BODIES, LINEAGES, CITIZENS, AND REGIONS:
A REVIEW OF MARK EDWARD LEWIS’
THE CONSTRUCTION OF SPACE IN EARLY CHINA

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_The Construction of Space in Early China_ is a monumental volume.¹ Few studies can match its breathtaking breadth, its richness of detail, its perfection of organization or—most notably—its continual display of its author’s awesome erudition. In five hundred closely printed pages, Mark Edward Lewis touches upon an extraordinary variety of topics, ranging freely from medicine to political philosophy and from popular customs to legal codes. He takes the reader down into the tombs and up into the heavens, visits the marketplace and ascends imperial towers and city walls, enters the human body and calls on the emperor’s harem. Lewis incorporates in his study almost every imaginable kind of evidence, from military treatises to tomb wills, from odes and rhapsodies to administrative documents, and from philosophical texts to popular almanacs. His 120 pages of footnotes and 40 pages of “Works Cited” provide a useful overview of the secondary literature in Chinese, Japanese and Western European languages. All this makes _The Construction of Space_ an indispensable volume for any student of early and, more broadly, traditional Chinese history.

_The Construction of Space_ is a complex book. It is ostensibly a study of the conceptualization of spatial units by Chinese thinkers from the Warring States (453–221 B.C.E.)² period through the end of the Han dynasty (206 B.C.E.—C.E. 220). Lewis shows that each spatial unit—from human body to the world—was considered a subordinate part of the larger whole, and that each likewise comprised smaller components, which had to be hierarchically ordered and subordinated to the encompassing center. He skillfully demonstrates that on every level partiality was associated with inferiority, while universality and the ability to encompass different units were linked with leadership. The all-encompassing imperial order presumed the primacy of universality, but it did not require uniformity.

². Hereafter all dates are Before Common Era, unless indicated otherwise.

Internal divisions within each inferior spatial unit preserved differences while allowing for the proper functioning of the hierarchically organized whole. The desire to achieve the utmost unity while maintaining internal divisions within this unity became a source of ongoing tension between the theory and practice of spatial constructions on each level. These tensions, in turn, may be adduced to explain much of the social, political and intellectual dynamics of early China, as Lewis brilliantly demonstrates.

Yet to summarize the book in this way, as the author modestly does in both “Introduction” and “Conclusion,” fails to do justice to Lewis’s enterprise. On the way to its stated goal of presenting ancient Chinese thinkers’ concepts of space, *The Construction of Space* becomes a truly encyclopedic endeavor. Even the most cursory review of the book’s topics will illustrate its immense breadth. Chapter 1, “The Human Body,” touches upon the philosophical meaning of the body and self-cultivation; the body as a replica of the state and the cosmos; the body’s internal divisions (its organs of sense, energies, skeleton, skin and shadow); the body and the spirit; sexual intercourse; medical treatment and treatment of the corpse; physiognomy; and clothing. Chapter 2, “The Household,” discusses family composition; kinship structures; roles of guests and retainers; patterns of residence and of land ownership; ways of partitioning the household; gender relations and relations between the family and the lineage; legal codes and norms of kinship responsibility; social divisions of labor and mourning systems; and ritual functions of tombs and of ancestral temples. Chapter 3, “Cities and Capitals,” surveys early Chinese city-states, larger urban centers of the Warring States period, and the imperial capitals. It touches upon the activities of capital-dwellers of the Chunqiu period (722–453); city architecture and layout during the Warring States; the conceptualization of the ruler’s authority and the life of the marketplace; ritual developments from the Qin (221–207) to the Later Han; and poetical views of the Han capitals. Chapter 4, “Regions and Customs,” discusses critiques of popular customs in the philosophical literature of the Warring States; conceptualizations of regional divergences and of regional cultures by pre-imperial and early imperial thinkers; regional administration and the reemergence of local identities under the Han; the power of the patrilines; local cults; and the depiction of different regions in the Han and post-Han rhapsodies. Chapter 5, “World and Cosmos,” depicts different models of cosmos; the structure of the “Bright Hall” (*ming tang* 明堂); the *liu bo* 六博 game; mirrors; spatial views of the *Shanhai jing* 山海經 authors, and Chinese images of the Other.

Even this brief survey shows Lewis’s intellectual audacity. Few other scholars in the field would dare to address so many disparate topics in
their research, and I can think of no single-authored monograph—with the possible exception of Lewis’s own earlier magnum opus, Writing and Authority in Early China—that approaches the scope of The Construction of Space. Lewis’s ability to navigate across several centuries’ heterogeneous data and the cross-currents of multiple academic disciplines is truly exceptional. Ultimately, The Construction of Space may be read as a reference book, a useful companion that at times supplements and at times supersedes the Cambridge History of Ancient China and the Qin-Han volume of the Cambridge History of China.

These strengths notwithstanding, Lewis’s bid to produce both a focused study and a comprehensive reference book has its price. Simultaneously attaining comprehensiveness and textbook clarity on one hand, and scholarly depth and scientific soundness on the other is a challenging task, and it is doubly so when the attempt is made within a rigid format of the kind selected by Lewis. The author has tried to introduce to his audience a great variety of issues, many of them not adequately dealt with in Occidental Sinology; he has also tried to subordinate these particular discussions to his master narrative. The resultant tension between the whole and its parts—not unlike that revealed by Lewis in ancient Chinese views of spatial order—results in more than a few setbacks. The sheer complexity of some of the topics raised by Lewis requires much more detailed discussion than was possible upon the Procrustean bed of the chapter or section allowed. Such issues as the evolution of early Chinese kinship systems, or the formation and fluctuation of local identities, are so complex and important that they may well require separate monographs; and even the most brilliant scholar cannot adequately address them in a few pages, even if margins and illustrations are dispensed with, as in Lewis’s book. The inevitable compression of these topics results in a loss of important nuances and an artificial flattening of the data presented.

To illustrate this flattening, I shall focus on a single example from Chapter 4. Lewis discusses Han depictions of Qin rule as a creation of “custom” (su), a largely pejorative term that highlighted the limitations and weaknesses of regional cultures. Lewis brings together, among other passages, two statements that he regards as similar: one by Jia Yi 賈誼 (ca. 200–168) and a second by the authors of the Huainanzi 淮南子 (composed ca. 140). Jia Yi says:

Lord Shang (Shang Yang 商鞅, d. 338) turned against ritual and duty, abandoned proper human relations, and put his whole heart and mind into expansion. After practicing this for two years, Qin’s customs grew worse by the day.

The Huainanzi states:

The customs of Qin consisted of wolflike greed and violence. The people lacked a sense of duty and pursued profit. They could be awed through punishments, but not transformed through goodness. . . . Lord Xiao (of Qin, 秦孝公, r. 361–338 B.C.E.) wanted to use his wolflike or tigerlike power to swallow up the feudal lords. The laws of Shang Yang were produced from this situation.

Lewis (pp. 206–8) treats the two texts as closely related in their approach to Qin, and he is certainly right insofar as both condemn Qin’s harshness and connect it with “customs.” Yet Lewis misses entirely the overt contradiction between the texts’ approaches. Jia Yi considers the badness of Qin customs not an intrinsic feature of this country, but a direct result of the corrupting impact of Shang Yang’s reforms. The Huainanzi, conversely, considers Qin people intrinsically bad, so that Shang Yang’s reforms were simply an adaptive mechanism and an outcome of, rather than the reason for, their badness. This very substantial difference between the two texts is entirely neglected in Lewis’s discussion, although it is certainly of great importance to our understanding of early Han political thought, especially when we consider that the Han rulers established their capital in the old Qin heartland. In the context of Lewis’s master narrative, this omission may be unproblematic, since both passages illustrate his thesis on negative attitudes toward regional “customs”; but the resultant simplification of two important texts is unwelcome.

Another problem with the format selected by Lewis is that it at times makes it difficult for a non-specialist audience to trace historical changes. The book’s systematic progression from smaller to larger spatial units is consciously patterned after the scheme presented in several important pre-imperial texts, such as “Da xue” 大學 (“Great Learning”) chapter of the Li ji 礼記, the Laozi 老子, and the “Zhi yi” 執一 (“Holding to the One”) chapter of the Lüshi chunqiu 呂氏春秋 (see pp. 3–5). Each of these texts treats orderly rule as emanating from the ruler’s body through larger concentric circles and extending ultimately to All under Heaven. Beautiful as they are, these idealized systems are largely ahistorical, and when employed in a historical study they result in significant distortions. At times, when Lewis is able to arrange his materials chronologically, as in Chapter 3 (“Cities and Capitals”) and especially in the section on the imperial capitals, his discussion truly excels. At times, however, Lewis’s presentation may well confuse the reader. Thus, his narrative of the development of the elite kinship units in Chapter 2 abruptly breaks off with the end of the Warring States period, only to reappear in Chapter 4, where the discussion begins in the Later Han period. This odd choice
not only interrupts what should have been a continuous narrative, but also results in a most infelicitous omission of the Early Han period from the overall discussion (see below). By abandoning a chronological principle of order for his book, Lewis let go the opportunity to clarify some of the crucial sociopolitical and intellectual developments during the period under discussion. That this sacrifice was made by one of the most sensitive historians of early China is truly regrettable in my eyes.

To summarize these general points, *The Construction of Space*, brilliant as it is, is hamstrung by two of its principles of composition: its (non-chronological) construction and of its (limited) space. Neither of these problems is serious enough to undermine the major thrust of Lewis’s arguments, but each weakens certain sections of the book. Lewis’s bold intellectual enterprise therefore yields mixed results. And yet, all criticisms aside, *The Construction of Space* creates an excellent opportunity for creative dialogue on many important topics that were previously given short shrift in most sinological studies in European languages. To illustrate the possibility of such dialogue, I shall focus in what follows on a few of my own points of disagreement with Lewis. I shall present critical comments on one section from each of the first four chapters of the book, hoping that these criticisms may be read not as an attack on a study that I greatly admire, but as an invitation for further discussion of some of the crucial issues that study has raised.

**Body, Politics and the Self**

Lewis begins his book with a discussion of the human body, the smallest spatial unit, but one that nonetheless comprised senses, viscera, energies, and other diverse elements requiring orderly organization. The author excels in depicting divergent views of this internal organization, elucidating parallels between those views and concepts of cosmic and political order. Somewhat more problematic is the first section of the chapter, “Discovery of the Body in the Fourth Century B.C.,” in which Lewis analyzes the formation of the body-oriented discourse of the middle Zhanguo period.

Lewis begins with a convenient summary of his findings. “The body became a central issue in Chinese thought in the fourth century B.C., when the school of Yang Zhu and the practice of self-cultivation described in the ‘Nei ye’ theorized it as the natural and necessary center for organizing space, and the Mencius and the Zuo zhuan presented it as the source of virtue and ritual order” (p. 14). Then, after a brief consideration of certain *Lun yu* antecedents, Lewis discusses the above four texts or traditions, presenting them in such a way as to emphasize a lineal
development from the Yang Zhu 楊朱 school through the Zuo zhuan. Lewis asserts that the “Nei ye” 內業 both “resembles” and “surpasses” “Yangist doctrines” (p. 20); that the Mencius (Mengzi) “is adapting an idea of qi borrowed from the ‘Nei ye’” (p. 27); while the Zuo zhuan, in turn, is engaged in a dispute with the Mencius (pp. 29–31) and modifies “Yangist” ideas (p. 34). Although minimally elaborated, these observations suggest a neat intellectual progression from Yang Zhu to the Zuo zhuan. The four fourth-century B.C.E. traditions are further credited with introducing “many of the fundamental themes for discussion of the body in Warring States and early imperial China” (p. 36).

I have two major points of disagreement with Lewis’s views as presented in this section. First, his neat narrative of an intellectual evolution in body-oriented discourse during the fourth century B.C.E. stands on shaky foundations. To validate his assertions, the author would have had to address in a more systematic way the thorny question of the proper dating of the texts and passages in question; otherwise, the discussion appears at times somewhat tenuous. For instance, Lewis’s analysis of the “Yangist” school is based largely on a few chapters from the third century B.C.E. Zhuangzi 莊子 and the Liushi chunqiu, in addition to the “Yang Zhu” chapter of the Liezi 列子, a text thought to have been composed in around the third century C.E. Even if these texts may securely be identified as belonging to a putative “Yangist” tradition, they may very well reflect developments within this tradition. They cannot be simply affirmed as antecedents of the Mengzi or the Zuo zhuan without further argument. As for the latter text, the supposition that it in toto reflects an ideology of the late fourth century B.C.E. strikes me as particularly disputable. The nature, dating, and particularly the ideological content of the Zuo zhuan are still hotly contested issues, and a reader would like to hear more of the reasons for Lewis’s confident placement of this text within the post-Mengzi ideological milieu, especially since elsewhere in The Construction of Space the Zuo zhuan is treated as a reliable source for Chunqiu history.4

4. For different approaches toward the dating, reliability and ideological contents of the Zuo zhuan, see, inter alia, David C. Schaberg, A Patterned Past: Form and Thought in Early Chinese Historiography, Harvard East Asian Monographs, 205 (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001) and Yuri Pines, Foundations of Confucian Thought: Intellectual Life in the Chunqiu Period, 722–453 B.C.E (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2002). Lewis relies heavily on the Zuo zhuan in the “City-State” section of Chapter 3 (see below); so only one hundred pages separate the Zuo zhuan as a Warring States polemical text from the Zuo zhuan as a reliable source for the sociopolitical and intellectual history of the Chunqiu period. This duality apparently reflects an evolution in Lewis’s views of the Zuo zhuan. In his first monograph, Sanctioned Violence in Early
Even if all of Lewis’s assumptions and assertions about the texts’ dating were correct, many of his examples of the possible dialogue among the texts are hardly convincing. The textual parallels that Lewis adduces as evidence of intertextual borrowing do not always prove contact between the texts in question. Different and unrelated intellectual traditions may share common vocabulary items without ever having influenced each other; they may also borrow from a common third source rather than directly influencing each other. To illustrate this point I shall focus on a single example of Lewis’s approach: his illustration of the supposed modification of “Yangist” ideas in the Zuo zhuan. Lewis bases his observation on a single passage (cited with slight modifications):

右師其亡乎！君子貴其身，而後能及人，是以有禮。今夫子卑其大夫而賤其宗，是賤其身也，能有禮乎？無禮，必亡。

“The commander of-the-right [Yue Daxin 樂大心] will perish. A true gentleman values his body/self and only then is able to reach others; hence he has ritual. Now, the Master [Yue Daxin] holds his fellow nobles in contempt and debases his kin: this means to debase his own body/self. How can he have ritual? Lacking ritual, he will surely perish.”

Lewis claims that this passage recalls “the Yangist arguments that a man becomes qualified to rule by placing supreme value on his own person,” although in the Zuo zhuan, unlike in Yang Zhu’s thought, “the care for one’s body is expressed through ritual” (p. 34). I consider this assertion extremely far-fetched. Rather than speaking of the “supreme value” of one’s body, the passage reflects a common strand of pro-ritual discourse in the Zuo zhuan, which abounds with predictions of doom for China (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), Lewis adopted the Zuo zhuan as a source for the history of the Chunqiu period, arguing that many of the Zuo zhuan anecdotes and speeches “have no moral message” and “depict a world alien or hostile to Zhanguo Confucianism” (p. 16). In Writing and Authority, by contrast, he argued that the aim of the Zuo zhuan was “to validate Ru teachings . . . through writing them into a narrative of the past,” while still asserting that the Zuo zhuan author(s) “had access to earlier records, and these may have served as the basis of anecdotes” (pp. 132 and 243 respectively). Lewis neither explains his reasons for changing his view of the Zuo zhuan nor refers to any secondary study that could have influenced his approach.

5. See Yang Bojun 楊伯峻, Chunqiu Zuozhuan zhu 春秋左傳注 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1981; hereafter the Zuo), Zhao 25, 1455. I modify Lewis’s translation on two important points. First, he translates you shi 右師, Yue Daxin’s official title, as if it were his personal name. Second, the term zong 宗 here refers not to the ancestors, but to the trunk lineage of Yue Daxin, the Sicheng 司城 lineage, which he disparaged in the conversation that led to the above criticism. Note that Yue Daxin established his own branch lineage, the Tongmen 桐門.
those who defy ritual norms. In this case, it is Yue Daxin’s careless and ritually inappropriate remarks to the visiting Lu 魯 noble that prompt the latter’s critical observation. The body figures here in two functions. First, it is the foundation of ritual behavior; Lewis elsewhere correctly identifies the importance of bodily performance for maintaining ritual (pp. 14–15). Second, its preservation should be of utmost concern to a noble. Although this latter aspect may superficially resemble Yang Zhu’s insistence on the body’s preservation as a supreme value, even this resemblance is misleading. Self-preservation (i.e., preserving one’s body) is an early topic in Chinese thought, antedating both Yang Zhu and the Zuo zhuan itself by centuries (see below). Yet while in Yang Zhu’s thought the notion of self-preservation was inextricably linked to an assault on the career-oriented life, this idea is absent from the above passage and from the Zuo zhuan in general. It is therefore unlikely that the Zuo zhuan authors knew of or were reacting to Yang Zhu’s views. On this analysis, much of Lewis’s discussion of the evolution of views of the body during the fourth century B.C.E. is open to dispute.

This observation brings me to a second weakness in Lewis’s account. This is his emphasis on the fourth century B.C.E. as the crucial period in the formation of the body-oriented discourse. While many of Lewis’s observations are doubtless correct, his neglect of earlier stages in the development of body-related views is infelicitous. The body was a focal point of concern by the Western Zhou (ca. 1046–771 B.C.E.) period, if not earlier. For instance, the use of the body in analogies for the political apparatus is attested already in some of the Western Zhou bronze inscriptions, such as those on the Shi Ke-xu gai 師克盉 and the Shi Xun-gui 師詢簋, where ministers are identified as the ruler’s “claws and teeth” or “limbs.” In other bronze inscriptions, we find a concern for personal

6. For the role of predictions in the Zuo zhuan narrative, see Schaberg, Form and Thought, 192–207 and passim; for the importance of ritual in the Zuo zhuan, see Pines, Foundations, 89–104.

7. “The king spoke to this effect: Shi Xun . . . your sage grand-father and late father were able to assist the former kings, acting as their limbs” 王若曰：師詢 . . .乃聖祖考克輔佐先王,作厥肱股; see Zhang Yachu 張亞初, Yin Zhou jinwen jicheng yinde 殷周金文集成引得 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 2001) 8.4342, p. 91. The characters for 肱股 gonggu are not clear. The compilers of Jinwen yinde 金文引得 (Nanning: Guangxi jiaoyu, 2002) leave them blank; see Vol. 1, #5062, 328. Shirakawa Shizuka 白川静 identifies them as zhao ya 爪牙 (“claws and teeth”); see Kinbun tsūshaku 金文通釋 (Kōbe: Hakutsuru bijutsukan, 1962–1984), vol. 31, #183, 710–12. For the Shi Ke-xu gai inscription, which identifies the king’s protectors as “claws and teeth,” see Jinwen yinde, Vol. 1, #5263, 341; for a similar figure see also the “Qifu” 祈父 ode in Mao shi zhengyi 毛詩正義 (Shisanjing zhushu 十三經注疏 ed., 1815; rpt. Beijing: Zhonghua, 1991), 11.1:433b (Mao 185). It is useful to keep in mind the ubiquity of corporeal metaphors for government: after all, we also speak of the “head of the government,” its “executive arm” and so on.
longevity and the protection of one’s body, both frequent subjects of the requests donors made of their ancestors in the so-called “auspicious words” (guci 樂辭). Finally, a third aspect of body-related discourse, namely the importance of the body for matters of ritual decorum, is apparent already in the Shi jing odes and certainly predates the Lun yu. Without considering all of these precedents, one cannot properly understand the novelty of the fourth century B.C.E. discourse.

What, then, was novel in the century on which Lewis focuses? Two lines of discourse can securely be identified as new departures in the middle Zhanguo period. On one of these developments, namely the elevation of the body to the position of a model for political or cosmic order or the center of the cosmos, I largely concur with Lewis’s analysis, and will therefore forego further discussion. Of more urgent concern is the other, probably earlier, strand of Warring States body discourse, namely the idea of body preservation as a political value and the linking of body preservation with the political career. It is on this topic that I would like to propose further qualifications of Lewis’s account.

The idea that one should preserve the body at the expense of political attainments is one of the most important intellectual developments of the Warring States period, as it eventually became a powerful argument in favor of disengagement from office-holding. In all likelihood, this idea appeared as a reaction to the shameless careerism of many Zhanguo shi 士, whose insatiability prompted plenty of critical remarks in late Warring States texts; the new view had a lasting impact on imperial political culture. Yet the origins of this position remain obscure. While its emergence was traditionally closely associated with the Laozi 老子, twentieth century skepticism with regard to the Laozi’s dating caused several scholars to reassess the role of this text in the evolution of the idea of disengagement from the career-oriented life. In particular, certain eminent scholars of Chinese thought, most notably Feng Youlan 馮友蘭


9. See, for example, “Xiang shu” 相鼠 in Mao shi 3.2:319 (Mao 52). In my view, as I explain in Foundations, 89–104, the ritual-related discourse of the Zuo zhuan also belongs to the intellectual milieu of the Chunqiu period.

10. For further discussion, see Pines, Envisioning Empire: Chinese Political Thought of the Warring States Period (453–221 B.C.E.) (forthcoming), Chapter 6; see also Aat Vervoorn, Men of the Cliffs and Caves: The Development of the Chinese Eremitic Tradition to the End of the Han Dynasty (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1990); Alan Berkowitz, Patterns of Disengagement: The Practice and Portrayal of Reclusion in Early Medieval China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000).
LEWIS’ CONSTRUCTION OF SPACE IN EARLY CHINA

(1895–1990) and Angus C. Graham (1919–1991), suggested that the idea of body preservation as a political value was first promulgated by Yang Zhu and his putative school.\(^\text{11}\) Graham’s identification of a few chapters in the Zhuangzi and Lüshi chunqiu as reflecting a “Yangist” tradition became extraordinarily influential among Western scholars, among them Lewis himself. It is in this regard that I find myself once again in disagreement with The Construction of Space.

Paul Goldin has recently offered a systematic analysis of the “Yangist” hypothesis, exposing its numerous weaknesses.\(^\text{12}\) I shall not repeat Goldin’s insightful arguments here, but will rather add a further reason for questioning the necessity of “Yangism,” namely the reassessment of the history of the Laozi. While the discovery at Guodian 郭店 of Laozi passages written before 278 B.C.E. did not resolve all controversies over the dating and nature of this much debated text, it is clear at the very least that the ideas found in the Guodian Laozi can be securely dated to the fourth century B.C.E.\(^\text{13}\) This means, among other things, that the Laozi’s concepts of the interaction between the body, the society and the cosmos, as well as its insistence on the importance of the body’s preservation, are also datable to that age.\(^\text{14}\) Moreover, the Guodian Laozi clearly juxtaposes self-preservation with political involvement:

名與身孰親？身與貨孰多？得與亡孰病？[是故]甚愛必大費，厚藏必厚亡。故知足不辱，知止不殆，可以長久。

11. For Feng Youlan’s interest in Yang Zhu and his putative school, see Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, translated by Derk Bodde (Peiping [Beijing]: Henry Vetch, 1937), 133–43. For Graham’s identification of putative “Yangist” thread in the Zhuangzi and Lüshi chunqiu, see his Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China (La Salle: Open Court, 1989), 53–64.


13. For controversies regarding the dating and the nature of the Guodian Laozi, see, inter alia, Ding Sixin 丁四新, Guodian Chu mu zhujian sixiang yanjiu 郭店楚墓竹簡思想研究 (Beijing: Dongfang, 2000), 1–85; Nie Zhongqing 聶中慶, Guodian Chu jian ‘Laozi’ yanjiu 郭店楚簡老子研究 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 2004); Edward L. Shaughnessy, “The Guodian Manuscripts and their Place in Twentieth-Century Historiography on the Laozi,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 65.2 (2005), 414–57. Insofar as the Guodian tomb can be securely dated to pre–278 B.C.E., it may be asserted that the ideas presented in the Guodian texts originated in the pre–300 B.C.E. milieu.

14. For interconnections between body and higher levels, see Laozi B 乙 in Guodian Chu mu zhujian 郭店楚墓竹簡, published by Jingmenshi Bowuguan 荊門市博物館 (Beijing: Wenwu, 1998), 125, slip 16 (parallel to Laozi 54 in Wang Bi’s 王弼 recension); for the quest for physical well-being, see Laozi B, 118, slip 12 (Wang Bi, par. 52); see also similar ideas in the Guodian Tai yi sheng shui 太一生水, which is closely related to the Laozi (125, slips 11–12).
What is more dearer to you: name or body? What is worth more: your body or goods? What plagues you more: gain or loss? [Thus], excessive attachments will surely bring great depletion; abundant stores are sure to bring great loss. Therefore, he who knows what is sufficient avoids humiliation; he who knows when to stop is not endangered; he is able to attain longevity.\(^\text{15}\)

This passage clearly juxtaposes body preservation with career-seeking (i.e., the pursuit of “name” and “goods”), and as such displays those ideas that are identified by Lewis as “Yangist.” Elsewhere, the Guodian recension proposes another “Yangist” idea according to which only he who prizes his body is worthy to rule the world.\(^\text{16}\) While this evidence does not rule out the possibility that a “Yangist” school existed in the Warring States, it serves to indicate the pivotal importance of the *Laozi* in the evolution of views of the body. It is regrettable, therefore, that Lewis preferred to adopt the outdated “Yangist” hypothesis instead of re-engaging the *Laozi*. It is possible that the bulk of *The Construction of Space* was written in the 1990s, prior to the publication of the Guodian texts; but even in that case some modification of the original arguments would have been of benefit to the readers. The omission of the *Laozi*, like the neglect of early antecedents of fourth century B.C.E. ideas, somewhat weakens Lewis’s otherwise engaging discussion.

**Lineage, Household and the State**

Chapter 2, “The Household,” is one of the most important portions of *The Construction of Space*, as it systematically addresses an issue long neglected by Western Sinologists, namely the composition and sociopolitical roles of kinship groups from the Western Zhou through the Han period. The dearth of Western studies on this topic, particularly for the pre-imperial period, contrasts markedly with the richness of Chinese and Japanese research, and Lewis’s discussion is a most laudable step toward redressing this shortcoming. Yet having decided to address in a single chapter a

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16. See *Laozi* B, *Guodian Chu mu*, 118, slips 6–8 (Wang Bi, par. 13). This section is damaged in the Guodian recension and therefore permits no resolution of the riddle of the *Laozi*’s message at the end of the passage. The lines allow two contradictory interpretations: “Only he who esteems/loves his body more than All under Heaven can be entrusted with All under Heaven” (故貴以身於天下, 若可託天下; *愛以身為天下者*, 若可寄天下); or, “Only he who forgets his body for the sake of All under Heaven deserves rule over the world” (see the summary of distinct views in Nie Zhongqing, *Guodian Chu jian ‘Laozi’,* 267–70). I prefer the former interpretation, which resonates with *Laozi* 26, where the ruler is warned against treating his body as “lighter” than the world.
great variety of issues, including those of gender inequality, legal codes, and mortuary practices, Lewis has inevitably sacrificed certain important details and inadvertently simplified certain of the complexities of historical processes. In what follows, I shall focus on two problems in Lewis’s discussion: first, his insufficient attention to the revolutionary changes in the nature and political role of elite kinship groups in the pre-imperial and early imperial periods; and, second, his neglect of the place of land ownership in the function of kinship groups.

I shall begin with a minor quibble. The choices Lewis has made in translating kinship terminology sometimes lead to confusion and imprecision. In particular, the adoption of the term “household” (jia 家 or hu 户) as a major analytical unit throughout the discussion is infelicitous. The household was indeed the single most important kinship group during the Warring States period, but this was certainly not the case for the preceding Chunqiu period. Lewis’s use of the term “extended household” for noble lineages of the Chunqiu period is therefore fairly misleading. This terminological choice creates an exaggerated impression of continuity in kinship structures over the two periods. A finer distinction between Chunqiu period lineages and Zhanguo households would have been of benefit to readers.

Terminological confusion is a common malady of studies of early Chinese social history. This confusion is partly a reflection of the notorious imprecision of our sources. In the Zuo zhuan, for instance, a single kinship unit can be designated shi 氏, zong 宗, zu 族, jia 家 and shi 室, sometimes in the same passage! To complicate matters further, the semantic field of certain kinship-related terms had profoundly changed during the period under discussion, creating significant problems for modern translators and interpreters. Lewis’s inaccuracies are therefore understandable;
but they could have been minimized, if not entirely avoided, if he had consulted more secondary literature on this topic, especially the seminal study of Zhu Fenghan 朱鳳瀚, *Studies on Shang and Zhou Family Formations*. Adopting some of Zhu’s definitions of the Zhou kinship units would have allowed Lewis to avoid both idiosyncratic definitions (for example, “kin with a common ancestor” rather than “trunk” or “high-ordered” lineage for *zongzu* 宗祖), or entirely wrong translations, such as “clan” for *shi* 氏, “lineage” (p. 94).20 Further engagement with recent scholarship might also have Lewis to an alternative to “household,” a term that is used confusingly throughout the discussion.

Lewis’s terminological imprecision can at times become fairly misleading, as when he states that in the *Zuo zhuan* the “extended households” of nobles are called either *jia* or *shi* 室 (p. 80). Even a glance at the text shows that this statement is incorrect. The term *jia* is only rarely used in the *Zuo zhuan* to designate a kinship unit; *shi* 室 is more frequent, but, as Lewis himself correctly notes, its usage is confined largely to the ruling houses and it rarely refers to the kinship units of ordinary nobles.21 One common term for noble kinship units in the *Zuo zhuan* is *shi* 氏 (lineage), which Lewis mentions only cursorily (p. 94). By ignoring this pivotal term, Lewis inadvertently creates an impression of similarity and continuity, if not identity, between Chunqiu noble lineages and Zhanguo elite households. The impression is supported by Lewis’s assertion that “from the Warring States into the Han the great household did not vanish but only changed form” (p. 82), by which he implies that the elite household essentially continued from Chunqiu times into the Han. This assertion, however, can—and should—be disputed.

one frequently reads that somebody’s *xing* 姓 is XX *shi*. See Yanxia 雁俠, *Zhongguo zaoqi xingshi zhidu yanjiu* 中國早期姓氏制度研究 (Tianjin: Guji, 1996).

20. A clan is a broad group, the agnatic links between the component units of which “are extremely remote and most likely fictionalized” (Watson and Ebrey, “Introduction,” 6). A lineage, however, is a “corporation” whose members hold property in common and have joint activities; this description applies aptly to the *shi* 氏. As for the clan, in the Chunqiu period the comparable term was *xing* 姓, the members of which shared only a mythological ancestor. For further details on the relevant definitions of kinship units, see Zhu Fenghan 朱鳳瀚, *Shang Zhou jiazu xingtai yanjiu* 商周家族形態研究 (Tianjin: Guji, 1990), especially 494–515. A revised edition of Zhu’s *magnum opus* was published by Tianjin Guji chubanshe in 2004.

21. The term *jia* appears in the *Zuo zhuan* 136 times in 102 passages. In 40 instances it appears as part of a personal name, while 30 times it is found in the compound *guojia* 國家, “state.” *Shi* appears 176 times in 136 passages; Lewis is right that in most cases it refers to the ruling house, although it is occasionally used as a designation of a noble lineage (e.g. *Zuo*, Cheng 7, 834; Cheng 16, 890), of a commoner household (Cheng 17, 898) or in its literal meaning, “room.” For further analysis of both terms, see Zhu Fenghan, *Shang Zhou jiazu xingtai*, 494–507.
The notion of continuity evaporates when we compare the Chunqiu noble lineages with the elite households of the Warring States period. The former acted as a clearly defined social, economic, religious and political entity. The lineage’s existence was based on three conditions: common possession of land, the existence of a lineage temple, and the lineage head’s holding of an official position within the state hierarchy. Loss of the office in most cases meant loss of the land allotment, without which a noble could no longer maintain his ancestral temple and inevitably descending to the status of a commoner. These conventions explain the singular authority of the head of the lineage, whose office was the key to the lineage’s survival and whose power over his kin was close to absolute. His relatives, including brothers and minor sons, were usually appointed to positions within the household alongside external appointees, the so-called “household servants” (jia chen 家臣). Lineages frequently maintained a common dwelling within the capital or outside it, sometimes living in walled compounds that acted as mini-fortresses. If one of the minor siblings was granted an appointment and the adjacent allotment (cai yi), he would establish a new branch lineage, which might eventually assert its independence from the maternal “trunk” lineage and even engage in violent struggle against it. This evidence suggests that the true glue holding the lineage together was the common land property rather than purely religious and ethical concerns.22

Two important features of the Chunqiu lineages distinguished them from the elite families of the Warring States. First was the cohesiveness of the former. The lineage was a political entity, and ties between its members came before all other political obligations. The Zuo zhuan abounds with stories of nobles whose high positions and even close personal relations with their lords did not prevent them from joining rebellious kin when lineage interests clashed with those of the ruler.23 Zha Changguo, who analyzed the pre-Confucian concept of xiao 孝 (“filiality”), even asserted that in religious and ethical matters the lineage member was

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23. See, for instance, the case of Hua Feisui 華費遂, the sima 司馬 of the state of Song 宋, who despite serious reservations had no choice but to join a rebellion of his kin against Lord Yuan 宋元公, r. 531–517. See Zuo, Zhao 20, 1409–10; 1414–15; Zhao 21, 1425–27; Zhao 22, 1427–30. His choice was entirely predictable; no one’s loyalty to his state was a sure thing when his lineage’s interests clashed with those of the ruler. In 552, the eminent Jin statesman Shu Xiang 叔向 barely escaped execution when the ruler learned of his brother’s affiliation with the rebellious Luan Ying 欒盈.
subordinate to the head of his lineage rather than to his father. Even if this assertion overreaches, there is no doubt that the lineage and not the individual family was the focus of loyalty among Chunqiu nobles. It was this internal cohesiveness that turned noble lineages into major political players during the Chunqiu period.

Second, the Chunqiu lineage was highly autonomous. As Lewis notes, it acted as a mini-state: it had its own well-defined territory, internal administration, military forces and ritual center. By the end of the Chunqiu period, most powerful lineages even maintained an autonomous system of foreign relations, invading weak polities or soliciting the support of foreign rulers while disregarding the interests of the lord of their own state. The notoriously limited ability of the overlords (zhuhou 諸侯) to impose their will on noble lineages within their domains resulted in a process of de facto disintegration in most Chunqiu polities.

All this had changed by the Warring States period. Lewis himself has written at length on the demise of powerful noble lineages in the wake of Warring States political, military, and administrative reforms. A gradual deterioration of the system of hereditary appointments and hereditary allotments undermined the power of most, if not all noble lineages. Deprived of their common landed property and unable to ensure the welfare for their members, these swiftly disintegrated. Even the prevalent Chunqiu pattern of common lineage dwellings was largely discontinued in the Zhanguo period. While certain details of the processes that led to the lineages’ disappearance are still obscure, and regional variations were considerable, the outcome is clear. Unruly and rebellious lineages, a major source of political instability during the Chunqiu period, disappear from the accounts of Zhanguo political life. Even ideas of filial piety in their Confucian interpretation, with their growing emphasis on parental

25. In the state of Lu, for instance, the Jisun 季孫 lineage orchestrated invasions of the tiny neighboring polity of Ju 莒, disregarding the international obligations of the Lu lords. In Jin, the Xi郤 lineage pursued a private land feud with the Zhou royal domain, which was nominally under Jin’s protection.
28. The reforms were conducted most sweepingly in the state of Qin 秦, where noble lineages disappeared so completely that even the term shi 氏 itself is absent from the Shuihudi 睡虎地 legal documents. This was not the case elsewhere. In the state of Chu 楚, for instance, certain noble lineages survived and retained considerable power well into the late Zhanguo period. For details, see Barry B. Blakeley, “King, Clan, and Courtier in Ancient Ch’u,” Asia Major, 2d. ser., 5.2 (1992), 1–39.
authority rather than on that of the head of the lineage, contributed to the weakening of the lineages.29

Lewis notes many of these developments, speaking of the “progressive destruction of the nobility and their large, autarkic households” (p. 86). Yet his misidentification of the Chunqiu lineages as “households” prevents him from assessing the truly revolutionary change that occurred in the nature of the elite kin groups in the Warring States period. The demise of the lineages meant not only a strengthening of the state and abolition of the independent societal power of the elite; it also meant a marked decrease in the importance of pedigree and an opening of new avenues of social advancement for individuals of elite and of common descent. The system by which social status reflected birth collapsed, creating favorable conditions for the development of the individual-oriented ideology highlighted by Lewis in Chapter 1.

Lewis’s understatement of changes in the composition and power of the elite during these periods is exemplified in his treatment of what he considers the “one practice [that] did preserve the extended household as a form of political power,” namely the employment of large numbers of retainers (“guests,” ke 客) by “political figures” (p. 82, emphasis in the original). Ostensibly this Warring States practice does resemble the keeping of “household servants” by Chunqiu nobles; but a careful analysis once again shows marked differences between those servants and the Zhanguo “guests.” The former were heavily dependent on their master. They were employed on a contractual basis, and provided that their contracts remained valid, they were supposed to serve the master until death. Even if the master rebelled against the lord of his state or was forced to go into exile, the retainers commonly followed him en masse, such unequivocal personal fidelity being considered both normative and laudable.30 This situation began to change by the end of the Chunqiu period. The stepped-up pace of inter- and intra-lineage struggles weakened the ties between the retainers and their masters. Not coincidentally, some nobles could no longer rely on contracts to ensure their retainers’ loyalty and resorted instead to the religiously significant ceremony of alliance (meng 盟) as a means of maintaining fidelity.31 These means seem

29. For the possible role of Confucius’s reinterpretation of the term xiao in weakening the authority of the lineage heads, see Pines, Foundations, 197–99.
31. Exemplary of meng between master and retainers are the early fifth-century B.C.E. Houma 侯馬 and Wenxian 溫縣 alliances. For the first, see Zhu Fenghan’s discussion in Shang Zhou jiazhu xingtai, 539; cf. Susan R. Weld, “The Covenant Texts at Houma and Wenxian,” in New Sources of Early Chinese History: An Introduction to Reading Inscriptions
also to have failed. Many Zhanguo stories about retainers emphasize the readiness with which they abandoned their masters and shifted their allegiance to other powerful figures. This fluidity in patron-client relations of the Warring States is yet another manifestation of the weakness of elite political power at that age. The retainers’ loyalty was personal rather than lineage-oriented; and once he was personally disgraced, the master was no longer a master.

Lewis abruptly ends his discussion of “Households as Political Units” with a depiction of commoners’ households during the Warring States period. As for the elite kinship groups, his summary is that “the shift from the Zhou city-states to the [Zhanguo] macrostates and then to the empire was based on the progressive destruction of the nobility and their large, autarkic households” (p. 86). This summary is doubtless correct, as long as “the empire” refers to the brief rule of the Qin dynasty. Indeed, the last century of the Warring States period and the Qin reign may in retrospect be recognized as an exceptional period in Chinese history, during which large kin groups played only a marginal social role, if any, and the state succeeded in absorbing the social elite. Lewis’s observation that “the great families of the Warring States were increasingly creatures of the government” (p. 86) is singularly important in this regard. Yet one wonders what happened to the elite “households” under the Han. Lewis does not address this issue in Chapter 2, leaving readers to be puzzled when, in Chapter 4 (pp. 215–29), they encounter the powerful elite lineages of the Later Han period. Lewis explains that “the important lineages” under the Han dynasty “were those who gained wealth through office holding, trade and the accumulation of land” (p. 220). This brief statement is doubtless correct, but it hardly suffices to depict the complex trajectory of the elite lineages’ resurrection during the Han dynasty.


32. Sima Qian 司馬遷 collected numerous anecdotes about Zhanguo binke in several biographies of Zhanguo personalities; see Sima Qian et al., Shi ji 史記, annotated by Zhang Shoujie 張守節, Sima Zhen 司馬貞 and Pei Yin 貝駰 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1997), 75.2351–78.2399. In one anecdote cited by Lewis, a retainer of Tian Wen 田文 (Lord Mengchang 孟嘗君, d. 279) put the matter plainly: “the rich and noble have many to serve them, while the poor and humble have few friends: this is invariably so.” Lewis (p. 84) focuses on one part of this equation: the inevitability with which “guests” gathered around a powerful personality. Yet no less important is the second half of the statement: the ease with which a patron could be abandoned.
Because the reappearance of the powerful autonomous elite during the Han reign is one of the most important developments in imperial China’s social history, its omission from The Construction of Space is truly regrettable. While a detailed discussion of the complex political, social and economic processes that brought about this resurrection would go beyond the scope of the current review,33 I would like to address a single issue that I believe should have been included in Lewis’s discussion, namely the issue of land property. The crucial importance of common land possession to the lineage’s survival is well known, and fluctuations in land ownership during the period under discussion had a direct impact on the existence of elite kinship groups.34 I believe that the appearance of private landownership and a market in land during the early Han was one of the most consequential developments in the social history of China in general and in the history of the kin groups in particular.

Many details of the evolution of private landownership in early China are still obscure due to the paucity and ambiguity of reliable data, but certain general trends are nonetheless clear. As mentioned above, during the Chunqiu period, the majority of arable lands and the peasants working these lands were hereditary possessions of the noble lineages, held as a kind of hereditary emolument by the head of the lineage. This system was discontinued in the Zhanguo period, as central authorities reasserted their supreme control over the reallocation of land and divided it among individual peasant households.35 These households accordingly became possessors of the land. But their rights with regard to the plots extended only to management and the reaping of harvests, and not to alienation. In other words, land could not be sold.36

33. For a comprehensive study of these processes, see Cui Xiangdong 崔向東, Han dai haozu yanjiu 漢代豪族研究 (Wuhan: Chongwen, 2003).
34. Ebrey and Watson judge that “strong corporate bases in shared assets, usually, but not exclusively, land” are the sine qua non of a lineage’s existence (see their “Introduction,” 5). It may be securely concluded that insofar as pre-imperial and early imperial China are concerned, land was the crucial common asset without which a lineage’s existence was not possible.
35. This development was certainly related to the introduction of iron technology in Warring States agriculture and the resulting possibility of developing previously barren lands, to which individual peasant households could be relocated under the direct jurisdiction of central authorities. For the revolutionary impact of iron technology in the Warring States, see Donald B. Wagner, Iron and Steel in Ancient China (Leiden: Brill, 1993).
36. I borrow the term “right of alienation” from Jean C. Oi, Rural China Takes Off: Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 18–19. For early landownership in China, see Li Chaoyuan 李朝遠, Xi Zhou tudi guanxi lun 西周土地關係論 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin, 1997), and especially Yuan...
from a single case mentioned in the Baoshan 包山 legal documents, our sources—both textual and epigraphic—are silent about the existence of land market before the Han dynasty, and it is highly likely that land was not a purchasable commodity at that time.\(^{37}\)

By the early Han, this situation had undergone a profound change. Although it is at present impossible to verify Yuan Lin’s 袁林 assertion that rights of land alienation were introduced during the short reign of the Qin dynasty,\(^{38}\) it is nonetheless clear that by the early Han dynasty, a vibrant land market had come into existence. This transformed the nature of the elite and its relations with the state. For the Warring States and Qin periods there is almost no evidence of rich landowners who were not creatures of the state: only the latter could allocate huge allotments to its servants, and it could also easily confiscate these allotments and transfer them to other owners.\(^{39}\) It is only under the early Han that a change in the situation becomes noticeable. Now that land could be bought and sold, swift accumulation of large plots ensued, creating a class of rich landowners. These landowners became the backbone of the local elite (haozu 豪族) that dominated the early Han sociopolitical landscape.

Under the lenient policy of the early Han emperors, the haozu gradually strengthened their economic and social power, becoming a new locus of autonomous societal authority. The Han taxation system, which benefited large landowners, as well as the temporary retreat of the state apparatus from such areas as salt and iron production, minting and trade, allowed the haozu to prosper and to solidify their position.\(^{40}\) Only during the reign of Han Wudi 漢武帝 (r. 141–87) were significant steps taken to reduce the power of the haozu and to reassert the socioeconomic leadership of the state. Yet Wudi adopted a double policy of oppressing and co-opting these new elites. Some of his policies, such as the introduction of state monopolies in salt and iron production, state intervention in trade, and increased taxation of the elite, served to reduce the economic power of

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Lin 袁林, Liang Zhou tudi zhidu xin lun 兩周土地制度新論 (Changchun: Dongbei shifan daxue, 2000).


39. For further details, see Liu Zehua 劉澤華, Zhongguo de Wangquan zhuyi 中國的王權主義 (Shanghai: Renmin, 2000), 20–25.

the haozu; and renewed activism among local administrators, especially
the so-called “cruel officials” (ku li 酷吏), diminished their social power.
On the other hand, the policy of co-opting the members of the local elite
through the system of recommendations and examinations eventually
created a more amicable pattern of relations between the government
and the haozu. By the end of the early Han, a pattern of partial conver-
gence between the local elite and the state apparatus became evident,
and by the late Han, this situation allowed the re-emergence of powerful
lineages whose social position was increasingly determined by pedigree.
The way was paved for the resurrection of the hereditary aristocracy, an
occurrence that came about shortly after the end of the Han dynasty.41

Lewis’s decision to de-emphasize the rupture between the Chunqiu
and Zhanguo periods on the one hand, and between the Qin and Han
periods on the other, is puzzling. After all, it was Lewis who in an earlier
publications presented cogent analyses of the decline of the Chunqiu
aristocracy, and it was he who insightfully noted the recrudescent aris-
tocratic mindset of the Han elite.42 In The Construction of Space, Lewis
had an opportunity to expand, clarify and substantiate these earlier
observations, but chose not to exercise it.

City-states and Chunqiu citizens

Chapter 3, “Cities and Capitals” is the chapter arranged most clearly along
chronological lines, its three sections focusing roughly on the Chunqiu,
Zhanguo and early imperial periods respectively. Among many insights
scattered throughout this chapter, one of the most thought-provoking
comes in the first section, “The World of the City-States,” where Lewis
applies a city-state definition to Chunqiu polities. This line of analysis
is a blessed shift away from the uncritical projection of Warring States
models on the preceding Chunqiu period. Lewis’s successful blending
of his own insights with earlier conclusions reached by Chinese and
Japanese scholars therefore effects a miniature breakthrough in Western
studies of Chunqiu history. Nonetheless, some of Lewis’s observations
and even the very applicability of the city-state model to Chunqiu history
require significant qualifications.

“The World of the City-States” is based on Lewis’s contribution to
the collected volume A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures.43

41. This discussion is based largely on Cui Xiangdong, Han dai haozu yanjiu,
130–47.
42. See Lewis, Writing and Authority, 351–60.
43. Mark Lewis, “The City-State in Spring-and-Autumn China,” in A Compara-
tive Study of Thirty City-State Cultures: An Investigation Conducted by the Copenhagen
The contributors to that volume were called upon “to search for all occurrences in world history of regions broken up into city-states and to make a comparative study of them all . . . to suggest a re-interpretation of the concept of city-state; and to advocate the introduction of a new concept . . . of city-state culture.” The project’s coordinator and editor of the volume, Mogens Herman Hansen, set guidelines for the contributors by outlining the parameters of the ideal type of a city-state in terms of its size, population, political identity, self-government and the like.

Lewis does not mention this background in The Construction of Space, but it may explain why Lewis does his best to show similarities between putative Chinese city-states and the Greek *poleis*, while repeatedly avoiding discussion of their intrinsic differences.

Possible similarities between Chunqiu polities and the Mediterranean city-states were noticed first by Miyazaki Ichisada 宮崎一定 back in the 1930s; since then many Chinese and Japanese scholars have addressed the topic. The discussion intensified in China in the early 1980s, likely for reasons related to the political implications of the comparison. Since the Greek *polis* and its peculiar culture are widely regarded as the breeding ground of liberty, democracy, and the ideals of citizenship, certain scholars assumed that identifying a similar social model in China would confirm the existence of indigenous Chinese roots for these concepts. This project accounts for some of the heated debates over the city-state paradigm that have taken place in Chinese scholarly circles. Lewis has refrained from addressing those debates, presenting his model as entirely unproblematic. By contrast, I shall elucidate the other side of

44. Mogens Herman Hansen, “Preface,” in *A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures*, 9.
45. See Mogens Herman Hansen, “Introduction: The Concept of City-State and City-State Culture,” in *A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures*, 11–34.
46. See Miyazaki, “Shina jōkaku no kigen isetsu” 支那城郭の起源異説, *Rekishi to chiri* 歴史と地理 32.3 (1933): 187–203. Other studies are mentioned by Lewis; see 373–74n11.
48. The most painstaking attempt to deny the applicability of the city-state model to the Chinese case is that of Zhao Boxiong 趙伯雄, *Zhou dai guojia xingtai yanjiu* 周代國家形態研究 (Changsha: Hunan jiaoyu, 1990). See also Lü Shaogang 呂紹鋼, “Zhongguo...
the controversy and shall use Lewis’s theses to show the limits in the applicability of the city-state model to Chunqiu cases.

Lewis enumerates several features of the Chunqiu polities that place them within the category of the city-states and distinguishes them from earlier and later forms of political organization, such as the early Zhou “theocratic monarchy” and the territorially integrated Warring State. Crucial among those distinctive traits are the size of the polity and its form of political organization. With regard to the first, Lewis notes that most Chunqiu polities were relatively small, comprising a single capital city and its rural hinterland. This observation is doubtless correct with regard to numerous tiny statelets, but can we adopt it for larger polities, such as Jin, Qi, Chu, or Qin? To allow inclusion of those polities within the “city-state” discussion, Lewis suggests treating them as “congeries of semi-independent city-states” (p. 141). The reason for this identification is that internal allotments of the leading nobles were highly autonomous entities, with their courts, military forces and independent economic bases.

Lewis is certainly right to point out the low degree of centralization in most Chunqiu states and the high degree of autonomy within their internal allotments or cai yi, territories granted by Chunqiu rulers to their meritorious servants. Yet his identification of large Chunqiu polities as “congeries of semi-independent city-states” is misleading. First, internal allotments were not necessarily similar to “city-states”: some of them were fairly centralized administrative units, more akin to future districts (xian) of the Warring States than to the Greek poleis. Second, while the cai yi was indeed highly independent of the political center, its autonomy did not automatically turn it into a city-state. For the latter, insofar as its “classical” Hellenistic form is concerned, the idea of autonomy was intrinsic; even in de facto dependence on external powers, the Greek poleis vehemently tried to preserve the nominal appearance of autonomy; in the twelfth through fourteenth centuries this issue re-emerged as a crucial one during the struggle between the newly autonomous Italian city-states and the Holy Roman Empire.
Chunqiu case, allotments did not enjoy de jure autonomy; theoretically they remained part of the larger polity and were alienable at the will of the overlord. Their de facto autonomy was a by-product of political disintegration and of the overlords’ weaknesses in most Chunqiu states; full independence, as in the case of the component parts of the state of Jin, likewise resulted from weakness at the center. But decentralization was never legitimated. Hence, although at times large Chunqiu polities, most specifically Jin, were fairly decentralized, the mindset of their political actors was markedly different from that of Hellenistic or later northern Italian leagues of city-states. Not coincidentally, such ideas as autonomia or libertas, strongly associated with European city-state culture, never came into existence in the Chinese case.

Lewis’ eagerness to find parallels between ancient Greece and Chunqiu China is evident also in his discussion of internal political life of the Chunqiu polities, especially when he tries to create a notion of “citizens” for Chunqiu capital dwellers (guoren 国人). Lewis correctly identifies this stratum as exceptionally politically active; and he also helpfully points out that in aristocratic Chunqiu society the gap between the ruler and the ruled was much smaller than in later Chinese polities, allowing more participatory modes of government than prevailed in later periods. Yet the correctness of these arguments notwithstanding, I believe that the equation of the guoren to the Greek polites remains problematic.

To understand the exceptional role of capital dwellers in the Chunqiu polities, we should address first the problem of systemic crisis in these polities. By the second half of the Chunqiu period, most overlords were overshadowed by their nominal aides, the heads of hereditary ministerial lineages, who because of the economic and military might of their allotments could treat the ruler as no more than primus inter pares. Soon enough, most states were engulfed in a complex web of power struggles between the overlords and their ministers or among ministerial lineages themselves. In this unstable situation, commoners and minor nobles (shi 士) from among the capital dwellers emerged as power brokers. Their very proximity to the loci of power made them indispensable in domestic struggles, especially during street fighting, which put the chariot-riding nobility at a disadvantage in confrontations with infantrymen from among the capital dwellers. Capital dwellers figured prominently not

only in small and medium-sized states such as Lu, Zheng 鄭 and Song 宋, but even in larger states as Qi and Chu, where they could occasionally influence the outcome of internal conflicts.

The involvement of the guoren in internal struggles and the military importance they took on as the main forces of the lord’s armies gave them extraordinary political leverage, which duly reflected in numerous Zuo zhuan anecdotes and registered by Lewis. But did this leverage make them citizens? Lewis’ affirmative answer is based on two distinctive Chunqiu phenomena: popular assemblies and the occasional swearing of blood covenants (meng) between the rulers or the high nobles and the capital dwellers. Lewis recognizes that “the assembly of the citizens was not a regular institution” (p. 144), but immediately asserts “the great frequency of their occurrence and the key role played by the citizens in times of crisis” (p. 145). Elsewhere he argues that “much of the citizenry also sometimes assembled at the court, in major squares, or in the market. . . . In all these sites both the day-to-day business of politics and major crises could be discussed and dealt with by either small groups of interested individuals or by the assembled citizenry” (pp. 146–47).

Lewis’s observations are correct, but his conclusions strike me as exaggerated. The “great frequency” of popular assemblies refers to only seven instances in the more than two-and-a-half centuries that the Zuo zhuan and Guoyu 國語 narratives encompass. A close analysis of each of these cases shows that the assemblies convened and covenants with capital-dwellers were sworn only at times of major and exceptional crises.52 While the memories of these assemblies were powerful enough to be incorporated into the idealized picture of government constructed by the Zhou li 周禮 authors, there is no evidence to support the conclusion that “the day-to-day business of politics” was run by the “citizenry.”53

Not only were the assemblies exceptional, but the very layout of Chun-

52. These assemblies/covenants are the following: in the state of Jin, after its defeat by Qin and the capture of its lord (Zuo, Xi 15, 360); in the state of Wei 衛 after its humiliated ruler decided to turn against the state’s powerful patron, Jin (Zuo, Ding 8, 1567); twice in the state of Zheng after prolonged and bloody internal strife (Zuo, Cheng 13, 867; Xiang 30, 1176); twice in the case of coups: in Qi (Zuo, Xiang 25, 1099) and Lu (Zuo, Ding 6, 1559); and once in the case of a proposed capital relocation in the state of Chen 陳 (Zuo, Ai 1, 1607).

53. For the Zhou li depiction of the assemblies, see Zhou li zhushu 周禮注疏, annotated by Zheng Xuan 鄭玄 and Jia Gongyan 賈公呀, in Shisanjing zhushu, 35.873 (“Xiao sikou” 小司寇). Yet in the Zhou li, the process of consulting the “myriad people” is degraded to the status of a minor bureaucratic procedure, maintained by a petty official; it therefore lacks the dramatic dimensions that characterized popular assemblies in the Zuo zhuan and becomes just another ritualized performance, far removed from actual policy making. See further discussion in Pines, Envisioning Empire, Chapter 9.
qiui cities was not conducive to their occurrence. *Pace* Lewis, the cities evidently lacked public squares of a type similar to the Athenian *agora* or the Roman forum; at least none of these squares appears in relevant archeological reports of which I am aware. In the rare instances in which we know of the locations of the assemblies, they were held either near the temple of the dynastic founder or at the altars of soil, outside the city walls.  

These locations themselves suggest that the capital dwellers did not regularly take part in everyday political processes. Nor do they appear to have sought increased political participation; while numerous speeches in the *Zuo zhuan* call for improvements in the living conditions of the populace, no speaker ever raises the issue of regular consultation with “the people.” It was up to political leaders to grasp the people’s opinion, but there was no demand—not in the Chunqiu, not in later periods—to institutionalize popular political input. The capital dwellers of the Chunqiu state were not Greek citizens. Their political activities—much like the French *Fronde* of the mid-seventeenth century—were symptoms of political crisis, not a solution to it. This explains why “popular assemblies” of the Chunqiu period did not give rise to participatory modes of policy-making in later periods.

The desire to equate Chinese and Greek experience at times leads Lewis to make somewhat odd statements. Thus, he identifies Guan Zhong 管仲 (d. 645) of Qi and Zichan 子産 (d. 522) of Zheng as two examples of “tyrants”: members of the “citizenry” supposedly drawn into the government to increase mobilization of the population. He considers Guan Zhong a commoner, “supposedly of merchant origin,” and a reform-maker; Zichan is identified as “a low noble.” Both statements are incorrect. Guan Zhong was surely not a commoner but a ranked noble; the story of his low origins was invented in the Warring States period when meritocratic ideas prompted identification of many past

54. See *Zuo*, Cheng 13, 867, Xiang 30, 1176, and Xiang 25, 1099, for covenants sworn at the “Grand Temple”; and *Zuo*, Ding 6, 1559 for a covenant at the altars of soil. The location of ancestral temples in the Zhou cities was not uniform. In Qin’s capital, Yongcheng 雍城, compound no. 1 at Majiazhuang 马家庄, which was identified as an ancestral temple, is located within the city walls; while at the Lu capital, Qufu 曲阜, the possible ancestral temple at Wuyuntai 舞雩台 was located 1750 m south of the city wall. Lewis opines that on one occasion the “ceremony of cursing those who violated covenants was held at a major square in the [Lu] capital” (pp. 147–48). Actually, the ceremony was held at a location named Wufu zhi Qu 五父之衢. The mid-seventh century C.E. *Kuodi zhi* 括地志 identifies this location as a street within the Lu capital (see Li Tai 李泰, *Kuodi zhi ji jiao* 括地志輯校, compiled by He Cijun 賀次君 [Beijing: Zhonghua, 2005], 3.119); but this is incorrect: the location was surely outside the Lu walls, since the rebellious Yang Hu 楊虎 camped there after he fled the Lu capital (*Zuo*, Ding 8, 1569; see also Yang Bojun’s gloss in *Zuo*, Xiang 11, 987).
paragons as self-made men. Nor are there any major reforms that can be attributed to him. Zuo zhuan references to Guan Zhong stress his role as an architect of Qi international success but have nothing to say about domestic reforms; legends of Guan Zhong as reformer and as promulgator of specific systems of social control are definitely of Warring States origin. There is no reason to consider Guan Zhong a representative of “citizens,” i.e., commoners, participating in the government.

As for Zichan, his identification as a “low noble” who owed his career to “the support of citizenry” (pp. 145–46) is truly puzzling. Zichan was a grandson of the illustrious Lord Mu of Zheng 郑穆公 (r. 627–606), and son of Ziguo 子國, the Zheng minister of war (simu 司馬), who was assassinated in 563. Zichan therefore belonged to the highest segment of hereditary aristocracy. His power derived exclusively from his pedigree, since in the state of Zheng descendants of Lord Mu rotated high positions among themselves throughout most of the sixth century. Zichan indeed paid due attention to the needs of the commoners (who were exceptionally active in the state of Zheng, plagued as it was by inter-lineage feuds), but his major source of worry was his fellow nobles, with whom he tried to maintain a delicate balance of power. I think that Lewis’s assertion that Zichan’s career “followed the classic pattern of tyrant who cultivated popular support to secure power, but then relied on increasing the state’s wealth and military force to maintain it” (p. 146) is far-fetched. Neither Zichan nor Guan Zhong can be convincingly identified as a sort of Chinese Peisistratos (the Athenian tyrant, ca. 607–528). Rather, they were skilled nobles engaged in the classical aristocratic policy-making of their age, and their successes and failures had little to do with public opinion of the lower strata.

The above critical observations do not undermine the validity of Lewis’s “city-state” model, but they do make necessary some modifications in it. To apply this model creatively, Lewis would have had to set aside the desire to discuss Chunqiu polities in terms borrowed from the history of Greek poleis. Chunqiu political patterns share commonalities with Greek city-states, as they do with medieval European polities; but to

55. According to Wei Zhao (韋昭, 204–273 C.E.), Guan Zhong came from the royal Ji 姬 clan; his father is identified as Guan Yanzhong 管嚴仲; see Guoyu jijie 国語集解, compiled by Xu Yuangao 徐元誥 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 2002), 216 ("Qi yu" 齊語 6.1). For different versions of Guan Zhong’s low origins, see, e.g., Yang Bojun 楊伯峻, Mengzi yizhu 孟子譯注 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1992), 298 (“Gaozi xia” 12.15); Shi ji 62.2131–32.
57. For details, see Zhu Fenghan, Shang Zhou jiazu xingtai 上周家族形態, 580–82.
58. For further details, see Pines, “The Search for Stability: Late Ch’un-ch’iu Thinkers,” Asia Major, 3rd series, 10 (1997), 31–42.
become fruitful, the comparison should highlight not only commonalities but also variables. This second step is left incomplete in the “City-states” section of The Construction of Space. It may be hoped, nonetheless, that future research will result in the creation of a novel theory of city-states, one which will be truly universal and not beholden to the Mediterranean perspective. Only a development of this kind stands to re-legitimize the use of comparative methods in studies of political history. Such a revalidation was surely not Lewis’s aim in The Construction of Space, and one cannot finally fault the author for failing to achieve a goal he never set for himself.

Regionalism and Regional Identities

The fourth chapter of The Construction of Space deals with one of the most intriguing issues in the early history of the Chinese empire: that of regionalism and its potential challenges to the imperial center. In the first two sections, Lewis analyzes rejections of regionalism from the Warring States to the early Han period. Thinkers of that age associated regional affiliations with the lowly local customs (su俗), which were morally and intellectually inferior both to the all-encompassing abilities of the true sages and, mutatis mutandis, to the imperial order. Lewis then shows in the next sections how new forms of regionalism appeared under the Han dynasty, bolstered by newly established local frameworks of powerful lineages; he shows, too, how this resurrected regionalism gained partial legitimacy through the proliferation of local cults and through literary writings that celebrated regional identities in the Later Han and afterwards. It seems that in the final account regional affinities were too powerful to be suppressed entirely and were instead successfully tamed by the empire-builders, losing their subversive political potential.

Lewis’s analysis is convincing throughout the chapter, but it leaves unanswered a few intriguing questions. In particular, one may wonder why the Warring States thinkers invariably opposed regionalism. While in the unified empire adopting an anti-regional stance could have been a matter of political expediency, this should not have been the case in the pre-imperial age, particularly if Lewis is right in equating pre-imperial “regions” with each of the Warring States. Why then, at the heyday of the age of division, did not a single known thinker endorse regional identity

59. Another important precondition for an improved comparative framework would be more systematic incorporation of archeological data into the city-state theory; for interesting advances in this direction, see The Archaeology of City-States: Cross-Cultural Approaches, ed. Deborah L. Nichols and Thomas H. Charlton (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997).
and try to legitimate it? Why did nothing similar to the pro-regional discourse of the Later Han appear prior to imperial unification?60

To answer these questions, I would like temporarily to shift the discussion from its narrow focus on attitudes toward regionalism to the more substantial question of the meaning of regionalism in the Warring States world and the issue of the educated elites’ cultural identities. This issue is not addressed in *The Construction of Space* even though it has become increasingly important in studies of early China since Chinese archeology’s shift to a “regionalist paradigm” and the subsequent adoption of the latter in Chinese historical research.61 Yet unless we understand what “regionalism” meant for a Chu or Qin intellectual, we cannot truly assess the reasons for the ultimate rejection of the regional identity in favor of a universal and imperial identity.

Despite—or, very possibly, because of—the rapid proliferation of studies of regional cultures and identities in pre-imperial China, there is still no scholarly consensus about what exactly constitutes a “regional culture”; nor is it clear to what extent the cultural and political boundaries of pre-imperial entities overlapped. As a working hypothesis for further discussion, I would like to suggest that the Zhou ritual culture served as the core of cultural identity in the “Chinese” world. Archeological and textual data indicate that, starting in the middle of the Western Zhou, elites in the core areas of the future Warring States, including the major “peripheral” superpowers, Qin and Chu, shared numerous common cultural traits. Common rituals, burial practices, a spoken language (the so-called “refined language,” *yayan* 雅言) and possibly also a shared

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60. The single possible exception to this observation may be the *Chu ci* 楚辭 anthology, with its obvious Chu flavor. For the complexity of the formation of their collection and its place within the Chu-oriented discourse of the Han dynasty, see Gopal Sukhu, “Monkeys, Shamans, Emperors and Poets: The *Chuci* and Images of Chu during the Han Dynasty,” in *Defining Chu: Image and Reality in Ancient China*, ed. Constance A. Cook and John S. Major (Honolulu, University of Hawai‘i Press, 2004), 145–66. Significantly, however, not a single manuscript from the Chu tombs yields anything that may be defined as clearly pronounced pro-Chu sentiments.

knowledge of quasi-canonical texts, such as early versions of the Shi 詩 and Shu 書 collections: all reinforced the cultural cohesiveness of the Zhou aristocrats, distinguishing them both from alien ethno-cultural groups and from the uncouth commoners of their own states. Despite the political weakness of the Zhou center after the eighth century B.C.E., this common ritual culture continued to expand, absorbing elite members of the ethnic groups on the fringes of the Zhou world, for example, in the Lower Yangzi basin and among groups of Rong 戎 and Di 狄. Evidently, the Zhou aristocratic culture, which created a general veneer of shared cultural norms, was identified as a mainstream cultural standard within most of the territories that would eventually form the Qin empire; and it is against this mainstream that local identities were reasserted.62

While the cultural uniformity of the aristocratic elite throughout the Zhou world is confirmed both archeologically and textually, much less is known about the almost invisible lower strata. In all likelihood, since most commoners did not participate in the aristocratic ritual culture, they remained to a significant degree culturally heterogeneous, preserving their own spoken languages and religious beliefs.63 This heterogeneity was likely especially marked among the subjugated population of the “peripheral” (and probably also some of the “core”) Zhou polities, the so-called “people of the wilderness” (yeren 野人), among whom much indigenous custom may have been preserved intact despite centuries of political dominance by the Zhou elite.64


63. The cultural gap between the refined Zhou elite and the commoners was large enough to elicit numerous pejorative references to “uncouth” commoners and “uncivilized” aliens, both of whom were at times equated with beasts and birds. See Pines, “Beasts or Humans,” 63–69.

64. Falkenhausen (Chinese Society, 169–200) assesses the case of the Shang population subjected to Zhou control; his analysis suggests a gradual waning of cultural differences between the two groups. What I am interested in, however, is the lower segments of local populations, including the “outsiders” of lineage culture, whose mortuary practices are largely untraceable in the extant record (Chinese Society, 160).
With the demise of the hereditary aristocracy and the elevation of some members of the lower strata into officialdom, the cultural unity of the Zhou world was deeply disrupted. Because the newcomers were less versed in Zhou aristocratic culture, they inevitably brought increasing cultural heterogeneity to the upper strata of the Warring States world. In addition, a certain shift away from Central Plains culture is observable in some of the major polities of the time, specifically Qin and Chu. Motivated either by a desire to reassert themselves against the Zhou center, or by a need to incorporate newly conquered peripheral populations, or possibly even by a desire to create a new sense of cultural cohesiveness within a single state and thereby to increase the loyalty of peasant conscripts, the elites of these states began adopting new forms of cultural expression. By the middle to late Warring States period, this estrangement of the Qin and Chu from the core Zhou states was duly reflected in a new “barbarian” image of local elites as seen from the perspective of some of their Central States peers. The earlier cultural unity of the Zhou world was fading in the face of increasing cultural and political cohesiveness in each of its component states.  

The overall complexity and diversity of cultural processes within the Warring States world notwithstanding, for the purposes of the present discussion it is particularly important to focus on the correlation between social and cultural changes during that period. The influx of imperfectly educated commoners into officialdom may have caused indignation among their educated peers. It was perhaps no coincidence that the latter applied the pejorative term “custom” both to regional habits and to the behavior of the lower social strata, as Lewis shrewdly notes. Regionalism meant cultural backwardness.

Lewis’s insights may be supported by a further analysis of the usage of the term “custom” in the texts of the Warring States. The word su 俗 is conspicuously absent from the texts that deal with the aristocratic society, such as the Zuo zhuan and the Lun yu, but its usage increases in direct proportion to the increasing influx of commoners into officialdom. In

For a brief analysis of these yeren, see Tang and Zang, Zhou Qin shehui jiegou, 52–53; for their eventual convergence with the guoren, see pp. 167–72.

the core chapters of the *Mozi* 墨子, the term *su*  is mentioned only twice, and from its very inception it is identified as a negative characteristic of uncivilized behavior. The term becomes fairly common starting in the late fourth century B.C.E.: it appears in six passages of the *Mengzi*, in eleven of the *Shang jun shu* 商君書, in 31 of the *Zhuangzi* (of which only two are from the “Inner Chapters”), in 59 of the *Xunzi* 荀子, in 18 of the *Han Feizi* 韓非子, and in 39 of the *Lüshi chunqiu*. Parallel to this rising interest in the existence of “customs,” one discerns an increasingly negative view of their social role. Competing thinkers therefore invariably advocated “reforming” (gai 改), “unifying” (yi 一 or tong 同), “beautifying” (mei 美), “altering” (yi 移 or yi 易), “changing” (bian 變 or hua 化) or “correcting” (zheng 正) diverse customs; following (cong 從) customs was permissible only as an ad hoc and temporary measure. Lewis’s observation on the negative connotations of the term *su* (“vulgar”) complete the picture.

This analysis suggests that the rejection of local customs and of regionalism in general by members of the educated elite derived from both cultural and social factors. Those members of the *shi* stratum who are most visible in extant textual sources were strongly attached to the Zhou legacy, especially to its textual and, to a lesser degree, its ritual aspects. These proud bearers of the common cultural tradition were appalled by the advancement of “uneducated” commoners into the state apparatus. Not coincidentally, as Lewis observes (pp. 192 ff.), the most radical rejection of “customs” comes from the *Ru* 儒 (“Confucian”) texts, the authors of which considered themselves true guardians of the glorious Zhou past. Yet both the *Ru* and their intellectual rivals might have regarded lowly newcomers who lacked a proper understanding of the “universal” Zhou culture as unwelcome competitors for power.

Beyond the prejudices of culture and class, the rejection of regional identities by the educated elite members may also have reflected distinct career patterns within the upper echelons of the elite. As is well known,
Warring States ministers, generals and thinkers routinely left their states in search of better employment, rarely confining their careers to a single polity. The existence of a global market for talent— to which, as Han Feizi keenly observed, ministers brought their ability “to exhaust their force to the point of death” in exchange for ranks and emoluments— discouraged intellectuals from upholding the interests of any single state. On the contrary, their proclaimed goal was to achieve the unity of “All under Heaven” (tianxia 天下) as the only means of ensuring universal peace and tranquility. Since they were among the foremost proponents of the abolition of the multi-state system, these thinkers may have found it awkward to adopt the cultural identity of a single state.

The combination of ideological, cultural, social and careerist factors explains the distinctly anti-regionalist position advocated by Warring States intellectuals. This in turn may explain why centrifugal forces in the Zhou world were ultimately checked and local cultural affiliations did not develop into politically meaningful identities. While some rulers may have wanted to strengthen the cultural cohesiveness of their subjects (for example, by promulgating ritual innovations and introducing a unified script, as was done in the state of Qin), and while local upstarts in some states may have preferred preserving indigenous identity to acquiring an alien, Zhou, affiliation, these trends had only a limited influence on the

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69. “A minister brings to the rulers’ market [his ability] to exhaust his force to the point of death; a ruler brings to the ministers’ market [his ability] to bestow ranks and emoluments. Ruler-minister relations are based not on the intimacy of father and child, but on calculation [of benefits]” 臣盡死力以與君市; 君垂爵祿以與臣市; 君臣之際, 非父子之親也, 計數之所出也. Wang Xianshen 王先慎, Han Feizi jijie 韓非子集解 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1998), 36.352 (“Nan yi” 難一).

70. For Warring States thinkers’ unequivocal support for the unification of All under Heaven and the abolition of the competing states, see Pines, “‘The One that pervades All’ in Ancient Chinese Political Thought: Origins of ‘The Great Unity’ Paradigm,” T’oung Pao 86.4–5 (2000), 280–324; for the career patterns of Zhanguo thinkers, see Pines, “Friends or Foes: Changing Concepts of Ruler-Minister Relations and the Notion of Loyalty in Pre-Imperial China,” Monumenta Serica 50 (2002), 35–74.

71. For sweeping changes in Qin mortuary practices in the aftermath of the so-called “Shang Yang reforms” (358–338), see Shelach and Pines, “Power, Identity and Ideology,” 212–16; for Qin’s imposition of uniform script on newly conquered territories, see Chen Zhaorong 陳昭容, “Qin ‘Shu tong wenzi’ xintan” 秦「書同文字」新探, Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan 68.3 (1997), 589–641, especially 605–12. For the attempts of Qin local officials to impose uniform customs on the subject Chu population, see Yu shu 語書, in Shuihudi Qin mu zhujian 睡虎地秦墓竹簡, ed. Shuihudi Qin mu zhujian zhengli xiaozu 睡虎地秦墓竹簡整理小組, 2nd ed. (Beijing: Wenwu, 2001), 13–16 and Lewis’s discussion in The Construction of Space, 205–6. For archeological reflections on the complexity of cultural interactions in the newly conquered Chu territories, see Wang Xianfu 王先福, “Xiangyang Qin mu zhujian” 襄陽秦墓初探, Kaogu yu wenwu zengkan: Xian Qin kaogu 考古與文物增刊: 先秦考古 (2004), 219–25.
cultural dynamics of the Warring States. Lacking intellectuals’ blessing, regional identities remained illegitimate, and they evaporated soon after imperial unification, becoming a source of ethnographic curiosity rather than of political concern.

If my analysis is correct, then the contribution of pre-imperial intellectuals to the formation of the Chinese empire becomes truly exceptional: in addition to their well-known role as architects for the ideological foundations of the imperial unification and creators of its bureaucratic blueprint, intellectually active shi of the Warring States also became promoters of the imperial order by de-legitimizing local identities. Lewis excels in depicting the latter function of these intellectuals, and had he chosen to pay greater attention to the complex story of the interplay between centrifugal and centripetal forces in the Chinese world on the eve of the imperial unification, his contribution might have been even more significant.

Concluding remarks

Given its polemical character, my review may be somewhat unfair to Lewis. Not only have I inevitably focused on weaker parts of The Construction of Space at the expense of many stronger portions, I have also frequently faulted the author for things he has not done rather than for the things he has actually written. Clearly, of two possible readings of The Construction of Space, I opted for the second one, treating it as a potential textbook rather than as a focused analysis of Chinese spatial perceptions. In doing so, however, I tried not only to do justice to the magnitude of Lewis’s enterprise, but also to call attention to certain basic weaknesses in the field of early China studies in the West, weaknesses that were thrown into focus by Lewis.

More than forty years have passed since the publication of Hsu Cho-yun’s seminal Ancient China in Transition (Stanford, 1965). During these decades, a series of remarkable archeological discoveries have brought about profound changes in our understanding of imperial China’s formative age. These findings are duly reflected in dozens of monographs and thousands of articles published in Chinese and Japanese; but they have heretofore had only a marginal impact on Anglophone Sinology. Only a very few attempts have been made to move from in-depth analysis of specific discoveries and of selected phenomena toward systematic discussion of long-term sociopolitical, economical and administrative developments in the pre-imperial age. Studies of early China continue to be dominated by the narrowly defined field of intellectual history, primarily analyses of the philosophical aspects of certain transmitted
and recently discovered texts, while other topics remain woefully under-represented. A survey of Paul Goldin’s indispensable “Ancient Chinese Civilization: Bibliography of Materials in Western Languages,” suffices to show the enormous gap between the research interests of Western and Asian specialists in early China’s history.

This perspective sheds a new light on Mark Lewis’s long-term efforts to reinterpret some of the basic sociopolitical developments from the Chunqiu through Han periods. In his three major monographs—Sanctioned Violence in Early China, Writing and Authority and The Construction of Space in Early China—Lewis has tried to combine his novel analyses of contemporary intellectual and cultural dynamics with systematic coverage of many of the heretofore largely neglected topics in the sociopolitical history of that age. Predictably, not all of these attempts are equally convincing—and perhaps inevitably so in a field where any major discovery can still require significant modification of previous views. Yet Lewis’s audacity and persistence have benefited the field enormously. Lewis has not only introduced a great variety of Sino-Japanese studies to graduate and undergraduate students, but, more importantly, has contributed decisively toward the expansion of our research horizons. By his very ability to rouse controversy, Lewis encourages his colleagues, myself included, to tackle foundational issues in the history of early China. It is Lewis’s overall research approach, and not only his specific research results, that make this book and his earlier studies most laudable contributions to our field.

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