng Lin 1993; Xu Hongxiu 1995.
121. See *Guoyu*, “Jin yu 2” 8.8:311. The commanderies (*jun*) are first mentioned in the early fifth century B.C.E. in the state of Jin (*Zuo*, Ai 2:1614); in the state of Qin the twofold administrative system apparently originated only in the mid-fourth century B.C.E. during Shang Yang's (d. 338 B.C.E.) reforms (Tong Shuye 1980, 184–186).
122. For Zhanguo allotments, see *Zhanguo ce*, “Wei 魏 ce 1” 22.8:815.
123. See *Guoyu*, “Lu yu 2” 5.4:193; “Chu yu 2” 18.7:581.
124. For the interpretation of the archaeological data, see Li Ling 1991; Falkenhausen 1999, 514–525; see also discussion in Chapter 4, and in Pines 2000b.
125. For a detailed discussion, see Xu Fuguan 1985, 1:318–323. In the *Zuo* the term “*bai-xing*” in regard to “the people” appears only in three speeches of the late sixth to the early fifth century B.C.E.
126. See *Guoyu*, “Zhou yu 3” 3.6:125; “Jin yu 5” 11.2:394. For the usage of “*ji*” in Zhanguo texts, see note 77.
127. The latter term occurs once in the *Zuo*, where it refers to sacrificial items (Xuan 3:670). The term “*wu*” originally meant a “sacrificial item,” and only gradually acquired the abstract meaning of “the thing”; hence, the compounds “*bai wu*” and “*wanwu*” are of relatively late (early Zhanguo?) origin.
128. See for instance *Guoyu*, “Zhou yu” 1.10:26–27; 1.6:15–17; 3.3:101–113; 3.6:122–131. The concentration of these terms in the books of Zhou may indicate their relatively late provenance. The *Zuo* contains seeds of correlative thinking, but never as mature as in the above examples. For the early usage of the terms “*yin*” and “*yang*,” see Xu Fuguan 1982, 42–50. Although Xu considers the *Guoyu* an authentic source for Chunqiu thought, he notes the difference in the usage of both terms in the *Guoyu* and in other pre-Zhanguo texts; hence, he admits that the *Guoyu* speeches suffered extensive intervention by the compiler (Xu Fuguan 1982, 49–50).
129. See Karlgren 1926.
130. See explanation by Zhang Zhenglang 1977. In discussing the text I follow the publication in *Wenwu* 1 (1977) and the comparative analysis in Zheng Liangshu 1982.

131. See Yoshimoto (1990a, 41–45) versus Li Xueqin (1989).
132. For the probable sources of the *Chunqiu shiyu*, see Li Xueqin 1989, 3; Yoshimoto 1990a, 38–41; the latter also shows definite cases of borrowing from the *Zuo*. On the similarity between *Chunqiu shiyu* no. 16 and *Guanzi*, see Pian Yuqian 1992. Xu Renfu, in a somewhat pathetic attempt to revive “Liu Xin’s theory” of the *Zuo* forgery, claimed that, conversely, the *Zuo* quoted the *Chunqiu shiyu* (1979; 1981). These claims, however, are unsubstantiated; Yoshimoto’s analysis definitely confirms the later origins of the *Chunqiu shiyu* in comparison with the *Zuo*.
133. See Zhang Zhenglang 1977.
134. See the analysis of the speeches’ content in Yoshimoto 1990a, 45–49. Remonstrances appear in nos. 1, 2, 4, 8, 9, 12, 14; evaluations in nos. 6, 7, 11, 13, 15, 16; planning in nos. 3, 5, 10.
135. See *Chunqiu shiyu* no. 5.
136. The possible explanation for this mistake is that the authors of no. 5 relied on Qin sources that were less precise in dealing with the events of Jin. The *Zuo*, in contrast, does not use Qin materials.
137. For instance, the *Chunqiu shiyu* speeches refer to the people as “*baixing*” (nos. 13, 16). On another occasion, the speaker talks of the “evil virtue” (*e de*; no. 9). Nowhere in the *Zuo* or the *Guoyu* does the term “*de*” appear with a negative adjective; this usage is characteristic of the Zhanguo period, when “*de*” acquired a neutral meaning of “qualities.” *De* appears once with a negative adjective (“inauspicious virtue”; *xiong de*) in the *Shu jing* (“Duo Fang” 17:229) and once in the *Zuo*, in a speech that is in all likelihood a later interpolation (Wen 18:635; see Appendix 4 below). Except for these cases, “*de*” invariably appears in pre-Zhanguo sources with positive adjectives.
138. Of course, there is a problem of forged bronze vessels, thoroughly discussed in Qu Wanli 1983, 168–220 and Shaughnessy 1991, 43–62. This problem, however, is of little if any concern for the present study, since the catalogues I used definitely do not contain forged inscriptions. For the dating of bronze inscriptions, see Shaughnessy 1991, 106–155; Falkenhausen 1993b, 172–192; Qu Wanli 1983, 129–168. For problems concerning the dating, see Mattos 1997, 119–121, on the Qin Gong-zhong and the Qin Gong-gui. Another instance of striking difference in dating concerns the Shuxiang Fuyu-gui: Shirakawa Shizuka (1962–1984, vol. 27, no. 161) attributes the inscription to the mid-ninth century B.C.E. minister at the court of King Li of Zhou, while Zhao Yingshan (1984, 450–461) relates it to the prominent Jin statesman Shu Xiang (d. ca. 525 B.C.E.). Similar disagreement accompanied the dating of the Houma texts, although most recently scholars agree to date them to the early fifth century B.C.E.
139. This discussion of bronze inscriptions has benefited enormously from two complementary studies, one by Shaughnessy (1991) and especially that by Falkenhausen (1993b). Many insightful ideas on the nature of the inscriptions appear in the recent study by Vassili Kryukov (2000, 18–33ff.).
140. Gilbert Mattos’ statistics based on Shirakawa Shizuka’s catalogue indicate that no

- more than 4.1 percent of Eastern Zhou inscriptions exceed one hundred characters in length, as compared with 10.8 percent for their Western Zhou counterparts (Mattos 1997, 87). The donors particularly tended to omit announcements of merit, since these were less important in terms of ritual intercourse (Falkenhausen 1993b, 160–161; see also Kryukov 2000, 330–332ff.).
141. Falkenhausen speaks of the “ossification” of the language of Chunqiu inscriptions (1993b, 161, 171).
 142. The only known inscription that employs these terms, and expounds many other interesting aspects of late-Zhanguo political theory, is the long inscription on the caldron cast by the order of King Cuo of Zhongshan in the late fourth century B.C.E. This extraordinarily interesting inscription is, however, beyond the scope of the present discussion (see Mattos 1997, 104–111). For the possibility that the term “*li*” (sacrificial rites) appears in certain bronze inscriptions, where it is spelled as “*feng*” or “*li*” 豐, see Kryukov 2000, 32–33 and this volume, 276 n8.
 143. For the important contribution of the Qin bronzes from the Chunqiu period to our understanding of the political self-image of the Qin rulers, see Falkenhausen 1990, 39–41.
 144. See Ikezawa 1992; Emura 1989–1991; Mattos 1997, 86–87.
 145. See Weld 1997, 137–139. See also an extensive discussion in Weld 1990.
 146. This topic has been thoroughly discussed by Zhu Fenghan (1990, 557–565, 533).
 147. The following discussion is largely based on Pines 1999.
 148. See Mozi, “Jian’ai xia” 16:178.
 149. That is Zhao, Han, Wei, Qi, Chu, and Yan.
 150. See *Shiji* (14:510). I modify Schaberg’s translation (1996a, 17).
 151. The *Chun qiu* here certainly does not refer to the laconic official annals of Lu; it is difficult to imagine that the king of Chu could not read the whole of this short text. The *Zuo* was generally named *Chun qiu* from the Zhanguo to early Han; see Lin Zhen’ai 1981; Jin Dejian 1962, 105; Durrant 1992; Schaberg 2001. For the term “Chun qiu” as genre of historical writings, see note 31 above.
 152. See Egan 1977, 351.
 153. Concluding an alliance prescribed a complicated ceremony: a cow was to be sacrificed (or its ear cut off), its blood smeared on the participants’ lips, and then the oath was written down. The blood oath invoked the deities’ authority as guardians of the alliance (see Liu Boji 1977; Lewis 1990, 43–50; Kudō 1994, 2–3; Weld 1997). That Lord Huan avoided this ceremony during the Kuqiu assembly meant, according to Mencius, that he trusted the overlords and did not need to impose a blood oath on them.
 154. That is, the elder scion from the major wife.
 155. Yang Bojun explains that the overlords used the “crooked embankments” to maximize water supply to their fields during a drought and to divert the flood water to the neighbor states. According to the *Guliang zhuan*, the oath prescribed “not to block the springs” (see in text below).

156. See *Mencius*, “Gaozi xia” 12.7:287–288.
157. See *Zuo*, Xi 9:327.
158. This mode of reading probably reflected the reverence to Zai Kong, the envoy of King Xiang, who participated in the assembly.
159. See *Guliang zhuan*, Xi 9,8:2396.
160. See Lewis 1990, 45–46; Weld 1997, 154–160. In 541, the Chu envoys demanded to renew the 546 alliance without smearing sacrificial blood; this alliance was therefore not recognized by the *Chun qiu* as a proper alliance and it reported only on the “assembly” (*hui*) but not on an “alliance” (*meng*) (see *Zuo Zhao* 1:1197–1202). The Kuiqiu meeting, however, is reported in the *Chun qiu* as an “alliance”; hence, we may assume that a complete ceremony was performed.
161. This issue may have been added to the Kuiqiu oath by the *Guliang* compiler to show Lord Huan’s treatment of contemporaneous succession crises in several major Chunqiu states. Lord Huan did indeed intervene in the succession struggles in Lu and Jin in 660 and 651 B.C.E. on behalf of the “legitimate” heirs. However, the rule “to uphold the elder scion” could hardly be pursued by Lord Huan, who himself was only a minor scion and a de facto usurper.
162. This supports Creel’s observation that “Mencius cannot be absolved of suspicion of having attributed to the past what he wished to be done in the future” (1960, 75). Perhaps Mencius was more sincere when he stated that “the disciples to Zhongni (Confucius) do not discuss the affairs of [Lords] Huan [of Qi] and Wen [of Jin]” (*Mencius*, “Liang Hui Wang shang” 1.7:14).
163. The most prominent heroes adopted by “disputers of the Dao” as paragons of virtue and political wisdom are the legendary emperors Huangdi, Yao, and Shun, early Zhou leaders the Duke of Zhou and Jiang Taigong, Chunqiu statesmen Guan Zhong, Yan Ying, and Zi Chan, and military leaders Wu Zixu and Sun Wu.
164. For the *Yanzi chunqiu*, see Gao Heng 1980; Jin Dejian 1962, 213–215; Chen Tao 1996, 1–13. For the *Guanzi*, particularly three “Kuang” chapters, which claim to be historical accounts of Guan Zhong’s reform, see Rickett 1985, 279–284; Luo Genze 1931, 58–70. Both argue for a strong possibility that the “Da kuang” author borrowed from the *Zuo* or from a common source; generally, the discussion reflects the intellectual milieu of the third century B.C.E.
165. David Schaberg (1996b) convincingly showed that the compilers of Han collections of historical anecdotes had little if any concern for historical accuracy. Some protagonists of these compilations “discuss” the affairs that occurred more than a century after their death.
166. See Du Yu 1991, 2188; Zhu Xi 1986, 93:2144–2176; Cui Shu 1983, 394–395. However, the compilers of the *Gongyang* and *Guliang* had at their disposal a certain amount of historical materials from the Chunqiu period that were not used by the author of the *Zuo* (see Zhao Boxiong 1991).
167. Of the three commentaries to the *Chun qiu*, the *Gongyang* has the strongest ideo-

- logical commitments and is the most biased in its presentation of Chunqiu history. On *Gongyang zhuan* thought, see Liu Zehua 1992, 292–300.
168. We must remember, however, that precise periodization of the *Shu jing* documents and the *Shi jing* poems remains controversial, and traditional commentaries, particularly the Mao commentary on the *Shi jing*, are often misleading (Jiang and Han 1991).
 169. For the dating of the “Guo feng,” see Dobson 1967, 238; Qu Wanli 1982, 328–333. Both scholars, as well as the Mao commentary, agree that most of the “Guo feng” poems originated in the Chunqiu period. Similarly, Chunqiu dating may be accepted for the “Lu song” section. The “Shang song” (Shang Hymns) section is also often attributed to the Chunqiu period. However, Jin Dejian (1985) has strongly argued for a late Shang–early Western Zhou origin of these hymns.
 170. See Creel 1970, 447–463; Chen Mengjia 1985; Jiang Shanguo 1988, 133–263. Recently Kryukov suggested a radical revision of the traditional periodization of both the *Shu jing* documents and the *Shi jing* odes, based on a linguistic comparison of their language with that of the Western Zhou inscriptions, as well as on the alleged anachronisms in the received texts. Kryukov reached the conclusion that all—or most—of the earliest portions of the *Shi jing* and *Shu jing* were compiled in the Chunqiu period (Kryukov 2000, 296–326). This interesting hypothesis is, however, not entirely flawless, as some of the linguistic divergences between the bronze inscriptions and the alleged Western Zhou texts may be explained otherwise. Currently, I refrain from adopting Kryukov’s views, although they certainly deserve further discussion.
 171. Many insightful remarks about Chunqiu views of women, including presenting female voices from the *Zuo* and *Guoyu*, are scattered throughout Raphals 1998.
 172. Of particular interest are Qin bronze inscriptions that testify to a very assertive self-view by the Qin rulers and their apparent disregard of the Zhou ruling house. See Falkenhausen 1988, 1059–1065; 1990, 39–41; Kern 2000, 59–105.

Chapter 2: Heaven and Man Part Ways

1. See Graham 1989, 3.
2. See, for instance, Bilsky 1975; Chao Fulin 1995; Poo 1998.
3. Lord Kang of Liu stated in 578: “The great affairs of the state are sacrifices and warfare” (*Zuo*, Cheng 13:861). Indeed, sacrificial activities were of major importance for the rulers throughout the Chunqiu period and thereafter (for details, see Bilsky 1975).
4. I borrow the term “extrahuman” (rather than “superhuman”) from Poo (1998, 6), as I accept his argument that not all the divine forces in China were “above” the natural and the human world.
5. For differing views of the origins of *tian*, see Creel 1970, 493–506; Hsu and Linduff

- 1988, 106–109; Zhang Rongming 1997, 45–55. For a general discussion of Heaven in early Zhou political thought, see Liu Zehua 1991, 12–19; see also a brief summary of Chunqiu views of Heaven in Feng Youlan 1937, 31; and a discussion in Li Jinglin 1995.
6. See Poo 1998, 30; see also similar views about “political religion” in Zhang Rongming 1997.
 7. See Poo 1998, 30.
 8. The above discussion is primarily based on chapters of the *Shu jing* such as “Kang gao,” “Jiu gao,” “Da gao,” “Shao gao,” “Jun shi,” “Duo shi,” and others. Although the precise dating and authorship of these chapters are far from clear, few doubt that they represent authentic Western Zhou political thought (see Du Yong 1998). For more about Heaven’s role, see early Zhou odes of the *Shi jing*, such as “Wen wang,” “Da ming” (Mao 235, 236) and many others. See also such inscriptions as Da Yu-*ding* and He-*zun* (Shirakawa 1962–1984, vol. 12, no. 61; vol. 48, add. no. 1). Needless to say, the above discussion only cursorily summarizes basic trends of Western Zhou religious thought; for a more detailed discussion, see Shaughnessy 1999b, 313–317; cf. Kryukov 1997, 204–223. Elsewhere Kryukov suggested that the idea of transferability of the mandate appeared only in the Chunqiu period (2000, 355–376). This assertion is intrinsically linked with Kryukov’s hypothesis about the Chunqiu provenance of the *Shi jing* and *Shu jing* (see this volume, page 268n170), and is based on several questionable assumptions, which require further validation to become sufficiently convincing.
 9. See *Shi jing*, “Jing zhi” 19:598 (Mao, 288).
 10. See note 8, and other documents, such as *Shu jing*, “Wu yi” and “Duo fang.”
 11. See for instance *Shi jing*, “Yu wu zheng,” “Xiao min,” “Qiao yan” (Mao 194, 195, 198); or the Yu-*ding* and Shi Xun-*gui* inscriptions (Shirakawa 1962–1984, vol. 27, no. 162; vol. 31, no. 183).
 12. See *Shi jing*, “Shi yue zhi jiao” 12:447 (Mao, 193).
 13. References to *tian ming* in its early sense as the right to rule the world are conspicuously absent from the *Zuo*, except for a speech which is in all likelihood a Han interpolation (*Zuo*, Xuan 3:672; see discussion in Appendix 2). Elsewhere “Heaven’s decree” refers exclusively to personal destiny, and occasionally to the right to rule a single state, but never to the right to rule All under Heaven. This does not mean, however, that the early etymology of *tian ming* entirely disappeared, but in the Chunqiu period it was applied exclusively in the context of the sage kings of the past (see, for instance, Shu Yi-*zhong*, which mentions the decree received by the founder of the Shang dynasty, Cheng Tang [Shirakawa 1962–1984, vol. 38, no. 61:363]). For the decline of discourse on Heaven’s mandate in the Chunqiu-Zhangou period, see Loewe 1994, 88–93 (but see also note 18 below).
 14. Lord Zhuang refers to his rebellious brother, Gongshu Duan, who fled the state after being defeated in 722.
 15. See *Zuo*, Yin 11:74–75.

16. For the three cases, see *Zuo* (Xi 19:383; Xi 15:359–360; Xi 22:396).
17. For the view that divination is necessary only “to resolve doubts” but is not needed otherwise, see *Zuo*, Huan 11:131. Indeed, only a few of the eighty-odd instances of divination recorded in the *Zuo* deal with political problems, usually matters of appointments and military undertakings. Even then, the results of the divination could be ignored or reinterpreted to conform with political needs. For more on the role of divination and omens in Chunqiu politics, see Zinin 1988; Poo 1998, 44–52; Pines 1998a, 145–151. Interestingly, Kryukov suggested (2000, 342–344) that during the Chunqiu period the importance of divination increased in comparison with the Western Zhou age, and that this increase reflects “a search for a new source of the sacredness, which was lost in the process of decline of the Western Zhou ritual.”
18. The only exception to this, was the early Chunqiu rulers of the state of Qin who haughtily declared that they had received Heaven’s decree to rule the world. Even these claims were made for a limited, domestic audience: they appear in several bronze inscriptions directed to the ancestors, but are not referred to in extant texts. It is highly unlikely that such arrogant declarations were made in the course of Qin’s diplomatic communications with other states (for the Qin inscriptions, see Shirakawa 1962–1984, vol. 34, no. 199:1–28; vol. 50, add. no. 16; Mattos 1997; 111–120; Falkenhausen 1990, 39–41; Kern 2000, 72–105).
19. This attitude might have foreshadowed Sima Qian’s observation: “Being in a desperate position man turns to [what is] basic; hence, it never happened that one who is exhausted by hardships would not cry to Heaven” (*Shiji* 84:2482).
20. See *Shi jing*, “Yu wu zheng” 12:448 (Mao, 194); *Shi jing*, “Wo jiang” 19:558 (Mao, 272), respectively.
21. See *Zuo*, Wen 16:614. Lord Yi murdered his nephew, Prince She, and seized power in 613, which means that he seized it by means of disorder. Lord Yi was murdered in 608.
22. See *Zuo*, Zhao 11:1323–1324.
23. For predictions based on “Heaven’s justice,” see *Zuo*, Xiang 31:1184–1185; Zhao 1:1204; Zhao 1:1214–1215. Alternatively, the concept of Heaven’s justice served to explain extraordinary political events, such as the expulsion of Lord Xian of Wei from his state in 559 (*Zuo*, Xiang 14:1016–1018), or the Lu victory over powerful Qi in 484 (*Zuo*, Ai 11:1663); in this last case, however, Lu’s rhetoric was mostly aimed at humiliating the defeated Qi rather than expressing a real belief in Heaven’s justice.
24. For the claims of Heaven’s support of Chonger, see *Zuo*, Xi 23:408–409.
25. See a translation of Chonger’s story in Watson 1989, 44–66; and the discussion in Schaberg 1996a, 535–562.
26. See *Zuo*, Xi 28:456. Dechen ignored the warning and suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Jin army at Chengpu.
27. For these speeches, see *Zuo*, Xi 33:497; Xuan 15:759; Xuan 15:762–763, respectively. For another example of deducing Heaven’s intent from the actual balance of power, see an attempt by Zijia Ji in 515 to dissuade the supporters of the fugitive Lord Zhao

- from fighting the Lu insurgents whose earlier successes proved in Zijia Ji's eyes that they enjoyed Heaven's support (*Zuo*, Zhao 27:1487).
28. See *Zuo*, Zhao 4:1246.
 29. See, for instance, *Zuo*, Zhao 30:1508; Ai 1:1608; Ai 15:1692–1693.
 30. Thus, the rebellious Jin minister Luan Ying dismissed warnings that his rebellion would fail due to lack of Heaven's support, and decided to carry out his plan (*Zuo*, Xiang 23:1073). Similarly, in 494, King Fuchai of Wu did not heed the advice of Wu Zixu to "comply with Heaven" and to extinguish the defeated state of Yue (*Zuo*, Ai 1:1605–1607). The most radical manifestation of diminishing respect toward Heaven was the behavior of King Ling of Chu. The *Zuo* tells: "Earlier, King Ling divined by making cracks, saying: 'Let me attain all under Heaven!' [The response] was inauspicious. [The king] threw down the tortoise shell, and cursed Heaven, shouting: 'Such a paltry thing and still you will not give it to me! I must take it by myself!'" (*Zuo*, Zhao 13:1350). King Ling, like Luan Ying and Fuchai, ultimately failed, which may indicate that the scribes included the stories of their defiance of Heaven's will to express disapproval of this arrogance. Yet rejection of Heaven's potential intent did not necessarily lead to disaster. In 516, overlords dismissed the warning of rebellious Prince Chao of Zhou that abandoning his cause would bring about Heaven's punishment—and nothing negative happened (*Zuo*, Zhao 26:1475–1479).
 31. See *Zuo*, Zhao 26:1471; for the deaths mentioned in this passage, see *Zuo*, Zhao 25:1466–1467.
 32. See *Zuo*, Zhao 27:1486–1487.
 33. See a detailed discussion of Zi Chan's thought in Rubin 1965 and Pines 1997b, 31–38.
 34. See *Zuo*, Zhao 18:1395.
 35. For Zi Chan's practical steps after the firestorms and to avoid further disasters, see *Zuo*, Zhao 18:1395–1399.
 36. The term "*shen*" (神) is of earlier origin. On the Shang oracle bones and some of the Western Zhou bronzes it appears as "申"; Chao Fulin assumes that it originated from "lightning" (電). The term "*gui*," according to Chao, originally referred to the impersonator of the deceased ancestor during the sacrificial performance (Chao Fulin 1995, 21). It is tempting, therefore, to assume that "*shen*" refers to natural deities, and "*gui*" to ancestral spirits. In fact, however, in the Chunqiu and early Zhanguo periods, both terms were used interchangeably, and the compound "*guishen*" refers sometimes to natural deities and sometimes to ancestral spirits. As a matter of convenience, and unless the context indicates otherwise, I translate "*shen*" as "deities" and "*guishen*" as "spirits and deities."
 37. See Falkenhausen 1993b, 150.
 38. See, for instance, Liang Qichao [1911] 1996, 33–44; Feng Youlan 1937, 31–34; Hou Wailu 1957, 122–131, and the recent discussion in Liu Jiahe 1995.
 39. For the *do-ut-des* principle as the foundation of human intercourse with the deities, see Keightley 1978a, 214–217 for the Shang, and Falkenhausen 1993b, 145–167 for

- the Western Zhou. It should be noted, however, that the discussions of Shang–Western Zhou religion are based on the sources that either depict or serve as the means of ritual intercourse with extrahuman powers (oracle bones, bronze inscriptions, and several odes of the *Shi jing*), and as such they may be inadequate to represent the full complexity of contemporary religious thought. For the later absorption of the *do-ut-des* principle in Chinese religious life, see Paper 1995.
40. See Poo 1998, 61.
 41. It should be noted, however, that statements of merit in which donors manifest their virtue (*ming de*) appear on only a tiny fraction of bronze vessels, which suggests their relative insignificance in ritual communication (Falkenhausen 1993b, 154–161).
 42. See *Liji jijie*, “Biao ji” 51:1310.
 43. For the ritualization of the Shang royal religion, see Keightley 1978a; 1999, 260–268. For the Western Zhou ritual reform, see p. 276n4.
 44. Hultkrantz’s saying is cited from Paper 1995, 30. Its relevance for the Chinese case may be exemplified by the following observation of Falkenhausen in regard to the changing form of Western Zhou ritual vessels in the process of Western Zhou ritual reform: “The new visual language promulgated by the Late Western Zhou ritual reform was, in other words, deliberately focused on the ritual procedure as such, rather than, for instance, on the spirits of deities to whom the rituals were addressed” (Falkenhausen 2000). The evidence for Zhou religious life does not support Paper’s assertion that before the time of Confucius “ecstatic religious experience was a major factor in Chinese religion” (1995, 51).
 45. See discussion on the “auspicious words” (*guci*) in the Zhou bronze inscriptions in Xu Zhongshu 1936; Falkenhausen 1993b, 151–152; Lewis 1999a, 16; Kryukov 2000, 135–137.
 46. According to Yang Bojun’s assertion, Lord Hui had illicit relations with his brother’s widow (*Zuo*, 351).
 47. See Xi 10:334–335. I modify Schaberg’s translation (1996a, 537).
 48. Qi 杞 and Zeng were ruled by the descendants of the Xia dynasty, and should have performed sacrifices to the Xia deities.
 49. See *Zuo*, Xi 31:487. The state of Wei was founded by King Cheng and the Duke of Zhou in c. 1040 B.C.E.; its sacrificial obligations were apparently fixed at that time.
 50. In 563, Lord Dao of Jin (r. 572–558) was told after a divination by reading cracks (*bu*) that to avert his illness he must perform sacrificial ceremonies to Sanglin, a deity from the state of Song. Lord Dao’s aide, Xun Ying, dissuaded him: “We reject this ritual; they [Song] use it. If spirits and deities exist, they will add troubles to them [i.e., to Song]” (*Zuo*, Xiang 10:977). Lord Dao heeded Xun Ying’s advice and refrained from the sacrifice. Similarly, King Zhao of Chu (r. 515–489) refused in 489 to follow the divination’s orders to cure his illness by sacrificing to the god of the Yellow River, because this sacrifice was at odds with established ritual practice. Confucius lauded King Zhao’s behavior (*Zuo*, Ai 6:1636).

51. For example, in 535, Zi Chan persuaded Lord Ping of Jin to sacrifice to the spirit of Gun, explaining that since Gun enjoyed the offerings of the three dynasties, Jin as a new international leader needed to follow this custom (*Zuo*, Zhao 7:1289–1290). However, both the *Zuo* and *Guoyu* contain bitter criticism against the Lu statesman Zang Wenzhong, who dared to change the order of sacrifices in the Lu ancestral temple, elevating the revered Lord Xi (r. 659–628) over his younger brother and predecessor Lord Min (r. 661–660) (*Zuo*, Wen 2:523–526). The correct order in the Lu ancestral temple was restored in 502 (for details see Xu Zibin 1996). On another occasion Zang was censured for his intention to perform sacrifices to a strange sea bird (*Guoyu*, “Lu yu 1” 4.9:165–170; *Zuo*, Wen 2:526).
52. I borrow the concept of “unruly gods” from Shahar and Weller 1996.
53. In 541, Zi Chan reportedly argued that the illness of Lord Ping of Jin could not be attributed to the terrestrial deities, since human health remained beyond the power of these deities. He suggested that Lord Ping’s illness was rather caused by his excessive behavior and particularly by marrying women of the same Ji clan—an appalling violation of an ancient taboo (*Zuo*, Zhao 1:1217–1220). Seven years later, however, Zi Chan acted differently. Being asked the reasons for Lord Ping’s new illness, he suggested that this had been caused by the spirit of Gun, another terrestrial deity, and suggested performing appropriate sacrifices (see note 51 above). Either both anecdotes originated in independent traditions concerning Zi Chan’s sagacity, or, less likely, the different explanations given by Zi Chan to the Jin dignitaries reflected his own uncertainty concerning the degree of the deities’ influence on health.
54. See *Zuo*, Zhao 16:1382.
55. See *Zuo*, Zhao 19:1405. I follow Burton Watson’s translation (1989, 212).
56. For different views on Zi Chan’s alleged “atheism,” see Zhang, Li, and Huang 1979; Zhang Hengshou 1989; Zhou Qianrong 1982.
57. In 535, the inhabitants of the Zheng capital were terrified by the ghost of the late leader, Bo You, who allegedly avenged his death by killing his former adversaries. To pacify the population, Zi Chan ordered Bo You’s son to be appointed to the position of hereditary noble, so that he would be able to sacrifice to the father’s spirit (*Zuo*, Zhao 7:1291–1293).
58. See *Lunyu*, “Yong ye” 6.22:61.
59. The four parts of the sentence explain, respectively, “broad,” “large,” “thick,” and “fat.”
60. See *Zuo*, Huan 6:111–112. Ji Liang refers to the states of the Ji clan along the south-eastern banks of the Han River. Sui was the largest of the Ji states and the lord of Sui attempted to unite them to withstand Chu’s aggression.
61. In 684 Cao Gui from Lu stated that “petty trustworthiness” obtained through the proper performance of sacrificial rites would never ensure victory on the battlefield; instead, the ruler must seek support from his people (*Zuo*, Zhuang 10:182–183). In 655 Gong Zhiqi from the state of Yu resorted to a similar argument to undermine his ruler’s be-

- lief that “purity” of sacrifices would ensure supernatural blessing (*Zuo*, Xi 5:309–310). And in 641 Prince Mui of Song reiterated, “the people are masters of the deities” (*Zuo*, Xi 19:382).
62. Perhaps the divination performed after the sacrifice indicated the positive attitude of the deity to Guo expansion, on which see *Zuo*, Min 2:262.
 63. See *Zuo*, Zhuang 32:251–253. Two years after the deity’s visit, Guo did indeed achieve an important victory over the Rong tribes, but the “shallow virtue” of the Guo ruler led to the annexation of Guo by Jin in 655.
 64. For similar views, see also *Zuo*, Xi 28:467–468, and the examples mentioned in note 61.
 65. See, for instance *Zuo*, Zhuang 14:196–197; Xi 16:369.
 66. See *Zuo*, Zhao 8:1300; following Yang Bojun I emend 性 to 生.
 67. The first to express his doubts was, according to a legend incorporated in the *Zuo*, *lingyin* Zi Wen of Chu, who reportedly said in the late seventh century: “If spirits require food, then the spirits of the Ruao lineage would starve” (*Zuo*, Xuan 4:680). Since the mid-sixth century conditional statements become common whenever deities are mentioned (*Zuo*, Xiang 10:977; Xiang 14:1013; Xiang 20:1055; Zhao 27:1487).
 68. See *Zuo*, Ding 1:1524.
 69. In the late fifth century Mozi bitterly complained against those who claimed: “Spirits and deities definitely do not exist” (*Mozi*, “Ming gui xia” 31:336). The authors of the mid-Zhanguo “Tan Gong” chapter of the *Liji* painstakingly sought a rational explanation for sacrifices to the deceased: “To treat the dead as dead would be inhumane; this cannot be done; to treat them as living would be unwise; this cannot be done either” (*Liji jijie*, “Tan Gong shang” 9:216; for the dating of the “Tan Gong” chapter, see Yoshimoto 1992). Thus, whereas the authors of the Western Zhou odes of the *Shi jing* took the deities’ existence for granted, several centuries later this faith was considered “unwise.” For more on Zhanguo attitudes toward deities, see Harper 1985; cf. Kang Dewen 1997, 106–107.
 70. See for instance *Zuo*, Cheng 1:782; Cheng 13:860–861; Zhao 1:1210; Zhao 13:1350–1353. For the conservative trend in Shu Xiang’s thought, see Pines 1997b, 4–13.
 71. For Chunqiu bronze inscriptions, see Emura 1989–1991; for the issue of “sincerity,” see idem 37:55–56. Further interesting evidence for the elite’s religious life are the numerous occult manuscripts unearthed from Zhanguo tombs (see for instance Harper 1985; 1999, 866–874). At the present stage, it is difficult to estimate whether these texts reflect a mainstream or minority tradition. It is clear, however, that whereas faith in the deities’ political prowess diminished, the belief in supernatural forces did not necessarily fade away (see also Poo 1998, 41–68). Our knowledge of the commoners’ beliefs is extremely limited, but some indications suggest that skeptical attitudes were not shared by the lower strata, as is suggested, for instance, by the mass panic in the state of Zheng caused by the ghost of the late Bo You (see note 57 above).

Furthermore, while by the late Chunqiu, covenant oaths began to lose their prestige among the upper strata (see Chapter 4), this was not the case among the commoners. The fourth century B.C.E. legal documents from the state of Chu, discovered at the site of Baoshan, suggest that by then oaths were routinely used in judicial investigations, since for the lower strata spiritual sanctions for violating the oath might have been sufficiently compelling (Weld 1999, 94–97). See also Xunzi's saying cited in the epigraph.

72. See *Zuo*, Zhao 20:1415–1416.
73. See *Zuo*, Zhao 26:1479–1480.
74. See Kryukov 1995, 330. For more on the Western Zhou concept of “*de*,” see Komimami 1992; Kryukov 1997, 209–223.
75. Yan Ying's reinterpretation of “*de*” was preceded by similar efforts of other late Chunqiu thinkers (*Zuo*, Xiang 27:1133), but differed from the early Chunqiu approach (Pines 1998a, 97–110).
76. For more on Yan Ying's thought, see Pines 1997b, 18–31.
77. See *Zuo*, Ai 12:1671; Ai 13:1678–1679.
78. See Falkenhausen 1994, 2–3. For more on the reorientation away from the ancestors as reflected in the Chunqiu inscriptions, see Falkenhausen 1993a, 47, 51; Emura 1989–1991; Mattos 1997, 86–87.
79. See *Zuo*, Cheng 5:821.
80. In 647 Lord Mu of Qin justified his decision to send relief to famine-stricken Jin by claiming: “[Those who] uphold the Way [*Dao*] obtain good fortune” (*Zuo*, Xi 13:345). In 573 Lord Dao of Jin reminded his nobles: “He who respectfully follows the ruler is granted good fortune by the deities” (*Zuo*, Cheng 18:907). In 565, Han Wuji reiterated that deities bestow good fortune only on the benevolent (*Zuo*, Xiang 7:952). For the link between a person's morality and his fate, see also *Zuo*, Xiang 28:1149.
81. See *Mozi*, “Tian zhi”; “Ming gui”.
82. See the discussion in Chapter 6.
83. See *Zuo*, Xiang 14:1013. The “three crimes” refer to Lord Xian's provocative behavior and deliberate offense toward two chief ministers, Sun Wenzhi and Ning Huizi, which drove them to rebellion. Moreover, he mistreated his stepmother, Ding Jiang, as if she were the former ruler's concubine, while her position should have been that of the “first lady.”
84. “Outer strong” refers to the outer trigram of the hexagram *bi*; “inner mild” refers to the inner trigram of this hexagram. The term “*zhen*” means both the “matter of divination” and “faithfulness.” “To carry out the matter of divination” becomes, therefore, “to carry out faithfulness.”
85. See *Zuo*, Zhao 12:1337–1338. I follow Smith's translation (1989, 438) with minor modifications.

Chapter 3: The Universal Panacea

1. See *Lunyu*, “Ji shi” 16.2:174; cf. Zhu Xi’s analysis of this passage as the summary of Chunqiu history (1986, 93:2148–2149).
2. On futile attempts of various schools to challenge the Confucian ideal of *li*, see Liu Zehua 1991, 346–354; see also Pines 2000c.
3. Shang rituals are discussed in Keightley 1978a; 1999. For the different theories on the origins of *li*, see Yan Buke 1993, 296–303; Yang Qun 1990, 3–11; cf. Keightley 1987.
4. The most comprehensive discussion about the Western Zhou ritual reform, to date, is by Lothar von Falkenhausen (1996a); see also idem 1997; 2000; Rawson 1990, 93–125; 1999, 433–440; Shaughnessy 1999b, 332–338; Kryukov 1984; 2000, 132–137, 284–287.
5. Various aspects of “usurpation” of the superiors’ ceremonial rights, particularly sumptuary privileges, are discussed in Emura 1988, 79–82; Chen Xuguo 1991, 274–354; Falkenhausen 1999; Yin Qun 1999; for a general discussion of the demise of the early Zhou ritual system, see Kryukov 1997, 224–251; 2000, 327–355. The *Zuo* supplies plenty of examples of violation of ritual norms. Suffice it to mention that the *Zuo* evaluates no less than eighty events as instances of nonritual (*fei li* or *bu li*) or “irreverent” (*bu jing*) behavior by Chunqiu rulers and the highest dignitaries.
6. For the term “pan-liism,” see Hsiao 1978, 89; see also Shen and Liu 1992, 83–90; Schaberg 1996a; Lewis 1999, 132–139.
7. For the demise of the international ritual system, see Chapter 4. For details of Chunqiu military ritual, see Kierman 1974; Sekiguchi 1975; Takagi 1986; Lewis 1990, 15–52; Yang Guoyong 1995. For the inapplicability of ancient ritual norms to the new modes of warfare that appeared during the Chunqiu, see Pines 1998a, 188–195.
8. The religious origins of *li* may be traced from the character itself. The *Shuo wen* defines “*li*” as follows: “*Li* 禮 is *li* 履; by it spirits are served to bring good fortune. It comes from ‘to expose’ (*shi* 示) and ‘vessel’ (*feng* 豐).” Indeed, on the oracle bones “*li*” appears as “sacrificial vessel” (*feng*; see Xu Fuguan 1984, 41–43; Yan Buke 1996, 75–76); in the later Guodian manuscripts *li* appears also as “sacrificial vessel” (*li* 豐; see Guodian, *passim*). Kryukov (2000, 32–33) suggested that in certain bronze inscriptions, such as He-zun, *feng* should also be identified as *li* 禮 (“sacrificial rites”); this interpretation is supported by Shirakawa (1962–1984, vol. 48, add. no. 1:174–175), but is rejected by Shaughnessy (1997, 78). The Western Zhou chapters of the *Shu jing* mention “*li*” only in the context of specific rites, inherited from Shang times (see “Luo gao,” “Jun shi”); the only exception is the later part of the “Jin teng” chapter, but this part is likely of later origin (see Shaughnessy 1993, 64–65). The *Shu jing* uses the term “*yi*” (originally also meaning “sacrificial vessel”) for the broad concept of ritual propriety (Xu Fuguan 1984, 43–47). Western Zhou odes and hymns of the *Shi jing*, with the exception of “Shi yue zhi jiao” (Mao, 193), invariably refer to *li* as sacrificial rites; the entire complex body of these rites is defined as “hundreds of *li*” (see “Chu ci,” “Feng nian,” “Bin zhi chu yan,” “Zai shan” [Mao, 209, 279, 200, 290]). For more on religious origins of

- li*, see Vandermeersch 1994. For the etymology of the term “*yi*” (ceremonial decorum) see an interesting study by Boltz (2000); for “*yi*” and “*weiyi*,” see Jiang Kunwu 1981 and Kryukov 2000, 229–234. These terms definitely overshadow “*li*” in Western Zhou texts. In the *Shi jing*, for instance, “*li*” is mentioned only ten times; “*yi*” and “*weiyi*,” thirty-five times.
9. “Be cautious [performing] the awe-inspiring ceremonies, they are the counterpart of virtue!” (*Shi jing*, “*Yi*” 18:554 [Mao, 256]). The “*Jia le*” ode echoes it: “Solemn are awe-inspiring ceremonies, ordered is the voice of virtue. Without resentment, without wickedness, your leadership derives from the multitudes. Obtains immeasurable blessing, oh, the pivot of the four quarters” (*Shi jing* 17:541 [Mao, 249]). See also such odes as “*Bin zhi chu yan*,” “*Min lao*,” “*Ban*” (Mao, 220, 253, 254), and the discussion by Onozawa 1968, 167–168.
 10. The term “*weiyi*” is first mentioned in the inscriptions on Guoshu Lü-*zhong* and Shu Xiang Fuyu-*gui*. Both inscriptions are dated to King Li’s reign (r. 857–842). See Shirakawa 1962–1984, vol. 26, no. 155; vol. 27, no. 161; and note in vol. 27:436.
 11. The “*Yi*” ode states: “Be reverent and careful in awe-inspiring ceremonies; you shall become the model for the people” (*Shi jing* 18:554 [Mao, 256]); see similar ideas in “*Huang yi*,” “*Si qi*,” and “*Xia wu*” (Mao, 241, 240, 243). For more on the widespread Western Zhou belief in the importance of emulating the ruler, see K.V. Vasil’ev 1973; 10–11; Savage 1992.
 12. See *Zuo*, Yin 5:41–44.
 13. In translating 物 I follow Yang Bojun’s gloss (*Zuo*, 88).
 14. That is, ancestral temple.
 15. See *Zuo*, Huan 2:86–89. In translating this speech I partly follow Legge 1960, 40.
 16. See *Shi jing*, “*Ban shui*” 20:611 (Mao, 299). This hymn praises the martial achievements of Lord Xi (r. 659–626).
 17. “Inner families” refers to the collateral branches of the ruling lineage; “outer,” to other lineages. See Abe 1983, 250. For more on Chu administration, see Blakeley 1992.
 18. See *Zuo*, Xuan 12:724–725.
 19. See *Zuo*, Cheng 12:858.
 20. See *Zuo*, Xiang 26:1120–1121.
 21. See *Zuo*, Cheng 3:814.
 22. See *Zuo*, Cheng 13:860–861. According to Lewis (1990, 17), “in the sacrifices one takes the meat from the sacrifice in the ancestral temple, and in warfare [before setting out on a campaign] one receives the meat from the sacrifices at the *she* altar.”
 23. See *Zuo*, Xiang 31:1191. The quoted passage is from *Shi jing*, “*Sang rou*” 18.559 (Mao, 257). Beigong’s prediction failed; shortly after Zi Chan’s death, the domestic and international power of Zheng began to decline rapidly, and the state suffered from incessant turmoil and foreign incursions until its final annihilation in 375 B.C.E.

24. See *Shi jing*, “Yi” 18:554 (Mao, 256).
25. See *Shi jing*, “Bo zhou” 2:297 (Mao, 26).
26. See *Shi jing*, “Ji zui” 17:536 (Mao, 247).
27. The quoted document is lost.
28. See *Shi jing*, “Huang yi” 16:552 (Mao, 241).
29. See *Zuo*, Xiang 31:1193–1195. The speech was delivered in the context of criticizing arrogant behavior of *lingyin* Wei of Chu, the future King Ling. I modify Schaberg’s translation (1996a, 453–454).
30. For Shu Xiang’s views of *li*, see *Zuo*, Xiang 21:1063; Zhao 2:1229; Zhao 5:1266–1267; Zhao 11:1326–1327; Zhao 15:1374. For more about Shu Xiang’s conservative vision, see Pines 1997b, 4–13.
31. In 541 Lu invaded the state of Ju and seized the town of Yun; this action violated Lu’s obligations according to the peace agreement of 546.
32. Earlier the same year, three major aristocratic lineages—Jisun, Mengsun, and Shusun—distributed the entire state revenues among themselves, virtually stripping the ruler of his economic power.
33. See *Zuo*, Zhao 5:1266.
34. Kong Zhang arrived at the ceremony too late and had to stand among the guests instead of standing at the place appropriate to his position in the Zheng government.
35. See *Zuo*, Zhao 16:1377.
36. I disagree with Du Yu’s interpretation of “*lan*” as “[do not] lose office” (*Chunqiu Zuozhuan zhengyi* 52:2115); the context suggests that Yan Ying worried the *shi* would “overwhelm” the high-ranking nobles (*dafu*). Note that Yan Ying himself belonged to the higher segment of the hereditary aristocracy.
37. That is to say, officials do not usurp the power of their superiors, especially that of the lord. Again, I disagree with Du Yu’s interpretation of “*tao*” as “being sluggish.”
38. See *Zuo*, Zhao 26:1480.
39. Note that if the *Liji* is to be trusted, Yan Ying himself was not a staunch supporter of the ceremonial norms, for which he is criticized several times (*Liji jijie*, “Tan Gong xia” 10:267; “Li qi” 14:647; cf. *Zuo*, Xiang 18:1033–1034). Interestingly, the *Yanzi chunqiu* attributes to Yan Ying extremely critical statements concerning ceremonial decorum (“Wai pian xia” 8.1:367).
40. Yan Ying consistently expressed his dissatisfaction with the ascendancy of *shi* (Pines 1997b, 28).
41. Zhu Xi 1986, 93:2171.
42. For the Zhanguo evolution of the concept of “*li*,” see Liu Zehua 1987, 78–99; Pines 2000c.

Chapter 4: The World Falls Apart

1. For the impact of Chunqiu modes of interstate ties on future East Asian diplomacy, see Goncharov 1986, 9–13; Tao 1988, 5–6. Even in the late nineteenth century Chinese statesmen resorted to Chunqiu models of international law to deal with the Occidental multistate system (Qian Mu 1972, 43); and the interest in the Chunqiu experience continued well into the republican era (Dobson 1968, 270). For the early-twentieth-century European interest in Chunqiu diplomacy, see Walker 1953, 129–132.
2. See Hsu 1965, 53.
3. The emergence of lineage land ownership in the Chunqiu period (see p. 299n103) might have directly influenced the increasing importance of lands in contemporary political life. The rulers sought lands to distribute to meritorious servants and internal allies; alternatively, newly acquired territories could be turned into a dependency (*xian*), the revenues of which would strengthen the ruler's position at home. In the late Chunqiu period powerful lineages often attacked weaker polities to seize their lands, the ruler's international obligations notwithstanding.
4. These components of international *li*, except mutual visits of the overlords, were enumerated by Cao Gui of Lu in 671 (*Zuo*, Zhuang 23:226).
5. See *Zuo*, Yin 9:65; Yin 10:70 for the first two cases; see also *Zuo*, Yin 6:51; Huan 2:90–91; Zhuang 10:184–185; Zhuang 16:202.
6. See *Zuo*, Huan 5:106; Yin 11:75.
7. Although Zhou kings, particularly King Xiang (r. 651–619) were de facto puppets of Lord Huan, the latter repeatedly declared that he was acting on behalf of the Son of Heaven. See, for instance, his invocation of royal patronage to justify the 656 assault on Chu (*Zuo*, Xi 4:288–292); see also Lord Huan and Guan Zhong's explicitly reverent attitude toward King Xiang in 651 and 648 (*Zuo*, Xi 9:326–327; Xi 12:341–342). For details of Lord Huan's relations with the Zhou kings, see Yoshimoto 1990b, 262–265.
8. See *Guliang zhuan*, Xi 17, 8:2398.
9. Lord Huan adopted the policy of preserving weak polities only after achieving effective hegemony over most Huaxia states. At the earlier stage of his career, he annexed the statelets of Tan in 684 and Sui in 681.
10. In 651 Guan Zhong explained to Lord Huan the advantages of abiding by ritual norms to enhance the prestige of Qi, and accordingly dissuaded him from supporting the rebellious heir apparent Hua of Zheng, even though the latter suggested ousting Lord Huan's enemy, Lord Wen (*Zuo*, Xi 7:317–318). Ten years earlier Zhongsun Qiu similarly dissuaded Lord Huan from annexing the state of Lu, which reportedly “adhered to *li*” (*Zuo*, Min 1:257).
11. Lord Wen was famous for his strange behavior, particularly his unusual austerity (*Mozi*, “Jian'ai zhong” 15:159). That his mother was of Rong origin and he himself spent eleven years among the Di tribesmen may explain his ambivalence toward *li*.

12. See *Zuo*, Xi 25:433. Zhou kings traditionally referred to the overlords of the Ji clan as “paternal uncles” (*shufu*), and those of the Jiang clan, such as Lord Huan of Qi, as “maternal uncles” (*boju*).
13. See *Chun qiu*, Xi 28:450; *Zuo*, Xi 28:473.
14. See Yoshimoto 1993, 389–401. I use Yoshimoto’s statistics, but do not necessarily agree with his analysis of Jin-Zhou relations (see pp. 402–404). The degree of Zhou decline is evident from the fact that in 533 only a pathetic appeal by King Jing (r. 544–520) and Shu Xiang’s intervention stopped the incursions into the Zhou lands orchestrated by the state of Jin—the nominal protector of the Zhou house!
15. See statistics presented by Hsu Cho-yun (1965, 58). Hsu’s statistics are based on Gu Donggao’s study (1993), for some corrections of which, see Chen Pan 1988. Certainly, annexations had occurred during Lord Huan’s reign as well, but most of these were done by Chu, Qin, and Jin, that is, in the areas beyond the effective control of Qi.
16. See *Zuo*, Xi 21:392. Lord Xi’s mother, Cheng Feng, a lady from Xugou origin, urged her son to act in accord with the Zhou ritual norms and restore her native state.
17. Namely, restored Wei and Xing of the Ji clan (Lord Huan belonged to the Jiang clan).
18. The founder of the state of Cao.
19. On the eve of the Chengpu battle, Cao and Wei rulers sided with Chu and opposed Jin. Lord Wen forgave the ruler of Wei, but was more reluctant to forgive the lord of Cao, who offended him personally during Lord Wen’s earlier wanderings in exile.
20. See *Zuo*, Xi 28:474.
21. Thus, when in 598 the Chu minister, Shen Shushi, dissuaded King Zhuang (r. 613–591) from annexing the state of Chen, he did not appeal to ritual rules, but only warned the king that such an act would cause dissatisfaction among other overlords (*Zuo*, Xuan 11:714–715).
22. See *Zuo*, Xiang 25:1106.
23. See *Zuo*, Xiang 29:1160. Lords Wu and Xian ruled the state of Jin from 678 to 651.
24. For another instance of statesmen’s awareness of the inevitability of conquests, see *Zuo*, Zhao 1:1206–1207.
25. For instance, in 592 the mother of Lord Qing of Qi (r. 598–582) ridiculed the Jin envoy, Xi Ke, during the latter’s official visit (*Zuo*, Xuan 17:772). Infuriated, Xi Ke swore to retaliate and fulfilled his promise three years later when he headed the Jin army that defeated Qi at An. For other invocations of *li* to justify military expeditions, see *Zuo*, Xi 28:457; Xi 30:479; Xi 33:497. Conversely, in 627 Zang Wenzhong of Lu urged Lord Xi to submit to Qi because “Submission to those who possess *li* protects the altars of soil and grain” (*Zuo*, Xi 33:497; cf. Xiang 28:1141–1142).
26. See *Zuo*, Xiang 28:1143; Zhao 13:1358–1359; Zhao 16:1378–1379; Zhao 30:1506–1507.
27. In 592, Jin arrested the Qi messengers during the assembly at Duandao; Lord Qing of Qi (r. 598–582) refrained from participating in the assembly, presumably because

he feared being humiliated by Jin's nonritual behavior (*Zuo*, Xuan 17:772–773). In 587 Lord Jing of Jin (r. 599–581) humiliated Lord Cheng of Lu, who was so outraged that he almost broke his alliance with Jin (*Zuo*, Cheng 4:818). In 571, Jin armies invaded Zheng when this state was mourning its lord; this action constituted the gravest violation of international ritual (*Zuo*, Xiang 2:922). The Jin leaders invoked *li* in their foreign relation only when they felt insecure, as happened during their contacts with the Chu rivals (see, for instance, *Zuo*, Cheng 12:857–888).

28. The close ties between Chu and the Huaxia are suggested, for instance, by Chu burial patterns, which generally conform to Zhou sumptuary rules, and by Chu material culture in general (Falkenhausen 1999, 514–525; Li Ling 1991, 61–62; Xu Shaohua 1999, 21–23 ff.; for a different view that emphasizes the uniqueness of Chu, see Cook and Blakeley 1999). Importantly, the *Zuo* refers to Chu as a country of “a different clan” (*yi xing*), but never as “*manyi*” (see Pines 2000b). It is likely, therefore, that the distinct Chu identity was created in the late Chunqiu–early Zhanguo period, and not earlier.
29. In 538 King Ling heeded the advice of his aide, Jiao Ju, and adopted Lord Huan's ritual norms while meeting foreign dignitaries. Yet the *Zuo* suggests that, as the state of Chu generally lacked sophisticated ritual specialists, the king's enthusiasm about *li* soon evaporated (*Zuo*, Zhao 4:1250–1252).
30. *Gui* is a large jade staff, held during the court visit; *zhang* is a lesser jade staff held during the reception at the ruler's wife's chambers. See Yang Bojun's gloss (*Zuo*, 1267).
31. See *Zuo*, Zhao 5:1267–1268.
32. See *Zuo*, Zhao 13:1355–1356.
33. See *Zuo*, Zhao 13:1357.
34. See *Zuo*, Zhao 13:1357.
35. See *Zuo*, Ding 8:1566.
36. Marx [1852] 1975, 103.
37. Archaeological findings also strongly indicate the otherness of Wu in comparison with the Central Plain states before the late sixth century B.C.E. (Falkenhausen 1999, 525–542; cf. Gu Jianxiang and Wei Yihui 1999, 72).
38. For instance, Wu defied ritual norms by invading Chu while Chu was mourning King Gong in 560 and King Ping in 515. Even Wu's ally, Jin disliked these violations of ritual norms by Wu leaders and cut off contacts with Wu in 559 (*Zuo*, Xiang 14:1005).
39. One *lao* consisted of one cow, one sheep, and one pig.
40. In 521 the Jin noble Fan Yang (Shi Yang) paid a visit to Lu. Being dissatisfied with the traditional presents, Fan Yang threatened to use force against Lu and consequently was granted an unprecedented and ritually inappropriate present of eleven *lao* (*Zuo*, Zhao 21:1425).
41. Ancient Chinese astronomy divided Heaven into twelve parts (see Yang Bojun's gloss, *Zuo*, 1641).

42. See *Zuo*, Ai 7:1640–1641.
43. See *Zuo*, Ai 7:1641. Zi Gong referred to the distinct customs of the Wu population in order to stress that they do not belong to the Zhou ritual culture. Zhong Yong succeeded Taibo as the ruler of Wu.
44. “He considered Wu as lacking in ability to act” (*Zuo*, Ai 7:1641).
45. In 482, when the Wu leaders arrested Lord Chu of Wei (r. 492–480, 476–456) during the large interstate assembly, Zi Gong intervened on behalf of the detained ruler. Yet in his conversation with Bo Pi, Zi Gong completely ignored the ritual impropriety of Wu’s behavior; instead, he pointed at the political stupidity of this arrest (*Zuo*, Ai 12:1672; cf. an account in *Chunqiu shiyu*, no. 10).
46. The alliance (*meng*) required a solemn ceremony that included preparing a written oath, sacrificing an animal, and smearing its blood on the participants’ lips. The text of the oath was kept in special repositories, and deities were invoked to guard the oath. Allies met periodically to renew (literally, “rewarm”; *xun*) the alliance; in certain cases they assembled without performing an oath ceremony. Such assemblies (*hui*) were considered less binding than an alliance, since they invoked no deities and no written oath. For the detailed description of *meng*, see Liu Boji 1977; Dobson 1968; Mo Jinshan 1996; Weld 1997.
47. This argument was convincingly stated by Susan Weld in regard to Houma alliances, concluded between the head of the aristocratic lineage and his retainers and followers. Although no interstate alliance documents have been excavated until now, it may be plausibly assumed that they followed a similar pattern (i.e., the draft of the oath was prepared unilaterally by the alliance leader).
48. See, for instance, the struggle for precedence between Chu and Jin during the 546 and 541 alliances, between Wei and Cai in 506, and between Jin and Wu in 482 (*Zuo*, Xiang 27:1132–1133; Zhao 1:1201–1202; Ding 4:1535–1542; Ai 13:1677). The Chu representatives plainly stated in 546: “You [Jin envoys] say that Jin and Chu are equals. If Jin always goes first, that must mean that Chu is the weaker party” (*Zuo*, Xiang 27:1132–1133). Thus, alliances implied inequality. For these reasons I reject Mo Jinshan’s assertion that in the early Chunqiu period alliances were based on the equality of participants (1996, 15–16), and agree with Mark Lewis that alliances were primarily a vehicle of one state’s hegemony over another (1990, 44–45).
49. Zheng was allied with Jin in 632–612. In 608 it concluded an alliance with Chu; in 606 it reestablished friendly ties with Jin only to abandon Jin for Chu in 603; next year another alliance with Jin was concluded; in 599 Zheng shifted its allegiance to Chu and then immediately back to Jin; in 598 an alliance with Chu was concluded, betrayed, and reestablished once more in 597.
50. See Lewis 1990, 44.
51. For detailed discussions on the importance of *xin* in the Chunqiu period and the variety of its meanings, see Yan Buke 1981; Lu Shaogang 1984, 34; He Huaihong 1994; Xu Nanyu 1995.
52. See *Zuo*, Cheng 6:827.

53. See *Shi jing*, “Meng” 3:325 (Mao, 58). Ji Wenzi refers to Lu as a devoted wife, whereas Jin is a tricky husband.
54. See *Zuo*, Cheng 8:837.
55. See *Zuo*, Cheng 9:842–843.
56. This is vividly illustrated by the story of Chu’s siege of Song in 594. Song asked for Jin’s help. The latter, being reluctant to help, sent an envoy, Xie Yang, with a false promise of help in order to prevent Song from surrendering to Chu. But Xie Yang was captured by the Chu allies, and King Zhuang of Chu urged him to deliver the opposite (true) message to the besieged. Xie Yang reluctantly agreed, but when he arrived in Song he delivered the original (false) message. The Chu king intended to execute Xie Yang for the latter’s unfaithfulness (*bu xin*). Xie Yang, however, argued that true trustworthiness was properly carrying out his ruler’s commands, not “speaking truth.” King Zhuang released the captured officer, but to prevent further aggravations of mutual lies he forced Song to sign an agreement saying, “You shall not deceive me, I shall not cheat you” (*Zuo*, Xuan 15:759–760).
57. See, for instance, *Zuo*, Cheng 15:873; Xiang 27:1131.
58. Dobson 1968, 278. See also Weld 1990, 389–401, 428; Lewis 1990, 45–46.
59. See *Zuo*, Xi 28:466–467.
60. The Houma texts usually end with the formula: “If I [do such and such] may our former rulers, farseeing, instantly detect me and may ruin befall my lineage” (Weld 1997, 142).
61. See, for instance, *Zuo*, Cheng 1:782.
62. See *Zuo*, Cheng 15:873.
63. That is, will not accumulate grains in case of a natural disaster in the neighboring country, but rather support the neighbors. See, for instance, Qin’s assistance to Jin in 647.
64. According to Yang Bojun, Lord Inspector (Si Shen) is a heavenly deity in charge of those who behave “irreverently” (*bu jing*) (*Zuo*, 1990).
65. These are the participants of the alliance: Jin, Lu, Wei, Cao, and Teng (all of them belonged to the Ji 姬 clan), Zhu and Smaller Zhu (Cao clan), Song (Zi clan), Qi 齊 (Jiang clan), Ju (Ji 己 clan), Qi 杞 (Si clan), and Xue (Ren clan).
66. See *Zuo*, Xiang 11:989–990.
67. For the miserable situation of the beleaguered state of Zheng, see *Zuo*, Xiang 8:959.
68. See the detailed discussion on the 546 conference by Kano Osamu (1978).
69. See *Zuo*, Xiang 27:1131.
70. Zhang Erguo’s 1995 study shows that since the second half of the sixth century leaders preferred less rigid “assemblies” (*hui*) to impressive but ineffective alliances. This data contradicts Mark Lewis’ assertion that toward the end of the Chunqiu period “the blood covenant came to play an ever more important role” (1990, 51). Zhanguo and Han sources record only a few instances of alliances concluded during the Zhanguo period.

71. For Lu aggressions against its neighbors Qi and Ju, see *Zuo*, Xiang 29:1158–1161; Zhao 1:1204–1207.
72. See Kominami 1992, 50–55. Conceiving *de* as a noncoercive means of rule and juxtaposing it with *xing* or *fa* was common already in the Western Zhou; see, for instance, *Shu jing*, “Kang gao”; “Duo fang.” For more about *de*, see the discussion in Chapter 6.
73. See *Zuo*, Xi 4:292. There, Yang Bojun follows Yao Nai’s gloss and identifies Fangcheng as a mountain range of 700–800 *li* [Chinese miles] length to the south of the Huai river.
74. See, for instance, *Zuo*, Xi 7:317; Xi 9:327.
75. See *Zuo*, Xi 15:366; Xi 25:434; Wen 7:563.
76. See *Zuo*, Xuan 12:722.
77. See *Zuo*, Xuan 12:726. For internal quotes, see *Shi jing*, “Zhao” 19:604 (Mao, 293) (I follow Mao’s commentary, which refers to “yang” as “to seize,” rather than “to nurture.” This corresponds perfectly to Shi Hui’s intentions); *Shi jing*, “Wu” 19:597 (Mao, 285).
78. See *Zuo*, Xuan 12:726.
79. By four kings, Guo Zuo apparently refers to the founders of the Yu, Xia, Shang, and Zhou dynasties. According to Du Yu, the five leaders were Kun Wu of the Xia Dynasty, Da Peng and Shi Wei of Shang, Lord Huan of Qi, and Lord Wen of Jin. See Yang Bojun’s gloss, *Zuo*, 798.
80. See *Shi jing*, “Chang fa” 20:626 (Mao, 304).
81. See *Zuo*, Cheng 2:797–798. I modify translations of Watson (1989, 117–118) and Schaberg (1996a, 443–444).
82. See *Zuo*, Xuan 11:711; Xiang 9:969; Xiang 11:993–994; Xiang 24:1089.
83. See the *Shi jing*, “Jie nan shan” 12:441 (Mao, 191).
84. See *Zuo*, Cheng 7:832–833.
85. See *Zuo*, Zhao 16:1376.
86. This saying was first used by Han Yu (768–824 c.e.) in “Song Futu Wenchangshi xu” to designate “the law of the jungle,” which rules a society that lacks ritual and propriety (Han Yu 1986, 253).
87. See *Zuo*, Cheng 9:842–843.
88. For the views of Zi Fan and other Chu statesmen, see *Zuo*, Cheng 12:857–858; Cheng 15:873; Xiang 27:1131; for the Zheng statement, see *Zuo*, Xiang 9:971; for King Ling’s impact on Jin statesmen’s changing views of hegemony, see *Zuo*, Zhao 11:1325; Zhao 13:1353–1357. In the late Chunqiu both superpowers were perfectly aware that to maintain their leadership they needed mostly to manifest their military prowess rather than mildness (*Zuo*, Xiang 26:1123; Zhao 11:1325).
89. Wu Zixu had already become a legendary figure in the Zhanguo period, particularly due to his unusual biography. For details of the legend of Wu Zixu, see Johnson 1981.

90. See *Zuo*, Ai 1:1605–1606.
91. See discussions in Perelomov 1961, 22–34; Hsu 1965, 116–126; Yang Kuan 1998, 89–150.
92. See *Zuo*, Xi 4:289.
93. In 506, for instance, the southeastern state of Wu launched an unprecedented campaign against Chu, penetrating deep into the Chu heartland and invading the Chu capital, Ying. It was only the military assistance of Chu's northwestern neighbor, the state of Qin, that helped Chu to recover its lands. Thus, for the first time two opposite parts of the Chinese world were linked in the same campaign. In 485 Wu launched an unsuccessful naval expedition against Qi; in 482 it was on the verge of conflict with Jin.
94. In 550 Qi invaded Jin to assist Luan Ying's rebellion. In 547 Jin intervened in the Wei internal conflict to assist Sun Linfu. The Song internal crisis of 522–520 involved interventionist forces from the states of Wu, Jin, Cao, Qi, Wei, and Chu. In 517–515 Qi invaded Lu to assist the ousted Lord Zhao; other states also considered invasion but did not realize their plans. In 485–484 Wu invaded Qi to punish it because of the assassination of Lord Dao. Leaders of ministerial lineages in the state of Zheng routinely allied with either Jin or Chu to strengthen their position in the Zheng government. Such examples may be easily multiplied; by the late Chunqiu period internal and external affairs became virtually indistinguishable.
95. For instance, the leading Chu military commander, Qu Wuchen, left Chu in 589 because of a romantic affair; he briefly settled in Qi, and then moved to Jin. The Jin leaders dispatched him in 584 to Wu to train the Wu army in using war chariots; his descendants prospered in the state of Jin throughout the sixth century. The Bo family provides another example of “cross-Chinese” connections. In 576, Jin leaders executed the high minister (*qing*) Bo Zong. Zong's son, Zhouli, fled to Chu and was appointed to a high ministerial position. Later, when Bo Zhouli was likewise slandered and killed, his grandson, Bo Pi, fled to Wu, and headed the Wu government until the final collapse of this state in 474. Thus, four generations of the Bo family held high positions in three of the mightiest Chunqiu states. Many similar cases occurred in almost all of the Chunqiu states (see also Zhang Yanxiu 1996)
96. The term “*tianxia*” appeared first in the Western Zhou period, but its occurrence in Western Zhou texts is few and far between. *Tianxia* is mentioned only twice in the Western Zhou chapters of the *Shu jing* (“Shao gao” 15:213 and “Gu ming” 18:240) and twice in chapters, that cannot be attributed with certainty to the Western Zhou period (“Li zheng” 17:232 and “Lü xing” 19:251). In the *Shi jing* the term “*tianxia*” occurs only once (“Huang yi” 16:521 [Mao, 241]), and twice more in its precompound form “under the heaven” (*tian zhi xia*) (“Bei shan” 13:463 [Mao, 205], and “Ban” 19:605 [Mao, 254]). To my knowledge, the term “*tianxia*” does not occur in bronze inscriptions (according to the index to Shirakawa's *Kinbun tsūshaku*). Its occurrence in the first half of the Chunqiu period is extremely rare: the *Zuo* records only four references to *tianxia* in the speeches of the eighth and seventh centuries. It appears eighteen times, however, in the speeches of the second half of the Chunqiu period.

97. See *Zuo*, Zhao 7:1284.
98. See *Zuo*, Zhao 13:1350.
99. See *Zuo*, Zhao 19:1402; Zhao 26:1474–1475.
100. See *Lunyu*, “Ji Shi” 16.2:174; *Mozi*, “Shang tong shang” 11:109; see *Mengzi*, “Liang Hui Wang shang” 1.6:17–18; see also the detailed discussion in Pines 2000a.

Chapter 5: When a Minister Mounts the Ruler

1. See *Mengzi*, “Teng Wen Gong xia” 6.9:155.
2. For details on the system of hereditary allotments, see Lü Wenyu 1990, 76–79; for hereditary offices, see Hsu 1965, 80–85; Qian Zongfan 1989, 22–26. For a comprehensive discussion about the power of Chunqiu ministerial lineages, see Zhu Fenghan 1990, 525–593; cf. Tian Changwu 1996.
3. The relative weakness of the Chunqiu rulers encouraged some scholars to suggest that Chunqiu society enjoyed a certain degree of “democracy,” not unlike the Greek polis (Rubin 1960; 1965; Ri Zhi 1981). This is a clear exaggeration: the power that slipped from the ruler’s hands fell not to the capital-dwellers (*guo ren*) but to a handful of high-ranking aristocrats (see Masubuchi 1963, 139–180; Hao Tiechuan 1986; Ge Quan 1988; Zhao Boxiong 1990, 321–327). Besides, the deterioration of the ruler’s position was less evident in the peripheral states such as Qin, Chu, and probably also Wu and Yue. In the latter states, the rulers succeeded in controlling most of the land throughout the Chunqiu period, and thus prevented the emergence of powerful lineages. See Thatcher 1985 for Qin; Creel 1964 and Abe 1983 for Chu (but see also modifications of Creel’s views in Blakeley 1992).
4. In 547, the ousted Lord Xian of Wei (r. 576–559 and 546–544) suggested to Ning Xi, the son of his former enemy, Huizi: “If you let me return [to Wei], all the administration will be in the hands of the Ning lineage, while I shall [only control the] sacrifices” (*Zuo*, Xiang 26:1112). This offer is perhaps the most striking evidence of the overlords’ weakness in the late Chunqiu.
5. See the behavior of the Lu noble Hui Bo in 609 (*Zuo*, Wen 18:632), and of the Chu ministers Ke Huang in 605, and Dou Xin in 506; the last two explicitly equated the ruler with Heaven (*Zuo*, Xuan 4:684; Ding 4:1546). For the relative strength of Chu rulers, see note 3.
6. Powerful ministers assassinated the lord of Jin in 607, and in 573; of Zheng in 566; of Qi in 548; and expelled the lords of Wei, Yan, and Lu in 559, 539, and 517 respectively, to mention only a few cases. In the Western Zhou–early Chunqiu, rulers were assassinated or expelled only by their close relatives as part of succession struggles. In the late Chunqiu, to the contrary, independent ministerial lineages began threatening the overlords’ power.
7. For a partial explanation of Lord Xian’s wickedness, see *Zuo*, Xiang 24:1011–1013.
8. Following Yang Bojun I emend 主 to 生 (*Zuo*, 1016).

9. The term “one hundred clans [or families]” (*baixing*) appeared in Western Zhou texts and bronze inscriptions as a synonym for “one hundred officials” (*baiguan*), that is the ranked aristocracy; by the late Chunqiu, it acquired the new meaning of “the entire population” (Xu Fuguan 1985, 319–320). Master Kuang’s speech is apparently the first recorded instance of the new usage of this term.
10. For translating “*pengyou*” as “[young] brothers and sons,” see Zhu Fenghan 1990, 306–311; cf. Zha Changguo 1998, 94–99.
11. If the subject of this sentence are the ruler’s aides, then 賞 must be translated as “praised” and not “rewarded.”
12. The quoted document is lost.
13. “First month” (*zheng yue*) literally means “the correction month” (see Schaberg 1996a, 182).
14. See *Zuo*, Xiang 14:1016–1018. I modify translations of Watson (1989, xvii–xviii) and Schaberg (1996a, 182–183).
15. The *Zuo* records cases of rulers apologizing to the people for humiliating “the altars,” and asking to be replaced (Xi 15:360; Xi 18:378; Ding 8:1566). Zhao Boxiong considers this as the vestiges of ancient communal rules (1990, 303). If this assumption is correct, then Kuang’s view of the responsibilities of the ruler may have very ancient origins. Since Kuang was a music master, whose tasks included the preservation of a semihistorical, semilegendary past (Hawkes 1983), this assumption sounds plausible.
16. Master Kuang evidently did not distinguish the ruler’s aides from his closest relatives. This and other aspects of his speech reflect conscious archaisms; political principles discussed by Kuang belong to the bygone age of a “family state” of the Western Zhou (for which, see Tian Changwu 1996, 1–95).
17. For the altars as representative of the collective entity of the state dwellers, see Masubuchi 1963, 139–163.
18. Lord Zhuang seduced Cui Zhu’s wife; hence, Yan Ying claimed that he died “for personal reasons.”
19. Cui Zhu played the decisive role in Lord Zhuang’s ascendancy to the rule of Qi in 554.
20. See *Zuo*, Xiang 25, 1098.
21. This concept of the fraudulent ruler might have influenced Mencius’ later observation that killing the ruler who violates the norms of benevolence and propriety / righteousness cannot be considered regicide (*Mengzi*, “Liang Hui Wang xia” 2.8:42). Yan Ying’s interest in defining which ruler is genuine and which ceases to be so anticipated later discussions on “rectifying the names” in Chinese political thought and philosophy in general.
22. From 601, during the reign of Lu Lords Xuan, Cheng, Xiang, and Zhao, the power in the state of Lu was concentrated in the hands of Ji Wenzi, his son Wuzi, and great-grandson Pingzi.

23. See *Shi jing*, “Zhan yang” 18:578 (Mao, 264). In the ode “*ren*” apparently refers to high-ranking officials, but Yue Qi extended its meaning to the entire populace (see Yang Bojun’s gloss), *Zuo*, 1456–1477.
24. See *Zuo*, Zhao 25:1456–1457.
25. See *Zuo*, Zhao 27:1486–1487.
26. For the concept of “*shi*” in Zhanguo political discourse, see Ames 1994, 66–94.
27. Yue Qi and Fan Xianzi had good reasons to side with the “rebellious ministers” of Lu. Within less than one generation, both the Yue and Fan lineages were engulfed in struggles with their respective rulers; in 500 Lord Jing of Song expelled Yue Qi’s brother Daxin, whom he suspected of rebellious plans; four years later Fan Xianzi’s son, Zhaozi, rebelled against Lord Ding of Jin, and was defeated in the course of a bitter struggle.
28. See *Shu jing*, “Kang gao.” Many other documents, such as “Shao gao” and “Duo shi,” express similar awareness of the decline of previous dynasties, as a warning to contemporary rulers.
29. See *Zuo*, Ai 11:1665. Two centuries earlier, Deng Man of Chu similarly remarked, “Full becomes unstable—this is the Way of Heaven” (*Zuo*, Zhuang 4:163).
30. See *Zuo*, Zhao 20:1420–1421.
31. See *Shi jing*, “Shi yue zhi jiao” 12:446 (Mao, 193).
32. Scribe Mo refers to the descendants of the Yu, Xia, and Shang dynasties.
33. According to Du Yu, the Heaven (*Qian*) trigram symbolizes a ruler, whereas the Thunder (*Zhen*) trigram symbolizes a minister; in the hexagram “*Da zhuang*,” *Zhen* is the upper part: hence, minister may “mount” the ruler (*Chunqiu Zuozhuan zhengyi* 53:2128).
34. Chengji You assisted in establishing Lord Xi in 660. Ji Wenzhi and Ji Wuzi headed the government of Lu during the first half of the sixth century.
35. See *Zuo*, Zhao 32:1519–1520.
36. See Wei Zhao’s gloss in the *Guoyu* (“Jin yu 9” 15.12:496; see also 15.14:497).
37. The “subversive nature” of Mo’s speech was convincingly exposed by Pi Xirui (1998, 4:44–46).
38. Lord Huan (r. 806–771), the founder of the state of Zheng.
39. See *Zuo*, Zhuang 14:197–198.
40. See *Zuo*, Xi 9:329; Xi 23:403; Xi 24:414.
41. “*Xin*” had several other semantic dimensions, which are discussed in the studies mentioned in note 51, p. 282. “*Xin*” was a reciprocal virtue, and it was demanded also of the rulers (see *Zuo*, Zhuang 13:137; Xiang 11:993; Xiang 22:1068; Zhao 6:1274), but its major meaning remained “ministerial obedience.” In some cases, mentioned below, speakers used the synonymous terms “reverence” (*jing*) and “faithfulness” (*zhen*) to designate unequivocally carrying out the ruler’s orders.
42. See *Zuo*, Xuan 15:759–760.

43. It is worth remembering, that Xie Yang was given a highly immoral order to deliver a false message of forthcoming military help from Jin to the besieged people of Song. It is ironical, therefore, that he names this order as manifestation of propriety (for details, see p. 283n56.) For other examples of demands of the ministers to display *xin* (unequivocal obedience), see, for instance, *Zuo*, Xi 5:309; Xuan 2:658; Cheng 17:901.
44. The late *Zuo* also supplies an instance of critical evaluation of *xin*. In 479 the Lord of She claimed that to stand by one's words is not true trustworthiness; real *xin* means acting in accord with benevolence (*ren*), thereby subordinating *xin* to other ethical requirements (*Zuo*, Ai 16:1700). Similar critical views of trustworthiness as insufficiently noble virtue appear in the *Lunyu* ("Xue er" 1.13:8; "Zi Lu" 13.20:140), and it is worth reminding the reader that the Lord of She was Confucius' acquaintance (for their meetings, see *Lunyu* "Shu er" 7.19:71; "Zi Lu" 13.16:139; 13.18:139), and might have been influenced by the Master's ethical views.
45. The paucity of Western Zhou sources requires extreme caution whenever we resort to *argumentum ex silentio*. Nonetheless, distinct usage of "*zhong*" in early Chunqiu speeches suggests that this term was new and hence relatively unknown in that period. For more on the origins of *zhong*, see Ning Ke 1994, 5–6; Lee Cheuk-yin 1991, 97; Liu Baocai 1988, 10–11; Qian Zongfan 1985, 12–14. For the later usage of *zhong*, see also Lü Shaogang 1984, 33; Fu Wuguang 1990.
46. See *Zuo*, Huan 6:111.
47. In another early speech we learn that *zhong* might have had reciprocal implications as well (*Zuo*, Zhuang 10:183).
48. For defining "*zhong*" as considering long-term interests of the state, see *Zuo*, Min 2:272; Cheng 2:805; Xiang 25:1098; Xiang 28:1152. For unselfishness (*wu si*) as another important feature of the loyal minister, see *Zuo*, Wen 6:553; Cheng 16:894; Zhao 10:1319–1320.
49. See *Zuo*, Cheng 9:844–845; Zhao 1:1205–1206; Zhao 2:1229.
50. See *Zuo*, Xi 5:304. Shi Wei assumed that the sons of Lord Xian would rebel, and their fortified cities would turn into "holdings of bandits and adversaries" (i.e., rebels).
51. That is, to follow the will of the deceased Lord Xian and serve the living ruler, Xi Qi.
52. Li Ke was a high official who opposed the establishment of an illegitimate heir. "Three resentful groups" refers to the followers of the three elder sons of Lord Xian: Shen-sheng (who was forced to commit a suicide), Chonger, and Yiwu (both in exile at the time of their father's death). All three fell victim to the intrigues of Li Ji, the mother of Xi Qi. After Lord Xian's death their followers intended to overthrow Li Ji's son and establish one of the elder scions.
53. See *Zuo*, Xi 9:328–329.
54. See *Zuo*, Xuan 2:658. Needless to say, Chu Ni's last words could never be recorded. In all likelihood the story is a scribal invention, but the dilemma of Chu Ni doubtless befits that of the Chunqiu minister.

55. See *Zuo*, Zhuang 19:211. Both Yu Quan's contemporaries and the *Zuo* narrator praised his behavior.
56. For the *Zuo* accounts about Qing Zheng, see Xi 14:348; Xi 15:354–356; Xi 15:367; see also *Guoyu*, "Jin yu 3" 9:8:333.
57. See *Zuo*, Cheng 8:839; Xuan 2:663, respectively. The *Zuo* praise of Zhao Dun appalled Confucian purists of the later generations who failed to understand historical context of this evaluation (see, for instance, Pi Xirui 1998, 4:44).
58. See *Xunzi*, "Chen Dao" 13:250. For more about Zhanguo development of Chunqiu notions of loyalty, see Suzuki 1982; 1983; 1984; Ning and Jiang 1994; Liu Zehua 1991, 270–283; Pines (forthcoming).
59. On the dual position of the high nobles, see Wang Lanzhong 1984, 104–111; cf. Qian Zongfan 1989, 22–26. On the system of allotments, see Lü Wenyu 1990, 76–79.
60. The appointment of a retainer was confirmed by presenting gifts to the master and recording the retainer's name on bamboo tablets, concluding thereby a contract. Fu Qian (fl. late second century c.e.) assumed that contracts were lifelong (his gloss on the *Zuo* is cited in the commentary on the *Shiji*, 67:2191). However, this was not necessarily the case; for instance, a leading Qi aristocrat, Bao Guo, served as retainer of the Shi lineage in the state of Lu before returning to his position as a Qi *dafu* (*Zuo*, Cheng 17:898–899). It is not clear, furthermore, whether or not contractual relations involved those retainers who were a master's siblings. Kaizuka Shigeki argues that all the retainers belonged to the *shi* stratum (1974, 278–281), but Zhu Fenghan's study shows that some of them were of noble (*dafu*) origin (1990, 531–540). For more on retainers, see Zhao Boxiong 1990, 245–251; Qian Zongfan 1989, 26–30; Shao Weiguo 1999; cf. Suzuki 1982, 9–11. Hsu Cho-yun's study shows a significant increase in the political weight of personal retainers by the end of the Chunqiu period (1965, 34–37). Regarding the nature of retainers' allegiance, see Suzuki 1982, 5.
61. See note 60, and Hu Tu's speech in text below.
62. *Sikou*: an official in charge of capturing criminals.
63. See *Guoyu*, "Jin yu 9" 15.2:485–486.
64. Lord Huai was a son of Lord Hui, a nephew of Chonger. He was enthroned in 637 but was killed several months later on Chonger's orders.
65. See *Zuo*, Xi 23:402–403.
66. See *Guoyu*, "Jin yu 8" 14.2:451–452 and *Zuo*, Xiang 23:1073–1074.
67. See *Zuo*, Zhao 14:1364. It is a bitter irony that such a conversation occurred at the court of the lord of Qi. After the death of Lord Jing (490) his heirs were exterminated by powerful ministers, and the state of Qi became in 480 a possession of the Tian lineage. Perhaps Lord Jing's compliance with the dominance of the aristocrats over their retainers at the expense of the ruling family contributed in no small measure to the bad end of his descendants.
68. The clearest evidence of this detrimental impact was the behavior of the retainers of Cui Zhu, the strongman of Qi. In 548 Cui Zhu plotted to assassinate Lord Zhuang.

The lord was captured in Cui Zhu's house, where he seduced Cui Zhu's wife. He tried to negotiate his freedom with Cui Zhu's soldiers, but they responded: "Your servant, Cui Zhu, is seriously ill, and unable to hear your orders. Here, near the lord's palace, we, the household servants, are patrolling to find an adulterer, and we know of no other order." The lord tried to climb the wall, but they shot him twice and killed him (*Zuo*, Xiang 25:1097). Burton Watson (1989, 145n8) argues that Cui Zhu's servants pretended that they did not recognize their ruler. This is not the case, since they said "your servant Cui Zhu." Mentioning the private name of one's master was allowed only while talking with the supreme ruler—in this case, the lord of Qi.

69. See *Zuo*, Zhao 25:1464.
70. Zi Lu, the disciple of Confucius, underlined this principle, explaining his willingness to die for his masters: "I benefited from their emoluments, I must help them in their troubles" (*Zuo*, Ai 16:1696). Of course, there were exceptions. In 496 Xiyang Su, a retainer of the heir apparent of Wei, Kuaikui, refused to carry out his master's command to murder Kuaikui's mother Nanzi, because such a command was morally improper (*Zuo*, Ding 14:1597). There are certain indications that in the late Chunqiu period retainers increasingly sought moral justifications for their actions (see *Zuo*, Ai 5:1630; cf. *Lunyu*, "Xian jin" 11.17:115; 11.24:117).
71. See *Zuo*, Ai 16:1704.
72. In this regard it is useful to recall Mozi's discussion on "elevating the worthy." Mozi urged the rulers to bestow lavish emoluments and high ranks on the *shi* in order to recruit the most able of this stratum (*Mozi*, "Shang xian zhong" 9:76). Definitely, *shi*—most of whom served as personal retainers—were not expected to give up their selfish interests. See also Sima Qian's depiction of the relations between Zhanguo dignitaries and their retainers (*Shiji* 75–78:2351–2399).
73. For the idea of the ruler-minister friendship, see Zha Changguo 1998; Pines (forthcoming).
74. For the evolution of the concepts of loyalty in the Zhanguo period and beyond, see note 58 above and also Ge Quan 1998, 193–221.
75. See, for instance, *Zuo*, Xiang 30:1178–1179; Ai 6:1636. For the earlier and later usage of the body simile, see Liu Zehua 1991, 47–49, 252–255.
76. See *Zuo*, Huan 2:86–90; Xi 9:331; Xiang 13:1193; Zhao 1:1201–1202; Zhao 6:1279. Some late Chunqiu thinkers suggested a more complicated view of the ruler as a source of inspiration rather than merely a model for imitation by his subjects (*Zuo*, Xiang 21:1057; Xiang 22:1068).
77. For more on Yan Ying's activities and thought, see Pines 1997b, 18–31.
78. Yan Ying consistently pointed out the "contending mind/heart" (*zhengxin*) of the people as the major threat to orderly rule; most of his discussions on the importance of ritual (see Chapter 3) and against benefit and profit seeking (Chapter 6) may be understood as part of his search for ways to restrict competitiveness of the lower strata (see Pines 1997b, 24).
79. See *Zuo*, Zhao 20:1419–1420. I modify Schaberg's translation (1996a, 712–713).

80. Analyzing phenomena in terms of complementary opposites may be traced already to the Shang divination charges (Keightley 1988, 377). However, Yan Ying was apparently the first to apply this principle to the political sphere.
81. Later thought emphasized the hierarchical nature of the flavors, and especially tones; the *gong* tone became a direct simile of the ruler (*Liji jijie*, “Yue ji” 37:978). Yet there is no evidence that Yanzi was aware of this hierarchy or implied it in his speech.
82. See *Lunyu*, “Zi Lu” 13.23:141 for a possible influence of Yan Ying on Confucius. Yet Leonard S. Perelomov’s (1993, 36–38) statement that the concept of harmony constitutes the backbone of the Chunqiu intellectual legacy is a clear exaggeration; see for instance Zi Taishu’s emphasis on conformity (*tong*) as an important ministerial feature (*Zuo*, Ding 4:1542). The *Guoyu* contains a similar speech on harmony, attributed to Scribe Bo from the late Western Zhou (“Zheng yu 1” 16.1:515–516). The speech, as the entire book of Zheng, is in all likelihood a Zhanguo invention, which may testify to the adoption of Yan Ying’s views by anonymous Zhanguo thinkers.
83. For Zhanguo views of ruler-minister relations, see Liu Zehua 1991, 223–283; for the general trend of elevating the ruler’s position in Zhanguo thought, see idem, 1987. For the overview of Zhanguo administrative reforms, see Yang Kuan 1998, 188–277; Lewis 1999b, 597–616.

Chapter 6: Nobility of Blood and Spirit

1. See Hsu 1965, 158–159, 166. Here and elsewhere, I change Hsu’s transliteration to *pinyin*.
2. See Hsu 1965, 159–161 for the *Shi jing* odes; for the usage of “*junzi*” in bronze inscriptions, see, for instance, Jin Jiang-*ding* (Shirakawa 1962–1984, vol. 35, no. 201: 92–93).
3. See *Zuo*, Xuan 12:725.
4. For the Chunqiu, see *Zuo*, Xuan 17:774; Xiang 9:968; Zhao 26:1473; Ai 7:1644; for the Zhanguo usage of “*junzi*,” see Hsu 1965, 166–174.
5. That is, they are prepared to resume hostilities in case Qin pursues further confrontation.
6. See *Zuo*, Xi 15:366; cf. Schaberg 1996a, 565.
7. See *Zuo*, Xi 26:439–440. After Yang Bojun I emend 師 to 史 (see *Zuo*, 440). The Duke of Zhou and Duke Tai are the founders of Lu and Qi respectively.
8. The “Qu li” chapter of the *Liji* stated: “Ritual does not descend to the commoners” (*Liji jijie*, “Qu li shang” 4:81). This statement might have reflected the early to mid-Chunqiu situation when only persons of *dafu* rank and higher could perform sacrifices in the ancestral temple (Ikezawa 1992, 161), and certainly only they participated in court rituals; for a critical assessment of this statement, see Li Qiqian 1981. Several *Zuo* speeches emphasize ritual behavior as a distinct feature of the

- superior man; see Cheng 13:860–861; Xiang 31:1193–1195, and the discussion in Chapter 3.
9. See Hsu 1965, 164. For the importance of ritual in determining the nobles' conduct and self-image, see Yan Buke 1996, 73–124. Maintaining *li* became a distinct feature of hereditary aristocrats not only in the Chunqiu, but also in the Six Dynasties period (220–589 C.E.) (Holcombe 1994, 82–83).
 10. See, for instance, *Zuo*, Huan 5:106; Xi 22:397; Wen 15:614; Xuan 17:774; Xiang 24:1089; Xiang 25:1109; Xiang 28:1152; Xiang 31:1194–1195; Zhao 1:1214; Zhao 3:1233; Zhao 20:1419–1420; Ai 8:1647.
 11. See *Zuo*, Wen 12:589; Cheng 9:845; Xiang 30:1173; Zhao 1:1221. For additional examples, see, for instance, Zhao 2:1228; Zhao 8:1301; Ai 20:1717.
 12. See *Zuo*, Xiang 31:1193.
 13. See *Zuo*, Zhao 16:1379.
 14. The insecure position of the leading aristocrats is illustrated by the changing fortunes of the Ji lineage in the state of Lu. Although the Ji had held the reins of power since 591, they were almost ousted by the treacherous retainer Nan Kuai in 530, attacked by a coalition of the lord's forces and the Hou lineage in 517, and were on the verge of collapse as a result of Yang Hu's plot in 505–502. The Ji withstood these attacks; others were less fortunate. In 539 Shu Xiang of Jin enumerated no less than eight formerly powerful collateral branches of the ruling lineage that were relegated to the position of "slaves" (*zaoli*) (*Zuo*, Zhao 3:1237). For more on downward social mobility in the Chunqiu period, see Hsu 1965, 80–92.
 15. For details, see note 100 below. Falkenhausen summarizes: "In [the] Eastern Zhou, recapitulation of the past is very much on the decline . . . This perhaps reflects the rapidly changing historical circumstances during that period, when merits accumulated by the former generations could not necessarily any longer guarantee perpetual well-being to their descendants" (1988, 654).
 16. In 545 a coalition of Qi aristocrats expelled the powerful Qing Feng and distributed his allotments among its members. Zi Wei, the head of the Gao lineage, followed Yan Ying's advice and returned part of his new lands to the ruler, Lord Jing, who highly appreciated such an unusual expression of loyalty.
 17. In summer 532 Zi Wei's son, Zi Liang, was defeated by the coalition of the Chen and Bao lineages and fled to the state of Lu.
 18. See *Zuo*, Zhao 10:1319–1320; *Shi jing*, "Zheng yue" 12:442 (Mao, 192).
 19. In 586 Zhao Ying's illicit relations with his aunt resulted in his fleeing to exile, destroying his branch of the Zhao lineage. In 584 a complicated love affair brought about the destruction of Qu Wuchen's kin in the state of Chu. Excessive drinking habits reportedly contributed towards aggravating conflicts that led to the destruction of the Liang lineage in Zheng in 543, the decimation of the Han lineage there in 535, and the destruction of the Gao and Luan lineages in Qi in 532, to mention only a few.

20. In the first 153 years of the *Zuo* narrative (722–569—approximately one half of the text) the term “*junzi*” appears in sixteen passages, while in the last century of the narrative (568–468) it appears in no less than thirty-seven passages—a more than twofold increase! (I have not counted the narrator’s and Confucius’ remarks, nor those occurrences in which “*junzi*” is mentioned exclusively in a quotation from the *Shi jing*).
21. See Roetz 1993, 34.
22. See Savage 1985; 1992. For more on “emulating the ruler,” see Vasil’ev 1973, 10–11 and Munro 1969, 96–102.
23. See details on the Wei lineage in Falkenhausen 1988, 983–999.
24. See Shirakawa 1962–1984, vol. 50, add. no. 15:387–389; translation in Falkenhausen 1988, 972–975.
25. See Shirakawa 1962–1984, vol. 27, no. 162; translation in Shaughnessy 1997, 82–84.
26. See Shirakawa 1962–1984, vol. 127, no. 161; my translation.
27. See Mattos 1997, 97–99. The original text was published in *Wenwu* 10 (1980).
28. See Shirakawa 1962–1984, vol. 40, no. 228:578–583; translation in Mattos 1997, 88–90.
29. See Falkenhausen 1988, 1084; Mattos 1997, 101–102.
30. This ruler mind-set of late Chunqiu aristocrats is further supported by their burial patterns, which frequently reflect usurpation of the overlords’ sumptuary rights (Falkenhausen 1999; Yin Qun 1999). The best example of a high minister’s conscious desire to display his rulerlike position is the recently excavated tomb of the Jin leader, Zhao Jianzi (d. 475), whose sets of funerary utensils are equal to those of the overlords, and their splendor by far surpasses that of the rulers of the medium-sized states (see Tao, Hou, and Qu 1996, 237–241).
31. See *Zuo*, Xi 14:348. “Former favor” refers to Qin’s assistance to famine-stricken Jin in 647.
32. See *Zuo*, Xi 24:424.
33. See *Zuo*, Xi 30:482. Qin previously assisted Lord Wen; hence he spoke of “betrayal.”
34. *Zuo*, Yin 4:36; Yin 6:50. Later thinkers related benevolence (*ren*) to the normative behavior among relatives. See the *Zhong yong*: “Benevolence is a human [feeling]. The greatest of it is to be intimate with relatives” (*Liji zhengyi*, 52:1629); cf. *Shuo wen*: “*Ren* is [the feeling among the] relatives.”
35. See *Zuo*, Yin 1:11–14; Yin 3:31; Xi 27:447. For the semantic affinity of “*yi*” (propriety) to “*li*” (ritual), see Boltz 2000.
36. See also *Zuo*, Zhuang 6:169–170; Xi 5:309–310.
37. See also *Zuo*, Zhuang 4:163–164; Xuan 12:744–745.
38. See *Lunyu*, “*Zi han*” 9.29:95; “*Xian wen*” 14.28:155; for “*Zhong yong*,” see *Liji zhengyi* 52:1629.

39. By killing Jia Ji's family, Yu Pian would "eradicate the resentment" of the previous offense, but turn Jia Ji into his enemy.
40. See *Zuo*, Wen 6:552–553.
41. See *Zuo*, Wen 13:595. Jia Ji's crime was to murder the head of the Jin government, Yang Chufu, in 621.
42. Zhong Yi claimed that the king was already virtuous as the heir apparent, so that his respect for the king did not derive from the selfish desire to flatter his master. See Yang Bojun's gloss (*Zuo*, 845).
43. That Zhong Yi mentioned the private names of his superiors, the *lingyin* Yingqi (Zi Zhong) and *sima* Ce (Zi Fan), instead of their polite cognomen (*zi*), indicated his respect for the Jin ruler.
44. See *Zuo*, Cheng 9:845. I modify Schaberg's translation (1996a, 155–156).
45. See *Zuo*, Cheng 17:901–902. "*Luan*" (calamity) here as elsewhere in the *Zuo* stands for "rebellion."
46. See *Zuo*, Zhao 20:1408.
47. See *Shi jing*, "Zheng min" 18:569 (Mao, 260).
48. The regicide should have been punished by the destruction of the entire Dou lineage.
49. See *Zuo*, Ding 4:1546–1547.
50. Both speeches were pronounced in the situations which rule out the possibility of simultaneous recording. It is highly likely that they originated in the lore of Chu anecdotes related to Wu Zixu and to the Wu invasion of Chu (a slightly different version of Dou Xin's speech appears also in the *Guoyu*, "Chu yu 2" 18.5:577). These speeches cannot, however, be plausibly attributed to the *Zuo* author, as ethical views expressed by the speakers do not appear in the earlier parts of the *Zuo*.
51. See *Zuo*, Zhao 27:1488; Ai 16:1700.
52. See Kominami 1992; Kryukov 1995; 1997, 209–223.
53. See Zhu Yiting 1989, 14–18; Liu Zehua 1991, 72–73.
54. For instance, the "Song gao" (18:566–567 [Mao, 259]) and "Zheng min" odes (18:568 [Mao, 260]) of the *Shi jing* praise the virtue of the Zhou ministers Zhong Shanfu and Shen Bo. For the Western Zhou inscriptions which refer to ministerial *de*, see, for instance, the Xing-zhong and Shuxiang Fu Yu-*gui* translated in text above.
55. See Kominami 1992; cf. Kryukov 2000, 217–218ff.; Schaberg (forthcoming).
56. For detailed discussions about the changing meanings of "*de*" from the Western Zhou till the imperial era, see Onozawa 1968; Martynov 1971; Graham 1989, 13–15; Kominami 1992; Ge Quan 1998, 3–15.
57. See *Zuo*, Xi 12:342. Guan Zhong is referred to as "[maternal] uncle" according to the ritual appropriate to the representative of the state of Qi.
58. See *Zuo*, Xi 27:445; Xi 28:451; Xuan 6:689; Xiang 7:951–952.

59. See *Zuo*, Xi 33:501; cf. Xi 27:445. For the early usage of the term “*jing*,” see Liu Zehua 1991, 20–24.
60. See, for instance, *Shi jing*, “*Jing zhi*” 19:598 (Mao, 288).
61. I identified six instances of ministerial *de* for the years 722–569, and fifteen for the years 568–468 (the length of the text is nearly identical in both cases).
62. For the notion of charismatic *de* in ministerial context, see, for instance *Zuo*, Zhao 1:1210; Zhao 20:1421.
63. See *Zuo*, Xiang 27:1133.
64. This short utterance might have gained fame among Zhao’s fellows: in 522 Yan Ying cited it almost verbatim in a conversation with Lord Jing of Qi (*Zuo*, Zhao 20:1415–1416).
65. Following Du Yu, I translate “*zong*” as “*zhu*” (master) (*Chun qiu Zuo zhuan zhengyi* 42:2029).
66. See *Zuo*, Zhao 2:1229; *Shi jing*, “*Min lao*” 17:548 (Mao, 253).
67. See *Zuo*, Zhao 10:1317; Zhao 10:1320; for the earlier connection of yielding with *de*, see *Zuo*, Yin 3:29.
68. See *Zuo*, Ding 4:1548; Ai 13:1677.
69. See *Zuo*, Zhao 12:1337–1338.
70. The origins of “*ren*” are discussed by Chan 1954, 295–296; 1975, 107; Takeuchi Teruo 1965, 60–77; Lin Yu-sheng 1974–1975, 179–180; Nikkila 1982, 53:148–152, 53:195–197; Liu Wenying 1990, 3–5; 1992; and Liu Jiahe 1990, 23–25.
71. “*Ren*” is mentioned in the presumably early Chunqiu poems *Shi jing*, “*Shu yu tian*” 4:337 (Mao, 77) and “*Lu ling*” 5:353 (Mao, 103), and in what is supposed to be the Western Zhou portion of the “*Jin teng*” (*Shu jing* 13:196, for the dating of which, see Shaughnessy 1993, 64–65).
72. See Liu Wenying 1990, 3–5.
73. See Chan 1954–1955, 295–296; for a broader discussion on the interpretation of “*de*” and “*ren*” as downward virtues, see Martynov 1969.
74. See *Zuo*, Yin 6:50; Xi 9:323; Xi 14:348; Xi 30:482; for Mui’s behavior, see *Zuo*, Xi 19:383–384; Xi 22:393.
75. On the interchangeability of political and ethical terms as a possible way to define their meaning, see Martynov 1969. Another interesting aspect of “*ren*” in early Chunqiu may be discerned from the story of the Song princes Mui and Cifu. In 652 Cifu intended to yield his position as heir apparent to the benevolent Mui; Mui refused, however, claiming that willingness to yield is the clearest manifestation of “*ren*” (*Zuo*, Xi 9:323). Again, ceremonial yielding was commonly considered a manifestation of *de* (see for instance *Zuo*, Yin 3:29).
76. In 597 the Chu minister Wu Can criticized the vice–prime minister of Jin, Xian Hu: “Xian Hu is tough, stubborn and not *ren*” (*Zuo*, Xuan 12:730). In 586 Shi Zhenbo of

- Jin said to the licentious Zhao Ying: “Deities bestow good fortune on [those who are] *ren* and send misfortune on the licentious” (*Zuo*, Cheng 5:821). For the next examples, see *Zuo*, Cheng 9:845; Xiang 7:951–952. See also another invocation of *ren* as a virtue that “encourages” *de* (*Zuo*, Xiang 11:993–994).
77. This confusion differs from the diffuse meaning of “*ren*” in the *Lunyu*. Multiple meanings of “*ren*” there derive from Confucius’ conscious efforts to turn “*ren*” into “one that pervades all,” which led to the subsequent expansion of its meaning.
 78. In 541 the head of the Jin government, Zhao Wenzhi, explained his willingness to avoid a confrontation with Chu by the fact that he had a “benevolent (*ren*) heart.” In 536, in a long letter to Zi Chan, Shu Xiang mentioned that the former kings “nourished the people by benevolence (*ren*).” In 515 Xu, the governor of Shen district in Chu, criticized the nonbenevolent (*bu ren*) behavior of the *lingyin* Zi Chang, who executed innocent officials; and in 488 Zifu Jingbo of Lu reminded Ji Kangzi that to invade the small state is not benevolent (*ren*) (*Zuo*, Zhao 1:1201; Zhao 6:1274; Zhao 27:1488; Ai 7:1642).
 79. See *Zuo*, Zhao 20:1408; Ding 4:1546–1547. For the translation, see pp. 178–179 above.
 80. See *Zuo*, Ai 9:1573.
 81. This gap may have been particularly apparent in the highly commercialized state of Qi, where aristocrats might have been envious of the merchants’ fortunes. Interestingly, Mencius attributes to Yang Hu the saying, “Rich is not benevolent, benevolent is not rich” (*Mengzi*, “Teng Wen Gong shang” 5.3:118).
 82. See *Zuo*, Ai 16:1700.
 83. See Li Yumin 1974, 25. For a slightly different statistic, see Ikezawa 1992, 66–77.
 84. Of course, the *Zuo* contains anecdotes that hail filial piety (the most important of which deals with Lord Zhuang of Zheng [Yin 1:14–16]), but the paucity of such anecdotes and of the usage of the term “*xiao*” itself strongly undermine Donald Holzman’s assertion (1998) that “*xiao*” retains its importance in the *Zuo*, just as it does in earlier and later historical and philosophical texts.
 85. Western Zhou rulers are King Xiao of Zhou (d. 895); Lord Xiao of Chen (d. early ninth century); Lord Xiao of Cao (d. late ninth century); Lord Xiao of Lu (d. 769); and Lord Xiao of Jin (d. 724). Chunqiu rulers are Lords Xiao of Qi 齊 (d. 633); and of Qi 杞 (d. 550). Zhanguo rulers are Lords Xiao of Yan (d. 450); and of Qin (d. 338); King Xiao of Yan (d. 255); King Xiaowen of Qin (d. 250); King Xiaocheng of Zhao (d. 245). Only two known Chunqiu nobles (Meng Xiaobo and Shi Xiaoshu) had “*xiao*” in their posthumous titles, as compared to seven known Western Zhou personalities (Zha Changguo 1993, 143).
 86. See Shen and Wang 1985, 56–60; Zhu Yiting 1989, 7–11.
 87. See Zheng Huisheng 1986. Ba Xinsheng (1994) opined that in the Shang period “*xiao*” was coterminous with “*de*,” but her arguments are not supported by the extant sources.
 88. See Zha Changguo 1993; Kang Dewen 1997; Kryukov 2000, 148–149; cf. Ikezawa 1992; Knapp 1995. The sole alleged occurrence of “*xiao*” in regard to nurturing parents is in

- the “Jiu gao”: 用孝養厥父母 (*Shu jing*, 14:206). Yet, Zha Changguo (1993, 145–146) argues that the object of *xiao* in this sentence is omitted, and it should be therefore translated: “Let [the people] be *xiao* [i.e., perform ancestral sacrifices] and nurture their parents.” Besides, *xiao* toward living parents is mentioned twice in the Chunqiu inscriptions: *Shiqian-gui* (Shirakawa 1962–1984, vol. 39, no. 225) and *Chouer-zhong* (Zha Changguo 1993, 143).
89. For the interchangeability of “*kao*” with “*xiao*” in the bronze inscriptions, see Karlgren 1974, 245n386; see also *Shuo wen* for the similarity of “*xiao*,” “*kao*,” and “*lao*” (elder). For the interpretation of “*kao*” as “to deceased father,” see Carr 1989.
 90. See Knapp 1996, 198–200. “*Xiao*” appears along with “*xiang*” in numerous bronze inscriptions, surveyed by Li Yumin (1974) and Ikezawa (1992), and also in the *Shi jing* (“Tian bao” 9:412; “Zai jian” 19:596; “Min yu xiao zi” 19:598 [Mao, 166, 283, 286]). In some odes and inscriptions “*xiao*” appears as a modifier in compounds “*xiao zi*” or “*xiao sun*.” I agree with Knapp that these instances should be translated not as “filial sons / grandsons” but as “sons / grandsons who [perform] *xiao*” (i.e., perform sacrifices; Knapp 1995, 198–200).
 91. In defining kinship units I follow Watson 1982 with modifications by Zhu Fenghan 1990.
 92. See Ikezawa 1992, 84–96. The presence of the retainers derived from the pseudokinship ties that ensued between them and their masters (Zhu Fenghan 1990, 333–339).
 93. See the detailed discussion in Zhu Fenghan 1990, 304–325.
 94. See *Shi jing*, “Chang ti” 9:407–408; “Fa mu” 9:410–411; “Lu xiao” 10:420; “Si gan” 11:436–438; “Kui bian” 14:482; “Jue gong” 15:490–491; “Xing wei” 17:534–535 (Mao, 164, 165, 173, 189, 217, 223, 246). These odes were presumably written in the late Western Zhou period. See also the discussion in Zhu Fenghan 1990, 421–427.
 95. Even in the relatively large royal domain, most of the higher officials belonged to the royal lineage (Zhu Fenghan 1990, 404–413); a similar situation characterized other overlords’ states (Tian 1996, 17–37). See also Hsu 1965, 26–31 for the early Chunqiu situation.
 96. See Zha Changguo 1993, 147; Ba Xinsheng 1994, 44–45. Most Western Zhou overlords were descendants of the brothers, sons, and grandsons of King Wen (see *Zuo*, Xi 24:420–423); therefore, in terms of kinship in the early to mid-Western Zhou they were sufficiently closely related to the Zhou kings.
 97. See *Shu jing*, “Kang gao” 14:202–205; “Jiu gao” 14:205–208; “Da gao” 13:198–200. For instance, in the “Kang gao” declaration, issued shortly after the rebellion was subdued, the Duke of Zhou warned his younger brother Feng that “the greatest evil and tremendous crime is lacking *xiao* and [proper] feeling toward the relatives (*you*),” and urged him to “mercilessly execute” the culprits (14:204).
 98. In “Wenhou zhi ming,” issued by King Ping (r. 771–720) to Lord Wen of Jin (r. 780–746), the king says: “My uncle Yihe! You were able continue your illustrious ancestors. You emulated [Kings] Wen and Wu, by assembling [the overlords] you glorified your lord; you are *xiao* to your deceased accomplished ancestors” (I follow glosses of Zhu Tingxian 1987, 663; cf. translation by Knapp 1995, 204n36). For a similar appeal to

- ancestors' pattern as the means to perpetuate allegiance to the Zhou, see such inscriptions as He-*zun* (Shirakawa 1962–1984, vol. 48, add. no. 1; Shaughnessy 1997, 77–78); Shi Xun-*gui* (Shirakawa 1962–1984, vol. 31, no. 183); Guai Bo-*gui* (Shirakawa 1962–1984, vol. 25, no. 145; Shaughnessy 1991, 172–173). The inscriptions suggest that ministers indeed believed in the need to follow in the ancestor's footsteps and be obedient servants of Zhou (see Shi Qiang-*pan* [Shirakawa 1962–1984, vol. 50, add. no. 15; Shaughnessy 1991, 183–192]). See also the discussion by Kryukov 2000, 213.
99. For various explanations on the role of *xiao* in upholding the rule of the last Western Zhou kings, see Li Yumin 1974, 20–21; Chen Suzhen 1983, 44–47; Wang Shenxing 1989; 1991.
 100. For instance, whereas almost 40 percent of the Western Zhou inscriptions call upon the ancestors to whom the vessel was dedicated, no more than 2 percent of the Eastern Zhou inscriptions contain a similar invocation, and only 12.6 percent even mention the ancestors at all (Mattos 1997, 86–87; for a different view, see Gu and Wei 1999, 71). See also Falkenhausen 1988, 654; Emura 1989–1991, 56; Xu Zhongshu 1936, 43.
 101. See *Zuo*, Zhao 10:1319–1320; *Guoyu*, “Lu yu 2” 5.7:198; “Jin yu 9” 15.15:498–499; “Chu yu 2” 18.8:582. In some cases relatives of ousted politicians were reappointed to their hereditary positions for the sole purpose of continuing family sacrifices (*Zuo*, Xiang 23:1083; Xiang 28:1142; Zhao 7:1291–1292; Ding 1:1525–1526).
 102. “*Shi*” is actually a branch of the trunk lineage (*zong*); both terms are frequently used interchangeably, although generally the scope of *zong* is larger (see Zhu Fenghan 1990, 501–507; Falkenhausen conversely suggests that *zong* was subordinated to *shi*). As a matter of convenience, in this section only, I shall transliterate *shi* or refer to it as a “branch” of the “trunk” lineage.
 103. For a discussion on landownership in the Western Zhou and the Chunqiu period, see Hu Fangshi 1981; Zhu Fenghan 1990, 380–384, 551–554; Qian Hang 1991, 59–65, 123–128. The data on landownership in the Western Zhou is primarily confined to the royal domain; we may assume, however, that similar modes of ownership existed in the overlords' states.
 104. See Li Yumin 1974, 25; Ikezawa 1992, 96–100. Of course, in some cases superiors and underlings invited to the sacrificial banquet could be the relatives of the organizer; yet the fact that authors of the bronze inscriptions emphasized political rather than blood relations with their guests indicates a weakening of the supra-*shi* kinship ties.
 105. In 575 Shusun Qiaoru attempted to eradicate two collateral branches of his lineage—Jisun and Mengsun—in order to seize their lands. In 535 Lord Xian of Shan of the royal domain attempted to destroy the families of his granduncles and great-granduncles, but was murdered by them. In 530 similar events occurred in the Gan lineage in Zhou. By the end of the sixth century major power struggles ensued in the state of Jin between the main branch of the Zhao lineage and its collateral branch of Handan, and later between the Zhi and Zhonghang branches of the Xun lineage. See more on lineage disintegration in Yanxia 1996; Zhu Fenghan 1990, 509–511.

106. The lords of Lu lost their power to the “three Huan” *shi* (namely, Jisun [Ji], Mengsun, and Shusun—the descendants of Lord Huan of Lu [r. 711–694]); the lords of Zheng were overshadowed by the descendants of Lord Mu (r. 627–606); and the lords of Song were incessantly challenged by descendants of the previous rulers. See details in Zhu Fenghan 1990, 459–460. The threat of the collateral branches sometimes became unbearable. In 671–669 Lord Xian of Jin expelled or executed all the collateral branches of his lineage. In 620 a similar attempt by Lord Zhao of Song ended in disaster; his supporters were killed, and the lord himself became a puppet of powerful relatives until his murder ten years later.
107. In 722 Gongshu Duan of Zheng, who relied on the support of his mother, rebelled in order to depose his elder brother, Lord Zhuang. In 712 the future Lord Huan of Lu murdered his elder half-brother, Lord Yin, and established himself. Lord Min of Lu was enthroned in 661 after his elder brother Zi Ban was murdered by their uncle Qingfu; two years later Lord Min himself was similarly murdered by Qingfu, and was succeeded by his elder brother, Lord Xi. A similar murder of scions accompanied the enthronement of Lord Xuan in 609. In the state of Wei, Lord Huan was murdered in 720 by his half-brother Zhouxu. In the state of Jin, the decision of Lord Xian to depose his elder sons and establish a young scion from the beautiful Li Ji led to incessant succession struggles that lasted from 651 to 636. Patricides occurred in Chu in 626; in Ju in 609 and in 542; in Cai in 543.
108. See Zuo, Yin 4:31–33. I modify Watson’s translation (1989, 6).
109. The state of Wei in the early Chunqiu period was similar in size to an average lineage. After the disastrous defeat by the Di tribesmen in 660, only 730 “men and women” of Wei remained alive (Zuo, Min 2:266). Although the massacre by the Di was terrible, the original population of the state of Wei was probably no larger than several thousand people, resembling a high-ordered lineage.
110. In 696 Prince Jizi, the son of Lord Xuan of Wei, preferred to sacrifice his life instead of defying his father’s orders, saying: “Who will make use of the son that disregards the father’s order? If there were a fatherless state, then it would be possible” (Zuo, Huan 16:146). *Xiao* was not mentioned in this uttering, but we may plausibly assume that it decisively influenced Jizi’s conduct. That is why he emphasized the impossibility to defy the *father’s* order: the lord was his father first, and the ruler second.
111. See other invocations of *xiao* by Shensheng’s advisors (Zuo, Min 2:269–272).
112. See Watson 1989, 23.
113. Knapp (1995; 201–204) suggested that already in the Western Zhou *xiao* might have had an ethical dimension, since it required obedience to the father. For the opposite view, see Zha Changguo 1993.
114. In 550 major succession struggles occurred in the Jisun and Mengsun *shi* in Lu. In 538–537 similar struggles occurred in the Shusun *shi*. In 502 a coalition of dissatisfied members of Lu’s most powerful *shi* attempted to depose the heads of their *shi*. In 546 similar internal struggles led to the destruction of the powerful Cui *shi* in Qi.

The Han *shi* of Zheng was plagued by internal struggles in 535. The Hua *shi* of Song was decimated by the struggles of 556 and 521–520. Events of this nature occurred in every major state.

115. See *Zuo*, Zhao 25:1455; cf. Xiang 19:1051; Zhao 6:1277–1278.
116. A *mazheng* was in charge of the *shi* military forces.
117. Emending 富 to 福 (Yang Bojun's gloss, *Zuo*, 1080).
118. See *Zuo*, Xiang 23:1079–1080.
119. See *Zuo*, Zhao 25:1480. See pp. 101–102 for the translation of Yan Ying's speech.
120. See *Zuo*, Xiang 22:1069–1070. I follow Schaberg's translation (1996a, 150), except in one major point: King Kang did not ask Qiji whether he intends to remain in the state, but whether he would remain in court and serve the king.
121. See *Zuo*, Ding 4:1547.
122. For a detailed account of Wu Zixu's story, see Johnson 1981; cf. Durrant 1995, 74–98.
123. For example, in 541, Zi Chan dared not expel the rebellious You Chu until he had the agreement of the head of the You *shi*, You Ji (Zi Taishu) (*Zuo*, Zhao 1:1212–1213).
124. Perhaps the best example of the problematic allegiance of the Chunqiu ministers is the case of Hua Feisui, the *sima* of Song. In 522 the Hua and Xiang *shi* rebelled against Lord Yuan (r. 531–517). Feisui did not betray his ruler; reluctantly, he participated in the assault on his kin and forced his own son, Hua Deng, into exile. He was still mistrusted, however, and finally had no choice but to join the rebellion in 521. We see that strong kinship allegiance could turn the minister of war into an adversary of his own ruler (*Zuo*, Zhao 20:1409–1410; 1414–1415; Zhao 21:1425–1427; Zhao 22:1427–1430; Ma Su 1992, 413–419).
125. See *Han Feizi*, “Wu du” 49:445.
126. This view is proposed by Keith Knapp (1995). Although I disagree with significant portions of his discussion, I accept the basic suggestion that Confucius and his disciples reinterpreted *xiao*.
127. See *Lunyu*, “Xue er” 1.7:5; 1.11:7; “Wei zheng” 2.5–2.8:13–16, “Li ren” 4.18–4.20:40. For *xiao* as sacrificial rites, see *Lunyu*, “Tai Bo” 8.21:84. In the following pages I follow K. Knapp in translating “*jia*” as “household.” In the late Chunqiu an average household comprised five to eight persons (Kang Dewen 1997, 108).
128. For quote, see *Lunyu*, “Wei zheng” 2.7:15; and see also *Lunyu*, “Wei zheng” 2.5–2.8:13–16.
129. See Knapp 1995, 216; see his discussion on the three-year mourning rites (pp. 209–216); cf. Ding Ding 2001.
130. This was suggested in Xu Fuguan 1985, 329–333. The dissolution of the *shi* and strengthening of the household (*jia*) is mentioned in Hu Fangshu 1981, 80–92; Ikezawa 1992, 101; and particularly Knapp 1995, 214. This development precedes

- the change in mortuary rites from the lineage temple (*zongmiao*) to the personal (father's) tomb, as depicted in Wu Hung 1988.
131. See Ikezawa 1992, 101–102; Zhu Fenghan 1990, 567–569; Zha Changguo 1993, 148.
 132. See *Lunyu*, “Zi Lu” 13.20:140.
 133. See, for instance, *Lunyu*, “Zi Lu” 13.18:139.
 134. See *Lunyu*, “Wei zheng” 2.20:20.
 135. See *Lunyu*, “Xue er” 1.2:2. For a very similar identification of *xiao* with loyalty by Mozi, see “Jian'ai shang” 14:154. For more on political implications of Confucian *xiao*, see Knapp 1995, 219–221.
 136. For more on the relations between *xiao* and *zhong*, see Lee 1991. For the adoption of *xiao* as a commonly required ethical imperative, see Liu Zehua 1996, 2:161–176.
 137. Cited from Huang Weihe 1990, 20. Some scholars, like Luo Guojie (1994, 49–51), and especially Jin Zhaozi (1949, 48–66), argue that the Confucian attitude toward benefit seeking was less negative than depicted by Zhu Xi. I would suggest that in this case Zhu Xi's understanding of the Confucian heritage was correct.
 138. See Zhu Xi 1986, 93:2149.
 139. For a brief discussion of the changing attitude toward *li* in the Western Zhou and Chunqiu age, see Huang Weihe 1990, 23–25.
 140. In the “Da tian” ode of the *Shi jing* (14:477 [Mao, 212]) farmers are urged to benefit the widows, while in the “Sang rou” ode (18:560 [Mao, 257]), the Zhou King Li is condemned for hurting (*bu li*) the people. In the “Pan Geng” chapter of the *Shu jing* (9:170), the Shang King Pan Geng claims that former rulers “considered the people's benefit when moving [the capital].” (The “Pan Geng” chapter, though attributed to Shang times, was perhaps compiled in the Western Zhou). *Li* is mentioned once more in the “Jin teng” chapter (*Shu jing* 13:197), when Guan Shu accuses the Duke of Zhou intending to hurt (*bu li*) young King Cheng.
 141. See *Zuo*, Huan 6:111; Xi 9:328.
 142. See *Zuo*, Xi 22:398; Xi 27:445; Xi 28:467; Xuan 15:760; Cheng 16:880–881.
 143. See *Zuo*, Wen 13:597–598.
 144. The “Qin shi” chapter of the *Shu jing*, presumably composed around 627, reflects this trend. Lord Mu of Qin (r. 659–621) expressed the belief that employment of good officials “will protect my descendants and the ordinary people, and will certainly bring benefit” (*Shu jing* 20:256).
 145. On the interconnections between land and power in the Chunqiu period, see Thatcher 1985, 45; Zhu Fenghan 1990, 492–593; Qian Hang 1991, 124–128.
 146. See *Zuo*, Xiang 22:1068.
 147. See *Zuo*, Xiang 28:1150.
 148. See *Zuo*, Zhao 10:1317.

149. See *Zuo*, Zhao 3:1238. Interestingly, the first documented attribution of *li* to merchants' profit seeking occurred in the highly commercialized state of Qi.
150. See *Zuo*, Zhao 20:1410; Zhao 27:1486; Ding 4:1547; Ai 15:1693; Ai 16:1702.
151. See *Zuo*, Ai 16:1703; Ai 25:1726; Ai 26:1730.

Chapter 7: The Chunqiu Legacy

1. See Hsu 1965.
2. See Graham 1989.
3. See Graham 1989, 3.
4. For the evolution of the concept of *li* in the Zhanguo period, see Liu Zehua 1987, 78–99; Pines 2000c.
5. See Schwartz 1968, 279.
6. See Schwartz 1985, 60; italics in original.

Appendix 1: Grammatical Change in the *Zuo*

1. When I began working on my research I was unaware of He Leshi's study; hence my statistical analysis was undertaken independently and differs slightly from hers (for which see He Leshi 1988). The differences, however, are not substantial.
2. For statistical analysis of the distribution of the “*yu*” particles in Zhou texts, see He Leshi 1988, 56; Pines 1997a, 122–124. Initially, the meaning and even pronunciation of both “*yu*” particles might not have been identical (see Pulleyblank 1986; cf. Petersen [in progress]), but semantic differences were negligible enough to allow for the process of substitution of 于 by 於 in Zhou texts.
3. See Karlgren 1926, 45.
4. 其 in this case study is counted only in its meaning as a rhetorical question particle, identical to the later 豈. The dominant usage of 其 in the *Zuo* is for the third-person pronoun, possessive pronoun, and modal auxiliary particle of future tense. On different meanings of 其 in pre-Qin texts, see Yang Bojun and He Leshi 1992 passim; cf. Qian Zongwu 1996, 274–276. The divergent opinions of modern scholars regarding the early usage of “*qi*” are critically summarized by Takashima 1994.
5. See Petersen (in progress); see also Barry Blakeley 1999.
6. The ratio between 豈 and rhetorical 其 in the later *Zuo* is remarkably similar to the *Lunyu* (8 豈 to 3 rhetorical 其; ratio of 2.6667; cf. *Mengzi*: 50 豈 to 4 rhetorical 其; ratio of 12.5).
7. *Qi* occurs also in several commentary remarks by the *Zuo* narrator and by Confucius.
8. For more on grammatical changes from the beginning to the end of the *Zuo* narrative, see He Leshi 1988, and a less convincing discussion by Zhang Wenguo 1997.

Appendix 2: Zhanguo Data in the *Zuo*

1. The last entry in the *Zuo* is the fourth year of Lord Dao (464), and it is usually considered the end of the *Zuo* narrative, although the last sentence mentions events of 453 (see Wang Shoukan 1981).
2. See Hsu 1965, 184; Niu Hongen 1994. For predictions about the future of the Chen lineage, see *Zuo*, Zhuang 22:221–224; Zhao 3:1234–1235; Zhao 8:1305.
3. See Yang Bojun 1981a, 40–41. Sima Qian refers to the state of Qi as belonging to the Tian lineage since 480 B.C.E. (*Shiji* 14:680).
4. For a more detailed discussion, see Wang He 1984.
5. The prediction of Qin's lack of ability to march to the east might have been easily made by a fifth century B.C.E. personality. In this century Qin's power was at its nadir, and Qin even lost some of its eastern territories to the state of Wei 魏 (for details, see *Shiji* 5:200; Yang Kuan 1998, 291–292).
6. These are not the only instances of favorable predictions of the bright future of the states of Jin and Zheng in the *Zuo* (see Xi 15:367 for Jin, and Zhao 16:1381 for Zheng). In all likelihood, these predictions were incorporated into the *Zuo* from its primary sources, but the fact that they were not edited out strongly suggests that the author/compiler of the *Zuo* did not witness the final decline of Jin and Zheng.
7. For discussions of the *Zuo* predictions, see Gu Yanwu 1990, 4:155; Wei Juxian 1934, 55–61; Kamata 1962, 318–330; Hsu 1965, 184–185; Xu Zhongshu 1980, 76–80; Hu Nianyi 1981a, 20–21; Yang Bojun 1981, 40–43; Qu Wanli 1983, 363–370; Zheng Junhua 1984, 21–23; Wang He 1984; Niu Hongen 1994.
8. Gu Yanwu questioned the accuracy of Ji Zha's prediction of the fall of Zheng (item 4). Ji Zha asked: "Will [Zheng] be ruined first?" Yet Zheng was ruined one year after the final elimination of Jin (376). We continue however, to refer to Ji Zha's prediction as correct, since Gu Yanwu's interpretation is not unanimously accepted.
9. Item 3 is almost certainly of Early Han origins; see Hong Ye [1937] 1983, xc–xcii. Items 2 and 7 were in all likelihood added by a personality who witnessed the decline of the state of Wei 衛, but was unaware that this state would survive until 209 B.C.E.
10. See Yao Nai, cited in Zhang Xinzhen 1939, 362; Zhang Handong 1988, 158–160; Hu Nianyi 1981a, 21–22, and the detailed discussion in Appendix 4.
11. Ji Zha mentioned that Qin airs indicate "ultimate greatness" (*Zuo*, Xiang 29:1162–1163). Though Ji Zha attributed Qin's greatness to its location—the Zhou dynasty birthplace—I agree with Zhao Zhiyang's interpretation that only someone who had witnessed Qin's success could have said this (Zhao Zhiyang 1985, 12–13). I disagree, however, with Zhao's attempt to attribute Ji Zha's speeches to Liu Xin.
12. See Zhao Zhiyang 1985; Zhao Guangxian 1982, 55; Wang He 1993a, 24. For a discussion of Ji Zha's analysis of the *Shi jing* poems, see Schaberg 1996a, 694–705.
13. See Hu Nianyi 1981a, 22–25.

14. Hirase Takao (1988, 109) implies that these passages may be related to the putative attempt by the *Zuo* author to bolster the legitimization efforts by King Xuanhui of Han (r. 332–312), but I do not find his suggestion sufficiently convincing. Recently, David Pankenier suggested in an insightful study (1999) that Jupiter's positions might have been of great political and military significance at least since the early Zhou. This may be the case, but if so, then we should ask why the *Zuo* contains only eight references to Jupiter's positions, of which at least five (if not all) are definite Zhanguo interpolations? Was the Jupiter-related data considered secret? Or, pace Pankenier, did Jupiter's position become politically and militarily important only in the Zhanguo period? In any case, I have failed to find a convincing explanation for the passages in the *Zuo* that deal with Jupiter's movements.
15. See *Shiji* 49:1981–1986; 60:2114–2120. For more on the interpolations in the *Shiji*, see Zheng Zhihong 1997, 189–199.
16. See Wang He 1984; 1993a, 19.

Appendix 3: Comparing Scribal Accounts in the *Zuo*

1. “The nobles of the overlords” are the ministers of the northern states. In the late Chunqiu, powerless overlords ceased to participate in most interstate meetings.
2. Rewarming the alliance meant renewing friendly ties between allies without altering the oath of the previous alliance. Wei Shu rewarmed the Pingqiu alliance of 529. To sit facing the south was the prerogative of the ruler. Wei Shu usurped not only the position of the ruler of Jin, but also the position of the Zhou Son of Heaven, under whose formal aegis the meeting was conducted.
3. See *Shi jing*, “Ban” 17:550 (Mao, 254).
4. See *Zuo*, Zhao 32:1517–1519.
5. See *Zuo*, Ding 1:1522–1523.
6. See Yang Bojun's gloss (*Zuo*, 1523). The first one, to my knowledge, to grasp that the *Zuo* misplaced two different accounts of the single event was Gu Yanwu (1990, 4:151). See also Wang Shumin 1981, 8.
7. See Liu Zhiji 1990 (“Yanyu”:362).

Appendix 4: Spurious Speeches and Interpolations in the *Zuo*

1. Generally, I use the techniques outlined by Gu Jiegang 1988a; Hu Nianyi 1981a; Zhao Guangxian 1982; Zhang Handong 1988; Wang He 1993a.
2. These are the phrases “臣聞之：出門如賓，承事如祭，仁之則也” (*Zuo*, Xi 33:502) and “六府、三事，謂之九功。水火金木土穀，謂之六府；正德，利用；厚生，謂之三事” (*Zuo*, Wen 7:564); and a third instance in the speech of Mu Jiang (*Zuo*, Xiang 9:964–966), which itself is a later interpolation.

3. *Houtu* was an official in charge of land resources.
4. Here and below, the names of the “inept sons” definitely have pejorative meanings.
5. This is a quotation from the “Shun dian,” a part of the “Yao dian” chapter of the *Shu jing* (3:126).
6. The quotations from the *Yu shu* appear in the present “Shun dian” (*Shu jing* 3:125–126).
7. See *Guoyu*, “Lu yu 1” 4.12:176.
8. A detailed analysis of the historical-mythological material in Taishi Ke’s speech would lead us astray. Suffice it to say that it bears a strong imprint of Zhanguo attempts to construct China’s prehistoric past into a meaningful sequence.
9. See, for instance, Jiang Shanguo 1988, 140–168. Jiang argues that the “Yao dian” was compiled in the mid-Zhanguo period, and was possibly edited in the Qin period.
10. Comparing the ancestor of the Ji lineage to Shun was politically important: if Shun attained all under Heaven through his virtue, the Ji lineage should at least attain the state of Lu.
11. For self-criticism, see *Zuo*, Xiang 9:964–966 and the detailed arguments against the reliability of this speech by Kidder Smith 1989, 435–438. For the favorable prediction, see *Zuo*, Min 2:263–264.
12. It is also possible that the historical narrative in Taishi Ke’s speech was aimed at constructing a favorable biography for one of the *Zuo* transmitters’ patrons.
13. See *Shi jing*, “Huang yi” 16:520 (Mao, 241). I translate the poem in accord with Cheng Zhuan’s interpretations, which sometimes differ from the extant glosses (see also Schaberg 1996a, 458–459).
14. I modify translation by Schaberg 1996a, 458–459.
15. See *Shiji* 39:1684.
16. See *Liji zhengyi*, “Da xue” 60:1673.
17. Although *Bielu* is lost, it is quoted by Lu Deming (c. 550–630 c.E.): “Zuo Qiuming made a commentary [the *Zuo*] and passed it to Zeng Shen (a son of Confucius’ disciple Zeng Can), Shen passed it to Wu Qi of Wei, Qi passed it to his son Qi, Qi passed it to Duo Jiao of Chu (a tutor of King Wei of Chu [r. 339–329]), Jiao passed it to Yu Qing of Zhao (a prime minister of King Xiaocheng of Zhao [r. 265–245]), Qing passed it to Xun Qing, named Kuang from the same commandery (i.e., Xunzi, d.a. 218), Kuang passed it to Zhang Cang of Wuwei (a Han prime minister, d. 152), Cang passed it to Jia Yi of Luoyang (199–166)” (Lu Deming 1:36; see also Kong Yingda’s gloss, *Chunqiu Zuozhuan zhengyi* 1:1703). This chain of transmission is partly corroborated by the *Shiji* 14:510.
18. Zi Xia was widely noted for his mastery of the *Chun qiu* and historical writings in general, as attested in *Lüshi chunqiu* (“Cha fu” 12:1527), *Han Feizi* (“Waichu shuo you shang” 34:314), and *Chunqiu fanlu* (“Yu xu” 17:160).
19. Wu Qi apparently succeeded in convincing Lord Wen that history was useful to the

lord's purposes. Ban Gu mentions: "Of the rulers of the six states, Lord Wen of Wei was the most fond of antiquity" (*Han shu* 30:1712). For more on Wu Qi's career, see *Shiji* 65.

20. See *Zuo*, Zhao 28:1497.
21. The royal house was in a deep crisis due to the 520 rebellion of Prince Chao. Zhao Jianzi intended to dispatch the overlords' garrisons to guard the royal capital against Chao's supporters.
22. "The two things" presumably refer to *yin* and *yang*.
23. I partly follow Schaberg's translation (1996a, 643).
24. Song, the descendant of the Shang dynasty, enjoyed a special status as "the guest" rather than the vassal of the Zhou royal house.
25. The northern alliance had been officially established at Jiantu in 632.
26. Itano Chōhachi (1975) and especially Kondō Noriyuki (1983) relied on the content of Zi Taishu's speech as the major argument in favor of dating the *Zuo* to the late Zhanguo or early Han. Their argument, as we see, does not take into consideration the easy explanation that Zi Taishu's speech does not belong to the original text of the *Zuo*.
27. The tripartite formula "Heaven-Earth-Man" originated in all likelihood in military writings of the early to middle Zhanguo; by the late Zhanguo its usage expanded to general political and philosophical discussions. See Jiang Lequn 1996.
28. The term "*chengren*" appears once in the *Lunyu* in a passage that apparently belongs to the later layer of this work ("Xian wen" 14.12:149).
29. The latter might have been added in the Eastern Han (Gu Jiegang 1988a, 73–81).
30. See Gu Jiegang 1988a, 68–73.
31. See Zhao Guangxian 1982, 56.
32. Such efforts are being made, among others, by the members of the Warring States Working Group, initiated and orchestrated by Bruce Brooks. Although the current results of Brooks' efforts (Brooks and Brooks 1998) may be disputable, the attempt to distinguish various layers in pre-Qin texts is most laudable.

List of Chunqiu Personalities

Numbers within brackets refer to pages in this volume.

1. Whenever possible, all persons are listed according to their lineage name (*shi*) and personal name (*ming*). Some Chunqiu personalities had several lineage names; they are listed according to the earliest lineage name. For instance, members of the Zhi and Zhonghang lineages in the state of Jin are listed according to their original lineage name, Xun.
2. Sons of the overlords had no lineage name and are listed as princes. The rulers are listed according to their posthumous names.
3. Whenever possible I mention the person's cognomen (*zi*) and/or seniority name and posthumous name (*shi*). For the sake of convenience, I refer to seniority name as a cognomen unless the person had both a cognomen and seniority name. Many persons are referred to in the *Zuo* and later texts by a combination of their seniority name and posthumous name. For instance, Zang Wenzhong of Lu is a combination of the posthumous name Wen and the seniority name Zhong.
4. In all but a few cases, dates of a person's life and activities are given in accordance with the *Zuo*. The ruling dates of the Chunqiu overlords are given in accordance with Fang Shiming's chronological tables. Whenever appropriate, the *Guoyu* and *Shiji* information was also consulted.
5. In preparing this list I used the following sources: Fang Shiming 1991; Gu Donggao 1993; Yang Bojun and Xu Ti 1985; and Zhu Fenghan 1990.

✧ ✧ ✧

Baili 百里 (late 8th century). Xu 許 noble [60]

Bao 鮑 **lineage**. One of the most powerful aristocratic lineages in the state of Qi. Established by Bao Shuya 鮑叔牙 in the mid-seventh century. The Bao lineage was a major power holder in Qi between 532 and Chen Chang's coup of 481. [293n. 17]

Bao Guo 鮑國 (c. 590–500), posthumous name Wenzi 文子. Head of the Bao lineage. A

second son in his family, Bao Guo left Qi and became a steward of the Shi 施 lineage in Lu. In 574, after his elder brother Bao Qian 牽 was expelled from Qi, Bao Guo returned and headed his lineage for more than seventy years until approximately 500. [186–187, 290n. 60]

Bao Wenzi 鮑文子 (see Bao Guo)

Beigong Tuo 北宮佗 (fl. 540s), posthumous name Wenzi 文子. Wei 衛 chancellor [97–99, 102, 224, 277n. 23]

Beigong Wenzi 北宮文子 (see Beigong Tuo)

Biao Xi 彪蹊 (fl. late sixth century). Wei 衛 noble [25, 228–230]

Bin Meiren 賓媚人 (see Guo Zuo)

Bo Pi 伯嚭 (d. 473?). Prime minister (*taizai*) of Wu in the first quarter of the fifth century. Great-grandson of the Jin official Bo Zong; grandson of the Chu *taizai* Bo Zhouli. [118, 282n. 44, 285n. 95]

Bo You 伯有 (see Liang Xiao)

Bo Zhouli 伯州犁 (d. 541). A son of the Jin statesman Bo Zong. Zhouli fled to Chu after his father was killed in the interlineage struggle of 576. A year later he was appointed to the position of *taizai*, and assisted the Chu army during the military encounter with Jin at Yanling. After King Ling of Chu seized the throne, he immediately had Zhouli executed. [285n. 95]

Bo Zong 伯宗 (d. 576). Conservative Jin noble, a victim of the interlineage struggles in Jin [66, 120–121, 285n. 95]

Bu Yan 卜偃 (see Guo Yan)

Cai Mo 蔡墨 (fl. 520–470s) (usually referred to as Scribe Mo 史墨 or An 黯). Scribe of the Zhao lineage in Jin. A person of extraordinary political and historical wisdom, Mo is often quoted in the *Zuo*, *Guoyu*, and many Zhanguo texts. [145–146, 245, 288n. 37]

Cao Gui 曹劌 (fl. 680s–670s). Lu official of apparently humble origin. His superb military abilities enabled him to make a career at the court of Lord Zhuang. [273n. 61, 279n. 4]

Chang Hong 萇弘 (d. 492), cognomen Shu 叔. Zhou official, probably a divination specialist, who served the Liu lineage and was executed because of his master's involvement in the internal strife in the state of Jin. Zhanguo sources often depict Chang's sagehood. [223, 245]

Chen 陳 (Tian 田) **lineage**. The most powerful ministerial lineage in the state of Qi, founded by Prince Wan (公子完 from the state of Chen), who fled to Qi in 672. The Chen lineage was the major beneficiary of interlineage strife in Qi in 546–532. In 481 the eighth head of the lineage, Chen Chang, performed a coup d'état, after which the Chen lineage became the de facto rulers of Qi; they nominally replaced the Qi lords in 386. [5, 101, 103, 144, 221–222, 245–246, 290n. 67, 293n. 17, 304n. 2]

Chen Chang 陳常, cognomen Heng 恆, posthumous name Chengzi 成子. Head of the Chen lineage. In 481 Chang arrested and then murdered Lord Jian 簡 of Qi (r. 484–481), establishing thereby the Chen dictatorship in the state of Qi. [221]

Chen Huanzi 陳桓子 (see Chen Wuyu)

Chen Wuyu 陳無宇 (fl. 570–530), posthumous name Huanzi 桓子. The fifth head of the Chen lineage, the major beneficiary of the interlineage struggles in Qi in 546–532,

and the first representative of the Chen lineage to be appointed to high ministerial position (*qing*). [202]

Cheng Dechen 成得臣 (d. 632), cognomen Zi Yu 子玉. Chu *lingyin* in 637–632. Cheng led the Chu army to the disastrous defeat at Chengpu (632) and was ordered by King Cheng to commit suicide. [65, 270n. 26]

Cheng Feng 成風 (d. 623). Mother of Lord Xi of Lu [111, 280n. 16]

Cheng Zhuàn 成鱗 (late sixth century). Jin noble [238–242, 306n. 13]

Chengji You 成季友 (see Prince You 公子友)

Chu 褚 lineage. Zhou aristocratic lineage [19]

Chu Ni 鉏麇 (d. 602). A Jin *shi* who was dispatched by Lord Ling to assassinate the prime minister Zhao Dun, but refused to carry out the order, preferring to commit suicide instead. [151–152, 255n. 46, 289n. 54]

Cui 崔 lineage. Aristocratic lineage from the state of Qi; descendants of Lord Ding of Qi (丁公, tenth century). The lineage prospered under the powerful Cui Zhu, but was eliminated by its rivals in 546. [141, 300n. 114]

Cui Zhu 崔杼 (d. 546), posthumous title Wuzi 武子. Qi dictator in 553–546; assisted the ascendancy of Lord Zhuang in 553, but five years later murdered his former protégé, who had an affair with Cui Zhu's wife. Two years later, Cui was outmaneuvered by his erstwhile ally Qing Feng; Cui's family was massacred, and he committed suicide. [141, 251n. 12, 287nn. 18, 19, 290n. 68]

Deng Man 鄧曼. The wise wife of King Wen of Chu [260n. 84, 288n. 29]

Ding Jiang 定姜. The principal (not biological) mother of Lord Xian of Wei [86, 275n. 83]

Dong Hu 董狐 (fl. late seventh century). Jin grand scribe (*taishi*) [251n. 14]

Dongmen Sui 東門遂 (see Prince Sui)

Dou Chengran 門成然 (d. 528), lineage name Man 蔓, cognomen Zi Qi 子旗. Ally of Prince Qiji of Chu, the future King Ping. After Qiji's coup d'état in 529, Dou Chengran was appointed to the position of *lingyin*, but was executed a year later because of corruption charges. [179]

Dou Gouwutu 門穀於菟 (d.c. 625), cognomen Zi Wen 子文. Chu *lingyin* in 664–638, yielded his position to Cheng Dechen. An energetic leader of high moral integrity who contributed greatly to Chu's territorial expansion and political stability. [274n. 67]

Dou Huai 門懷. Son of Dou Chengran and a younger brother of Dou Xin; Dou attempted to murder King Zhao in 506, but was dissuaded by his elder brother, Dou Xin. [179, 196]

Dou Xin 門辛 (fl. 520s–500s). Elder son of Dou Chengran. In 528 King Ping executed Chengran but did not persecute Dou Xin and appointed him to govern the Yun dependency. In 506 Xin repaid the king's leniency by saving King Ping's son, King Zhao, despite the pledge of his brother Huai to avenge their father by murdering the king. [179, 186, 195–196, 286n. 5, 295n. 50]

Duanmu Ci 端木賜 (520–?), cognomen Zi Gong 子貢. Confucius' disciple and a Lu official in the early fifth century. [105, 118, 282nn. 43, 44]

Fan 范 lineage. One of the six powerful ministerial lineages of Jin, descended from Shi Wei and Shi Hui, named after their allotment at Fan. The Fan lineage was destroyed together with the Zhonghang lineage in the civil war of 497–490. [48, 143, 288n. 25]

Fan Wenzi 范文子 (see Shi Xie 士燮)

Fan Wuzi 范武子 (see Shi Hui 士會)

Fan Xianzi 范獻子 (see Shi Yang 士鞅)

Fan Xuanzi 范宣子 (see Shi Gai)

Fan Yang 范鞅 (see Shi Yang 士鞅)

Fan Zhaozi 范昭子 (see Shi Jishe 士吉射)

Fei Wuji 費無極 (d. 515). The evil genius at the court of Chu in 528–515; masterminded several intrigues that led to the executions of leading officials, including Wu She and Wu Shang, father and brother of Wu Zixu. Fei Wuji's atrocities were generally deplored and he was executed. [178, 203]

Fu Chen 富辰 (fl. 630s). Zhou minister [175–176]

Fu Xia 傅瑕 (d. 680). Zheng official. In 680 he helped Lord Li to return from exile, but was later betrayed by the lord and executed. [147]

Fuzi 富子 (fl. 530s). Zheng minister [100]

Gan 甘 **lineage**. Zhou aristocratic lineage [299n. 105]

Gao **lineage**. One of the strongest aristocratic lineages in the state of Qi. Qi had two Gao lineages; the one referred to in this research were the descendants of Prince Qi 公子旗 (cognomen Zi Gao 子高, son of Lord Hui 惠, r. 608–599). The Gao lineage flourished in 540s–530s, but was eliminated by the coalition of the Chen and the Bao lineages in 532. [169–170, 293nn. 16, 19]

Gao Qiang 高彊 (fl. 530s), cognomen Zi Liang 子良. Son of Gongsun Chai; headed the Gao lineage in the state of Qi after the death of his father in 534. In 532 Gao Qiang was defeated and his lineage eliminated by the Bao and Chen lineages. Gao Qiang fled to Lu and later to Jin. [170, 293nn. 16, 17]

Gao Qumi 高渠彌 (fl. 710s–690s). Zheng high minister under Lord Zhuang; adversary of the future Lord Zhao. After Lord Zhao's ascendancy, Gao Qumi feared that the ruler would retaliate and preferred to act in advance; in 695 he murdered Lord Zhao, and for several years remained the most powerful Zheng official. [29–30, 258n. 66]

Gong Meng 公孟 (d. 522), private name Zhi 贄 (Meng may be a cognomen). Elder brother of Lord Ling of Wei; murdered by dissenting officials. [203]

Gong Zhiqi 宮之奇 (fl. 650s). Wise official from the tiny state of Yu. The Lord of Yu did not heed Gong Zhiqi's advice and his state was conquered by Jin in 655. [273n. 61]

Gongfu Chu 公父歌 (early fifth century), cognomen Bo 伯, posthumous name Wen 文. Lu official; headed a collateral branch of the Jisun lineage. [42, 262n. 103]

Gongfu Wenbo 公父文伯 (see Gongfu Chu)

Gongfu Wenbo's mother. A paragon of female wisdom in the *Guoyu* [42, 262n. 103]

Gongshu Duan 公叔段 (d.c. 710). Younger brother of Lord Zhuang of Zheng; rebelled in 722 against his brother, but was defeated and fled the state of Zheng. [269n. 14, 300n. 107]

Gongsun Chai 公孫釐 (d. 534), cognomen Zi Wei 子尾. Qi noble, head of the Gao lineage; enjoyed special favor and trust of Lord Jing. [170, 202, 293nn. 16, 17]

Gongsun Cheng 公孫成 (see Gongsun Su)

Gongsun Gu 公孫固 (fl. 630s). Song military commander [61]

- Gongsun Guisheng** 公孫歸聲 (fl. 550–530s), cognomen Shengzi 聲子. Cai official [95–96]
- Gongsun Heigu** 公孫黑股 (d. 551), cognomen Zi Zhang 子張. Zheng minister [201]
- Gongsun Qiao** 公孫僑 (d. 522), cognomens Zi Chan 子產 and Zi Mei 子美. Eminent Zheng statesman and high minister from 554, Gongsun headed the government of Zheng from 543 until his death. He initiated administrative and economic reforms and greatly improved the international position of Zheng. [10, 36, 69–70, 74–75, 97, 100, 112–113, 168–169, 242, 244, 267n. 163, 271n. 33, 273nn. 51, 53, 57, 277n. 23, 297n. 78, 301n. 123]
- Gongsun Shezhi** 公孫舍之 (d. 544), cognomen Zi Zhan 子展. Head of the Zheng government in 554–544 [123]
- Gongsun Su** 公孫宿 (fl. early fifth century), cognomen Cheng 成. Governor of Cheng, the allotment of the Mengsun lineage in Qi. A conflict with his master in 481–480 caused him to rebel and flee to Qi. [203]
- Gongzhu** 公鉏 (fl. 550s), cognomen Gongmi 公彌. Elder son from a concubine of Ji Wuzi of Lu. Gongzhu was dismissed from the position of the heir of the Jisun lineage in 550 and appointed to *mazheng*, a military official in the Ji household. He established a collateral Gongzhu branch of the Ji lineage. [194]
- Guan Qi** 觀起 (d. 551). Chu official, a favorite of the corrupt lingyin Zi Nan, was executed. [195–196]
- Guan Yiwu** 管夷吾 (d.c. 645), cognomen Zhong 仲, posthumous name Jing 敬. The most famous among Chunqiu officials, paragon of political wisdom, architect of hegemony of Lord Huan. Zhanguo tradition attributes Guan Yiwu with a series of political and social reforms that assured Qi's hegemony; the *Zuo* emphasizes his skillful management of international relations. [10, 52, 109, 181–182, 267nn. 163, 164, 279nn. 7, 10, 295n. 57]
- Guan Zhong** 管仲 (see Guan Yiwu)
- Guo, *neishi* (“inner scribe”)** 內史過 (see Scribe Guo)
- Guo 國 lineage.** One of the eldest and the most powerful aristocratic lineages in the state of Qi; miraculously survived internal strives in this state [222]
- Guo Yan** 郭偃 (fl. 660–630). A divination specialist at the court of Jin and wise advisor of the Jin lords [22, 222, 245]
- Guo Zuo** 國佐 (d. 573), posthumous name Wuzi 武子, cognomen Bin Meiren 賓媚人. Headed the Qi government in 589 during the defeat by Jin forces at An 鞍. Guo Zuo rebelled in 574 and was executed a year later. [129, 284n. 79]
- Han 韓 lineage.** One of the six major ministerial lineages of the state of Jin, established in the early seventh century by Han Wan 韓萬. Since the early sixth century the Han lineage strengthened its position by eliminating its rivals. Since the early fifth century the Han lineage became a de facto independent polity. Together with the Wei and the Zhao lineages the Han were elevated to the position of overlords in 403. [5, 48, 115, 222]
- Han 罕 lineage.** A major aristocratic lineage in the state of Zheng; descendants of Lord Mu. Together with its collateral branches the Han lineage dominated the Zheng policy throughout the second half of the Chunqiu period. [293n. 19, 300n. 114]

Han Buxin 韓不信 (fl. late sixth century), cognomen Boyin 伯音, posthumous name Jianzi 簡子. Han Qi's grandson; Jin high minister [48, 228–229]

Han Chuan 韓穿. Jin official and military commander in the first quarter of the sixth century [121]

Han Hu 罕虎 (d. 529), cognomen Zi Pi 子皮. Headed the Han 罕 lineage, the major aristocratic lineage in the state of Zheng. In 543 he used his position to promote Zi Chan to the head of the Zheng government and remained the major aide of Zi Chan throughout the early years of his rule. [168–169]

Han Jianzi 韓簡子 (see Han Buxin)

Han Qi 韓起 (d. 514), posthumous name Xuanzi 宣子. Jin high minister since 567; acted as prime minister from 540 until his death [100, 114–115, 169]

Han Xuanzi 韓宣子 (see Han Qi)

Han Wuji 韓無忌, posthumous name Muzi 穆子. Elder son of the Jin high minister Han Jue. He yielded the family position of high minister to his younger brother Qi, was appointed ca. 566 to an official position in the lord's household, and established a cadet branch of the Han lineage. [275n. 80]

Handan 邯鄲 **lineage**. Cadet branch of the Zhao lineage from Jin; a major rival of the major branch of the Zhao lineage since the late sixth century [299n. 105]

Hou 郕 **lineage**. Minor collateral branch of the ruling lineage in the state of Lu. The Hou lineage briefly reached prominence when it joined forces with Lord Zhao to expel the Jisun lineage, but was eliminated in the course of defeat. [299n. 14]

Hu Mao 狐毛 (fl. 630s). Hu Tu's son, a retainer of Prince Chonger (Lord Wen of Jin) [155]

Hu Shegu 狐射姑, cognomen Jia Ji 賈季. Jin official, son of Hu Yan. As head of the Jin government, Yang Chufu offended Hu Shegu. In 621, Hu murdered Yang and fled to the Di 狄 tribesmen. [176–177, 295nn. 39, 41]

Hu Tu 狐突 (d. 637), cognomen Boxing 伯行. Jin official, maternal grandfather of Lord Wen of Jin. Hu Tu's sons followed the fugitive Prince Chonger (Lord Wen); when Hu Tu refused to summon them back, he was executed by Lord Huai of Jin. [73, 155, 290n. 61]

Hu Yan 狐偃 (fl. 650–630), cognomen Zi Fan 子犯. Hu Tu's son; maternal uncle and staunch supporter of Chonger (Lord Wen of Jin). Hu Yan followed Chonger into 19 years of exile and played a crucial role in Chonger's ascension to the Jin throne. [155]

Hua, heir apparent of Zheng 鄭大子華 (see Prince Hua)

Hua 華 **lineage**. One of the oldest aristocratic lineages in the state of Song, descendants of Lord Dai 戴 (r. 799–766); rebelled together with the Xiang lineage in 522–520 and almost ousted Lord Yuan [300n. 114, 301n. 124]

Hua Deng 華登. Participated in the 522–520 revolt of the Hua and Xiang lineages; fled to Chu [301n. 124]

Hua Du 華督 (d. 682), cognomen Fu 父. Grandson of Lord Dai 戴 of Song (r. 799–766). In 710 Hua Du murdered Lord Shang 瑯, but escaped punishment and became *taizai*. Founder of the Hua lineage, he was murdered in 682. [251n. 12]

Hua Feisui 華費遂 (fl. 540s–520s). Song grand marshal (*da sima*) who participated in the suppression of the revolt of his kin in 522. Later he forcibly joined the rebels and fled the state after the defeat in 520. [301n. 124]

Hua Ou 華耦 (fl. 610s), cognomen Zi Bo 子伯. Song *sima*, great-grandson of Hua Du [251n. 12]

Hui Bo 惠伯 (see Shuzhong Pengsheng)

Hun Han 渾罕 (fl. 530s). Zheng official [222, 245]

Invoker Gu 固 (fl. 520s). Qi official [81]

Ji 季 (Jisun 季孫) lineage. The most prominent aristocratic lineage in the state of Lu, established by Chengji You—a younger son of Lord Huan of Lu. From 601, heads of the Ji lineage customarily headed the Lu government. In 517 Ji Pingzi, supported by the Mengsun and the Shusun lineages, expelled Lord Zhao, nullifying the authority of the Lu lords. Jisun prosperity continued well into the Zhanguo period, when their allotment at Bi turned into an independent polity. [86, 142–143, 145–146, 156, 186, 194, 233, 238, 246, 278n. 32, 293n. 14, 299n. 105, 300nn. 106, 114, 306n. 10]

Ji Kangzi 季康子 (see Jisun Fei)

Ji Liang 季梁. Wise aide of the ruler of Sui 隨 in the late eighth century [76–78, 83, 149, 200]

Ji Pingzi 季平子 (see Jisun Yiru)

Ji Wenzi 季文子 (see Jisun Xingfu)

Ji Wuzi 季武子 (see Jisun Su)

Ji Zha 季札 (fl. mid-sixth century). A younger son (?) of King Shoumeng of Wu; yielded the throne to his elder brothers. In the Zhanguo, Ji Zha became a paragon of virtuous and sage official. [222, 225–226, 245, 304nn. 8, 11]

Jia Ji 賈季 (see Hu Shegu)

Jia Xin 賈辛 (fl. 510s). Jin official; in 520 led expeditionary force aimed at restoring order at the Zhou royal domain; in 515 was appointed a governor of a dependency [241–242]

Jiao Ju 椒舉 (see Wu Ju)

Jisun lineage (see Ji lineage)

Jisun Fei 季孫肥 (d. 468), posthumous name Kangzi 康子. Grandson of Jisun Yiru; headed the Lu government in 492–468 [118, 297n. 78]

Jisun Si 季孫斯 (d. 492), posthumous name Huanzi 桓子. Weak head of the Jisun lineage who was almost overthrown by his retainer, Yang Hu. After the failure of Yang Hu's plot in 502, he regained his position. [186]

Jisun Su 季孫宿 (d. 535), posthumous name Wuzi 武子. Son of Jisun Xingfu; headed the Lu government from 560 until his death [145, 168, 194, 287n. 22, 288n. 34]

Jisun Xingfu 季孫行父 (d. 568), posthumous name Wenzi 文子. Grandson of Chengji You, the founder of the Jisun lineage. Xingfu headed the government of Lu in 601–568 and became a paragon of a selfless and loyal official. [62–63, 121, 130–131, 234–238, 287n. 22, 288n. 34]

Jisun Yiru 季孫意如 (d. 505), posthumous name Pingzi 平子. Grandson of Jisun Su; headed the Lu government in 517–505. Yiru's forces defeated the supporters of Lord Zhao in 517, causing the lord to flee into exile. [67–68, 146, 287n. 22]

Jizi 急子 (see Prince Jizi 公子急子)

Ke Huang 克黃 (fl. late seventh century). Member of the Dou 鬥 branch of the Ruobao 若敖 lineage of Chu. During the extermination of his kin in 605, Ke Huang was on mission to Qi; he decided to return to Chu and share the fate of his lineage. King

Zhuang spared him and allowed to “continue the sacrifices” to the Ruao. Ke Huang is the great-grandfather of Dou Chengran 鬥成然. [286n. 5]

King Cheng of Chu 楚成王 (r. 671–626). Strong leader under whose aegis the state of Chu began its quest for hegemony. He withstood with mixed success such northern rivals as Qi, Song, and Jin and was murdered by his son, Shangchen (King Mu). [65, 126, 224]

King Fuchai of Wu 吳王夫差 (r. 495–473). The last king of Wu, a controversial ruler who dominated the late Chunqiu international scene for almost two decades. His aggressive politics weakened Wu, which was defeated and conquered by its Yue adversaries in 473, after which Fuchai committed suicide. [117–118, 271n. 30]

King Gong of Chu 楚共王 (r. 590–560). A weak ruler and anticlimax after his powerful father, King Zhuang. During King Gong’s reign, Chu was defeated by Jin at Yanling (575) and had to give up its quest for hegemony for almost thirty years. [177, 281n. 38]

King Goujian of Yue 越王句踐 (r. 496–465). The last great Chunqiu ruler. At a young age Goujian suffered humiliating defeat by Wu adversaries; later he restored the power of Yue and eliminated Wu in 473, becoming the hegemon of the southeastern part of the Zhou world. [42, 131–132]

King Huan of Zhou 周桓王 (r. 719–697). Weak Zhou ruler; alienated Zhou’s powerful ally, the state of Zheng, contributing thereby to further decline of the Zhou dynastic power [2, 108–109]

King Hui of Zhou 周惠王 (r. 676–652). [77–78]

King Jing of Zhou 周景王 (r. 544–520) [280n. 14]

King Jing of Zhou 周敬王 (r. 519–476) [19, 228–229, 241]

King Kang of Chu 楚康王 (r. 559–545) [195–196, 301n. 120]

King Ling of Chu 楚靈王 (r. 540–529), private name Wei 圍. The most controversial ruler of the Chunqiu period; acted as *lingyin* from 544. In 541 he murdered his nephew, King Jia’ao (r. 544–541), and established himself as the new king. King Ling actively pursued hegemony, and indeed achieved unprecedented international supremacy. Yet a coalition of dissenting officials, aristocrats from the defeated states, and the king’s brothers deposed King Ling in 529, after which he committed suicide. [63, 66–67, 113–115, 124, 131, 134–135, 271n. 30, 278n. 29, 281n. 29, 284n. 88]

King Ping of Chu 楚平王 (r. 528–516), private name Qiji 棄疾. King Ling’s brother and successor; pacified the dissent created by his ambitious brother, but had to give up Chu’s quest for international supremacy [178–179, 281n. 38]

King Wen of Chu 楚文王 (r. 689–677). Bolstered the process of Chu’s territorial expansion [35–36, 152, 260n. 84]

King Wu of Chu 楚武王 (r. 740–690). Began the process of Chu’s territorial expansion [260n. 84]

King Xiang of Zhou 周襄王 (r. 651–619). Weak ruler, a puppet of Lord Huan of Qi. King Xiang’s intrigues undermined the shaky stability of the Zhou ruling house. In 635 he was restored after the intervention of the overlords’ armies led by Lord Wen of Jin. [18, 110–111, 125, 175, 251n. 11, 267n. 158, 297n. 7]

King Zhao of Chu 楚昭王 (r. 515–489). Ascended the throne as a child. Under his rule Chu suffered the disastrous defeat by Wu in 506. [179, 196, 272n. 50]

King Zhuang of Chu 楚莊王 (r. 613–591). Prominent leader who strengthened his authority at home and abroad. After the 597 victory over the Jin forces at Bi, King Zhuang dominated the Chinese world. [95, 127–128, 280n. 21, 283n. 56]

Kong Zhang 孔張. Zheng official, mid-sixth century [100, 278n. 34]

Kuaikui 蒯聵 (see Lord Zhuang of Wei)

Li Ge 里革 (fl. late seventh century); other name Ke 克. Grand scribe (*taishi*) of Lu [234, 237–238, 306nn. 8, 10]

Li Ji 麗姬 (d. 650?). Femme fatale of Jin. A daughter of the Rong 戎 tribal leader, Li Ji became a concubine of Lord Xian of Jin, and urged him to dismiss his elder sons for the sake of her offspring. Tradition blames Li Ji for the major succession crisis in which Jin was engulfed for almost twenty years (655–636). [42, 150–151, 289n. 52, 300n. 107]

Li Ke 里克 (d. 650). Jin official. Li Ke opposed Lord Xian's plans to depose his elder sons in favor of Li Ji's offspring. After Lord Xian's death Li Ke deposed Li Ji's son and nephew and enthroned Prince Yiwu (Lord Hui). Ungrateful, Lord Hui had Li Ke executed immediately after assuming power. [43, 151, 194–195, 289n. 52]

Liang 良 **lineage**. One of the most powerful Zheng aristocratic lineages, descendants of Lord Mu. Their prosperity ended with the extermination of Liang Xiao in 543. Although in 535 Liang Xiao's son was reestablished in official position, the Liang lineage never again played a significant role in the political life of their state. [293n. 19]

Liang Xiao 良霄 (d. 543), cognomen Bo You 伯有. Head of the government of Zheng in 544–543; murdered by his rivals [222, 273n. 57, 274n. 71]

Liangqiu Ju 梁丘據 (fl. 530–510), cognomen Zi You 子猶. Corrupt sycophant at the court of Lord Jing of Qi [68, 81, 160–161]

Liu 劉 **lineage**. Prominent aristocratic lineage from the Zhou royal domain [19]

Liuzi 劉子 (see Lord Wen of Liu)

Liuxia Ji 柳下季 (see Zhan Huo)

Lord Ai of Lu 魯哀公 (r. 494–468). A weak ruler who attempted to reduce the power of his powerful ministers, but in vain; he was forced to flee his state and died in exile. [117–118]

Lord Cheng of Lu 魯成公 (r. 590–573) [281n. 27, 287n. 22]

Lord Cheng of Wei 衛成公 (r. 634–600). A victim of the Jin-Chu struggle. On the eve of the Chengpu battle (632) Lord Cheng sided with Chu against Jin; when Lord Wen of Jin invaded Wei, Lord Cheng fled, but later returned and retained power. [73]

Lord Chu of Wei 出公 (r. 492–480, 476–456). Son of Lord Zhuang; expelled by his own father, but later returned to rule Wei [282n. 44]

Lord Dao of Jin 晉悼公 (r. 572–558). The last politically potent Jin ruler. Lord Dao ascended the throne at the age of fourteen after his predecessor, Lord Li, was assassinated by Luan Shu. Despite his young age, Lord Dao skillfully maneuvered among rival aristocratic lineages and partly restored the power of the Jin lords at home and abroad. [139, 263n. 109, 272n. 50, 275n. 80]

Lord Dao of Qi 齊悼公 (r. 488–485). A weak ruler who failed to regain power usurped by his courtiers. Lord Dao was murdered by his former benefactor, Bao Mu 鮑牧. [285n. 94]

Lord Ding of Jin 晉定公 (r. 511–475). A weak ruler, a puppet of the powerful ministerial lineages [288n. 27]

Lord Huai of Jin 晉懷公 (r. 636). Son of Lord Hui, murdered by his uncle, Lord Wen, in early 636 [155–156, 290n. 64]

Lord Huan of Lu 魯桓公 (r. 711–694). Younger brother of Lord Yin; ordered the assassination of Lord Yin in order to ascend the throne [92, 300nn. 106, 107]

Lord Huan of Qi 齊桓公 (r. 685–643). The most prominent of the Chunqiu rulers, the first and most powerful hegemon. Lord Huan ascended the throne after a prolonged period of internal anarchy; he managed not only to stabilize his rule at home but also to solidify his power abroad. His major achievements were to repulse the Di and Rong invaders in 660s–650s, impose a semblance of the royal Zhou authority on the state of Chu in 656, restore the extinguished states of Wei, Xing, and Qi 杞 in 660–646, and enthrone his protégé, King Xiang, in the Zhou royal domain. [2–4, 13, 42, 50, 107, 109–113, 125–126, 132–133, 211, 267nn. 161, 162, 279nn. 7, 9, 10, 280nn. 15, 17, 281n. 29, 284n. 79]

Lord Huan of Wei 衛桓公 (r. 734–719) [19, 193, 300n. 107]

Lord Hui of Jin 晉惠公 (r. 650–637), personal name Yiwu 夷吾. Second son of Lord Xian; fled the state during the domestic turmoil of 655; enthroned with the help of the Qin army in 651. Lord Hui proved to be an inept leader, responsible (among other things) for the disastrous defeat by the Qin army at Han in 645. Shortly after his death, Lord Hui's son, Lord Huai, was murdered and replaced by Lord Hui's younger brother, Lord Wen. [43, 61, 73, 150–152, 156, 166–167, 175, 185, 194, 289n. 52, 290n. 64]

Lord Jing of Jin 晉景公 (r. 599–581) [177, 281n. 27]

Lord Jing of Qi 齊景公 (r. 547–490). The last of the Qi rulers to preserve nominal power. [68, 81–83, 101–102, 115–116, 144, 156, 160–161, 170, 186, 245, 290n. 67, 293n. 16, 296n. 64]

Lord Jing of Song 宋景公 (516–469). A weak ruler who failed to restore the lord's authority weakened by the rebellions of 522–520 [288n. 27]

Lord Kang of Liu 劉康公. Zhou minister in the first quarter of the sixth century [96–97, 268n. 3]

Lord Li of Jin 晉厲公 (r. 580–573). Attempted to neutralize the powerful aristocrats by appointing his personal favorites to the highest positions in the state hierarchy. In 574 Lord Li ordered the extermination of the Xi lineage and contemplated destroying other major ministerial lineages. His indecisiveness cost him his life; in 573, Lord Li was murdered by Luan Shu. [177]

Lord Li of Zheng 鄭厲公 (r. 700–696 and 680–673). Younger son of Lord Zhuang; expelled from his state and stayed for 16 years in exile; after his return acted as a cruel autocratic ruler [147–148]

Lord Ling of Jin 晉靈公 (r. 620–607). Ascended the Jin throne as a baby. When grown up, Lord Ling became an extravagant, cruel, and excessive ruler. Reprimanded by prime minister Zhao Dun, Lord Ling attempted to assassinate him. These plans failed, and Lord Ling was murdered by Zhao Dun's relative, Zhao Chuan. [46, 151, 153, 251n. 14]

Lord Ling of Wei 衛靈公 (r. 534–493). A weak ruler under whom the international position of Wei greatly deteriorated [116]

Lord Min of Lu 魯閔公 (r. 661–660). Younger scion of Lord Zhuang, Lord Min was en-

throne by his uncle, Qingfu, who murdered the heir apparent Zi Ban. Within a year, however, Qingfu decided to seize power for himself and he murdered his weak protégé. [273n. 51, 300n. 107]

Lord Mu of Qin 秦穆公 (r. 659–621). The most eminent Qin ruler of the Chunqiu period; dominated the western part of the Chinese world. Lord Mu enthroned Lords Hui and Wen of Jin, and actively participated in interstate life of the mid-seventh century. His attempts to further strengthen Qin failed after the 627 defeat at Yao at the hands of Jin. [61, 166–167, 275n. 80, 302n. 144]

Lord Mu of Shan 單穆公 (fl. 520s–510s), personal name Qi 旗. Zhou minister [19]

Lord Mu of Zheng 鄭穆公 (r. 627–606). A powerful leader whose sons established major ministerial lineages that dominated the politics of Zheng for the next two centuries [300n. 106]

Lord of She 葉公 (see Shen Zhuliang)

Lord Ping of Jin 晉平公 (r. 557–532). Son and successor of Lord Dao, Lord Ping is frequently blamed as an incapable ruler whose lack of will and licentious behavior undermined the remnants of the lord's prestige in the state of Jin. [66–67, 79, 99, 156, 168, 273nn. 51, 53]

Lord Qi of Deng 鄧祁公 (early seventh century). An ally of the state of Chu, Lord Qi trusted his Chu relative, King Wen, and refused to assassinate him in 688. Ungrateful, King Wen of Chu had Deng eliminated in 679. [35–36, 260n. 84]

Lord Qing of Qi 齊頃公 (r. 598–582). A weak ruler under whose leadership the state of Qi suffered the humiliating defeat at An in 589 [280nn. 25, 27]

Lord Su of Cheng 成肅公 (d. 578). Zhou official [96]

Lord Wen of Jin 晉文公 (r. 636–628), personal name Chonger 重耳. The great ruler whose life became a legend. A third son of Lord Xian and his Rong concubine, Chonger had to flee his state during the succession turmoil of 655. After 19 years of wandering, he returned to his state, and ascended the throne with the help of the Qin army. In less than two years, Lord Wen was recognized by King Xiang of Zhou as a new hegemon; after the victory over the Chu army at Chengpu (632), he dominated the Chinese world until his death. [42, 64–65, 110–112, 125, 150–151, 155–157, 176, 180, 182, 185, 194, 251n. 11, 267n. 162, 269n. 23, 270n. 24, 279n. 11, 280n. 19, 284n. 79, 289n. 52, 290n. 64, 294n. 33]

Lord Wen of Lu 魯文公 (r. 626–609). Son of Lord Xi; the last Lu ruler to effectively rule his state [145, 251n. 12]

Lord Wen of Liu 劉文公, private name of Juan 卷 (fl. late sixth century). Zhou noble [19]

Lord Wen of Zheng 鄭文公 (r. 672–628). The first Zheng ruler to ally with Chu [279n. 10]

Lord Wen of Zhu 邾文公 (d. 614) [200–201]

Lord Wu of Jin 晉武公 (d. 677). Headed the cadet branch of the ruling lineage of Jin; ruled Quwo from 715; established his rule over Jin in 678 [112, 280n. 23]

Lord Xi of Lu 魯僖公 (r. 659–627). Powerful and popular leader under whose rule the state of Lu prospered [111–112, 273n. 51, 277n. 16, 280nn. 16, 25, 288n. 34, 300n. 107]

Lord Xi of Zheng 鄭僖公 (r. 570–566) [251n. 13]

Lord Xian of Jin 晉獻公 (r. 676–651). Son of Lord Wu. Lord Xian greatly expanded the territory of Jin, establishing this state as a superpower. At home, Lord Xian destroyed the collateral branches of the ruling lineage, triggering the process of ascendancy of

independent ministerial lineages. In 655, under the influence of his concubine Li Ji, he deposed the heir apparent Shensheng and expelled other elder scions, ushering in twenty years of domestic turmoil. [22, 36, 42, 46, 112, 120, 150–151, 280n. 23, 289nn. 50, 51, 52, 300nn. 106, 107]

Lord Xian of Shan 單獻公 (d. 535). Zhou minister who unsuccessfully tried to rid himself of his powerful relatives in 535 but was subsequently murdered by them [299n. 105]

Lord Xian of Wei 衛獻公 (r. 576–559 and 546–544). Incapable, arrogant, and treacherous ruler; expelled by the coalition of the Ning and Sun lineages in 559. After 13 years in exile Lord Xian returned and soon thereafter executed his major benefactor, Ning Xi. [86, 139, 251n. 12, 270n. 23, 275n. 83, 286n. 4]

Lord Xiang of Lu 魯襄公 (r. 572–542). Ascended the Lu throne as a child; remained a powerless figure overshadowed by his courtiers, particularly Ji Wenzhi and Ji Wuzi [287n. 22]

Lord Xiang of Song 宋襄公 (r. 650–637), cognomen Cifu 茲父. Mini-hegemon of eastern China. After the death of Lord Huan of Qi, Lord Xiang briefly emerged as the most powerful leader in the area of Shandong. His quest for hegemony came to a tragic end in 638 when the Song army was defeated by Chu forces at Hong; Lord Xiang himself was mortally wounded in the battle. [61, 127, 185, 200, 260n. 90, 296n. 75]

Lord Xiao of Qi 齊孝公 (r. 642–633). Son of Lord Huan; enthroned by the Song army and quickly lost his father's international prestige [167]

Lord Xuan of Lu 魯宣公 (r. 608–591). Son of Lord Wen from a minor concubine; Lord Xuan was enthroned by Prince Sui; together with Sui's son, he planned to eliminate the power of the Jisun, Shusun, and Mengsun lineages. These plans failed due to Lord Xuan's death. [234, 236, 287n. 22, 300n. 107]

Lord Xuan of Wei 衛宣公 (r. 718–700). Ascended the Wei throne after prolonged period of internal calamity and succeeded in stabilizing his rule [300n. 107]

Lord Yi of Qi 齊懿公 (r. 612–609). Son of Lord Huan of Qi. In 613, following the death of his brother Lord Zhao, Lord Yi gathered his supporters, attacked and killed his nephew, the heir apparent She 舍. His arrogant behavior soon alienated his supporters; in 609 Lord Yi was assassinated, and the Qi throne passed to his brother, Lord Hui. [62–63, 270n. 21]

Lord Yin of Lu 魯隱公 (r. 722–712). Ascended the throne illegitimately as a regent of the young Lord Huan; subsequently assassinated by Lord Huan [19, 300n. 107]

Lord Yuan of Song 宋元公 (r. 531–517). A weak ruler who was almost ousted by the rebellious Hua and Xiang lineages during the 522–520 civil war. [68, 301n. 124]

Lord Zhao of Lu 魯昭公 (r. 541–510). The weakest of the Lu sovereigns, a puppet in the hands of powerful “three Huan” lineages. His attempt to get rid of the Lu strongman Ji Pingzi in 517 ended in disaster. Lord Zhao's forces were defeated, he fled Lu, and died in exile. [5, 67–68, 99–100, 142–143, 145–146, 156, 246, 251n. 11, 270n. 27, 285n. 94, 287n. 22]

Lord Zhao of Song 宋昭公 (r. 620–611). Unsuccessfully attempted in 620 to expel the cadet branches of the ruling lineage; remained a puppet in the hands of powerful relatives, who finally murdered him. [300n. 106]

- Lord Zhao of Zheng** 鄭昭公 (r. 696–695). Son of Lord Zhuang; assassinated shortly after assuming power by the former prime minister Gao Qumi [30–31, 258n. 66]
- Lord Zhuang of Qi** 衛莊公 (r. 553–548). A wicked and incompetent ruler, he was enthroned by Cui Zhu, but later became involved in the illicit affair with the wife of his benefactor. Infuriated, Cui Zhu assassinated Lord Zhuang in 548. [141, 251n. 13, 287nn. 18, 19, 290n. 68]
- Lord Zhuang of Wei** 衛莊公 (r. 757–735) [193]
- Lord Zhuang of Wei** 衛莊公 (r. 480–478), private name Kuaikui 蒯聵. Heir apparent; in 496, Kuaikui attempted to assassinate his licentious stepmother, Nanzi; after the plot failed he fled to Song. In 481, Kuaikui returned to Wei, ousted his own son Zhe (Lord Chu 出公) and established himself as a new ruler. He failed to consolidate his position and was murdered in 478. [291n. 70]
- Lord Zhuang of Zheng** 鄭莊公 (r. 743–701). Mini-hegemon of early Chunqiu years. In 707, he defeated the coalition personally led by King Huan of Zhou. During Lord Zhuang's time the state of Zheng was the most powerful polity of the Central Plain. [2, 60–61, 109, 148, 258n. 66, 269n. 14, 297n. 84, 300n. 107]
- Lu Jin** 鱗金. Retainer of Zi Qi 子期 of Chu. In 506, when King Zhao fled his capital from the Wu invaders, Lu Jin prevented the handover of the fugitive king to his enemies. [203]
- Luan 樂 lineage.** Qi aristocratic lineage, descendants of Lord Hui 惠 (r. 608–599). The Luan lineage flourished in 540s–530s but was destroyed by the coalition of the Bao and Chen lineages in 532. [293n. 19]
- Luan 樂 lineage.** One of the powerful Jin ministerial lineages during the seventh and sixth centuries. Established in the late eighth century by Luan Shu 樂叔, the Luan prospered and became a powerful political entity in the early sixth century. Their good fortune ended during the unsuccessful rebellion of Luan Ying in 552–550. [156]
- Luan Shu** 樂書 (d. 573?), cognomen Bo 伯, posthumous name Wuzi 武子. Jin minister (from 595) and prime minister (from 587); murdered Lord Li in 573. [286n. 6]
- Luan Ying** 樂盈 (d. 550), posthumous name Huaizi 懷子. Jin official; served in the lord's household from 557; became high minister (*qing*) in 555. In 552 Luan Ying fled to Chu; two years later he invaded Jin and almost ousted Lord Ping, but was defeated and killed. [156, 197, 271n. 30, 285n. 94]
- Master Kuang** 師曠 (fl. 560–530). Eminent personality at the court of Jin. A blind music master, Kuang was famous for his political acumen and musical talents. [79, 139–143, 145–146, 287nn. 9, 15, 16]
- Meng Heji** 孟何忌 (d. 481), posthumous name Yizi 懿子. Headed the Mengsun lineage since the late sixth century; studied under Confucius [228–229]
- Meng Jue** 孟獲 (d. 518), posthumous name Xizi 僖子. Head of the Mengsun 該 lineage in Lu; reportedly admired Confucius [245]
- Meng Xizi** 孟僖子 (see Meng Jue)
- Meng Yizi** 孟懿子 (see Meng Heji)
- Mengsun 孟孫 lineage.** One of the “three Huan” lineages of the state of Chu. Established by Prince Qingfu, it was destroyed in 408, after its stronghold in Cheng fell to the Qi invaders. [41, 278n. 32, 299n. 105, 300nn. 106, 114]

Min Mafu 閔馬父 (fl. 550–490s), cognomen Zima 子馬. Lu official [194–195]

Min Zima 閔子馬 (see Min Mafu)

Mo 墨 (see Cai Mo)

Mu Jiang 穆姜 (d. 564). Mother of Lord Cheng of Lu; unsuccessfully plotted with Shusun Qiaoru to expel the Jisun and Mengsun lineages [238, 305n. 2]

Muyi 目夷 (see Prince Muyi)

Nan Kuai 南蒯 (fl. 530s). Steward of the Jisun lineage in Lu. In 530 Nan Kuai intended to rebel against his masters and restore the rule of Lord Zhao. The plot failed and Nan Kuai fled to Qi. [86, 156, 293n. 14]

Nang Wa 囊瓦 (d. 506), cognomen Zi Chang 子常. Infamous *lingyin* of Chu in 519–506; led his state to the disastrous defeat by the Wu forces in 506; committed suicide [116, 297n. 78]

Nanzi 南子 (late sixth century). A beautiful and reportedly licentious concubine of Lord Lind of Wei [291n. 70]

Ning 甯 lineage. One of the oldest and most powerful aristocratic lineages in the state of Wei, established by the son of Lord Wu 武 (r. 811–758). For nine generations heads of the Ning lineage held positions of high minister (*qing*). In 559 Ning Zhi, together with Sun Linfu, expelled Lord Xian from his state. Ning Zhi's son Xi assisted the ousted lord to return to Wei; the ungrateful ruler murdered Xi and put an end to the Ning lineage in 546. [286n. 4]

Ning Huizi 甯惠子 (see Ning Zhi)

Ning Su 甯速 (fl. 660s–630s), posthumous name Zhuangzi 莊子. Wei minister; proponent of aggressive political course toward neighboring states [61]

Ning Wuzi 甯武子 (see Ning Yu)

Ning Xi 甯喜 (d. 546), posthumous name Daozi 悼子. Wei minister, son of Ning Zhi. Xi assisted the ousted Lord Xian to return to his state in 549; the lord promised that “the state affairs will be managed by the Ning lineage, while I shall maintain the sacrifices.” Three years later the treacherous lord ordered the assassination of Ning Xi and expelled the Ning lineage. [286n. 4]

Ning Ying 甯嬴 (fl. 620s). Jin *shi* [42]

Ning Yu 甯俞 (fl. 630s–620s), posthumous name Wuzi 武子. Wei minister; restored internal order during the turmoil of 632 [73]

Ning Zhi 甯殖 (d. 553), posthumous name Huizi 惠子. Powerful Wei minister; held position of *qing* from 587. In 559, together with Sun Linfu, he expelled Lord Xian from his state. Before his death, Ning Zhi repented and ordered his son, Xi, to restore the ousted lord. [251n. 12, 275n. 83, 286n. 4]

Ning Zhuangzi 甯莊子 (see Ning Su)

Nü Hou 女侯 (d.a. 535), cognomen Shuqi 叔齊. Prominent Jin official, acted as *sima*. Along with Yangshe Xi, Nü Hou was the only high-ranking official who did not belong to one of the six major ministerial lineages. Interested in strengthening the centralized rule, Nü Hou was a political realist who dismissed outdated principles and ideas when those were at odds with the needs of the state and the ruler. [36, 43, 66–67, 99–100, 112, 263n. 109]

Nü Kuan 女寬 (fl. 520s–510s), cognomen Shu 叔. Jin military commander; son of Nü Hou [19]

Nü Shuqi 女叔齊 (see Nü Hou)

Pei Zheng 丕鄭 (d. 651). Jin official; assisted Lord Hui to return from exile and ascend the Jin throne; later betrayed by Lord Hui and executed [43]

Pi Zao 裨灶 (fl. 540s–520s). Zheng official, a specialist of astronomy [69, 74, 222–223, 245]

Prince Ce 公子側 (d. 575), cognomen Zi Fan 子反. Chu *sima* in the early sixth century; responsible for the defeat at Yanling in 575; executed by King Gong [122, 131, 284n. 88, 295n. 43]

Prince Chao 王子朝 (d. 505). Son of King Jing 景 of Zhou; rebelled after the death of his father in 520, but was defeated and fled to Chu, where he was murdered by Zhou assassins [19, 271n. 30, 307n. 21]

Prince Chonger 重耳 (see Lord Wen of Jin)

Prince Cifu 茲父 (see Lord Xiang of Song)

Prince Fei 公子騑 (d. 563), cognomen Zi Si 子駟. Son of Lord Mu of Zheng; founder of the Si 駟 lineage. Zi Si became a high minister in 571. In 566 he assassinated Lord Xi, putting an end thereby to the lord's power in Zheng. In 563 he acted as prime minister, but was murdered by rebellious petty nobles. [251n. 13]

Prince Hua 公子華 (d. 644). Son of Lord Wen 文 of Zheng (r. 672–628). Hua plotted to oust his father with the help of Lord Huan of Qi; the offer was rejected. Lord Wen discovered his son's plot and had Hua executed in 644. [279n. 10]

Prince Jin 太子晉 (fl. 550s). Son of King Ling of Zhou (周靈王, r. 571–545); not mentioned in the *Zuo*. Zhanguo and later sources refer to him as a paragon of wisdom. [42–43]

Prince Jizi 公子急子 (d. 696). Son of Lord Xuan of Wei; fell victim to a succession intrigue [300n. 110]

Prince Kou 公子彊 (d. 718), cognomen Zi Zang 子臧, seniority name Bo 伯, posthumous name Xi 僖. Lu minister; son of Lord Xiao (孝公, r. 806–769), a senior advisor to Lord Yin, and founder of the Zangsun lineage [92–93]

Prince Mui 公子目夷 (fl. 650–630), cognomen Zi Yu 子魚. Elder son of Lord Huan 桓 of Song (r. 681–651) from a concubine. Mui's younger brother, Cifu, wanted to yield him the lord's position, but Mui refused. When Cifu (Lord Xiang) ascended the throne, he appointed Mui as commander-of-the-left. Mui opposed the harsh and aggressive foreign policy of Lord Xiang, but was not heeded. [185, 200, 274n. 61, 296n. 75]

Prince Pu 大子僕. Rebellious son of Lord Ji 紀 of Ju. In 609 he murdered his father, seized his treasures, and fled to Lu, but was forced to leave this state. [234–235, 237]

Prince Qiji 棄疾 (see King Ping of Chu)

Prince Qingfu 慶父 (d. 660), cognomen Zhong 仲, posthumous name Gong 共. Son of Lord Huan of Lu; founder of the Mengsun lineage. After the death of this brother, Lord Zhuang, in 662, Qingfu murdered the heir apparent Zi Ban; two years later he murdered Lord Min, intending to establish himself as the ruler of Lu. The plot failed, and Qingfu fled to the state of Ju, where he committed suicide. [300n. 107]

Prince Shensheng 大子申生 (d. 655). Elder son of Lord Xian, a tragic figure and a source of literary inspiration for future generations. Shensheng fell victim to the intrigues of his stepmother Li Ji and was forced to commit suicide. [42, 73, 194–195, 289n. 52, 300n. 108]

Prince Sui 公子遂 (d. 601), lineage name Dongmen 東門, cognomen Xiang Zhong 襄仲. Powerful Lu minister, son of Lord Zhuang. In 609 Sui murdered the heir apparent Prince Wu and enthroned his own puppet, Lord Xuan. After Sui's death, however, his adversaries from the Ji lineage seized power. [145, 165, 251n. 11]

Prince Tuo 公子佗 (d. 706), cognomen Wufu 五父. Son of Lord Huan 桓 of Chen (r. 744–707). In 706 Tuo was murdered by maternal relatives of his half-brother, Lord Li of Chen. [185]

Prince Wei 王子圍 (see King Ling of Chu)

Prince Wu 王子午 (d. 552), cognomen Zi Geng 子庚. Chu *lingyin* in 559–552 [173–175]

Prince Wu 惡 (d. 608). Elder son of Lord Wen of Lu; murdered by Prince Sui [251n. 11]

Prince Wufu 五父 (see Prince Tuo)

Prince Ying 公子嬰 (d. 680), cognomen Zi Yi 子儀. Son of Lord Zhuang of Zheng; ruled the state of Zheng in 693–680; murdered by his elder brother, Lord Li [147–148]

Prince Yingqi 王子嬰齊 (d. 570), cognomen Zi Zhong 子重. Chu *lingyin* in 590–570 [295n. 43]

Prince Yiwu 夷吾 (see Lord Hui of Jin)

Prince You 公子友 (d. 644), cognomen Ji 季, posthumous name Cheng 成. Son of Lord Huan of Lu; founder of the Jisun (Ji) lineage. Prince You engineered the enthronement of Lord Xi and remained the most powerful figure in Lu during the early reign of his appointee. [145, 288n. 34]

Prince Zhouxu 公子州吁 (d. 719). Younger brother of Lord Huan of Wei. In 719 Zhouxu murdered his brother and seized power, but failed to stabilize his position and was killed later in the year. [193, 300n. 107]

Prince Zhuishu 王子追舒 (d. 551), cognomen Zi Nan 子南. Chu official; appointed to the position of *lingyin* in 552 and executed a year later due to corruption charges [195–196]

Pu 僕 (see Prince Pu)

Qi 祁 **lineage**. Jin aristocratic lineage; destroyed in 514 [238, 240–241]

Qiji 棄疾 (d. 551). Son of Prince Zhuishu, *lingyin* of Chu; committed suicide after his father was executed due to corruption charges [195–196, 301n. 120]

Qing Feng 慶封 (d. 538), cognomen Zi Jia 子家. Strongman of Qi, a person of legendary wealth and limited education. Minister at the Qi court since 573, Qing Feng joined forces with Cui Zhu in the assassination of Lord Zhuang in 548. Two years later, Qing Feng exterminated the Cui lineage and became the dictator of Qi. Other aristocratic lineages joined forces against him, causing Qing Feng to flee to Wu in 545, where he soon regained his wealth. In 538 King Ling of Chu invaded Wu, seized Qing Feng, and had him executed. [179, 202, 293n. 16]

Qing Zheng 慶鄭 (d. 645). Jin minister; strongly opposed the political course of Lord Hui but was not heeded. At the Han battle (645), Qing Zheng sabotaged the lord's orders and caused the defeat of the Jin army and the imprisonment of Lord Hui. Later, Qing Zheng refused to flee the state and accepted the deserved punishment. [152, 175–176, 185, 290n. 56]

Qingfu 慶父 (see Prince Qingfu)

Qu Jian 屈建 (d. 545), cognomen Zi Mu 子木. Chu minister; served as *moao* in 551–548

and as *lingyin* in 548–545; headed the Chu delegation to the Song peace conference of 546 [124, 183]

Qu Wan 屈完. Chu military commander [126]

Qu Wu 屈巫 (see Qu Wuchen)

Qu Wuchen 屈巫臣 (fl. 590s–570s), cognomen Zi Ling 子靈. A ruler of the Shen 申 dependency in Chu (usually referred to as Wu Chen, Lord of Shen 申公巫臣). Eminent Chu official at the court of King Zhuang. Qu Wuchen left Chu in 589 because of a romantic affair; he briefly settled in Qi and then moved to Jin. Shortly thereafter, Qu Wuchen's rivals eliminated his relatives who had remained in Chu. Wuchen swore revenge; in 584 he moved to Wu, established contacts between Wu and Jin, and reportedly taught the Wu army to use war chariots. Wuchen's descendants prospered in Jin. [285n. 95, 293n. 19]

Royal Grandson Sheng 王孫勝 (see Sheng, Lord of Bai)

Ruoao 若敖 **lineage**. The largest aristocratic lineage in the state of Chu; major powerholders throughout the seventh century B.C.E. The Ruao rebelled against King Zhuang in 605 and were exterminated, with only the Dou 鬬 branch spared. [274n. 67]

Scribe Guo 內史過 (fl. 670s–650s). Zhou inner scribe (*neishi*) [77–78, 83]

Scribe Hu 史狐 (see Dong Hu 董狐)

Scribe Ke 大史克 (see Li Ge)

Scribe Mo 史墨 (see Cai Mo)

Scribe Yin 史嚭 (fl. 660s). Zhou official [78, 83]

Scribe Yin 史嚭 (fl. 520s). Qi official [81]

Scribe Zhao 史趙 (fl. 540s–480s?). Jin official [222, 245]

Shan 單 **lineage**. Powerful aristocratic lineage from the Zhou royal domain. In the Zhanguo period the Shan lineage dominated the Zhou domain. [263n. 107]

Shanzi 單子 (see Lord Mu of Shan)

Shensheng, heir apparent of Jin 晉大子申生 (see Prince Shensheng)

Shen Shushi 申叔時 (d. 575). Chu official; active since the late seventh century [122–123, 263n. 109, 280n. 21]

Shen Wuyu 申無宇 (fl. 540s–530s). Chu official, ruler of the Yu 芋 dependency. Shen was a staunch supporter of centralization and consolidation of royal power; he played an important role in the government of King Ling. [134]

Shen Zhuliang 沈諸梁 (fl. 480s–470s), cognomen Zi Gao 子高, Lord of She 葉公. High-ranking Chu official; suppressed the rebellion of Sheng, Lord of Bai, in 479; *lingyin* in 479–478 [187, 289n. 44]

Sheng, Lord of Bai 白公勝 (d. 479). Grandson of King Ping of Chu, son of the dismissed heir apparent Jian 建. Sheng was summoned to Chu from Wu in the 480s, and appointed a governor of the Bai district. He rebelled in 479, nearly ousting young King Hui. Lord of She, Zi Gao, suppressed the rebellion and Sheng committed suicide. [157, 187]

Shi 尸 **lineage**. Zhou aristocratic lineage [19]

Shi 施 **lineage**. Lu aristocratic lineage [290n. 60]

Shi Bo 士伯 (see Shi Mimou)

- Shi Fu** 師服 (mid-eighth century). Jin minister, advisor of Lord Zhao (昭侯, r. 745–740); opposed to the enfeoffment of Lord Zhao's younger brother, Huan Shu 桓叔, at Quwo [245]
- Shi Gai** 士匄 (d. 548), lineage name Fan 范, posthumous name Xuanzi 宣子. Jin military commander and high minister, vice head of the central army in 564–555; head of the government in 554–548; suppressed Luan Ying's rebellion in 552 [245]
- Shi Hui** 士會 (fl. 630s–590s), lineage names Fan 范 and Sui 隲, cognomen Ji 季, posthumous name Wuzi 武子. Prominent Jin statesman. Shi Hui was in service from 632 until his retirement in 592. In 621 he fell victim to court intrigues and fled to Qin, but returned to Jin in 614 and regained his position. From 597 he headed the Jin government; in 593 was concurrently appointed to the position of grand tutor (*taifu*), and became the most powerful official in the history of Jin. [x, 46, 95, 127–128, 130, 166, 177–178, 183]
- Shi Jishe** 士吉射, lineage name Fan 范, posthumous title Zhaozi 昭子. Son of Shi Yang; led the Fan lineage into the rebellion of 497–490; defeated and fled to Qi, ending the prosperity of the Fan lineage [288n. 25]
- Shi Mimou** 士彌牟 (fl. 520s–500s), cognomen Bo 伯, posthumous name Jing 景. Jin *simu* [80, 84, 228–229, 243]
- Shi Qi** 石乞 (d. 479). Retainer of Sheng, Lord of Bai [157]
- Shi Que** 石碯 (fl. second half of the eighth century). Wei minister opposed to Prince Zhouxu; resigned after Lord Zhuang did not heed his remonstrance. Shi Que's son, Hou 厚, allied with Zhouxu and performed a coup on the latter's behalf in 718. Shi Que suppressed the coup and arranged execution of Zhouxu and Shi Hou. [193]
- Shi Wei** 士蒍 (fl. 660s–650s), cognomen Zi Yu 子輿. *Sikong* of Lord Xian of Jin after 668. Shi Wei masterminded the destruction of the cadet branches of the lord's lineage in Jin in 671–669. He resigned in the 650s on the eve of Lord Xian's conflict with his sons. Shi Wei is the founder of the Fan and the Shi lineages in the state of Jin and, according to a legend, an ancestor of the founder of the Han dynasty, Liu Bang. [36, 150–151, 289n. 50]
- Shi Wozhuo** 士渥濁 (fl. 570s–560s), cognomen Bo 伯, posthumous name Zhenzi 貞子. Jin official; acted as grand tutor (*taifu*) from 573 [85, 296n. 76]
- Shi Xie** 士燮 (d. 574), lineage name Fan 范, cognomen Shu 叔, posthumous name Wenzi 文子. Son of Shi Hui; high minister of Jin from 592; vice-prime minister from 575 [130–131, 168, 177–178]
- Shi Yang** 士鞅 (d. 503), lineage name Fan 范, cognomen Shu 叔, posthumous name Xianzi 獻子. Fled to Qin in 559 to avoid interlineage feud in Jin; returned in 557 and received a position in lord's household; high minister from 548; prime minister in 510–503 [68, 117, 143, 145, 228, 281n. 40, 288n. 25]
- Shi Zhenbo** 士貞伯 (see Shi Wozhuo)
- Shu Gong** 叔弓 (see Zishu Gong)
- Shu Xiang** 叔向 (see Yangshe Xi)
- Shusun** 叔孫 **lineage**. One of the “three Huan” lineages of Lu; established by Prince Ya 公子牙; supported Jisun Yiru against Lord Zhao in 517 [156, 278n. 32, 300nn. 106, 114]

Shusun Chuo 叔孫婼 (d. 517), posthumous name Zhaozi 昭子. Headed the Lu government in 535–517; died soon after the unsuccessful attempt to reconcile rebellious Jisun Yiru and Lord Zhao [68, 130, 169–170, 183]

Shusun Qiaoru 叔孫僑如, cognomen Bo 宣伯, posthumous name Xuan 宣. Head of the Shusun lineage in the early sixth century. Qiaoru plotted to expel the Jisun and the Mengsun lineages from Lu; his plot failed and he fled to Qi in 575. [299n. 105]

Shusun Zhaozi 叔孫昭子 (see Shusun Chuo)

Shuzhong Pengsheng 叔仲彭生 (d. 608), posthumous name Hui 惠, cognomen Bo 伯. Prominent Lu official in the late seventh century. Shuzhong founded the cadet branch of the Shusun lineage. He was executed during the succession struggle in Lu following the death of Lord Wen. [286n. 5]

Sima Hou 司馬侯 (see Nü Hou)

Sui Hui 隧會 (see Shi Hui)

Sun Linfu 孫林父 (fl. 580s–540s), posthumous name Wenzi 文子. Head of the powerful Sun lineage in the state of Wei 衛; held hereditary position of high minister. In 584; Sun Linfu fled to Jin, and returned to Wei in 577. In 559 he and Ning Zhi expelled Lord Xian from his state. In 547 Sun was defeated by his former allies—the Ning lineage—and forced to flee again to Jin. [275n. 83, 285n. 94]

Sun Wenzi 孫文子 (see Sun Linfu 孫林父)

Sushaxi 夙沙厘 (fl. 520s). Retainer of the Di ruler of the city of Gu [154–155]

Three Huan 桓 lineages (see Jisun, Mengsun, and Shusun lineages) [251n. 11, 300n. 106]

Tian 田 lineage (see Chen 陳 lineage)

Tian Chang 田常 (see Chen Chang 陳常)

Wangsun Man 王孫滿 (fl. late seventh century). Zhou official [222, 245]

Wei 圍 (see King Ling of Chu)

Wei 魏 lineage. One of the major ministerial lineages in the state of Jin, established by Bi Wan 畢萬 in mid-seventh century. By the late sixth century the Wei lineage became one of the six ministerial lineages that usurped political power in the state of Jin; in the second half of the fifth century the Wei allotment became an independent polity; its independence was recognized in 403 by the Zhou king. [5, 48, 222, 233]

Wei Jiang 魏降 (fl. 560s–550s), posthumous name Zhuangzi 莊子. Jin official and military commander, acted as *simā* since 573; high minister (*qing*) since 570; proposed amicable policy toward the Rong and Di tribes, eliminating thereby their threat and allowing Lord Dao of Jin to regain international leadership in the 560s [245]

Wei Qijiang 蘧啓彊 (fl. 540s–530s). Chu official, in 541 appointed as *taizai* at the court of King Ling; one of the few officials who dared to reprimand King Ling [114–115]

Wei Shouyu 魏壽餘 (or Wei Zhouyu 魏州余; fl. late seventh century). Jin official; headed the cadet branch of the Wei lineage [46]

Wei Shu 魏舒 (d. 510), posthumous name Xianzi 獻子. Jin minister, headed the Jin government in 514–510 [228–230, 238–242, 305n. 2]

Wei Xianzi 魏獻子 (see Wei Shu)

Wei Wu 魏戊 (fl. 510s). Jin official, son of Wei Shu [238–239, 241]

Wei Zhouyu 魏州余 (see Wei Shouyu)

Wu 惡 (see Prince Wu)

Wu Can 伍參 (fl. early sixth century). Chu official [296n. 76]

Wu Ju 伍舉 (fl. 550s–540s), second lineage name Jiao 椒. Chu official, Wu She's father [281n. 29]

Wu Shang 伍尚 (d. 522). Elder son of Wu She; governor of the Tang dependency; executed together with Wu She [178, 188, 195]

Wu She 伍奢 (d. 522) second lineage name Jiao 椒. Governor of the Tang dependency. In 523 Wu She acted as grand tutor of the heir apparent, Jian 建. He was slandered by his colleague, Fei Wuji, and executed. [178]

Wu Yun 伍員 (d. 484), cognomen Zixu 子胥. A legendary hero of the late Chunqiu period; younger son of Wu She. After the execution of his father and brother, Wu Yun fled to Wu, where he masterminded Wu's offensive against Chu. In 494 Wu Yun criticized King Fuchai for sparing the archenemy of the state of Wu, the state of Yue; later he disagreed with Fuchai's expeditions against Qi. In 484 Fuchai ordered Wu Yun to commit suicide. [36, 131–132, 144, 178–179, 196, 276n. 163, 271n. 30, 284n. 89, 295n. 50]

Wu Zixu 伍子胥 (see Wu Yun)

Xi 郤 lineage. One of the eminent ministerial lineages in Jin, politically active since the mid-seventh century. In the early sixth century their power almost equaled that of the lord. The powerful and arrogant Xi lineage became a source of concern to Lord Li, who ordered its elimination in 574. [177]

Xi Ke 郤克 (fl. 590s), cognomen Jubo 駒伯, posthumous name Xianzi 獻子. Son of Xi Que; high minister from 597; head of the Jin government in 592–588. In 589 Xi Ke orchestrated Jin's successful assault on Qi to avenge the humiliation Xi Ke had suffered from the mother of Lord Qing of Qi in 592. [129, 280n. 25]

Xi Qi 奚齊 (d. 651). Son of Lord Xian of Jin and his concubine Li Ji. He became heir apparent and was expected to succeed Lord Xian, but was murdered by Li Ke. [150–151, 289nn. 51, 52]

Xi Que 郤缺 (d. 598), second lineage name Ji 冀, posthumous name Chengzi 成子. Powerful Jin minister. Xi Que's father plotted against Lord Wen, but the latter forgave Que and reappointed him to ministerial position in 627. Xi Que headed the Jin government in 601–598. [177, 182]

Xi Zhi 郤至 (d. 574), cognomen Wen 溫, seniority name 季. Jin high minister after 578. He was killed together with his kin by Lord Li. [95–96, 177]

Xian Hu 先穀 (d. 596). Jin military commander whose arrogance and unruly character contributed in no small measure to Jin's defeat at Bi in 597. He was executed a year later. [128, 296n. 76]

Xian Zhen 先軫 (d. 627), another lineage name Yuan 原. Jin high minister (*qing*) after 633; headed the Jin government from 632. In 627 Xian Zhen was angry at Lord Xiang, who released Qin captives, and spat during the court audience. As an act of self-punishment, Xian Zhen rushed to death during the battle with the Di tribesmen later that year. [66]

Xiang 向 lineage. One of the major ministerial lineages in Song, descendants of Lord Huan 桓 (r. 681–651). The Xiang lineage participated together with the Hua lineage

in the major revolt of 522–520; despite their defeat and the expulsion of several prominent lineage members, the Xiang lineage maintained its position in the life of the Song court well into the fifth century. [301n. 124]

Xiang Xu 向戎 (fl. 570s–540s), cognomen Zhan 鱸. Song political and military leader of the sixth century. Xiang Xu occupied the position of commander-of-the-left (*zuo shi*) after 576, and later became *sima*. He masterminded the historic peace conference held in Song in 546. [124, 255n. 43]

Xiang Zhong 襄仲 (see Prince Sui 公子遂)

Xiayang Shuo 夏陽說 (fl. late seventh century). Jin military officer [120]

Xie Yang 解揚 (fl. early sixth century). Jin military officer [148, 150, 283n. 56, 289n. 43]

Xin Liao 辛廖 (fl. 660s). Zhou official [222, 242, 245]

Xin Yu 辛俞. Retainer of Luan Ying of Jin; participated in Luan's rebellion in 552 [156]

Xiong Yiliao 熊宜僚. Brave Chu *shi* [203]

Xiyang Su 戲陽速. Retainer of the heir apparent of Wei, Kuaikui 蒯聵. In 496 Xiyang defied his master's orders and refrained from killing Kuaikui's stepmother, Nanzi. [291n. 70]

Xu Chen 胥臣 (d. 622), another lineage name Jiu 臼, cognomen Ji 季. Jin *sikong* from 628 [182]

Xu, governor of Shen 沈尹戌 (d. 506). Chu official; acted concurrently as left *sima*. Xu criticized the inadequacy of the defensive policy of the *lingyin* Nang Wa, which ultimately led to the defeat of Chu by Wu in 506. Xu died in a battle against the Wu invaders. [297n. 78]

Xu Shu 許叔. Younger brother of the late-eight-century Xu ruler; appointed as Xu ruler by Lord Zhuang of Zheng, who conquered Xu in 711 [60]

Xun lineage. Important aristocratic lineage in the state of Jin. In the sixth century it broke into two rival branches, the Zhi and the Zhonghang lineages. [299n. 105]

Xun Li 荀躒 (fl. 530s–520s), lineage name Zhi 知, posthumous name Wenzhi 文子. Jin military commander and high minister [19]

Xun Wu 荀吳 (fl. 550s–520s), lineage name Zhonghang 中行, cognomen Bo 伯, posthumous name Muzi 穆子. Jin military commander and high minister [154–155]

Xun Xi 荀息 (d. 651), cognomen Shu 叔. Jin minister; a military commander at the court of Lord Xian, and later the tutor of Lord Xian's younger scions, Xi Qi and Zi Zhuo. Xun Xi fulfilled his promise to the late lord and attempted to ensure the enthronement of Xi Qi and Zi Zhuo. After both were murdered by Li Ke, Xun Xi committed suicide. [151, 200]

Xun Yao 荀瑤 (d. 453), lineage name Zhi 知, cognomen Bo 伯, posthumous name Xiangzi 襄子. An arrogant head of the Zhi lineage, the most powerful Jin noble in the mid-fifth century. Xun Yao's attempt to eliminate his rivals from the Zhao lineage ended in disaster; his enemies united against him and had the Zhi lineage destroyed. [223]

Xun Ying 荀瑩 (d. 560), lineage name Zhi 知, cognomen Bo 伯, posthumous name Wuzi 武子. Jin military commander. Xun Ying was captured by the Chu army at Bi in 597, but later released. He became high minister in 578 and headed the Jin government in 564–560. [96, 272n. 50]

Yan Jiangshi 鄢將師 (d. 515). High-ranking Chu official, allied with Fei Wuji; executed together with his ally [203]

- Yan Ying** 晏嬰 (c. 580–510), cognomen Zhong 仲, posthumous name Ping 平. Eminent Qi official. Yan Ying was aware of the decline of lords' power in his state and exerted himself to prevent further deterioration of centralized rule. Yan Ying was by far the most creative Chunqiu thinker, who boldly suggested new departures in the realm of political and ethical thought. His wisdom is commemorated in a Zhanguo collection of anecdotes about his life, the *Yanzi chungiu*. [10, 52, 81–83, 86, 101–103, 141–144, 146, 160–161, 183, 195, 201–203, 213, 245–246, 267n. 163, 275nn. 75, 76, 278nn. 36, 39, 40, 287nn. 18, 21, 291nn. 77, 78, 292nn. 80, 82, 293n. 16, 296n. 64]
- Yang Chufu** 陽處父 (d. 621). Jin official, military commander, and grand tutor (*taifu*). Yang Chufu's arrogant behavior brought about his assassination by the dissenting official Hu Shegu. [295n. 41]
- Yang Hu** 陽虎 (fl. 510–490), cognomen Huo 貨. Steward of the Jisun lineage. In 505–502 Yang Hu ruled the state of Lu in the name of powerless head of the Jisun lineage, Ji Huanzi. Attempting to place his protégés at the head of the “three Huan” lineages of Lu, he was defeated and fled Lu in 502. He suggested to Lord Jing of Qi a plan to conquer Lu, but was rejected and fled to the Zhao lineage court in Jin. In 493 Yang Hu led the Zhao forces to the decisive victory over the coalition of the state of Zheng and the rebellious Fan and Zhonghang lineages. [186, 293n. 14, 297n. 81]
- Yangshe** 羊舌 lineage. Collateral branch of the lord's lineage in the state of Jin. It prospered in the mid-sixth century under Shu Xiang, but was destroyed shortly after his death in the interlineage struggle. [115, 238, 240–241]
- Yangshe Xi** 羊舌肸 (d.c. 520), second lineage name Yang 楊, cognomen Shu Xiang 叔向. Prominent Jin official; headed the last of the collateral branches of the lord's lineage in Jin. In 557 Yangshe Xi became the grand tutor (*taifu*) and played an important role in international activities of the Jin court. He was one of the most intellectually active statesmen of the late Chunqiu. He usually adhered to traditional, conservative views. [43, 63–64, 67, 81, 99, 114–116, 124, 183, 197, 265n. 138, 278n. 30, 280n. 14, 293n. 14, 297n. 78]
- Yi Kuan** 裔款 (fl. late sixth century). Qi official, advisor of Lord Jing [81]
- Yin Yisheng** 陰飴甥 (d. 636), other lineage names Lü 呂 and Xia 瑕, cognomen Zi Jin 子金. Jin official; staunch supporter of Lords Hui and Huai. He plotted rebellion against Lord Wen, but the plot was discovered and Yin Yisheng was executed. [166–167]
- You Chu** 游楚 (fl. 540s), cognomen Zi Nan 子南. A member of the powerful You lineage in the state of Zheng, Zi Nan was involved in 541 in a fight against another leading noble, Gongsun Hei 公孫黑. The Zheng leader, Zi Chan, punished You Chu by expelling him to the state of Wu. [301n. 123]
- You Ji** 游吉 (d. 506), cognomen Zi Taishu 子大叔. Zheng minister, aide and heir of Zi Chan at the head of the Zheng government. You Ji became minister in 551 and headed the Zheng government in 522–506. [69, 113, 242–244, 292n. 82, 301n. 123, 307n. 26]
- Yu Pian** 夷騙 (fl. 620s). Jin official, retainer of Zhao Dun [176, 295n. 39]
- Yu Quan** 鬻拳 (d. 675). Petty Chu official. Yu Quan used arms to threaten King Wen to pursue further conquests. Yu later punished himself by cutting off his own foot and was appointed gatekeeper of the Chu capital. Yu Quan once more prodded the king to launch new conquests by preventing him from entering the capital. After King Wen's death, Yu Quan committed suicide to die along with the monarch. [152, 290n. 55]

Yuan Fan 原繁 (d. 680). Zheng minister; served Prince Ying; executed by Lord Li [147–148]

Yuan Shouguo 厚壽過 (fl. 510s). Zhou official [228]

Yuanzhi 怨支 (fl. 520s). Ruler of the city of Gu [154–155]

Yue 樂 **lineage**. One of the major aristocratic lineages in the state of Song, descendants of Lord Dai 戴 (r. 799–766); maintained their high position at the court of Song from the late seventh century to the end of the Chunqiu period and beyond [143, 288n. 25]

Yue Daxin 樂大心 (fl. 530s–500s), another lineage name Tongmen 桐門. Song official; from 522 Yue acted as commander-of-the-right. A controversial and cynical thinker, Yue reportedly ridiculed family values and social hierarchy. In 500 he was engaged in a conflict with the ruler and fled to Cao. [243–244, 288n. 27]

Yue Qi 樂祁 (see Yue Qili)

Yue Qili 樂祁梨 (d. 502), cognomen Zi Liang 子梁. Song official, *sicheng* in 520 [142–143, 145, 288nn. 23, 25]

Zai Kong 宰孔 (fl. 660s–650s), Lord of Zhou 周公. Zhou high minister [267n. 158]

Zang Aibo 臧哀伯 (see Zangsun Da)

Zang Xibo 臧僖伯 (see Prince Kou)

Zang Wenzhong 臧文仲 (see Zangsun Chen)

Zang Wuzhong 臧武仲 (see Zangsun He)

Zangsun Chen 臧孫辰 (d. 617), cognomen Zhong 仲, posthumous name Wen 文. Eminent Lu official, grandson of Zangsun Da. Beginning in the late 680s Zangsun Chen played an important role in Lu's political life for more than sixty years. Future generations of Lu statesmen regarded Zangsun Chen as a paragon of political wisdom; Confucius disagreed with this opinion. [255n. 43, 271n. 51, 280n. 25]

Zangsun Da 臧孫達 (d.a. 680), cognomen Bo 伯, posthumous name Ai 哀. Lu official, son of prince Kou [92–93, 95, 99]

Zangsun He 臧孫紇 (fl. 570s–530s), cognomen Zhong 仲, posthumous name Wu 武. Lu official; in 549 he fled the state due to an intralineaage struggle.

Zhan Huo 展獲 (fl. late seventh century), lineage name Liuxia 柳下, cognomen Qin 禽, seniority name Ji 季, posthumous name Hui 惠. Lu official; in the Zhanguo period he was hailed as a sage. [255n. 43]

Zhan Qin 展禽 (see Zhan Huo 展獲)

Zhan Xi 展喜 (fl. 630s), cognomen Yi 乙. Lu official, perhaps a younger brother of Zhan Huo [167]

Zhao 趙 **lineage**. The strongest ministerial lineage in Jin. It played a prominent role in Jin life beginning in the 630s. The Zhao lineage became a de facto independent polity already in the early fifth century, and they were granted the overlord status in 403. [5, 48, 222, 293n. 19, 299n. 105]

Zhao Chuan 趙穿 (fl. late seventh to early sixth centuries). Nephew (or cousin?) of Zhao Dun; founded the Handan branch of the Zhao lineage. In 607, Zhao Chuan assassinated Lord Ling of Jin. [153]

Zhao Dun 趙盾 (fl. late seventh century), cognomen Meng 孟, posthumous name Xuanzi 宣子. Eminent Jin leader of the late seventh century; headed the Jin government

in 621–601. In 607 he was nearly assassinated by Lord Ling, but managed to escape. [18, 151–153, 176, 251n. 14, 255n. 46, 290n. 57]

Zhao Jianzi 趙簡子 (see Zhao Yang)

Zhao Wenzhi 趙文子 (see Zhao Wu)

Zhao Wu 趙武 (d. 541), cognomen Meng 孟, posthumous name Wenzhi 文子. Head of the Zhao lineage and high minister of Jin after 573. He headed the Jin government in 548–541 and presided over the peace conferences of 546 and 541. [183, 296n. 64, 297n. 78]

Zhao Xuanzi 趙宣子 (see Zhao Dun)

Zhao Yang 趙鞅 (d. 475), cognomen Meng 孟, posthumous name Jianzi 簡子. Head of the Zhao lineage; high minister of Jin. Zhao Yang headed the Jin government from 497; he expelled the Fan and Zhonghang lineages from Jin. [19, 48, 116, 145–146, 242–244, 294n. 30]

Zhao Ying 趙嬰 (see Zhao Yingqi)

Zhao Yingqi 趙嬰齊 (fl. 590s–580s). Jin military commander, younger brother of Zhao Dun. Zhao Yingqi had illicit relations with his brother's widow and was forced into exile in 586. [85, 293n. 19, 297n. 76]

Zhi 知 **lineage**. A collateral branch of the Xun lineage in Jin established by Xun Linfu's brother, Xun Shou 荀首, a military commander of the early sixth century. The Zhi lineage prospered throughout the sixth century; at the beginning of the fifth century it reached the apex of its power, especially during the reign of Zhi Bo (Xun Yao). In 453 the Zhi lineage was eliminated by rival ministerial lineages. [48, 299n. 105]

Zhi Bo 知伯 (see Xun Yao)

Zhi Li 知躒 (see Xun Li)

Zhi Wuzi 知武子 (see Xun Ying)

Zhi Ying 知營 (see Xun Ying)

Zhong Ji 仲幾 (fl. 520–510). Song minister [79]

Zhong Yi 鐘儀. Chu musician; captured by the Jin army in 584 and remained for two years in Jin. He impressed the Jin leaders with his skill and integrity, and was dispatched to Chu to negotiate friendly ties between the two states. [177, 295nn. 42, 43]

Zhong You 仲由 (542–480), cognomen Zi Lu 子路. Disciple of Confucius, served as a retainer of Kong Kui 孔悝 of Wei 衛; died while attempting to protect his master against the supporters of Prince Kuaikui during the succession struggles in Wei. [291n. 70]

Zhonghang 中行 **lineage**. A collateral branch of the Xun lineage, one of the six great ministerial lineages of Jin. Descended from Xun Linfu 荀林父, who was head of the Jin government in the early sixth century. The Zhonghang lineage was destroyed together with the Fan lineage in the civil war of 497–490. [48, 299n. 105]

Zhonghang Yan 中行偃 (see Xun Yan)

Zhongsun Qiu 仲孫湫 (fl. 650s–640s). Qi official [279n. 10]

Zhouxu 州吁 (see Prince Zhouxu)

Zi Ban 子般 (d. 662). An elder son of Lord Zhuang of Lu. Shortly after his father's death he was murdered by his uncle, Qingfu. [251n. 11, 300n. 107]

Zi Chan 子產 (see Gongsun Qiao)

Zi Chang 子常 (see Nang Wa)

- Zi Fan** 子犯 (see Hu Yan)
- Zi Fan** 子反 (see Prince Ce)
- Zi Gao** 子高 (see Shen Zhuliang)
- Zi Geng** 子庚 (see Prince Wu)
- Zi Gong** 子貢 (see Duanmu Ci)
- Zi Hanzan** 子韓暫 (fl. 530s). Qi official [156]
- Zi Liang** 子良 (see Gao Qiang)
- Zi Lu** 子路 (see Zhong You)
- Zi Mu** 子木 (see Qu Jian)
- Zi Nan** 子南 (see Prince Zhuishu)
- Zi Pi** 子皮 (see Han Hu)
- Zi Shen** 梓慎 (fl. 540s–530s). Lu official [222]
- Zi Si** 子駟 (see Prince Fei)
- Zi Taishu** 子大叔 (see You Ji)
- Zi Wei** 子尾 (see Gongsun Chai)
- Zi Wen** 子文 (see Dou Gouwutu)
- Zi Yi** 子儀 (see Prince Ying)
- Zi Yu** 子玉 (see Cheng Dechen)
- Zi Yu** 子魚 (see Prince Mui)
- Zi Zhan** 子展 (see Gongsun Shezhi)
- Zi Zhang** 子張 (see Gongsun Heigu)
- Zi Zhuo** 子倬 (d. 651). Son of Lord Xian of Jin from Li Ji's sister. In 651 Zi Zhuo was enthroned as the lord of Jin, but immediately thereafter murdered by Li Ke. [151]
- Zi Zhong** 子重 (see Prince Yingqi)
- Zifu He** 子服何 (fl. 500–480s), cognomen Bo 伯, posthumous name Jing 景. Lu official in charge of Lu international ties [117–118, 203, 297n. 78]
- Zifu Huibo** 子服惠伯 (see Zifu Jiao)
- Zifu Jiao** 子服椒 (fl. 540s–530s), cognomen Bo 伯, posthumous name Hui 惠. Lu official; headed the collateral branch of the Mengsun lineage [86–87]
- Zifu Jingbo** 子服景伯 (see Zifu He)
- Zijia Ji** 子家羈 (fl. 504–510), cognomen Bo 伯, posthumous name Yi 懿. Lu official, a member of the Dongmen 東門 lineage; the only dignitary who volunteered to follow Lord Zhao into exile; returned to Lu after the lord's death. [100, 270n. 27]
- Zishu Gong** 子叔弓 (d. 527), cognomen Shu 叔, posthumous name Jingzi 敬子. Lu official [183]
- Zong Li** 鬬戾. *Sima* of the Shusun lineage; backed the Ji lineage revolt in 517 [156]
- Zong Lu** 宗魯 (d. 522). Retainer of Gong Meng in Wei [203]

Glossary

An 鞍

“An shu” 案書

ba 霸

baiwu 百物

baiguan 百官

baixing 百姓

“Ban” 板

Ban Biao 班彪

Ban Gu 班固

“Ban shui” 泮水

Baoshan 包山

Beidian 邨殿

“Bei nei” 備內

“Bei shan” 北山

ben 奔

bi 比

Bi (battle location) 郊

Bi (the Ji lineage allotment) 費

“Biao ji” 表記

Bielu 別錄

“Bin zhi chu yan” 賓之初筵

bingxu 丙戌

bingzi 丙子

bo 伯

bojiu 伯舅

“Bo zhou” 柏舟

bu 卜

bu er 不貳

bu jing 不敬

bu jun 不君

bu li (behave impolitely) 不禮

bu li (harm) 不利

bu ren 不仁

bu wu 不武

bu xin 不信

bu yan 不厭

bu yi 不義

bu zhi 不知

bu zhong 不忠

Cai 蔡

Cai Shu 蔡叔

cai yi 采邑

Cao (state and clan) 曹

Cao Shu Zhenduo 曹叔振鐸

ce 策

“Cha fu” 察傳

“Chang fa” 長發

“Chang ti” 常梯

Chen 陳

“Chen Dao” 臣道

chen li 臣禮

cheng 誠

Cheng (city and state) 郕

Cheng Tang 成湯

Chengpu 城濮

chengren 成人

Chengzhou 成周

chi 恥

Chouer-zhong 僇兒鐘

Chu 楚

“Chu ci” 楚茨

Chu Shaosun 褚少孫

“Chu yu” 楚語

Chunqiu 春秋

Chun qiu 春秋

Chunqiu fanlu 春秋繁露

Chunqiu shiyu 春秋事語

Cui Shi 崔適

Cui Shu 崔述

Da Peng 大彭

Da zhuang 大狀

da luo shui gou 打落水狗

da sima 大司馬

dafu 大夫

Dalu 大陸

de 德

“Da gao” 大誥

“Da ming” 大明

“Da tian” 大田

Da xue 大學

da yitong 大一統

Da Yu-ding 大盂鼎

da zong 大宗

Dan Zhu 啖助

“Dang” 蕩

Dao 道

Deng 鄧

Di (state) 翟

Di (ethnic group) 狄

Di (God) 帝

di 弟

Difang Jin 翟方進

dingchou 丁丑

dinghai 丁亥

Diquan 狄泉

dongzuo 動作

du 度

Duke of Zhou 周公

Duke Tai 大公

Du Yu 杜預

Duandao 斷道

“Duo Fang” 多方

Duo Jiao 鐸椒

“Duo shi” 多士

Duoshi wei 鐸氏微

e de 惡德

er 貳

fa 罰

“Fa mu” 伐木

Fan Sheng 范升

Fan Ye 范曄

Fan Yu 范烜

Fangcheng 方城

“Fei gong” 非攻

fei li 非禮

fei li ye 非禮也

feng 豐

“Feng nian” 豐年

Fenyang 汾陽

fu (archives) 府

fu (ornaments) 黻

fu (units of measurement) 幅

Fu Qian 服虔

Fu Xuan 傅玄

Fucaì 負蔡

ganzhi 干支

Gao 郛

“Gaozi” 告子

gengchen 庚辰

gengshen 庚申

gengwu 庚午

gengyin 庚寅

gong 公

Gongsun Gu 公孫固

Gongyang zhuan 公羊傳

“Gongye chang” 公冶長

gui (jade staff) 珪

gui (spirit) 鬼

guishen 鬼神

Gu 鼓

Gu Jiegang 顧頤剛

“Gu ming” 顧命

Gu Yanwu 顧炎武

Guai Bo-gui 乖伯簋

Guan Shu 管叔

Guanzi 管子

guci 蝦辭

“Gui dang” 貴當

Guliang zhuan 穀梁傳

Gun 鯀

Guo 號

“Guo feng” 國風

guo ren 國人

Guo Yang 國羊

Guoshu Lü-zhong 郭叔旅鐘

Guoyu 國語

Han (lineage and early Chunqiu and
Zhanguo state; place-name) 韓

Han (river and dynasty) 漢

Han Feizi 韓非子

Han shu 漢書

Hanshi waizhuan 韓氏外傳

he 和

He-zun 矧尊

He Xiu 何休

Heyang 河陽

Hong 泓

Hou Han shu 後漢書

Houma 侯馬

houtu 后土

Hua 滑

Huan Tan 桓譚

“Huang yi” 皇矣

Huangdi 黃帝

Huangfu 黃父

Huaxia 華夏

hui 會

Ji (state) 紀

Ji (royal clan) 姬

Ji (minor clan) 己

Ji (place-name) 棘

ji (records) 記

ji (seniority name) 季

ji (trigger) 機

Ji Ce 季則

“Ji shi” 季氏

“Ji zui” 既醉

jia 家

jia chen 家臣

“Jia le” 假樂

Jia Yi 賈誼

“Jian'ai” 兼愛

Jiang 姜

Jiang Taigong 姜太公

Jiantu 踐土

Jiao 焦

jiao xun 教訓

Jiaru 郊郛

jichou 己丑

“Jie nan shan” 節南山

jihai 己亥

jisi 己巳

Jin 晉

Jin Jiang-ding 晉姜鼎

Jin shu 晉書

“Jin teng” 金滕

“Jin yu” 晉語

jing 敬

“Jing zhi” 敬之

“Jiu gao” 酒誥

Ju 莒

juan 卷

“Jue gong” 角弓

jun (lord, ruler) 君

jun (commandery) 郡

“Jun shi” 君夷

junzi 君子

“Kang gao” 康誥

Kang Shu 康叔

Kang Youwei 康有為

kao 考

ke 客

Kong Yingda 孔穎達

“Kuang” 匡

“Kui bian” 頽弁

Kuiqiu 葵丘

Kun Wu 昆吾

lai 來

lan 濫

lao (sacrificial unit) 牢

lao (elder) 老

Laozi 老子

li (ritual) 禮

li (Chinese mile) 里

li (principle) 理

li (benefit/profit) 利

li (sacrificial vessel) 豐

“Li Lou” 離婁

“Li qi” 禮器

“Li ren” 里仁

li ye 禮也

“Li zheng” 立政

li zhi (rule by ritual) 禮治

li zhi (ritual system) 禮制

“Liang Hui Wang” 梁惠王

liding 鬲鼎

Liji 禮記

lingyin 令尹

Liu Bang 劉邦

Liu Fenglu 劉逢錄

liu qi 六氣

Liu Xiang 劉向

Liu Xin 劉歆

Liu Zhiji 劉知幾

liyi 禮義

Lu 魯

Lü Buwei 呂不韋

Lu Chun 陸淳

Lu Deming 陸德明

“Lu ling” 盧令

“Lu song” 魯頌

“Lu xiao” 蓼蕭

“Lü xing” 呂刑

“Lu yu” 魯語

luan 亂

Lun heng 論衡

Lunyu 論語

“Luo gao” 洛誥

Luoyang 洛陽

Lüshi chunqiu 呂氏春秋

Man 蠻

manyi 蠻夷

Mawangdui 馬王堆

mazheng 馬正

meng (seniority name) 孟

meng (covenant, alliance) 盟

“Meng” 氓

meng zhu 盟主

mengfu 盟府

Mengzi 孟子

min (cleverness) 敏

min (people) 民

“Min lao” 民勞

“Min yu xiao zi” 閔予小子

ming (name) 名

ming (decree, command) 命

ming (brightness) 明

ming de 明德

“Ming gui” 明鬼

ming xun 明訓

moao 莫敖

mou 謀

Mozi 墨子

“Nan” 難

Nan jun 南郡

neishi 內史

Ning 甯

nu 弩

“Pan Geng” 盤庚

pengyou 朋友

pian 篇

ping 平

Pingqiu 平丘

Pu 蒲

Pugu 蒲姑

qi (energy, ether) 氣

qi (land measure) 圻

Qi (large state) 齊

Qi (small state) 杞

“Qi yu” 齊語

Qian 乾

Qian zhi 前志

“Qiao yan” 巧言

Qin 秦

Qin Gong-zhong 秦公鐘

Qin Gong-gui 秦公簋

“Qin shi” 秦誓

Qing 清

qing 卿

qing dafu 卿大夫

Qu (Jin settlement) 屈

Qu (Zhou settlement) 渠

“Qu li” 曲禮

Quesai 闕塞

Quji 曲棘

Quwo 曲沃

ren (benevolence) 仁

ren (a person) 人

Ren 任

renyi 仁義

Rong 戎

Ru 儒

ruo rou qiang shi 弱肉強食

“Sang rou” 桑柔

Sanglin 桑林

Shang 商

“Shang song” 商頌

“Shang tong” 尚同

“Shang xian” 尚賢

Shang Yang 商鞅

“Shanquan shu” 山權數

“Shao gao” 召誥

Shao Kang 少康

she 社

shen 神

Shen (state; later, Chu dependency) 申

Shen (city in the state of Guo) 莘

Shen Bo 申伯

Shen Buhai 申不害

“Shen Zuo” 申左

sheng 聲

Sheng 乘

shi (stratum) 士

shi (lineage) 氏

shi (household) 室

shi (power) 勢

shi (posthumous name) 謚

shi (scribe) 史

shi (timely action) 時

Shi chun 師春

Shi jing 詩經

Shi Qiang-pan 史牆盤

Shi Wei 豕韋

Shi Xun-gui 師詢簠

“Shi yue zhi jiao” 十月之交

Shibancun 石板村

Shigu 施谷

shiji 史記

Shiji 史記

Shiqian-gui 郛遣簠

shu (trigger) 樞

shu (seniority name) 叔

shu (degrees of rank) 數

“Shu er” 述而

Shu jing 書經

shu min 庶民

Shu Xiang Fuyu-gui 叔向父禹簠

Shu Yi-zhong 叔夷鐘

“Shu yu tian” 叔于田

Shuangjiu 爽鳩

shufa 書法

shufu 叔父

Shuihudi 睡虎地

shuji 樞機

- Shun 舜
 “Shun dian” 舜典
 “Shuo yi” 說疑
 Shuo yuan 說宛
 Shuo wen 說文
 Si 姒
 “Si gan” 斯干
 “Si qi” 思齊
 Si Shen 司神
 sicheng 司城
 sikong 司空
 sikou 司寇
 sima 司馬
 Sima Qian 司馬遷
 Song 宋
 “Song Futu Wenchangshi xu” 送浮屠文暢
 師序
 “Song gao” 崧高
 Sui (Chu satellite) 隨
 Sui (annexed by Qi) 遂
 Sun Wu 孫武
 Sunzi bingfa 孫子兵法
 Tai Gong 大公
 Taibo 太伯
 “Tai Bo” 泰伯
 taifu 太傅
 taishi 太史
 taizai 太宰
 Tan 譚
 “Tan Gong” 檀弓
 Tang (state and dynasty) 唐
 Tang (Chu dependency) 棠
 Tang Shu 唐叔
 tao 滔
 Taowu 橈兀
 Teng (name) 騰
 Teng (state) 藤
 “Teng Wen Gong” 滕文公
 Tian 天
 “Tian bao” 天保
 “Tian Dao” 天道
 “Tian lun” 天論
 tian ming 天命
 Tian Wen 田文
 tian zhi 天志
 “Tian zhi” 天志
 tianxia 天下
 tianzi 天子
 tong 同
 “Waichu shuo you shang” 外儲說右上
 “Wai pian” 外篇
 Wang Anshi 王安石
 Wang Chong 王充
 wanwu 萬物
 wang yue 王曰
 wang ruo yue 王若曰
 Wangcheng 王城
 Wangu 萑谷
 Wangsun Yizhe-zhong 王孫遺者鐘
 Wangzi Wu-ding 王子午鼎
 wei 威
 Wei (state) 衛
 Wei (lineage and early Chunqiu
 and Zhanguo state) 魏
 Wei (river) 洧
 “Wei ce” 魏策
 Wei Zhao 衛昭
 “Wei Zheng” 為政

weiyi 威儀

wen 文

Wen 溫

“Wenhou zhi ming” 文侯之命

“Wen wang” 文王

Wenxian 溫縣

Wenyang 汶陽

wo 我

“Wo jiang” 我將

wu (thing, sacrificial item, color) 物

wu (martial spirit) 武

Wu (state) 吳

“Wu” (ode) 武

“Wu du” 五蠹

Wu Qi 吳起

Wu Qi (the son of the above *Wu Qi*) 吳期

wu si 無私

wu xing 五行

“Wu yi” 無逸

“Wu yu” 吳語

Wuwei 武威

wuwu 戊午

wuchen 戊辰

Xi (personal name) 喜

Xia 夏

“Xia wu” 下武

xian 縣

“Xian jin” 先進

“Xian wen” 憲問

xiang 享

Xiang 相

xiao 孝

“Xiao min” 小旻

xiao ren 小人

xiao sun 孝孫

xiao zi 孝子

xiao zong 小宗

xin 信

Xin xu 新序

xing (clan, family name) 姓

xing (punishments) 刑

Xing 邢

Xing-zhong 癩鐘

“Xing e” 性惡

“Xing wei” 行葦

xingli 行理

xinmao 辛茂

xinsi 辛巳

xiong de 凶德

Xu 徐

Xu 許

Xue 薛

“Xue er” 學而

Xugou 須句

Xuma 胥靡

xun (lessons) 訓

xun (to rewarm) 尋

Xun Kuang 荀況

Xun Qing 荀卿

Xunzi 荀子

Yan 燕

Yang 楊

yang 養

yang fumu 養父母

Yanling 鄆陵

“Yanyu” 言語

Yanzi chungiu 晏子春秋

Yao 堯

“Yao dian” 堯典

Yao Nai 姚鼐

“Yao wen” 堯問

Ye Mengde 葉夢得

Ye Shi 葉適

yi (propriety/righteousness) 義

yi (ceremonial decorum) 儀

yi (sacrificial vessel) 彝

“Yi” (poem of the *Shi jing*) 抑

Yi (ethnic group and state name) 夷

Yi (place-name) 繹

Yi (Book of Changes) 易

yi xing 異姓

yin 淫

Yin 殷

Yin Xian 尹咸

yin-yang 陰陽

Ying 郢

yong 勇

“Yong ye” 雍也

you 友

You Ruo 有若

Youfeng Boling 有逢伯陵

Yu (state and dynasty) 虞

yu (speeches) 語

Yu-ding 禹鼎

Yu Qing 虞卿

Yu shu (a Shuihudi document) 語書

Yu shu (part of the *Shu jing*) 虞書

“Yu wu zheng” 雨無正

“Yu xu” 俞序

“Yu zao” 玉藻

Yue 越

“Yue ji” 樂記

“Yue yu” 越語

Yun 鄆

Yushi chunqiu 虞氏春秋

“Zai jian” 載見

“Zai shan” 載芟

zaoli 皂隸

Zeng 鄧

Zeng Can 曾參

Zeng Shen 曾申

“Zhan yang” 瞻仰

zhang (jade staff) 璋

zhang (paragraph) 章

Zhang Cang 張蒼

Zhanguo 戰國

Zhanguo ce 戰國策

Zhao 趙

Zhao Fang 趙汸

Zhao Kuang 趙匡

zhen 貞

Zhen 震

zheng (struggle) 爭

zheng (proper government) 政

zheng (correctness) 正

Zheng 鄭

zheng de 正德

Zheng Qiao 鄭樵

“Zheng yu” 鄭語

zheng yue 正月

“Zheng yue” 正月

zhengxin 爭心

zhi (documents, maxims) 志

zhi (wise, wisdom) 知

zhi (uprightness) 直

“Zhi zhong” 至忠

zhong (center) 中

zhong (loyalty) 忠

zhong (seniority name) 仲

zhong bu zhong 中不忠

Zhong hui 仲虺

Zhong Shanfu 仲山甫

“*Zhong xiao*” 忠孝

“*Zhong yan*” 重言

Zhong yong 中庸

Zhong Yong 仲雍

Zhongni 仲尼

zhongxin 忠信

Zhou 周

“*Zhou yu*” 周語

Zhouyi 周易

zhu 主

Zhu 邾

Zhu Xi 朱熹

zhuan li 專利

Zhuangzi 莊子

zhufu 諸父

zhuhou 諸侯

“*Zhuo*” 洫

Zhushu jinian 竹書紀年

zi (cognomen) 字

zi (son) 子

Zi (clan) 子

“*Zi han*” 子罕

“*Zi Lu*” 子路

Zi Xia 子夏

zong 宗

zongmiao 宗廟

zu 族

zuo ce 作策

zuo shi 左師

Zuo Qiuming 左丘明

Zuo zhuan 左傳

Zuoshi chunqiu 左氏春秋

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Index

Note: To locate names of Chunqiu personalities, refer to the List of Chunqiu Personalities

- accomplished man (*chengren*), 244, 307n. 28
- administrative thought, 51, 138, 158–161, 213; and ritual, 95–96. *See also* body simile; harmony and conformity; *li* (ritual): and administration; model emulation
- alliances (*meng*), 50–51, 229; ceremony of, 51, 115, 124, 266n. 153, 267n. 160, 282n. 46; —, and inequality, 119, 282n. 48; distinguished from assemblies (*hui*), 267n. 160, 282n. 46, 283n. 60; leaders of, 119–121; oaths, 79, 119, 122–125, 244, 266n. 153, 267n. 161, 275n. 71, 282nn. 46, 47; “rewarming” of, 124, 130, 282n. 46, 305n. 2; system of, 106, 119–125, 133; —, decline of, 124–125; texts, 46–48, 51, 119; —, Houma, 46–48, 122, 265n. 138, 282n. 47, 283n. 60; —, Wenxian, 46–48. *See also* deities: as guardians of alliances; hegemons; meetings, inter-state; multi-state system
- allotments. *See* ministers: and hereditary allotments
- All under Heaven (*tianxia*), 134–135, 235–237, 239, 271n. 30, 285n. 96; in the *Zuo zhuan*, 285n. 96
- altars of soil and grain (*sheji*), 138, 140–142, 145–146, 152–153, 157, 162, 201, 212, 280n. 25, 287nn. 15, 17
- An, battle of (589 B.C.E.), 121, 129, 280n. 25
- ancestors, 172–174; changing role of, 81, 84, 169, 191, 275n. 78, 293n. 15, 299n. 100; communication with, 17–18, 46–47, 72–73, 86, 272n. 39; ridiculed, 194; worship of, 189–191, 198, 292n. 8, 299n. 101; —, cutting off sacrifices, 170, 191; —, as prerogative of aristocrats, 198, 292n. 8. *See also* bronze inscriptions; lineage; spirits; *xiao*: as ancestral worship
- annals. *See* official annals
- archives, 167, 253n. 29, 282n. 46
- aristocracy, 8, 89, 154, 164–165, 286n. 3, 290n. 59; aristocratic lineages, 2, 4–5, 48, 137, 154, 164, 211; downward mobility, 169–171, 293nn. 14, 19; ruler’s mind-set of, 172–175, 294n. 30; and the *shi* stratum, 5, 102, 278nn. 36, 40. *See also* lineage; ministers: lineage, ministerial; *junzi*
- assemblies (*hui*). *See* meetings, inter-state
- awe-inspiring ceremonies (*weiyi*). *See* ceremonial decorum
- awesomeness (*wei*), 98, 126. *See also* *de*: as kindness, grace; punishments
- ba*. *See* hegemons
- baixing* (one hundred clans/surnames), 44, 264n. 125, 265n. 137, 287n. 9

- Ban Biao (3–54 C.E.), 259n. 74
 Ban Gu (32–92 C.E.), 256n. 52, 261n. 98.
 See also *Han shu*
 “barbarians,” 117–118. See also *manyi*
 benefit. See *li* (benefit/profit)
 benevolence. See *ren*
 “benevolent rule,” 52
 Bi, battle of, 4, 114
Bielu, 241, 306n. 17
 body simile, 159–160, 213, 291n. 75
 Boltz, William, 262n. 102
 bronze inscriptions, 11, 46–47, 54, 92,
 172, 285n. 96; “announcements of
 merit” in, 46, 71; “auspicious words”
 in, 72–73, 272n. 45; changes in the
 Eastern Zhou, 46–47, 191, 266n. 141,
 299n. 100; Chouer-*zhong*, 297n. 88;
 dating of, 265n. 138; Da Yu-*ding*,
 269n. 8; *de* in, 180; donors’ self-image
 in, 47, 172–175; Guai Bo-*gui*, 298n. 98;
 Guoshu Lü-*zhong*, 277n. 10; He-*zun*,
 269n. 8, 298n. 98; Jin Jiang-*ding*,
 292n. 2; Qin Gong-*gui*, 265n. 138;
 Qin Gong-*zhong*, 265n. 138; as ritual
 messages, 17, 46–47, 272nn. 39, 41;
 and scribal rules, 24; Shi Qiang-*pan*,
 298n. 98; Shiqian-*gui*, 297n. 88; Shi
 Xun-*gui*, 269n. 11, 298n. 98; Shuxiang
 Fu Yu-*gui*, 173, 265n. 138, 277n. 10,
 295n. 54; Shu Yi-*zhong*, 269n. 13;
 and the state of Qin, 266n. 143,
 268n. 172, 270n. 18; and views of the
 ancestors, 81, 169, 299n. 100; Wang-
 sun Yizhe-*zhong*, 174–175; Wangzi Wu-
 ding, 173; *xiao* in, 187–188, 297n. 88,
 298nn. 89, 90, 98; Xing-*zhong*, 172–
 173, 295n. 54; Yu-*ding*, 173, 269n. 11
 Brooks, Bruce E., 260nn. 82, 83, 90,
 261n. 94, 307n. 32
 Bykov, F. S., 248n. 12

 Cai, state of, 63, 95, 116, 222–223, 225,
 282n. 48
 Cai Shu (eleventh century B.C.E.), 190
 calendars, 19–20, 22, 227, 252n. 19,
 253n. 24

Cambridge History of Ancient China,
 248n. 13
 Cao: clan, 283n. 65; state of, 111, 222,
 225, 280nn. 18, 19, 283n. 65, 285n. 94
 Cao Shu Zhenduo (eleventh century
 B.C.E.), 111
 capital-dwellers (*guo ren*), 273n. 57,
 286n. 3
 Carr, Michael, 189
 ceremonial decorum (*yi*), 92–94, 96–103,
 276n. 8, 277nn. 9, 10, 11. See also *li*
 (ritual): and ceremonial decorum
 Chen, state of, 112, 185, 223, 280n. 21
 Cheng: city of, 41; state of, 108
cheng (sincerity, integrity), 34, 44, 237,
 259n. 76, 274n. 71
 Chengpu, battle of, 4, 110, 114, 270n. 26,
 280n. 19
 Cheng Tang (fl. c. 1600 B.C.E.), 269n. 13
 Chengzhou, 227–229
 Chen Kejong, 259n. 79
 Chu, state of, 3, 8, 76, 131, 173–175,
 202, 222–223, 255n. 44, 263n. 109;
 aggressiveness of, 113–114, 116, 122–
 124, 131, 280n. 21, 284n. 88; as
 alliance leader, 4; annals of, 250n. 7;
 coup in (529 B.C.E.), 115; domestic
 problems, 157, 178–179, 195–196,
 293n. 19; and its “otherness,” 43–44,
 53, 113, 116, 247n. 7, 281n. 28; and
 Jin, 4–5, 63, 65–67, 95, 110, 113–115,
 123–124, 127–128, 131, 177, 267n.
 160, 270n. 26, 282n. 48; King Ling’s
 hegemony, 5, 63, 113–115, 124–125,
 131, 134–135, 271n. 30, 281n. 29;
 and Lu, 143; and Qi, 126, 133; and
 Qin, 285n. 93; ruler’s authority in,
 286nn. 3, 5; scribes in, 179, 295n. 50;
 social order in, 95, 166, 277n. 17;
 and Song, 127, 260n. 90, 283n. 56,
 285n. 94; and Wu, 117, 179, 285n. 93;
 and Zheng, 123, 127, 282n. 49; in the
 Zuo zhuan, 29, 32–33, 54
Chun qiu: as the designation of the *Zuo*
 zhuan, 266n. 151; as generic term, 21,
 245n. 31, 266n. 151; historical value

- denied, 256n. 51; Lu annals, 2, 16–19, 111, 250nn. 7, 9, 10, 251n. 11, 266n. 151, 267n. 160; —, commentaries, 252n. 16; —, Confucius' authorship of, 250n. 7, 252n. 15. *See also* official annals
- Chunqiu fanlu*, 306n. 18
- Chunqiu shiyu*, 45–46, 265n. 132, 282n. 45; possibly relies on Qin sources, 265n. 136
- Chu Shaosun (first century B.C.E.), 226
- cleverness (*min*), 177–178. *See also* wisdom
- commoners, 81, 140, 273n. 57, 274n. 71, 292n. 8. *See also* people
- Confucians (*Ru*), 104, 162, 176, 199, 216; and the *Zuo*, 260n. 91, 267n. 162
- Confucian thought, 35–37, 302n. 135. *See also* Traditionalist thought
- Confucius (551–479 B.C.E.), 1–2, 6–7, 9, 35, 89, 171, 184, 205, 210, 216, 240, 248n. 13; apocryphal stories about, 245, 262n. 103; as the author of the *Zuo*, 258n. 64; on benefit, 199; and *Chun qiu*, 250n. 7, 252n. 15; disciples of, 6, 118, 165, 198, 215, 240, 291n. 70; and *Lunyu*, 255n. 47; praises the Wei lineage, 241–242; reads recorded speeches, 255n. 43; and reinterpretation of *xiao*, 165, 197–199, 215, 301n. 126; and *ren*, 297n. 77; on scribes, 251n. 14; on trustworthiness, 289n. 44; in the *Zuo*, 23, 254n. 37, 272n. 50, 303n. 7; and Zuo Qiuming, 256n. 53
- correctness (*zheng*), 185
- correlative thought, 44, 242–244, 264n. 128
- courage (*yong*), 176–180, 187
- Creel, Herrlee G., 248n. 9, 267n. 162
- crossbow (*nu*), 34, 44, 259n. 77
- Cui Shi (1852–1924), 26, 256n. 52, 258n. 71
- Cui Shu (1740–1816), 31, 261n. 98
- Dan Zhu (724–770 C.E.), 28, 256n. 54
- Dao* (the Way), 1–2, 76, 149, 153, 205; in bronze inscriptions, 47; of Heaven, 144, 288n. 29; occurrences in the *Zuo*, 37–38, 261n. 95
- da yitong*. *See* unity, political
- de*, 2, 65, 81–83, 92, 165, 171, 175, 180–187, 204–205, 214; as charisma, *mana*, 58, 65, 71, 82, 110, 180, 190, 239–240, 296n. 62; downward dissemination of, 181–184; early meaning of, 180–181, 275n. 74, 295n. 56; as kindness, grace, 125–130, 178, 181, 284n. 72; of ministers, 181–182, 295n. 54, 296nn. 61, 62; negative meaning, 237, 265n. 137; as neutral quality, 183–184; occurrences in the *Zuo*, 37–38, 261n. 95; semantic inclusiveness of, 82–83, 180–181, 184, 295n. 56; as virtue, 71, 81–82, 170–171, 175–176, 182–184, 202, 275n. 75
- decline, inevitability of, 139, 144–146
- Defoort, Carine, 23
- deities (*shen*), 57, 70, 72–74, 77–78, 141, 183, 207–208; believers in, 80–81, 274n. 71; and *do-ut-des* principle, 57, 70–71, 76–77, 80, 208; etymology of *shen*, 271n. 36; as guardians of alliances, 79–80, 122–124, 266n. 153; and health, 273n. 53; manipulations of, 81–84; men as masters of, 70, 76–78, 83, 208, 273n. 61; and moral conduct, 57, 82–87, 275n. 80; and ritual, 72–76, 78, 207–208, 272nn. 44, 50, 273n. 51; —, in the Shang, 272n. 43; skepticism toward, 57, 70, 78–80, 85–87, 123–124, 208, 274nn. 67, 69; Zhanguo views of, 80, 274n. 69. *See also* alliances: oaths; spirits; *xin*: toward deities
- democracy in the Chunqiu period, 286n. 3
- Deng, state of, 35–36
- Di: ethnic group, 3, 4, 109, 110, 154, 166, 247n. 7, 279n. 11; state of, 112
- Di* (God), 73, 98, 239
- “didactic anecdotes,” 15, 19
- Difang Jin (first century B.C.E.), 258n. 64
- Diquan. *See* meetings, inter-state

- divination, 61, 74, 86–87, 111, 134, 207, 258n. 65, 270n. 17, 272n. 50; in the Shang, 292n. 80; in the *Zuo*, 270n. 17
- Dobson, W. A. C. H., 122, 259n. 78
- do-ut-des* principle, 57–58, 70–71, 271n. 39. *See also* deities: and *do-ut-des* principle
- Duandao. *See* meetings, inter-state
- Duke of Zhou (d. c. 1035 B.C.E.), 9, 24, 74, 167, 190, 254n. 42, 267n. 163, 272n. 49, 292n. 7, 298n. 97, 302n. 140
- Duke Tai. *See* Jiang Taigong
- Duo Jiao (fl. 340–330 B.C.E.), 49, 306n. 17
- Duoshi wei*, 49
- Du Yu (222–284 C.E.), 278nn. 36, 37, 284n. 79, 288n. 33, 296n. 65
- Egan, Ronald, 16, 50, 263n. 109
- faithfulness (*zhen*), 86, 151, 275n. 84, 288n. 41. *See also* reverence; *xin*
- Falkenhausen, Lothar von, 17, 84, 247n. 1, 265n. 139, 266n. 141, 272n. 44, 276n. 4, 293n. 15, 299n. 102
- Fangcheng, 126, 284n. 73
- Fan Sheng (fl. 20–30 C.E.), 256n. 53
- Fan Ye (398–445 C.E.), 33
- Fan Yu. *See* Fan Ye
- Feng Youlan (1895–1990), 9
- Feng Yuanjun, 262n. 104
- feudalism, 5, 248n. 9
- filiality. *See* *xiao*
- five phases (*wu xing*), 242, 244
- Fu Qian (fl. late second century B.C.E.), 290n. 60
- Fu Xuan (217–278 C.E.), 40
- ganzhi* dates, 18, 252n. 19
- Granet, Jacques, 259n. 80
- Gongsun Gu (third century B.C.E.), 49
- Gongyang zhuan*, 26–27, 45, 52, 256n. 53, 267n. 167; ideology of, 268n. 168
- Graham, Angus C. (1919–1990), 2, 55–56
- Granet, Marcel (1884–1940), 248n. 9
- Gu, city of, 154
- Guan Feng, 248n. 15
- Guan Shu (d. c. 1040 B.C.E.), 190, 302n. 140
- Guanzi*, 52, 249n. 19, 265n. 132, 267n. 164
- Gu Jiegang (1893–1980), 34, 245, 257n. 63
- Guliang zhuan*, 27, 45, 50–52, 266n. 155, 267nn. 161, 167
- Guo, state of, 22, 77–78, 112, 120, 274nn. 62, 65
- Guoyu*, 13, 28, 39–45, 54, 154–155, 249n. 19, 245n. 31, 253n. 29, 255n. 45; anachronisms in, 42–43; and the *Chun qiu*, 261n. 98; “Chu yu,” 40–43, 262n. 104, 295n. 50; dating of, 41, 262n. 106; different origin of its books, 262nn. 104, 105, 263n. 113; inaccuracies in, 43–44, 264nn. 116, 120; “Jin yu,” 40–41, 43–44, 262n. 104; “Lu yu,” 40–41, 44, 237, 255n. 43, 262n. 103, 306n. 7; as moralizing text, 293n. 109; “Qi yu,” 40–43, 249n. 19, 263n. 114; reliability of, 42–45; scholarly views of, 261n. 99; thought of, 249n. 16, 263n. 111; “Wu yu,” 40–41, 263n. 113; “Yue yu,” 40–43, 262n. 104, 263nn. 113, 114; “Zheng yu,” 40–41, 263n. 113, 292n. 82; “Zhou yu,” 40–41, 262n. 104, 264n. 128; and the *Zuo*, 28, 40, 261nn. 98, 100, 262n. 102
- Gu Yanwu (1613–1682), 225, 304n. 8, 305n. 6
- Han: battle of (645 B.C.E.), 166; Chunqiu lineage and Zhanguo state of, 112, 222–223, 260n. 82
- Han dynasty (206 B.C.E.–220 C.E.), 20, 52; and the *Chun qiu*, 252n. 16; and the *Zuo zhuan*, 14, 26, 28–29, 255n. 49, 256n. 52, 257n. 58; Han interpolations in the *Zuo*, 222, 245, 305n. 9, 307n. 29

- Han Feizi (d. 233 B.C.E.), 105–106, 162, 197, 213, 223n. 3, 307n. 18; cites the *Guoyu*, 262n. 106; cites the *Zuo zhuan*, 29–30
- Hanshi waizhuan*, 52
- Han shu*, 252n. 16, 255n. 48. *See also* Ban Gu
- Han Yu (768–824 C.E.), 284n. 86
- harmony and conformity, 160–161, 213, 292n. 83
- Hart, James, 263n. 111
- Heaven (*tian*), 55–57, 140, 145, 268n. 5, 269n. 8; decree of (*tian ming*), 55, 60, 142, 144, 269n. 8; —, and Qin claims of, 270n. 18; —, in the *Zuo*, 269n. 13; as guardian of justice, 62–64, 207, 270n. 23; as impersonal law, 56, 62, 207; intent or will of (*tian zhi*), 55–56, 58–61, 141, 207; —, inscrutability of, 61–62, 66–67, 69–70, 87, 207; —, manipulations of, 67–68; —, neglected, 271n. 30; as opportunity, 64–66, 270nn. 24, 27; as political deity, 55, 57–60, 68–69, 71; as sentient deity, 56, 58. *See also* deities; Son of Heaven
- Heaven's mandate. *See* Heaven: decree of
- hegemon (ba), 3, 50, 106, 129; changing views of, 125–132, 284n. 88; as guardian of inter-state order, 107, 125, 130, 132, 211; and international ritual, 109, 279n. 10; protector of the weak, 106, 109, 130, 132, 279n. 9; rely on power, 114–115, 127–132, 211; struggles for hegemony, 110; virtuous, 125–127, 211; and the Zhou king, 3, 109, 211, 279n. 7. *See also* alliances: leaders of; Son of Heaven: and hegemon
- He Leshi, 34, 217, 259n. 78, 303n. 1
- Henry, Eric, 28
- “heroic narratives,” 15, 19
- He Xiu (129–182 C.E.), 89, 103
- Heyang, 18, 251n. 11
- Hirase Takao, 260nn. 82, 90, 304n. 14
- historical lessons, 21, 41, 253n. 28, 29
- “historical romance,” 19, 249n. 2
- historiography, ritual origins of, 17, 21, 250n. 8; didactic aims, 21, 41, 43, 48–50
- Hong, battle of (638 B.C.E.), 127, 260n. 90
- Hong Ye, 258n. 64
- Hou Han shu*, 33
- Houma. *See* alliances, texts
- household servants (*jia chen*). *See* retainers
- Hou Wailu (1903–1987), 9, 248n. 12
- Hsu Cho-yun, 165, 168, 280n. 15, 290n. 60
- Hua, state of, 112
- Huangfu. *See* meetings, inter-state
- Huan Tan (c. 20 B.C.E. – 56 C.E.), 252n. 16
- Huaxia, 53, 211, 225, 247n. 7
- Hultkrantz, Åke, 72, 272n. 44
- Hundred Schools, 49
- Hu Nianyi, 226
- international order. *See* alliances; hegemon; *li* (ritual): in international relations; meetings, inter-state; multi-state system
- Itano Chōhachi, 260n. 82, 307n. 26
- Ji: minor clan, 283n. 65; state of, 19; Zhou royal clan, 132, 190, 224, 273n. 53, 280nn. 12, 17, 283n. 65
- jia chen*. *See* retainers
- Jiang clan, 280nn. 12, 17, 283n. 65
- Jiangling, 24
- Jiang Shanguo, 306n. 9
- Jiang Taigong (eleventh century B.C.E.), 144, 167, 267n. 163, 292n. 7
- Jiantu. *See* meetings, inter-state
- Jiao, state of, 112
- Jiaru. *See* Wangcheng
- Jia Yi (199–166 B.C.E.), 306n. 17
- Jin dynasty, 33
- Jin, state of, 3, 20, 22–23, 36, 66, 79, 85, 139, 145, 148, 154, 176, 185; aggressiveness of, 112–113, 115–116, 120–121, 128, 131, 263n. 109, 274n. 63,

Jin, state of (*continued*)

- 281nn. 27, 40, 284n. 88; annals of, 250n. 7; and Cao, 111, 280n. 19; and Chu, 4–5, 63, 65–67, 113–116, 123–124, 127–128, 131, 166, 168, 177, 270n. 26, 280n. 19, 281n. 27, 282n. 48; decline of ruler's authority in, 4, 286n. 6; decline of ruling lineage in, 293n. 14; disintegration of, 2, 5, 145, 222, 224, 240, 263n. 107; domestic problems, 95, 145, 150–153, 155–156, 176–177, 197, 238–240, 251n. 14, 271n. 30, 285n. 94, 288n. 27, 289nn. 50, 52, 293n. 19, 295n. 41, 299n. 105, 300n. 106; as leader of alliances, 4, 80, 110–111, 120–121, 124–125, 228–230, 243–244, 273n. 51, 280n. 19, 283n. 65, 284n. 88, 307n. 21; and Lu, 68, 99–100, 116–117, 121, 130, 143, 281nn. 27, 40, 283n. 53; praised, 168; prediction of its prosperity, 224, 304n. 6; and Qi, 115–116, 121, 129, 280nn. 25, 27; and Qin, 66, 166–167, 175–176, 275n. 80, 283n. 63; scribes, in, 22–23, 25, 65, 229–230, 251n. 14, 289n. 54; and Song, 283n. 56, 285n. 94, 289n. 43; succession struggles, 150–151, 194, 289n. 52, 290n. 64, 300n. 107; and Wei, 111, 116, 120, 280n. 19, 285n. 94; and Wu, 281n. 37, 282n. 48; and Zheng, 100, 123, 168–169, 281n. 27, 282n. 49, 285n. 94; and Zhou royal domain, 19, 110–111, 228–230, 280n. 14, 307n. 21; in the *Zuo zhuan*, 29, 32–33, 54
- Jin Dejian, 268n. 169
- Jin shu*, 258n. 65
- Ju, state of, 43, 234–235, 237, 283n. 65, 284n. 71
- jun* (commanderies), 43, 264n. 121
- junzi* ("superior man"), 39, 164–171, 203–205, 213; as moral definition, 164–169; moral image of, 171–180, 203, 213; —, and "catalogue of virtues," 171, 175–180; —, patterned after the ruler, 171–172, 175–176, 184, 203; occurrences in the *Zuo zhuan*, 294n. 20; original meaning of, 165–166, 292n. 2; as pedigree designation, 164, 166–168; and ritual behavior, 168, 292n. 8, 298n. 9; and social mobility, 170–171, 204, 215–216; Zhanguo usage, 292n. 4. *See also* aristocracy: ruler's mind-set of; *Zuo zhuan*: narrator
- Jupiter, movements of, 222–223, 225–226, 304n. 14
- Kaizuka Shigeki, 290n. 60
- Kang Sheng (1898–1975), 249n. 15, 298n. 97
- Kang Shu (eleventh century B.C.E.), 73
- Kang Youwei (1858–1927), 26, 28, 256n. 57
- Karapet'iants Artem, 250n. 9
- Karlgren, Bernhard (1889–1978), 20, 217, 253n. 25, 258n. 64, 259n. 78
- King Cheng of Zhou (r. 1042–1021 B.C.E.), 24, 74, 167, 190, 254n. 42, 272n. 49, 302n. 140
- King Cuo of Zhongshan (late fourth century B.C.E.), 266n. 142
- King Li of Zhou (r. 877–841 B.C.E.), 265n. 138, 277n. 10, 302n. 140
- King Ping of Zhou (r. 771–720 B.C.E.), 298n. 98
- kings. *see* Son of Heaven
- King Wen of Zhou (d. 1046 B.C.E.), 88, 111, 239–240, 298nn. 96, 98
- King Wu of Zhou (r. 1046–1043 B.C.E.), 111, 239, 298n. 98
- King Xiang of Wei (r. 318–296 B.C.E.), tomb of, 250n. 7, 262nn. 104, 106
- King Xuanhui of Han (r. 332–312 B.C.E.), 223n. 3, 304n. 14
- Knapp, Keith, 189, 198, 300n. 113, 301n. 126
- Kominami Ichirō, 126, 181
- Kondō Noriyuki, 260n. 82, 307n. 26
- Kong Yingda (574–648 C.E.), 306n. 17

- Kryukov, Vassily, 265n. 139, 268n. 170, 269n. 8, 270n. 17
- Kuiqiu. *See* meetings, inter-state
- lands, 240–241, 293n. 16; ownership of, 191, 279n. 3, 299n. 103; and power, 302n. 144; quest for, 105–106, 112, 121, 201–202, 210, 279n. 3; rulers' control of, in peripheral states, 191, 286n. 3
- lao* (sacrificial unit), 117, 281nn. 39, 40
- Laozi*, 89, 103
- Lewis, Mark, 23, 119, 257n. 62, 260nn. 90, 91, 282n. 48, 283n. 60
- li* (benefit/profit), 38–39, 165, 199–204, 215, 261n. 92, 291n. 78, 302n. 139; controversy about, 199, 302n. 137; as legitimate political goal, 199–201; as negative value, 199, 201–203, 303n. 149; as neutral term, 200, 302n. 140
- li* (principle), 34, 259n. 76
- li* (ritual), 2, 38–39, 60, 62–63, 89, 171, 176, 183, 195, 205, 208–210, 235, 291n. 78, 294n. 35; and administration, 95–96, 99–102, 159; and ceremonial decorum, 91, 94, 97, 99–103, 209, 242; in international relations, 91, 106–118, 276n. 7, 279n. 4, 280n. 25, 281n. 27; —, under Chu's hegemony, 113–115, 281n. 29; —, decline of, 106, 111–112, 116, 118–119; —, as etiquette, 97, 108, 112–115, 280nn. 25, 27, 281nn. 38, 40; —, and preserving small polities, 108–109, 111–112, 132, 279n. 9, 280nn. 16, 24; —, and the Son of Heaven, 108–111; —, under Wu's hegemony, 116–118; mentioned in bronze inscriptions, 47, 266n. 142, 276n. 8; metaphysical aspects of, 102, 242–243; origins of, 90, 276n. 3; rule by, 6, 89–90, 103–104, 205, 209–210; as sacrificial rites, 72–74, 76–78, 90, 92, 94, 102–103, 209, 276n. 8; and self-cultivation, 102–103, 243; and social hierarchy, 74, 90–92, 94, 101–103, 208–209; system, ritual (*li zhi*), 90, 103; transgressions of, 90–91, 94, 103, 209, 276n. 5; and warfare, 91, 260n. 90, 276n. 7, 280n. 25; Zhanguo views of, 104, 210, 276n. 2, 278n. 42, 303n. 4; and Zhou ritual reform, 72, 75, 90, 208, 272nn. 43, 44, 276n. 4; *See also* ceremonial decorum; deities; hegemons
- Liang Qichao (1873–1929), 9
- Liji*, 72–73, 244, 278n. 39; “Biao ji,” 272n. 42; “Da xue,” 240; “Qu li,” 255n. 43, 292n. 8; “Tan Gong,” 262n. 103, 274n. 69; “Yu zao,” 254n. 42; *Zhong yong*, 294n. 34
- Li Jun, 248n. 9
- lineage, 2, 165, 189; branch lineage (*shi*), 137, 189, 191–192, 194–197, 214–215, 247n. 1, 299n. 102; —, dissolution of, 198, 301n. 130; high-ordered lineage (*zong*), 137, 189–192, 214, 247n. 1, 299n. 102; inter-lineage strife, 5, 48, 95, 101, 192; intra-lineage strife, 192, 194–195, 299n. 105, 300n. 114; ruling lineage, 190, 192, 300n. 107; —, threatened by collateral branches, 192, 300n. 106; versus the state, 195–197, 301nn. 123, 124. *See also* aristocracy; ministers; *xiao*
- Lin Lüshi, 248n. 15
- literary criticism, 15–16
- Liu Fenglu (1776–1829), 26, 255n. 50, 256n. 51
- Liu lineage, 245
- Liu Xiang (77–6 B.C.E.), 52, 241
- Liu Xin (46 B.C.E.–23 C.E.), 26–28, 255nn. 48, 50, 256n. 53, 257n. 58, 304n. 11
- Liu Zehua, 9–10, 249n. 17
- Liu Zhenghao, 258n. 65
- Liu Zhiji (661–721 C.E.), 231, 267n. 59
- Li Yumin, 187
- Lord Kang of Qi, 221
- Lord Wen of Jin (r. 780–746 B.C.E.), 298n. 98

- Lord Wen of Wei (r. 445–396 B.C.E.), 241, 306n. 19
- loyalty, 87, 149–153, 170, 176–178, 183, 200, 212–213, 235, 242; and the altars, 149, 152, 212, 289n. 48; to the altars, 138; to lineage, 195–197; personal, 138, 149, 153, 154–158, 212–213, 290n. 68 (*see also* retainers); —, and morality, 156–157, 291n. 71; and trustworthiness, 150–152; and unselfishness, 149–150, 170, 289n. 48; versus filiality, 195–199, 302nn. 135, 136; Zhanguo views of, 153, 157–158, 290n. 58, 291n. 74. *See also* lineage: versus the state; *xiao*: as “subversive virtue”; *zhong*
- Lu, state of, 19, 86, 130, 168, 255n. 43, 283n. 65; aggressiveness of, 100, 125, 278n. 31, 284n. 71; ancestral temple, order in, 273n. 51; decline of ruler’s authority in, 4–5, 100, 192, 278n. 32, 286n. 6, 287n. 22, 300n. 106; domestic problems, 100, 156, 194–195, 293n. 14, 299n. 105, 300n. 114; expulsion of Lord Zhao (517 B.C.E.), 5, 67–68, 142–143, 145–146, 156, 246, 251n. 11, 270n. 26, 285n. 94, 286n. 6; and Jin, 116–117, 130, 168, 229–230, 252n. 14, 281n. 40, 283n. 53; and Qi, 41, 62, 67, 105, 167, 169, 186, 270n. 23, 280n. 25; scribes in, 25, 110, 229–230, 255n. 43, 256n. 52; and Song, 92; succession struggles, 250n. 11, 300n. 107; and Wu, 83, 117–118; and Zhu, 111; in the *Zuo zhuan*, 29, 32–33, 54
- Lü Buwei (d. 235 B.C.E.), 49
- Lu Chun (d. 806 C.E.), 28
- Lu Deming (c. 550–630 C.E.), 306n. 17
- Lun heng*, 256n. 53. *See also* Wang Chong
- Lunyu*, 7, 135, 184, 197–198, 258nn. 64, 65, 301nn. 127, 128, 302n. 135, 307n. 28; and Confucius, 255n. 47; dating of, 248n. 11, 289n. 44, 297n. 77
- Luo Zhuohan, 257n. 58
- Lüshi chunqiu*, 49, 254n. 42, 307n. 18
- Man (ethnic group), 247n. 7
- mana*. *See de*
- manyi*, 43–44, 113, 130, 132, 281n. 28. *See also* “barbarians”
- martial spirit (*wu*), 128, 176, 178
- Marx, Karl (1818–1883), 11, 116
- Maspero, Henry (1883–1945), 34, 249n. 2
- Mattos, Gilbert, 265n. 140
- Mawangdui, 45
- Ma Yong, 256n. 52
- meetings, inter-state, 111, Diqian (510 B.C.E.), 227–230; Duandao (592 B.C.E.), 280n. 27; Huangfu (517 B.C.E.), 242; Jiantu (632 B.C.E.), 79, 243; Kuiqiu (651 B.C.E.), 50–52, 266n. 153, 267nn. 158, 161; Pingqiu (529 B.C.E.), 305n. 2; Wen (632 B.C.E.), 18, 110–111, 125, 251n. 11. *See also* alliances; Song, state of: peace conference in; Zheng, state of: peace conference in
- Mencius (Mengzi, c. 379–304 B.C.E.), 49–52, 135, 153, 199, 250n. 7, 252n. 15, 266n. 153, 267n. 162, 287n. 21, 297n. 81
- ministers: crossing the boundaries, 134, 285n. 95; defending private and public goals, 137, 158–159, 212; dominating intellectual life, 143, 146; and hereditary allotments, 5, 137, 154, 286n. 2; —, redistribution of, 238–241, 293n. 16; —, size of, 43, 264n. 127; and hereditary offices, 51, 137; kinship ties with the rulers, 136, 190; ministerial lineages, 4–5, 134, 137, 143, 162, 194–195, 212, 286n. 2; obedient, 139, 147–148; responsible for the altars, 140–142, 147, 152–153; ritual of, 96, 98–99; and the rulers, 136–137, 140–143, 145–146, 150–153, 159–162, 211–213, 230, 278n. 37, 292n. 83; self-image, 137–138, 172–175, 211–212. *See also* aristocracy; loyalty; retainers; rulers
- model emulation, 93, 98, 159–160,

- 171–172, 180, 213, 277n. 11,
291n. 76, 294n. 22
- Mo Jinshan, 282n. 48
- moralizing speeches, 15, 112; in the
Guoyu, 263n. 109
- Mozi (c. 460–390 B.C.E.), 48–49, 55,
85, 135, 162, 213, 248n. 8, 253n. 31,
255n. 43, 259n. 76, 274n. 69,
291n. 72, 302n. 135
- multi-state system, 105–107, 210–211;
disintegration of, 6, 132–134; and
hegemony, 106; impact on later Chi-
nese diplomacy, 105, 279n. 1; and
system of alliances, 119–125, 133. See
also *li* (ritual): in international relations
- Nanjun, 24, 255n. 44
- Nivison, David, 259n. 76
- nobles. See aristocracy
- official annals, 16–17, 21; limited access
to, 252n. 15; as ritual messages, 17–
18; as tools of condemnation, 251n. 12,
245n. 31. See also Chu, state of: annals
of; *Chun qiu*; Jin, state of: annals of
- oral tradition, 16, 18, 42–43, 179, 252n.
18, 262n. 102, 264n. 116, 295n. 50
- overlords (*zhuhou*), 2, 4, 89, 105–106,
119, 140, 266nn. 153, 155, 271n. 30,
305n. 1; internal hierarchy of, 106,
108; and Son of Heaven, 3, 105. See
also rulers
- Pankenier, David, 303n. 14
- Paper, Jordan, 272n. 44
- people (*min*), 44, 82, 140–141, 152,
174, 195, 200–202, 208, 273n. 61,
291n. 78, 302nn. 140, 144. See also
commoners
- Petersen, Jens Østergård, 218–219,
253n. 30
- “petty man.” See *xiao ren*
- Pingqiu. See meetings, inter-state
- Pi Xirui (1850–1908), 288n. 37
- Poo Mu-chou, 71
- power. See *shi* (power)
- predictions, 22, 224, 230; in the *Guoyu*,
41, 263n. 107; in the *Zuo*, 22–23,
223, 254nn. 33, 35, 270n. 23; —,
long-term, 30–31, 221–226, 244–
245, 256n. 55, 258n. 70, 277n. 23,
304nn. 2, 7
- propriety/righteousness. See *yi* (propriety/
righteousness)
- Pulleyblank, Edwin, 259n. 78
- punishments (*xing* or *fa*), 95–96, 111–
112, 126–131, 235, 284n. 72
- Pu Weizhong, 249n. 20
- qi* (energy, ether), 242, 244
- Qi (major state), 3, 81–82, 283n. 65;
aggressiveness, 279n. 9; and Chu,
126, 133, 279n. 7; decline of ruler’s
authority in, 4, 245–246, 286n. 6,
290n. 67; domestic problems, 101,
141, 144, 156, 160–161, 169–170,
201–202, 251n. 13, 270n. 21,
285n. 94, 290n. 68, 293nn. 16, 17,
19, 300n. 114; hegemony of, 109–
110, 126, 279nn. 7, 9, 10; and Jin,
115–116, 129, 280nn. 25, 27,
285n. 94; and Lu, 41, 68, 105, 143,
167, 186, 270n. 23, 279n. 10,
280n. 25, 285n. 94; scribes, in,
251n. 13; seized by the Chen lineage,
5, 101, 144, 221–222, 245–246,
290n. 67, 304n. 3; —, and the compi-
lation of the *Zuo*, 260n. 82; and Song,
285n. 94; and Wu, 285nn. 93, 94;
and Zheng, 279n. 10; and Zhou, 109,
279n. 7; in the *Zuo zhuan*, 32–33, 54,
250n. 5
- Qi (small state), 43, 73, 283n. 65,
284n. 71; restored by Lord Huan
of Qi, 109
- Qi, state of, 3, 31, 47, 168, 247n. 7,
255n. 44; and Chu, 285n. 93; ex-
pansion after 360s B.C.E., 31, 224,
258n. 70; and Jin, 166–167, 275n. 80,
283n. 63, 292n. 5, 294n. 31; predic-
tions about, 31, 224–226, 304nn. 5, 11;
rulers of, authority, 286n. 3; —, claim

Qi, state of (*continued*)

Heaven's decree, 270n. 18; —, self-image, 266n. 143, 268n. 172; in the *Zuo zhuan*, 8, 32–33, 54

Qin dynasty (221–207 B.C.E.), 28, 256n. 55, 262n. 106

Qing dynasty (1644–1911 C.E.), 26, 31

Rapahls, Lisa, 268n. 171

recorders (*zuo ce*), 24. *See also* scribes reforms, 138, 162, 292n. 83; in the late Chunqiu, 5. *See also* administrative thought; state: centralization of remonstrance, 8, 16

ren (benevolence), 2, 165, 175–180, 184–187, 198, 204, 205, 214, 296n. 76, 297n. 78; in bronze inscriptions, 47; and *de*, 184–185, 296nn. 73, 75; downward dissemination of, 184–186; occurrences in the *Zuo*, 37–38, 261n. 95; as pivotal virtue, 186–187; —, in the *Lunyu*, 297n. 77; and relatives, 176, 294n. 34; and ruler's grace, 184–185; and trustworthiness (*xin*), 187, 289n. 44; in the Western Zhou, 184, 296n. 70, 71

Ren clan, 283n. 65

renyi (benevolence and propriety), 34, 259n. 76

retainers, 86–87, 89, 154–158, 162, 212–213, 290nn. 60, 67, 68; and contracts, 154, 290n. 60; plotting against masters, 293n. 14; pseudo-kinship relations with the masters, 298n. 92. *See also* loyalty: personal; *shi* (stratum)

reverence (*jing*), 87, 150, 182, 235, 288n. 41, 296n. 59; irreverent behavior, 276n. 5, 283n. 64. *See also* faithfulness; *xin*

ritual. *See li* (ritual)

ritualistic language, 17

Roetz, Heiner, 171, 175, 177

Rong (ethnic group), 3, 166, 181, 247n. 7, 274n. 65, 279n. 11

Ru. *See* Confucians

rulers, 136; and the altars, 140–142,

287n. 15; authority of, 136–137, 140; —, decline of, 4, 137–139, 142–145, 211–212, 286n. 3, 4; —, less evident in peripheral states, 286n. 3; —, restoration of, in the Zhanguo period, 160, 162; and ceremonial decorum, 92–93, 175; and Heaven, 149–151, 179; image of, 137–146, 149, 211; —, “true ruler,” 141–142, 149, 287n. 21; and ministers, 136–137, 140–146, 159–162, 292n. 83; moral qualities of, 175–176; orders conceived as indefinable, 139, 179; ritual supremacy of, 92–93, 136–138, 190, 228, 286n. 4; ruling lineages, 190, 192; succession struggles, 192, 300nn. 107, 110, 111. *See also* ministers; overlords; *xiao*: and strengthening ruler's authority rules of recording (*shufu*), 17, 252n. 14, 253n. 30

sacrifices, 56, 72–78, 85, 90, 92, 96, 189–191, 209, 268n. 3, 277n. 22, 298nn. 88, 90, 299n. 101. *See also* ancestors: worship of; *li* (ritual): and sacrificial rites

Sausurre, Leopold de, 223n. 2

Savage, William, 171, 180

Schaberg, David, 35–36, 250n. 2, 252n. 18, 254nn. 32, 33, 257n. 60, 260n. 82, 262n. 102, 267n. 165

Schwartz, Benjamin I., 216, 255n. 47

scribal records (*shiji*), 7, 20–21, 252n. 18, 253nn. 27, 30, 245n. 31. *See also* scribes; *Zuo zhuan*: sources of

scribes, 7, 21, 24–25, 65, 68, 77–78, 81–82, 167, 179, 183, 223–224, 229–231, 251n. 13, 252n. 14, 253n. 29, 255n. 43; ritual, scribal, 254n. 42. *See also* Chu, state of: scribes in; Jin, state of: scribes in; Lu, state of: scribes in; official annals; Qi (major state): scribes in; recorders; scribal records

Scribe Xi (d. 217 B.C.E.), 24

self-cultivation. *See li* (ritual): and self-cultivation

- Shang dynasty (c. 1600–1046), 24, 58, 72, 75, 78, 144, 188, 269n. 13, 272n. 39, 284n. 79, 292n. 80, 297n. 87, 302n. 140, 307n. 24
- Shang Yang (d. 338 B.C.E.), 162, 213, 264n. 121
- Shao Kang, 131
- Shaughnessy, Edward L., 248n. 13, 265n. 139
- sheji*. See altars of soil and grain
- Shen Buhai (d. 337 B.C.E.), 136, 162, 213
- shi* (power), 143–145, 288n. 26
- shi* (stratum), 6, 51, 102, 140, 157, 290n. 60, 291n. 72; and ancestral worship, 198; ascendancy of, 5, 170–171, 204, 210, 215–216, 278nn. 36, 40, 291n. 78; underrepresented in the *Zuo zhuan*, 8, 54. See also aristocracy: and the *shi* stratum; retainers
- Shibancun, 255n. 45
- Shi chun*, 258n. 65
- Shiji*, 226, 249n. 1, 256n. 52, 304n. 15, 306n. 17. See also Sima Qian
- Shi jing*, 1, 53–54, 218–220, 225, 230, 252n. 16, 274n. 69; ceremonial decorum in, 92–93, 93–94, 277nn. 9, 11; dating of, 53–54, 268nn. 168, 169, 170; *de* in, 180, 295n. 54, 296n. 60; “Guo feng” (Airs of States), 53, 188, 268n. 169; Heaven in, 55, 58–59, 269nn. 8, 9, 11, 12; “Huang yi,” 240; *junzi* in, 166, 292n. 2; and learning from the past, 252n. 28; *li* (benefit) in, 200, 302n. 140; *li* (ritual) in, 276n. 8; “Lu song” (“Lu Hymns”), 53, 93–94; *ren* (benevolence) in, 184, 296n. 71; and ritual intercourse, 272n. 39; “Shang song” (“Shang Hymns”), 268n. 169; *tianxia* in, 285n. 96; *xiao* in, 188–189, 298nn. 90, 94; “Zhou song” (“Zhou Hymns”), 59
- Shirakawa Shizuka, 265n. 138
- Shuihudi, 24
- Shu jing*, 1, 53–54, 218–220, 252n. 16, 265n. 137, 288n. 28; dating of, 268nn. 168, 170, 269n. 8; *de* in, 284n. 72; Heaven in, 55, 58, 269nn. 8, 10; and learning from the past, 253n. 28; *li* (benefit) in, 200, 302nn. 140, 144; *li* (ritual) in, 276n. 8; “Qin shi,” 53; *ren* (benevolence) in, 184, 296n. 71; and scribal tradition, 24, 254n. 41; “Shun dian,” 237–238, 306nn. 5, 6; *tianxia* in, 285n. 96; *xiao* in, 190, 298nn. 97, 98; “Yao dian,” 237, 306nn. 5, 9; “Yu shu” (“Yao dian”), 237–238, 306n. 6
- Shun, 33, 235–238, 267n. 163
- Shuo wen*, 276n. 8
- Shuo yuan*, 52
- Si clan, 283n. 65
- Sima Qian (c. 145–90 B.C.E.), 27, 33, 249n. 1, 253n. 25, 255n. 43, 261n. 98, 270n. 19, 291n. 72. See also *Shiji*
- Sin Chou-yiu, 258n. 64
- six ethers (*liu qi*), 242, 244
- Smith, Kidder, 261n. 94
- Song dynasty: (420–479 C.E.), 33; (960–1278 C.E.), 28, 256n. 55
- Song, state of, 61, 79–80, 109, 142, 200, 250n. 12, 283n. 65; and Chu, 127, 260n. 90, 283n. 56; domestic turmoil, 285n. 94, 288n. 27, 300n. 106, 301nn. 114, 124; hegemony of, 127; invaded, 108, 283n. 56, 285n. 94; and Jin, 228–229, 283n. 56, 289n. 43; and Lu, 92, 143; and peace conference (546 B.C.E.), 2, 4–5, 124, 131, 255n. 43, 282n. 48, 283n. 68; ruler’s authority challenged, 192; and Wu, 117; and Zheng, 250n. 10; and Zhou, 243–244, 307n. 24; in the *Zuo zhuan*, 32–33, 54
- Son of Heaven (*tianzi*), 60, 89, 102, 140, 228; ceremonial power of, 3, 108, 190; declining authority of, 3, 105–106, 110–111, 280n. 14, 305n. 2; in the early Chunqiu, 108–109; and hegemons, 3–4, 110–111, 279n. 7; related to the overlords, 2, 105, 190, 298n. 96; supremacy questioned, 110–111, 113. See also overlords; Zhou

- speeches, 7–9, 10–11, 13, 23, 26, 48, 227, 229–231, 255n. 46; as historical genre, 245n. 31; recording of, 24–25, 254n. 42, 255nn. 43, 45; in the *Zuo zhuan*, 8, 25. See also *Guoyu*; *Yu shu*; *Zuo zhuan*: speeches in
- spirits (*gui*), 70, 72–73, 172, 183, 274n. 69; etymology of *gui*, 271n. 36; ghosts, 73, 273n. 57. See also ancestors; deities
- state: centralization of, 5, 137, 160, 292n. 83; and the family, 101–102, 190, 193, 195–198, 287n. 16, 298n. 95, 300n. 109; and vestiges of communal life, 140, 287n. 15; nature of, 2. See also administrative thought; altars of soil and grain; ministers; reforms; rulers
- Sui, state of: annexed by Qi, 279n. 9; Chu adversary and later satellite, 76, 273n. 60
- Sun Wu (fifth century B.C.E.?), 267n. 163
- Sunzi bingfa*, 259n. 77
- “superior man.” See *junzi*
- taboo, 251n. 11
- Taibo (eleventh century B.C.E.), 117–118
- Takagi Satomi, 259n. 79
- Tan, state of, 130, 279n. 9
- Tang dynasty (618–906 C.E.), 27–28
- Tang, state of, 116
- Tang Shu (eleventh century B.C.E.), 111, 224, 254n. 42
- Teng, state of, 222, 225, 283n. 65
- thinkers, Chunqiu, 6, 205–206; belonging to aristocracy, 6, 11–12, 206; pursuing contradictory aims, 6, 137, 158–159. See also ministers
- thinkers, Zhanguo, 6, 10, 48–52, 132, 135, 162–163, 206–207, 213–214, 216. See also Hundred Schools
- tian*. See Heaven
- tian ming*. See Heaven: decree of
- tianxia*. See All under Heaven
- timely action (*shi*), 64
- Traditionalist thought, 35–37. See also Confucian thought
- trustworthiness. See *xin*
- Tsuda Sakichi, 256n. 52, 258n. 64
- unity, political: quest for, 107, 132–134, 210–211; under the Western Zhou, 108
- uprightness (*zhi*), 185
- Van Ess, Hans, 256n. 57
- virtue. See *de*
- Wang Anshi (1021–1086 C.E.), 28, 256n. 55
- Wangcheng, 19, 222
- Wang Chong (c. 27–97 C.E.), 261n. 98. See also *Lun heng*
- Wang He, 16, 226, 254n. 33
- Wang Lanzhong, 248n. 9
- Wang Shumin, 261n. 98
- wanwu* (ten thousand things, all things), 34, 44, 264n. 127
- Wei: Chunqiu lineage and Zhanguo state, 222–223, 233, 241–242, 258n. 70; early Chunqiu state, 112; lineage in the Zhou domain, 172, 294n. 23
- Wei, state of, 61, 73, 86, 202, 224, 228, 272n. 49, 282n. 48, 283n. 65, 304n. 9; decline of the ruler's authority in, 4, 286n. 6; expulsion of Lord Xian (559 B.C.E.), 86, 139, 250n. 12, 270n. 23, 286nn. 4, 6; and Jin, 111, 116, 280n. 19, 285n. 94; and Lu, 143; prediction about, 222; restored by Lord Huan of Qi, 109, 280n. 17; size of, 193, 300n. 109; succession struggle, in, 193, 291n. 70, 300nn. 107, 110; in the *Zuo zhuan*, 32–33, 54
- Wei Juxian, 258n. 73
- Wei Zhao (204–273 C.E.), 261n. 98
- wen* (culture), 55, 239–240
- Wen. See meetings, inter-state
- Western Zhou. See Zhou
- wisdom (*zhi*), 34, 44, 176–180, 259n. 76. See also cleverness (*min*)

- women, 268n. 171; underrepresented in the *Zuo zhuan*, 8, 54
- Wu, state of, 83; as “barbarians,” 83, 116–118, 130, 281n. 37, 282n. 43; and Chu, 117, 178, 285n. 93; hegemony of, 5, 116–118, 125, 131–132, 282n. 45; and Jin, 281n. 37, 282n. 48, 285n. 93; and Lu, 117–118, 282n. 44; nonritual behavior of, 117–118, 281n. 37; and Qi, 285n. 93; rise of, 129–130; ruler’s authority, 286n. 3; and Yue, 117, 131–132, 250n. 10, 271n. 30; in the *Zuo zhuan*, 8, 32–33, 54
- Wu Qi (d. 381 B.C.E.), 225, 241–242, 258n. 64, 306n. 17, 18
- Wu Xifei, 255n. 50
- Xia dynasty (c. 2000–1600 B.C.E.), 43, 58, 73, 78, 272n. 48, 284n. 79
- xian* (dependencies, later districts), 5, 43, 238, 279n. 3
- xiao* (filial piety, filiality), 51, 165, 179, 187–199, 204, 214–215, 235–236; as ancestral worship, 165, 189, 191, 197, 214, 298n. 90; and *de*, 297n. 87; disappearance in the *Chunqiu*, 187–188; as ethical term, 179, 189, 195, 300n. 113; and *kao* (deceased father), 189, 298n. 89; and lineage cohesiveness, 189, 192, 194–195, 214, 299n. 104; and nurturing the parents, 188, 197–198, 297n. 88; occurrences in the *Zuo*, 37–38, 261n. 95, 297n. 84; original meaning of, 188–189; reinterpretation by Confucius, 165, 197–199, 215, 301n. 126; and Son of Heaven, 190, 298nn. 96, 98, 299n. 99; and strengthening ruler’s authority, 189–190, 192–194, 198–199, 214, 300n. 110; —, role weakened, 192, 214; as “subversive” virtue, 195–197, 215
- xiao ren* (“petty man”), 166–169, 199, 201–202
- xin* (trustworthiness), 87, 111, 120–122, 148–149, 152, 177–178, 183, 235, 282n. 49, 288n. 41; in international relations, 111, 120, 283n. 56; and loyalty, 150–152; as ministerial virtue, 148, 288n. 41; and obedience, 146–149, 288n. 41, 289n. 43; reciprocal nature of, 120, 288n. 41; role questioned, 149, 289n. 44; toward deities, 76–77, 81–83, 183, 273n. 61. *See also* faithfulness; loyalty; reverence
- Xing, state of, 61; restored by Lord Huan of Qi, 109, 280n. 17
- Xin xu*, 52
- Xu, state of: Chu’s neighbor, 175; Zheng’s neighbor, 60, 109
- Xue, state of, 79–80, 283n. 65
- Xu Fuguan, 264n. 128
- Xugou, state of, 111, 280n. 16
- Xunzi (c. 305–218 B.C.E.), 49, 55–56, 104, 153, 164, 210, 244, 306n. 17
- Xu Renfu, 257n. 58, 265n. 132
- Yan, state of, 286n. 6; in the *Zuo zhuan*, 8
- Yang, state of, 112
- Yang Bojun, 221, 248n. 11, 258n. 72, 266n. 155, 272n. 46, 283n. 64, 284nn. 73, 79
- Yanling, battle of, 4, 114
- Yanzi chunqiu*, 52, 249n. 19, 267n. 164, 278n. 39
- Yao, 33, 235–237, 267n. 163
- Yao Nai (1732–1815 C.E.), 258n. 64, 284n. 73
- Ye Mengde (1077–1148 C.E.), 28, 30, 256n. 55
- Ye Shi (1150–1223), 262n. 102
- yi* (ceremonies). *See* ceremonial decorum
- yi* (propriety/righteousness), 96, 129, 175–176, 187, 199–200, 201–202, 230, 241, 243, 294n. 35
- Yi (ethnic group), 143, 173, 247n. 7
- Yi, state of, 18
- Yi jing*. *See* *Zhouyi*
- Yin Xian (first century B.C.E.), 258n. 64
- yin-yang*, 44, 264n. 128, 307n. 22
- Yoshimoto Michimasa, 41, 262n. 102, 105, 280n. 14

- You Ruo (518–? B.C.E.), 198
- Yu (Shun's "dynasty"), 78, 284n. 79
- Yu, state of, 22, 112, 120, 273n. 61
- Yuan dynasty (1278–1368 C.E.) 32
- Yue, state of, 117, 131–132, 222,
250n. 10; hegemony of, 5, 248n. 8;
ruler's authority, 286n. 3; in the *Zuo
zhuan*, 8, 32–33, 54
- Yu Qing (third century B.C.E.), 49,
306n. 17
- Yushi chunqiu*, 49
- Yu shu* (Speech Document), 24
- Zeng, state of, 43, 73
- Zeng Can (505–436 B.C.E.), 306n. 17
- Zeng Shen (fifth century B.C.E.), 306n. 17
- Zha Changguo, 188–189, 298n. 88
- Zhang Binglin (1869–1936), 255n. 50
- Zhang Cang (d. 152? B.C.E.), 258n. 64,
306n. 17
- Zhang Duansui, 249n. 20
- Zhang Erguo, 283n. 70
- Zhang Handong, 233
- Zhanguo ce*, 28, 157, 255n. 45, 293n. 109
- Zhanguo texts, 20, 217–219
- Zhang Yiren, 40, 262n. 101, 263n. 109
- Zhang Zhenglang, 45
- Zhao Boxiong, 287n. 9
- Zhao Fang (1319–1369 C.E.), 32–33
- Zhao Guangxian, 245–246
- Zhao Kuang (eighth century C.E.), 28,
256n. 54
- Zhao Yingshan, 265n. 138
- Zhao Zhiyang, 304n. 11
- Zheng, state of, 69–70, 74–75, 97, 201,
222–223; administration of, 97, 100;
and Chen, 112, 185; and Chu, 123,
282n. 49; decline of the ruler's author-
ity in, 4, 192, 286n. 6, 300n. 106;
destruction, of, 222, 224, 277n. 23,
304n. 8; domestic turmoil in, 29,
147–148, 251n. 13, 258n. 66,
269n. 14, 273n. 57, 285n. 94, 293n. 19,
300n. 107, 301nn. 114, 123; foreign
pressure on, 123–124, 283n. 67; good
fortune predicted, 97, 224, 277n. 23,
304n. 6; and Jin, 100, 113, 123, 168–
169, 223, 282n. 49; peace conference
in, (541 B.C.E.), 4–5, 124, 131,
267n. 160; shifting alliances of, 119,
123–124, 131, 282n. 49, 284n. 88,
285n. 94; and Song, 250n. 10; and
Xu, 60, 109; and Zhou, 3, 109; in the
Zuo zhuan, 32–33, 54
- Zheng Qiao (1104–1162 C.E.), 28,
256n. 55
- zhi*. See wisdom
- zhong* (loyalty), 2, 87, 150, 205, 289n. 45;
absence from Western Zhou texts, 149,
289n. 45; in bronze inscriptions, 47; as
devotion, 76, 149; as reciprocal virtue,
149, 289n. 47. See also loyalty
- Zhong Yong (eleventh century B.C.E.), 118
- Zhou: house of, 78, 108–109, 144, 222–
223, 247n. 7, 284n. 79; and nine
caldrons, 222, 245, 304n. 9; royal
domain, 81, 96, 175; —, internal
turmoil, 19, 110, 242–243, 263n. 107,
271n. 30, 299n. 105, 307n. 21; —,
and Jin, 110, 227–229, 242–243,
280n. 14; —, in the *Zuo zhuan*, 32–
33, 250n. 5; scribal tradition in, 24;
—, texts, 1, 9, 20, 149, 217–218,
268n. 170, 285n. 96, 289n. 45; views
of *de*, 126, 175, 180–181; —, of deities
and divination, 71–72, 270n. 17,
272n. 39, 274n. 69; —, of Heaven, 55,
58–60, 66; —, of *junzi*, 166; —, of *li*
(benefit), 200; views of *ren*, 184; —,
world order, 105–107; —, of *xiao* and
its role, 187–191; Western Zhou, 1–2;
—, political system and thought, 3,
106, 108, 158–159, 189–191, 298n.
95; —, ritual and ceremonies, 92, 103,
117, 189–190, 276n. 8; —, ruler's
authority in, 175, 189–190, 299n. 98.
See also *li* (ritual): and Zhou ritual
reform; Son of Heaven
- Zhou world, 2, 60, 133–134. See also
Huaxia
- Zhouyi*, 1, 86–87, 145–146, 200,
261n. 94; commentaries on, 244

- Zhu, state of, 111, 200–201, 283n. 65
Zhuangzi, 13
 Zhu Fenghan, 266n. 146, 290n. 60
zhuhou. See overlords
Zhushu jinian, 250n. 7, 258n. 65
 Zhu Xi (1130–1200 c.e.), 103, 199, 258n. 64, 261n. 92, 276n. 1, 302n. 137
 Zhu Yizun, 258n. 64
 Zi clan, 283n. 65
 Zi Xia (507–? B.C.E.), 241, 258n. 64, 307n. 18
 Zuo Qiuming (fifth century B.C.E.?), 27–28, 40, 256nn. 52, 53, 54, 261n. 98, 262n. 106
Zuo zhuan, 7, 13–15, 53–54, 128, 146, 157, 206, 247n. 6, 255n. 43, 281n. 29, 287n. 15, 290n. 57; accuracy of, 18–19, 227, 252n. 19; agenda of, 260n. 90, 261n. 92; —, ritualism in, 23, 91, 244, 254n. 38, 260n. 90, 276n. 6; authenticity of, 28–29; author(s) of, 14–15, 18, 22–23, 27–29, 32, 34, 150, 199, 206, 227, 257nn. 59, 60, 258n. 64, 295n. 50; and *Chunqiu shiyu*, 50–51; concept of *junzi* in, 166, 168, 170, 294n. 20; dating of, 15, 27–34, 226, 256nn. 54, 55, 56, 257n. 58, 259n. 78; *de* in, 184, 286n. 61; grammar, of, 20, 34, 217–220, 253n. 26, 257n. 60, 303n. 8; and *Guoyu*, 28, 40, 261n. 98, 100, 262n. 102; Heaven and deities in, 57, 67, 79–80, 83–85; interpolations in, 30–31, 38, 233–246, 257n. 63, 261n. 97, 265n. 137, 305n. 2; interpretative devices in, 21–23, 234, 249n. 1; language of, 31–34, 259nn. 75, 79; and learning from the past, 253n. 29; *li* (benefit) in, 199–200, 203; and the Lu *Chun qiu*, 15, 26–27, 41, 218, 234, 250n. 10, 251n. 11, 252n. 16, 253n. 30, 255n. 50, 256nn. 51, 54; and *Mencius* compared, 50–51; narrator (“superior man”), 11, 23, 28, 100, 218, 224, 254n. 37, 303n. 7; and the quest for unity, 134–135; reliability of, 7, 14–15, 34–39, 206, 261n. 94; *ren* in, 185–186; sources of, 7, 14–17, 19–20, 22–23, 206, 220, 227–231, 249n. 1, 252nn. 18, 22, 253nn. 24, 27, 254n. 39, 262n. 102, 304n. 6; speeches in, 7–9, 10–11, 13–14, 25–26, 53–54, 176, 206, 259n. 81; thought of, 249n. 16, 20; *tianxia* in, 285n. 96; transmitters of, 233–234, 238, 241, 256n. 54, 261n. 97; *xiao* in, 188, 193, 297n. 84; *zhong* (loyalty) in, 149–150, 155. See also *Chun qiu*; predictions; speeches

About the Author

Yuri Pines, Ph.D., is a lecturer at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Department of East Asian Studies. Previous publications include “Intellectual Change in the Chunqiu Period,” *Early China* (1997), “The Search for Stability: Late Ch’un-ch’iu Thinkers,” *Asia Major* (1997), and “‘The One That Pervades the All’ in Ancient Chinese Political Thought: The Origins of ‘The Great Unity’ Paradigm,” *T’oung Pao* (2000). *Foundations of Confucian Thought* is his first book.