

J. Bruce Jacobs, "Whither Taiwanization? The Colonization, Democratization and Taiwanization of Taiwan," *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 14, no. 4 (2013): 567–586.

3. J. Bruce Jacobs, "Taiwan and South Korea: Comparing East Asian's Two 'Third-Wave' Democracies," *Issues and Studies: A Social Science Quarterly on China, Taiwan and East Asian Affairs* 43, no. 4 (2007): 227–260; and J. Bruce Jacobs, "Two Key Events in the Democratization of Taiwan and South Korea: The Kaohsiung Incident and the Kwangju Uprising," *International Review of Korean Studies* 8, no. 1 (2011): 29–56.



John A. Rapp. *Daoism and Anarchism: Critique of State Autonomy in Ancient and Modern China*. Contemporary Anarchist Studies.

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Throughout most of its known history, China was a monarchic state, and, in the eyes of many, it was a paradigmatic monarchic state. While the actual power of kings and emperors varied in time and space, the ideology of monarchism—namely, the conviction that all under heaven should be ruled by a single, omnipotent sovereign who should preside over a powerful bureaucracy—remained intact. Yet it would be patently wrong to identify the entire Chinese political or intellectual history as merely a manifestation of uninhibited Oriental despotism. Actually, Chinese political thought had a powerful countercurrent of strong and pointed criticism of individual rulers and of interventionist state apparatus. A few of the most radical critics even questioned the very legitimacy of the monarchic rule and of the organized state in general; their views strongly resonate with modern anarchist thought. Although historically these radical critics remained a tiny minority, their ideas might have been conducive to the acceptance of anarchist ideology in China at the beginning of the twentieth century. These ideas may be of relevance to current critics of the state in China and elsewhere.

The history of China's anarchism—from its origins to current attempts to revitalize it—has not been heretofore systematically addressed in a single study; hence, publication of John Rapp's *Daoism and Anarchism* could have become a most welcome addition to the Sinological library. Unfortunately, the book is disappointing. In particular, its first part, dealing with Daoist philosophy, is so full of inaccuracies that it cannot be recommended to any scholar interested in the supposed anarchist strands in so-called Daoist thought. This failure, in addition to manifold methodological weaknesses and an inadequate understanding of

primary sources, invalidates the book in general, even though its second part, which deals with anarchism in modern and current China, is undoubtedly stronger than the first. Actually, the book improves from chapter to chapter, so the last two—which deal with extra-Party and inner-Party neoanarchist critiques of the state in the People’s Republic of China—are, indeed, the best; they are well written and are highly informative. However, in what follows, I shall focus exclusively on the first part, which is essential for the author’s project to “help non-China specialists to see anarchism as not just a Euro-American concept” (p. 3) and which is, unfortunately, the weakest.

Weaknesses of Rapp’s first chapters are manifold. To begin with, they are written so haphazardly that one may well believe that the manuscript was never edited by either the author or the publisher. The chapters are full of inaccuracies and typos. These include wrong transliterations (e.g., Shen Nong 神農 and Xu Xing 許行 are consistently transliterated as Shen Nung and Xiu Xing; Empress Lü 呂后 loses the umlaut to become Empress Lu [pp. 96, 247]), incorrect dates (e.g., 141–187 C.E. for the reign dates of Emperor Wu of Han [漢武帝, r. 141–87 B.C.E.], or incomprehensible ca. 220 B.C.E.–62 C.E. for the Wei-Jin period [魏晉, 220–420 C.E.]), and odd syntaxes, for example, on p. 22, where a single sentence comprises no fewer than 132 words. At times, Rapp’s statements are simply misleading, for example, when he attributes to unnamed opponents an argument that “separation of Daoism into *daoja* (philosophical Daoism) and *daojiao* (Daoist teaching, for example, alchemical and religious traditions) is itself only a later concept of the historian Sima Qian (165–110 B.C.E.)” (p. 8). This sentence is doubly wrong: First, Rapp means not Sima Qian 司馬遷 but his father, Sima Tan 司馬談; and, second, Sima Tan did not “separate Daoism” into “*daoja* and *daojiao*,” but was arguably the first to define *daoja* as scholastic lineage.¹ Making two obvious mistakes in a single sentence is not a good start for the book, and, unfortunately, many more occur in the following pages (see more below).

Factual inaccuracies aside, what annoys the present reviewer most are the book’s major methodological problems. For instance, Rapp appears singularly preoccupied with proving that original Daoism fits the true and genuine anarchist thought. The proof is most curious: In chapter 1, the author argues that the anarchist ideas of early Daoists (referring primarily to the *Laozi* 老子 and *Zhuangzi* 莊子) were “fully explicated” by “anarchist” thinkers from the Wei-Jin period (pp. 32–33), which should confirm the original anarchist inclinations of preimperial Daoist thinkers. Chapter 2 goes back to the texts of the *Laozi* and *Zhuangzi*, from which the author selects several quasi-anarchist passages. Then, the entire third chapter is dedicated to the 1993 discovery of proto-*Laozi* fragments at the site of Guodian 郭店, Hubei; for Rapp, it is important to show that this discovery does not undermine his assertions that Daoism is “originally anarchist” (p. 79).

The problems of this search for original and true Daoism are manifold. Trying to discern the earliest layers of so-called Daoist thought is extremely difficult

because of the currently irresolvable debates concerning the nature and composition of the *Laozi* and *Zhuangzi*. In any case, such a discussion makes sense only when it is based on a systematic textual analysis of these texts rather than on an odd supposition that the third century C.E. thinkers understood the true nature of the *Laozi* better than, for example, much earlier authors of such texts as the *Guanzi* 管子 (fourth through second centuries B.C.E.), *Han Feizi* 韓非子 (third through second century B.C.E.)² or the so-called Huang-Lao 黃老 texts from Mawangdui (3rd–2nd century B.C.E.), each of which interprets the *Laozi* in distinctively non-anarchistic fashion. Similarly, the discussion of the Guodian corpus of texts should have been based on a systematic analysis of their content rather than on wild speculations about the reasons why the owner of the Guodian texts supposedly excised antistate passages from the original *Laozi*.³ Actually, the very idea that there is a true meaning of the *Laozi* is pointless. Any intellectually rich text allows many interpretations, and there is no justification for viewing some of them as either “distortion” or “full explication” (p. 33) of the text’s original views.

More generally, I think that Rapp’s view of Daoism as an ideologically coherent school of thought is misleading. Dividing early Chinese texts into competing schools may be reasonable for heuristic purposes, but it becomes counterproductive when it is used as a major analytical tool as in *Daoism and Anarchism*. There are two problems with Rapp’s narrow focus on Daoism as a school. First, eager to find an anarchist theory in Daoist thought, Rapp glosses over multiple sections of the *Laozi* (and, to a lesser extent, of the *Zhuangzi*) that run against his presupposition (see below). Second, by narrowing his search for anarchist ideas to the texts that he defines as Daoist, the author ignores multiple relevant passages in non-Daoist texts that disclose similar quasi-anarchistic leanings that he finds in the Daoist tradition. One most notable example is the utopia of “Great Unity” (or Great uniformity, *Da tong* 大同), embedded in a short section in the “Li yun” (禮運) chapter of the Confucian canonical *Liji* 禮記 (Records of ritual). The text depicts an ideal society in which there are neither family ties (“men were not attached to their parents only, nor did they treat as children only their own sons”) nor coercion; the society in which the people share their property and work for each other. These ideas surely resonate well with anarchist utopia elsewhere.⁴ The ideal of *Da tong* became a source of inspiration for a variety of utopian-minded statesmen and thinkers; it was employed by personalities as diverse as the Khitan emperor Yelü Deguang 耶律德光 (aka Liao Taizong 遼太宗, r. 928–947); the Taiping (太平, 1850–1864) rebels; the major late imperial reformer, Kang Youwei (康有為, 1858–1927); and twentieth-century revolutionaries, including Sun Yatsen (孫逸仙, 1866–1925) and Mao Zedong (毛澤東, 1893–1976).⁵ The *Da tong* utopia also had a particularly considerable impact on early twentieth-century Chinese anarchists.⁶ By ignoring it altogether, Rapp significantly impoverishes his discussion.

Another aspect of my disagreement with Rapp’s methodology has to do with the thinness of his study. In an important recent article, Paul R. Goldin called for a

“thick description” of classical Chinese philosophy, namely, paying attention to the social, political, and ideological context of the texts; their rhetorical devices; vocabulary; and so on.⁷ Rapp’s study is diametrically opposite this approach: He deracinates the texts from their environment and pays more attention to their putative similarities with, for example, ideas exposed by Max Stirner (1806–1856), Mikhail Bakunin (1814–1876), and Piotr Kropotkin (1842–1921) than their relation to the realities of late preimperial or early imperial China. Complex historical questions, which could have required the author to modify some of his premises, are glossed over; for instance, the fascinating question of the impact of a supposedly anarchist Laozi on so-called legalist thinkers, most notably on Han Feizi, is not mentioned at all. Nor does the author try to assess the possible impact of Daoist criticism of the state on the practices of, for example, communities of religious Daoist believers, or on different rebel groups, including those that were explicitly inspired by Daoist ideology. Once again, the discussion appears much less engaging and stimulating than it could have been.

Abandoning the texts’ context is regrettable enough, but even on the level of pure textual analysis, Rapp’s discussion remains woefully inadequate. For the present reviewer, the oddest of Rapp’s choices was his occasional use of the English translation of the *Laozi* by Ursula K. Le Guin.⁸ This translation, performed by a person not knowledgeable in Chinese, may be an excellent book for those who want to study Le Guin’s thought, but it is inconceivable that a Sinologist should resort to it as a source for Laozi’s ideology.⁹ For instance, following Le Guin, Rapp cites *Laozi* 75:

People are starving.
The rich gobble taxes,
That’s why people are starving.

People rebel.
The rich oppress them,
That’s why people rebel. (p. 65)

This pseudo-translation has nothing to do with the original text:

People are starving, it is because too much of their grain is taken by taxes; hence they are starving. The people are unruly; it is because their superiors are too active; hence they are unruly.¹⁰

In the original *Laozi*, there is no accusation of “the rich” but just of “superiors” (*shang* 上); there is neither rebellion nor oppression but rather unruliness (*bu zhi* 不治) of the people and excessive activism (*youwei* 有爲) of the leaders. Thus, the text of Le Guin is just her own invention rather than translation from the original. To base an argument on this pseudo-translation, as Rapp does, is detrimental to the scholarly integrity of his study. Yet this choice of Le Guin may not be accidental. Eager to prove his point of the *Laozi*’s supposed anarchism, Rapp repeatedly selects those passages from the text that are conducive to his thesis and ignores the

others. Thus, Rapp never explains why the supposedly anarchist text, the *Laozi*, repeatedly advises the audience how to “attain All under Heaven” (*de tianxia* 得天下), how to “love the people and order the state” (*ai min zhi guo* 愛民治國), or how to stay “above the people” (*shang min* 上民), without causing commotion.¹¹ In my eyes, these are clearly ruler-oriented passages (as are many other in the text).¹² If Rapp thinks differently, then he should have at least made his points explicit.

I shall finish my review with a reference to what could be one of the laudable features of *Daoism and Anarchism*, namely, the translation of the short ninth-century text *Wunengzi* 無能子 (The master of no abilities). This text has not previously been translated into English, and the publisher’s blurb on Amazon.com features this translation as one of the major contributions of the book.¹³ The translation was performed by Rapp’s student Catrina Siu and edited by Rapp. A tolerable translation would, indeed, become one of the book’s major contributions. Alas, once again, the results are fairly disappointing.

Even a cursory look at the translation and a comparison with the excellently annotated text by Wang Ming 王明¹⁴ show almost unbelievable weakness on the part of the translators. To save the readers’ time, I shall focus on just a few examples. Thus, the stock phrase *luan chen zei zi* (亂臣賊子 rebellious ministers and murderous sons) is translated “chaotic ministers, thieves and rebels” (p. 242). The phrase “kowtowed in front of the horse and remonstrated” (*kou ma, jian yue* 叩馬諫曰) is translated most oddly as “grabbed hold of Ma Chen’s horse” (p. 241). Lord Lao (Lao Jun 老君, i.e., Laozi) is translated as “the old ruler” (p. 242). Most appalling and perhaps most ridiculous is the translation of Wang Mang (王莽 45 B.C.E.–23 C.E.) as “King Meng” (p. 249). Being unable to identify so prominent a figure in Chinese history would be inexcusable even for an undergraduate student.

Persistent weaknesses of *Daoism and Anarchism* invalidate this book as a source for premodern origins of Chinese anarchism. Let us hope that future research will address this fascinating topic more adequately.

Yuri Pines

Yuri Pines 尤锐 is the Michael W. Lipson professor of Asian studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. His major publications include *The Everlasting Empire: Traditional Chinese Political Culture and Its Enduring Legacy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012) and *Envisioning Eternal Empire: Chinese Political Thought of the Warring States Era* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2009).

NOTES

1. *Shiji*, by Sima Qian 司馬遷 et al., annotated by Zhang Shoujie 張守節, Sima Zhen 司馬貞, and Pei Yin 裴駟 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1997), *juan* 130: 3288–3292. For more on Sima Tan’s role in classification of China’s scholastic lineages, see Kidder Smith, “Sima Tan and the Invention of Daoism, ‘Legalism,’ et cetera,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 62, no. 1 (2003): 129–156. For the *Daojiao* (Daoist religion, as distinguished from Daoist school of thought), see, e.g., Gil Raz, *The Emergence of Daoism: Creation of Tradition*, Routledge Studies in Taoism 3 (London: Routledge, 2011).

2. To recall, the *Han Feizi* is the first known text to incorporate two exegetical chapters on the *Laozi*: “Jie Lao” 解老 and “Yu Lao” 諭老. For the discussion of both, see Sarah A. Queen, “*Han Feizi* and the Old Master: A Comparative Analysis and Translation of *Han Feizi* Chapter 20, ‘Jie Lao,’ and Chapter 21, ‘Yu Lao,’” in *Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Han Fei*, ed. Paul R. Goldin (New York: Springer Publishing, 2013), pp. 197–256.

3. Rapp follows an early erroneous identification of the occupant of the Guodian Tomb 1 as a teacher of the heir apparent of the state of Chu 楚; he then opines that the teacher made selections from the *Laozi* that “would best aid his goal of influencing his student to rule less harshly once he succeeded the throne” (p. 84). Actually, if Rapp had read the Guodian corpus more carefully, he would find some stronger cases for radical criticism of the political order therein, including the phrase that echoes the *Zhuangzi*: “He who steals a belt buckle is executed; he who steals a state becomes a regional lord; ‘benevolence’ and ‘righteousness’ are placed at the regional lords’ gates.” See “Yu cong 4” (語叢, Collected sayings) section of the Guodian corpus, slips 8–9 (Li Ling 李零, *Guodian Chujuan jiaodu ji* 郭店楚簡校讀記 [Rev. ed., Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2002], p. 44); cf. *Zhuangzi jinzhu jinyi* 莊子今注今譯, annotated by Chen Guying 陳鼓應 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1994), “Dao Zhi” 盜跖 29: 790; cf. *Zhuangzi*, “Qu qie” 祛箠 10: 257. This phrase suggests that the owner of the Guodian corpus did not eschew a radically critical stance toward political power.

4. *Liji jijie* 禮記集解, compiled by Sun Xidan 孫希旦 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1995), “Li yun” 21.9: 582.

5. See articles in Lev P. Deliusin and Lilia N. Borokh, eds., *Kitajskie Sotsial'nye Utopii* (Moscow: Nauka Publishers, 1987).

6. See, e.g., Yelena Yu. Staburova, *Anarkhizm v Kitae, 1900–1921* (Moscow: Nauka Publishers, 1983), passim.

7. Paul R. Goldin, “Introduction: Toward a Thick Description of Chinese Philosophy,” in Paul R. Goldin, *After Confucius: Studies in Early Chinese Philosophy* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005), pp. 1–18.

8. Le Guin, *Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching: A Book about the Way and the Power of the Way* (Boston, MA: Shambhala Publications, 1998).

9. For a pointed criticism of Le Guin's and other pseudo-translations of the *Laozi* into English, see Paul R. Goldin, “Those Who Don't Know Speak,” *Asian Philosophy* 12,3 (2002): 183–195.

10. 民之饑，以其（上）食稅之多，是以饑。民之難治，以其上之有爲，是以難治。 *Boshu Laozi jiaozhu* 帛書老子校注, compiled and annotated by Gao Ming 高明 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996) 77 (75): 192, following Wang Bi recession. The first 上 does not appear in both Mawangdui recessions.

11. See, respectively, *Boshu Laozi*: 29: 377; 48: 57; 10: 265 (for the latter, see also *Guodian Laozi A*, slips 18–19); 66: 146 (appears also in *Guodian Laozi A*, slips 3–4).

12. See my discussion in Yuri Pines, *Envisioning Eternal Empire: Chinese Political Thought of the Warring States Era* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2009), pp. 36–38.

13. The blurb inexplicably refers to *Wunengzi* as “Buddhist anarchist tract” (see <<http://www.amazon.com/dp/1441178805>>).

14. *Wunengzi jiaozhu* 無能子校注, compiled by Wang Ming 王明 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1997).